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Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate (Accused 1), was named in Crime No. 3446 of 2010 registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bund Garden Police Station, Maharashtra, under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). The first respondent (de facto complainant) alleged in a written complaint dated 22-11-2010 that he had been asked to pay a bribe of Rs 75,000 for issuance of a non-agricultural certificate necessary for obtaining a petrol-pump dealership. A trap was organised: on 23-11-2010 clerk Suhas Ramesh Soma (Accused 2) was caught accepting the tainted money after an earlier verification exercise in which the conversation between the complainant and Accused 1 was clandestinely recorded.
Upon completion of investigation, the officer submitted a closure report under Section 173(2) CrPC (mis-labelled as Section 169). The Director General, ACB, concluded that no prosecutable evidence existed against Accused 1, though departmental action was proposed; sanction was sought only against Accused 2. On 15-01-2012, after issuing notice to the complainant, the Magistrate accepted the closure report and discharged the appellant.
The complainant filed Criminal Revision Application No. 361 of 2012 in the Bombay High Court. By judgment dated 07-08-2013 the High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order, rejected the closure report, and directed the Director General of Police to forward papers for sanction to prosecute the appellant. The appellant thereupon challenged the High Court’s decision before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction has judicially accepted a closure report under Section 173(2) CrPC, the High Court can, in revision, set aside that order merely because another view is possible.
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of revisional powers, can direct the investigating agency to seek sanction for prosecution from the competent authority.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The appellant has enjoyed an unblemished service record since 1995 and has been falsely implicated merely to tarnish his reputation.
- The Director General, ACB, acting on the legal advice of a retired Special Judge, correctly concluded that no case exists against the appellant.
- The Magistrate examined the entire record and exercised a proper judicial discretion; the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by substituting its own view.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The High Court was justified in re-examining the material because at the cognizance stage only a prima facie basis for proceeding is required, not proof of guilt.
- The recorded conversation of 22-11-2010 prima facie discloses a demand by the appellant, warranting prosecution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vasanti Dubey v. State of M.P., (2012) 2 SCC 731 | Scope of court’s power to discard closure reports and proceed under CrPC | Magistrate had relied on it; Supreme Court noted High Court’s reference was misplaced in facts of present case. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain, (2013) 8 SCC 119 | Parameters governing sanction for prosecution | Quoted by High Court; Supreme Court did not find it altered outcome regarding sanction direction. |
| Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492 | Meaning of “cognizance” and Magistrate’s duties when taking cognizance | Used to explain when a Magistrate may proceed after investigation. |
| Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 5 SCC 424 | Stage at which sufficiency of grounds, not sufficiency of evidence for conviction, is tested | Cited to underscore limited inquiry at cognizance stage. |
| Nagawwa v. Veeranna S. Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736 | Discretion of Magistrate in issuing process; limited revisional interference | Relied upon to hold that High Court should not substitute its discretion for that of Magistrate unless order is perverse. |
| Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 | Admissibility of electronic evidence – requirement of source and authenticity | Court held recorded conversation inadmissible because it was inaudible and not forensically authenticated. |
| Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 | Summoning an accused is a serious step; criminal process must not be misused | Quoted to stress that prosecution without material is impermissible. |
| State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 | Court’s power to prevent abuse where material does not link accused to crime | Used to justify quashing further proceedings against appellant. |
| State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 | Unwarranted prosecution violates Article 21 | Cited to emphasise constitutional dimension of protecting individuals from baseless trials. |
| Mansukhlal V. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 | No court can compel grant of sanction; sanction must not be ordered for vexatious prosecution | Authority for holding that High Court’s direction to seek sanction was beyond jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by clarifying that references to Section 169 CrPC in the record actually pertain to Section 173, as the report was a final report after investigation. It reiterated that at the cognizance stage the Magistrate must only assess whether sufficient grounds to proceed exist, not whether a conviction is likely.
The Magistrate had scrutinised the entire file, found no evidence of demand or acceptance by the appellant, noted the recorded conversation was inaudible and thus scientifically un-verifiable, and concluded prosecution would be futile. The Court held that the High Court’s revisional power is limited: unless the Magistrate’s order is perverse, based on no material, or displays gross mis-reading, substitution of views is impermissible. None of these infirmities existed.
