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Makhan Singh v. State Of Haryana .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 27-07-1994, police officers on patrol intercepted a fitter-rehra (a vehicle) driven by the appellant, Makhan Singh, after noticing suspicious bags inside. In the presence of two villagers—Manjeet Singh (PW-1) and Gamdur Singh (later DW-2)—the police recovered three bags containing 120 kg of poppy husk, drew samples, sealed the contraband and filed a charge-sheet under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
During trial before the Sessions Court, PW-1 turned hostile and DW-2 supported the defence. Relying mainly on two official witnesses (PW-2 H.C. Suraj Mal and PW-6 Inspector Raghbir Singh), the Sessions Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹1,00,000. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed the conviction on 10-12-2007. The appellant then filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant had possession or control over the vehicle (fitter-rehra) carrying the contraband.
- Whether the courts below were justified in relying exclusively on official witnesses after independent witnesses had turned hostile.
- Whether compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act was required when the search was of a vehicle rather than the appellant’s person.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The prosecution case rested solely on official witnesses; independent witnesses did not support the recovery.
- The appellant was falsely implicated and taken from his house before being shown as arrested at the spot.
- Alleged non-compliance with mandatory provisions of Sections 50 and 52 of the NDPS Act vitiated the recovery.
Respondent State's Arguments
- Section 50 was duly complied with, and the concurrent findings of conviction should not be disturbed.
- The testimony of PW-2 and PW-6 was unimpeachable and sufficient to sustain conviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 (Constitution Bench) | Section 50 confers an indefeasible right to be searched before a Magistrate or gazetted officer when personal search is conducted. | Reiterated that Section 50 applies only to personal search; it does not govern searches of vehicles or baggage. |
| State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350 | Articles like bags or briefcases are not part of a person’s body; hence Section 50 is inapplicable to their search. | Relied upon to hold that searching the fitter-rehra did not attract Section 50 obligations. |
| Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 475 | Affirmed the principle that Section 50 is confined to personal search. | Cited to reinforce the conclusion that Section 50 compliance was unnecessary in the present facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the manner of recovery and found several deficiencies:
- Lack of nexus to the vehicle: The prosecution produced no independent evidence to establish that the fitter-rehra belonged to or was possessed by the appellant. Ownership or possession was a foundational fact the State failed to prove.
- Value of independent witnesses: Both PW-1 and DW-2 consistently stated that the appellant was taken from his home and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers. The High Court’s rejection of their testimony was considered speculative.
- Over-reliance on official witnesses: Although a conviction can rest on official witnesses alone, their evidence must inspire confidence. Here, PW-2 admitted that no signature or thumb impression of the appellant was taken on the recovery memo, undermining the reliability of the seizure.
- Misplaced focus on Section 50: Because the search involved a vehicle, not the appellant’s person, Section 50 was irrelevant. Compliance with Section 50 therefore could not salvage the prosecution case.
- Principle of strict proof: Given the severe penalties under Section 15, the burden on the prosecution is correspondingly heavy. The deficiencies in proof created reasonable doubt that had to be resolved in favour of the accused.
Holding and Implications
HELD: Conviction and sentence set aside; appeal allowed.
The fine of ₹1,00,000, if already paid, is to be refunded, and the appellant is to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.
Implications: The decision underscores that compliance with Section 50 is confined to personal searches and that the prosecution must independently prove an accused’s connection to a vehicle or container from which contraband is seized. While no new legal doctrine is created, the judgment reinforces the stringent evidentiary standards applicable in NDPS prosecutions.
R. Banumathi, J.— Delay condoned. Leave granted. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 10-12-2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No. 777-SB of 1996, decided on 10-12-2007 (P&H), whereby the High Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “the NDPS Act”) and also the sentence of imprisonment of ten years along with a fine of Rs 1,00,000 imposed on the appellant.
2. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is that on 27-7-1994, the police officials during patrolling, when talking with one Manjeet Singh, PW 1 and Gamdur Singh, DW 2, saw the suspicious fitter-rehra (a vehicle) driven by the appellant. The police intercepted the vehicle and questioned the appellant about his whereabouts, and found some dubious bags lying in the vehicle. Before searching the bags, the police intimated to the appellant that instead of being searched by police whether he wishes to be searched by a gazetted officer or a Magistrate and the appellant declined to be searched by them and a consent memo (Ext. PA) was drawn. Then, the police in the presence of independent witnesses i.e Manjeet Singh and Gamdur Singh, conducted the search and during the search, three bags containing commercial quantity of poppy husk (120 kg) were recovered from the appellant's vehicle. Police seized the bags, took sample of 200 gm from each of the bags and sealed them separately, and then sealed the remaining quantity in separate parcels and deposited the same with MHC. The sealed samples were sent to the chemical examiner, who vide his report (Ext. PK) found the samples to be “powdered poppy husk”. On completion of investigation, the police laid the charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.
3. The prosecution, to prove their case, examined as many as six witnesses. Out of two independent witnesses in the case, Manjeet Singh, PW 1 turned hostile and Gamdur Singh was won over by the defence and had been examined as defence witness DW 2. The defence examined one more witness viz. Jaswant Singh, DW 1.
4. The Sessions Court, after considering the evidence held that the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and thereby convicted the appellant under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs 1,00,000 and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. The appellant, being aggrieved, filed the appeal challenging the conviction and sentence of imprisonment before the High Court. The High Court held that the evidence of PW 6, Inspector Raghbir Singh and PW 2, H.C Suraj Mal is unimpeachable and vide the impugned judgment dated 10-12-2007 Criminal Appeal No. 777-SB of 1996, decided on 10-12-2007 (P&H) confirmed the conviction of the appellant and dismissed the appeal.
5. Challenging his conviction, the appellant has approached this Court with a contention that he has been falsely implicated in the case and that he was brought from his house and was put behind the bars.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the case of the prosecution is based solely on the testimony of official witnesses PW 2 and PW 6 and much weightage ought not to have been attached to their testimony, especially by discarding the testimony of both the defence witnesses. It was submitted that since both the independent witnesses did not support the prosecution story, the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and this material aspect has been ignored by the courts below. The appellant also alleges that non-compliance with mandatory provisions under Sections 50 and 52 of the NDPS Act vitiates the alleged recovery of contraband.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent State has supported the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 777-SB of 1996, decided on 10-12-2007 (P&H) and submitted that the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act has been duly complied with and the concurrent findings of the courts below recording the verdict of conviction cannot be interfered with.
8. During the trial, PW 1 Manjeet Singh was declared hostile by the prosecution and another independent witness Gamdur Singh was examined as defence witness. Both PW 1 and DW 2 have deposed that the appellant was not arrested in their presence nor was any recovery made from him. PW 1 and DW 2 have further deposed that when they went to police station for some work, they saw the appellant already in custody of police and that their signatures were obtained on the blank papers. In his cross-examination, though DW 2 has admitted that Ext. PB bears his signature at Point ‘A’, he disowned his statement in Ext. PL recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Though PW 1 turned hostile, his evidence cannot be discarded as his testimony draws support from the version of DW 1 and DW 2.
9. The High Court discarded the evidence of PW 1 and DW 2 observing that the independent witnesses hail from the same village to which the accused belongs and the accused might have approached the witnesses through respectables of the village to resile from his statement. That apart, the High Court also observed that both the independent witnesses did not explain the circumstances or compulsions in which they had to sign the blank papers. The reasoning of the High Court is based more on assumptions than on acceptable basis. When PW 1 and DW 2 have asserted that they have signed only the blank papers, the courts below ought to have considered them in proper perspective.
10. For recording the conviction, the Sessions Court as well as the High Court mainly relied on the testimony of official witnesses who made the recovery i.e H.C Suraj Mal, PW 2 and Inspector Raghbir Singh, PW 6, and found them sufficiently strengthening the recovery of the possession from the appellant. In our considered view, the manner in which the alleged recovery has been made does not inspire confidence and undue credence has been given to the testimony of official witnesses, who are generally interested in securing the conviction. In peculiar circumstances of the case, it may not be possible to find out independent witnesses at all places at all times. Independent witnesses who live in the same village or nearby villages of the accused are at times afraid to come and depose in favour of the prosecution. Though it is well settled that a conviction can be based solely on the testimony of official witnesses, condition precedent is that the evidence of such official witnesses must inspire confidence. In the present case, it is not as if independent witnesses were not available. Independent witness PW 1 and another independent witness examined as DW 2 have spoken in one voice that the accused person was taken from his residence. In such circumstances, in our view, the High Court ought not to have overlooked the testimony of independent witnesses, especially when it casts doubt on the recovery and the genuineness of the prosecution version.
11. It is to be pointed out that the prosecution misdirected itself by unnecessarily focusing on Section 50 of the NDPS Act, when the fact is that the recovery has been made not from the person of the appellant but from the fitter-rehra which was allegedly driven by the appellant and, thus, Section 50 of the NDPS Act had no application at all. The prosecution ought to have endeavoured to prove whether the appellant had some nexus with the seized fitter-rehra. Though the police has seized the fitter-rehra (Ext. PB), the prosecution has not adduced any evidence either by examining the neighbours or others to bring home the point that the appellant was the owner or possessor of the vehicle. PW 6 admitted in his cross-examination that signature or thumb impression of the appellant was not obtained on the recovery memo (Ext. PB). In our opinion, the courts below erred in attributing to the appellant the onus to prove that wherefrom fitter-rehra had come, especially when ownership/possession of fitter-rehra has not been proved by the prosecution.
12. Jaswant Singh, who is a Sarpanch of the village and was examined as DW 1, has supported the defence version that the appellant was taken away by the police from his home and he was falsely implicated. When the defence has taken the specific stand that the appellant was taken from his house by the police and that stand has been corroborated by the testimony of DW 1, the prosecution ought to have adduced cogent evidence that the alleged fitter-rehra on which the appellant was alleged to be carrying 120 kg of poppy husk belongs to the appellant. Failure to adduce the evidence connecting the appellant with the fitter-rehra that the ownership/possession of fitter-rehra with the appellant is fatal to the prosecution case, benefit of which ought to have been given to the accused.
13. Both the Sessions Court and the High Court concurrently held that the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act have been duly complied with. The Sessions Court observed that it is not necessary that in each and every case the accused should be produced before the gazetted officer or the Magistrate and if the accused so desires, then only he is to be produced before either of them. In Ext. PA-1, the investigating officer used the word “Nyayadish” instead of “Magistrate” does not mean that the investigating officer meant something else.
14. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 , 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080, while dealing with the scope of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, had emphasised upon the aspect of availability of right of an accused to have “personal search” conducted before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate and held as under:
“32. … The protection provided in the section to an accused to be intimated that he has the right to have his personal search conducted before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if he so requires, is sacrosanct and indefeasible—it cannot be disregarded by the prosecution except at its own peril.
33. The question whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50 were observed would have, however, to be determined by the court on the basis of the evidence led at the trial and the finding on that issue, one way or the other, would be relevant for recording an order of conviction or acquittal. Without giving an opportunity to the prosecution to establish at the trial that the provisions of Section 50, and particularly, the safeguards provided in that section were complied with, it would not be advisable to cut short a criminal trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act will come into play only in the case of personal search of the accused and not of some baggage like a bag, article or container, etc. which the accused may be carrying ought to be searched. In State of H.P v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350 , 2005 SCC (Cri) 943 this Court in para 11 has held as under:
“11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word ‘person’ occurring in Section 50 of the Act.”
The same view was reiterated in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746 , (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 475.
16. In the present case, since the vehicle was searched and the contraband was seized from the vehicle, compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not required. In the absence of independent evidence connecting the appellant with the fitter-rehra, mere compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act by itself would not be sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant. It is a well-settled principle of the criminal jurisprudence that more stringent the punishment, the more heavy is the burden upon the prosecution to prove the offence. When the independent witnesses, PW 1 and DW 2 have not supported the prosecution case and the recovery of the contraband has not been satisfactorily proved, the conviction of the appellant under Section 15 of the NDPS Act cannot be sustained.
17. Section 15 provides for punishment for contravention in relation to poppy straw. The maximum punishment provided in the section is imprisonment of twenty years and a fine of two lakh rupees and minimum sentence of imprisonment of ten years and a fine of one lakh rupees. Since in the cases of the NDPS Act the punishment is severe, therefore, strict proof is required for proving the search, seizure and the recovery.
18. The conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed on him is set aside and this appeal is allowed. Fine amount of Rs 1,00,000, if paid, is ordered to be refunded to the appellant. The appellant is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case.
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