Emphasising principles from Nagawwa, Videocon, and Muniswamy, the Court observed that allowing prosecution where material is lacking amounts to harassment and infringes Article 21. It further held—relying on Mansukhlal Chauhan—that a court cannot direct an investigating agency to obtain sanction when the prosecuting authority itself finds no case.
Consequently, the High Court’s directions were characterised as an overreach lacking legal basis, because the “crux” of the prosecution—the recorded conversation—was inadmissible; with that foundation gone, the case against the appellant collapsed.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; THE HIGH COURT’S ORDER DATED 07-08-2013 IS SET ASIDE.
Resultantly, the Magistrate’s acceptance of the closure report and discharge of the appellant stand restored. The decision bars further prosecution of the appellant on the present material, and reiterates that revisional courts must respect a Magistrate’s reasoned acceptance of a closure report unless it is demonstrably perverse. No new legal precedent was created; the judgment reinforces settled limits on revisional interference and on judicial directions concerning sanction for prosecution.
Kurian Joseph, J.— Leave granted. The appellant is Accused 1 in CR No. 3446 of 2010 of Bund Garden Police Station in the State of Maharashtra. The case is registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act”).
2. Genesis is Annexure P-7 complaint dated 22-11-2010 given by the first respondent. According to him, he had to pay an amount of Rs 75,000 by way of bribe for getting a certificate for non-agricultural use of his land. To quote from the complaint:
“On 5-10-2009 an advertisement of ‘Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., Pune’ appeared in daily Lokmat and Loksatta newspapers. The advertisement was for giving dealership of petrol pump. I had duly applied to the company Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. for the same. As per the procedure my interview was arranged on 30-3-2010. I was selected for this work. As per the terms and conditions of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., Pune it was binding on me to submit a ‘non-agricultural certificate’ of my land at Pimpalsuti, Tal Shirur, District Pune. To get the said certificate I applied to the Maval Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Pune on 9-9-2010. After the application I fulfilled all the documents required as per their demand.
After this, today on date 22-11-2010 at 11.20 a.m I went to the office of Maval Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Pune for enquiring about the non-agricultural certificate which I had not received till then. That time I met the clerk Shri Suhas Soma. He asked me to meet clerk Shri Langde. When I personally met Shri Langde he asked me to meet Shri Sanjaysinh Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer, Maval. As per that I met Shri Sanjaysinh Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer, Maval personally in his office. At that time he asked me the reason as to why I require the non-agricultural land certificate. I told him the reason of petrol pump and also told him the area of land. After that he asked me to meet the clerk Suhas Soma. After I went out of his office, he called his clerk Suhas Soma in his cabin. After Shri Soma came out of the cabin he asked me, ‘At what extent are you ready to pay?’ At that time I asked him ‘What will be the amount of challan?’ That time he said that the challan amount is meagre, an additional amount of Rs 1,00,000 will have to be paid as practice. If your matter was for house then I would have requested the boss for less amount. But as you are going to do business you should not have any objection to pay Rs 1,00,000. At that time I requested the Office Superintendent Mr Soma that ‘this amount is huge, some concession be given to me’. On that a compromise was made between me and him and he demanded an amount of Rs 75,000 as a bribe.”
3. On the basis of the above complaint, the vigilance arranged a trap. The first information report narrates the events as follows:
“As the complaint filed by the complainant Mr Dattatray Phalke is of a crime which comes under the Anti-Corruption Act and as we are authorised to take cognizance of such crime on the basis of the complaint filed by Mr Phalke by deciding to arrange for a trap for arresting Mr Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sub-Division Maval, Pune and Mr Soma, Office Superintendent (Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Office, Maval, Pune while taking bribe from the complainant Mr Phalke and for that purpose by giving a written letter to the Hon'ble Medical Superintendent, Regional Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune from their office, the services of (1) Dr Amol Ranganath Jadhav, aged 25 years, Occupation Service, Medical Officer, Regional Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune 6, residing at C 43, B.J Medical College Hostel, Near Collector Office, Pune 48, (2) Dr Sham Bandu Badse, aged 55 years, Occupation Service, Medical Officer, Regional Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune 6, residing at Sunderban Sadan, Nandanwan, Lohagon, Pune 48, got available as the panch witnesses. The complainant and the panch witnesses were introduced to each other. The complaint filed by the complainant was briefly stated to the panchas. Accordingly, we gave the complaint filed by the complainant for reading to panch witnesses and after getting assured that the same is correct, they signed below it. Thereafter, it was unanimously decided to verify the complaint filed by the complainant Mr Phalke in connection with the bribe demanded by the Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sub-Division Maval, Pune Mr Sanjaysinh Chavan and Office Superintendent (Shirastedar).
Thereafter on 22-11-2010 at 1630 hours, myself, complainant Mr Phalke, aforesaid two panchas, Police Inspector Mr B.R Patil, Police Inspector Shri Belsare from the office of Anti-Corruption Bureau came walking via Sadhu Waswani Chowk and went to New Administration Building, Pune 1. At that time, we started voice recorder from our custody and suppressed (sic hid) it and its mike below the shirt of the complainant and started the recording button of the same. Thereafter as per our instructions, firstly complainant Mr Phalke and Panch No. 1 Mr Jadhav went to the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sub-Division Maval, Pune which is in New Administration Building. Immediately behind them, myself, Panch No. 2 Mr Bedase and police officer and employees stood separately around the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval Sub-Division, Pune so that no doubt will be created on anyone. After half an hour from the said place, complainant Shri Phalke and Panch No. 1 Mr Jadhav came out. Thereafter, we all came back from there to the Pune Office of Anti-Corruption Bureau. After coming back to the said office, we took out the recording machine placed upon the complainant Shri Phalke and closed its button of recording and heard along with the panchas the conversation which took place among complainant Mr Phalke, public servant Mr Chavan and Mr Soma and it revealed that the public servant Mr Chavan and Mr Soma have demanded a bribe of Rs 75,000 from the complainant Mr Phalke. With the consent of myself, panchas and the complainant, it was decided to take further action on 23-11-2010. Accordingly, the complainant and the aforesaid panchas were instructed to remain present in the office of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune on 23-11-2010 at 10 o'clock in the morning.
On 23-11-2010 at 10 o'clock in the morning the aforesaid panchas, complainant Mr Phalke appeared in the Pune Office of Anti-Corruption Bureau. Thereafter, the list of all the valuable things which were with the complainant Mr Phalke, was made. The complainant and panch witnesses were informed about the anthracene powder and ultraviolet light and its demonstration was also shown. Anthracene powder was applied to all the notes of amount Rs 75,000 presented by the complainant for giving it as bribe and the said notes were folded and kept in the right side pocket of the complainant's pants. Mr S.K Satpute, Police/614, who applied anthracene powder to the notes and who showed demonstration were eliminated from the action of trap. The detailed instructions were given to the panch witnesses, the complainant and other officers/staff from team of trap regarding the action of trap. Accordingly, a detailed pre-trap panchnama was drawn in our office. The trap was arranged on 23-11-2010 at the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval, Pune, Sub-Division 1 in the New Administration Building when at about 12.02 o'clock afternoon in the presence of Panch No. 1 Mr Jadhav, the public servant Mr Suhas Ramesh Soma, aged 46 years, Office Superintendent (Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Office, Maval, Sub-Division, Pune, demanded the amount of bribe from the complainant Mr Phalke and personally opened Drawer 2 which is on the right hand side of his table and asked the complainant Mr Phalke to keep the amount in it. Accordingly, as the complainant Mr Phalke kept the said amount in the said drawer the public servant Mr Soma was caught red-handed. When the documents/papers which came in contact of the bribe amount were examined in the lamp of ultraviolet light, then the faint bluish shine of anthracene powder was seen upon it. The numbers of notes from bribe amount were compared with the numbers of notes mentioned in the pre-trap panchnama. It was seen that they are absolutely accurate with all the numbers of notes mentioned in the pre-trap panchnama. As the said amount of bribe is the same amount which public servant Mr Soma received from the complainant Mr Phalke and as the shining of anthracene powder was seen on it, the same was seized and sealed in the presence of the panchas. All the conversations regarding demand of bribe amount between the complainant Mr Phalke, public servant Shri Chavan and Soma were recorded and it was heard in the presence of panchas and its script was prepared and its mention has been made in the panchnama. Likewise, when an enquiry was made with Panch No. 1 Mr Jadhav he told that public servant Mr Soma personally said that he has received the said amount of bribe as per the instructions of Mr Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, aged 44 years, Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval Sub-Division, Pune. A detailed panchnama of all the incidents which took place at the time of trap was drawn in the presence of the panchas and the copy of the same was given to the public servant Shri Sanjaysinh Chavan and Suhas Soma and their signatures were obtained.”
4. The investigating officer submitted his report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) though wrongly mentioned as Section 169 CrPC. To quote from the closure report:
“From the overall investigation of the said crime and from documents and evidence received, for filing case under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as per the provisions in Confidential Circular No. CDR/1099.Pra.Kra. 62/99/11-A dated 3-4-2000 of the Maharashtra Government, General Administration, against the accused public servant herein (1) Shri Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval Sub-Division, District Pune; (2) Shri Suhas Ramesh Soma, Awal Karkoon (Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Officer Office, Maval Sub-Division, Pune, when report was submitted by the then Investigating Officer Shri P.B Dhanvat, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune vide Outward No. PBG/ACP/DSP/ACB/Pune/2011-283 dated 21-2-2011 to the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra State, Mumbai through the Deputy Commissioner of Police/Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune for writing to the Competent Officer, Maharashtra Government (Revenue and Forests) Mantralaya, Mumbai, of APS for obtaining pre-prosecution approval/sanction as required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police/Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune has vide his Outward No. CR/438.Pune/2010-1591 dated 20-5-2011 sent such report to the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, M.S Mumbai, after scrutinising the investigation documents of the crime, the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra State, Mumbai has issued orders vide his Order No. CR/438.Pune/2010-4812 dated 3-6-2011 that ‘since there is no evidence available to the extent of filing charge-sheet against APS Shri Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Maval, District Pune in the said trap case, decision is taken not to file charge-sheet against him and by taking legal action against him, for preparing and sending proposal of departmental inquiry to the Competent Officer and since evidence is available against APS Shri Suhas Ramesh Soma, Awal Karkoon (Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Officer Office, Maval, District Pune, orders are issued for submitting pre-prosecution sanction proposal to his competent officer for filing prosecution in the competent court against him. The said orders are received vide Order No. CR/438.Pune/2010-1846 dated 9-6-2011 of the Deputy Commissioner of Police/Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune and xerox copy of the abovementioned order is submitted herewith for perusal.
Therefore, if approved, it is requested to acquit accused public servant Shri Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Maval Sub-Division, Pune (Class 1) from the said offence as per Section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code.”
5. The learned Magistrate on 15-1-2012, after notice also to the de facto complainant, accepted the closure report. To quote the relevant portion from the order:
“7. … Record shows that the complainant lodged a report. If complaint is perused, it appears that role of Accused 1 is to the effect that on 22-11-2010 when the complainant met Accused 1, he inquired about the purpose for which N.A certificate was required and he asked the complainant to meet Accused 2. The complaint shows the demand of money and acceptance was made by Accused 2. Accused 1 has a filed bunch of papers consisting of his representation for false implication, so also other relevant papers. He has placed on record the application for N.A certificate filed by the complainant's wife, then all correspondence between the complainant and office of Accused 1 to show that the application of the complainant's wife was under process. Besides this, Accused 1 has also filed copy of his leave application showing that he was on medical leave for six days from 15-11-2010 to 20-11-2010 with permission to suffix Sunday falling on 21-11-2010. The applicant has filed the tickets to show that he travelled during this period. The applicant has also placed on record a news item published in the daily Lokmat on 24-11-2010 (sic) in which it is mentioned that when the amount of Rs 75,000 was accepted, Accused 1 was not in his office and it was accepted by Accused 2 Suhas Soma.
8. It is to be considered that the Anti-Corruption Bureau has filed papers and given reasons why decision not to proceed against Accused 1 was taken. If these papers are perused, it appears that the Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau has considered the relevant papers and after considering all aspects, passed a well-reasoned order. It is also mentioned that the vague conversation between the complainant and Accused 1 recorded at the time of the so-called verification will not help the prosecution and there is absolutely no evidence of demand and acceptance against Accused 1. It cannot be said that the Director General of Anti-Corruption Bureau did not apply his mind to the documents before him. When the order was passed giving reason and, as it is a speaking order, it cannot be said that the direction given by the Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau for submitting report under Section 169 CrPC is bad in law.
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12. I am well aware that in view of the judgment in Vasanti Dubey v. State of M.P (2012) 2 SCC 731 , (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1007 , (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 654, the Court can discard closure report and may proceed under Section 190 read with Section 156 CrPC or it may take cognizance upon the complaint and direct inquiry under Section 202 CrPC. However, after going through the case papers, it is found that the authority under the Anti-Corruption Bureau has come to the correct conclusion that there is no sufficient ground to proceed against Accused 1. As a result of this, I accept the report under Section 169 CrPC.
The proceedings against Accused 1 are closed and Accused 1 is discharged.”
6. Dissatisfied, the first respondent, the de facto complainant, approached the High Court in revision leading to the impugned judgment Criminal Revision Application No. 361 of 2012, decided on 7-8-2013 (Bom). The High Court set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and directed the Director General of Police to forward the request for sanction for prosecution to the competent authority. The trial court was also directed to follow the legal course in the matter. To quote paras 4 and 10 to 15 of the impugned judgment Criminal Revision Application No. 361 of 2012, decided on 7-8-2013 (Bom):
“4. The crux of the matter is, the conversation between the complainant applicant and Accused 1 on 22-11-2010 was recorded by the applicant as was directed by the investigating agency, which clearly prima facie reveals demand by Respondent 1-accused.
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10. The Legal Advisor presumably has legal knowledge and could not adversely comment on supplementary statement of the complainant recorded during the trap, as the supplementary statement is signed by the panch witness. He could have, prima facie, indicated his legal knowledge in proper frame which is lacking. He has no business at the end of the report to write that case against Accused 2 is weak, as this report could be flashed, used and raised as a defence by the concerned in the prosecution. Such unwanted effort will frustrate and fracture the prosecution.
11. Affidavit of Shri Hemant V. Bhat though supports the respondent-accused, however, he should have also equally gone through the papers, he had no reason to accept the doubtful findings of CFSL in respect of recorded conversation between the complainant and Respondent 1-accused. He has given reference to the Manual. There should not be contest to the Manual, however, it has been twisted for the benefits of Respondent 1-accused.
12. The learned Special Judge, basically travelled through the report or the opinion of the advocate which was not expected. He was swayed away himself by accepting the defences. He should have gone through the root of the matter and applied his mind. There should not be dearth of legal thought. He could have seen brazen attempt of a colourable exercise of power by a mighty officer, but the learned Special Judge missed the track.
13. Reference to the judgment of Vasanti Dubey v. State of M.P (2012) 2 SCC 731 , (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1007 , (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 654, was certainly misplaced. In the said case the Judge dealing with the matter was frustrated by the persistent negative report furnished by the police. However, on appreciation of material, the Supreme Court recorded, already there were findings of Lokayukta of a particular State of no material against the said accused. The learned Judge should not have ignored this aspect.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain (2013) 8 SCC 119 , (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 515 , (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 85 decided on 28-5-2013 also indicated about the parameters concerning sanction.
15. In the result, the order of the learned Special Judge, accepting the report under Section 169 CrPC is set aside. The report under Section 169 CrPC is rejected. The learned Special Judge or the investigator to follow the legal course in the matter. The learned DGP to forward case papers to appropriate sanctioning authority to pass orders in accordance with law. The observations are prima facie in nature.”
7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant has unblemished service since 1995 and he has been falsely implicated in this case so as to tarnish his image and spoil his career. The legal advisor in the Anti-Corruption Bureau was a retired Judge of the special court for trying offences under the PC Act, and on his legal advice only, the Director General of Police came to the conclusion that there was no ground for proceeding against the appellant. It is further submitted that the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, after going through the entire records and having taken an informed decision not to proceed against the appellant, the High Court is not justified in setting aside the said order merely because another view is also possible. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submit that the High Court in revision was fully justified in looking into the merits of the case and directing to proceed against the appellant. Whether there is evidence so as to ultimately enter conviction is not what is required to be seen at the time of taking cognizance; what is required is only to see whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the case.
8. At the outset, we make it clear that wherever the reference is made by the investigating officer or the courts to Section 169 CrPC, the same has to be read as a reference to Section 173 CrPC. Section 169 CrPC provides for the release of the accused when evidence is deficient, whereas the report on completion of investigation is under Section 173 CrPC. For easy reference, we may quote the relevant provision:
“169. Release of accused when evidence deficient.—If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, and to try the accused or commit him for trial.”
What is submitted by the investigating officer on 5-7-2011 is in fact a report on completion of investigation under Section 173 CrPC.
9. Two questions arise for consideration:
9.1 (i) Once the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, on proper application of mind, decides to accept the closure report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) CrPC, whether the High Court is justified in setting aside the same in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely because another view may be possible?
9.2 (ii) Whether the High Court is within its jurisdiction to direct the investigating officer to make a request for sanction for prosecution from the competent authority?
10. At the stage of taking cognizance of a case what is to be seen is whether there is sufficient ground for taking judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiate further proceedings. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492 , (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471 this Court has analysed the process and it has been held as follows:
“19. The expression ‘cognizance’ has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means ‘become aware of’ and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes ‘to take notice of judicially’. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. ‘Taking cognizance’ does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.”
11. The above view has been further endorsed in Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 5 SCC 424 , (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 872 holding that:
“11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492 , (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471 the expression ‘cognizance’ was explained by this Court as ‘it merely means “become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone’. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.”
12. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736 , 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 the extent to which the Magistrate can go at the stage of taking cognizance has been discussed. To quote:
“5. … It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused.”
13. Cognizance is a process where the court takes judicial notice of an offence so as to initiate proceedings in respect of the alleged violation of law. The offence is investigated by the police. No doubt, the court is not bound by the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) CrPC. If the report is that no case is made out, the Magistrate is still free, nay, bound, if a case according to him is made out, to reject the report and take cognizance. It is also open to him to order further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.
14. In the case before us, the learned Magistrate went through the entire records of the case, not limiting to the report filed by the police and has passed a reasoned order holding that it is not a fit case to take cognizance for the purpose of issuing process to the appellant. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.
15. The whole purpose of taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC is to commence proceedings under Chapter XVI CrPC by issuing process under Section 204 CrPC to the accused involved in the case. No doubt, it is not innocence but involvement that is material at this stage. Once the legal requirements to constitute the alleged offence qua one of the accused are lacking, there is no point in taking cognizance and proceeding further as against him.
16. It is to be noted that in the first complaint filed by the second respondent, the de facto complainant, there is no allegation for any demand for bribe by the appellant. The allegation of demand is specifically against Accused 2 only. That allegation against the appellant is raised only subsequently. Be that as it may, the only basis for supporting the allegation is the conversation that is said to be recorded by the voice recorder. The Directorate of Forensic Science Laboratories, State of Maharashtra vide Annexure B Report has stated that the conversation is not in audible condition and, hence, the same is not considered for spectrographic analysis. The learned counsel for the respondents submit that the conversation has been translated and the same has been verified by the panch witnesses. Admittedly, the panch witnesses have not heard the conversation, since they were not present in the room. As the voice recorder is itself not subjected to analysis, there is no point in placing reliance on the translated version. Without source, there is no authenticity for the translation. Source and authenticity are the two key factors for an electronic evidence, as held by this Court in Anvar P.V v. P.K Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 , (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 , (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 , (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108.
17. The Magistrate, having seen the records and having heard the parties, has come to the conclusion that no offence is made out against the appellant under the provisions of the PC Act so as to prosecute him. Even according to the High Court, “the crux of the matter is the conversation between the complainant and Accused 1 of 22-11-2010”. That conversation is inaudible and the same is not to be taken in evidence. Therefore, once the “crux” goes, the superstructure also falls, lacking in legs. Hence, prosecution becomes a futile exercise as the materials available do not show that an offence is made out as against the appellant. This part, unfortunately, the High Court missed.
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course.”
(Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 , 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400, para 28.) The process of the criminal court shall not be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment.
Once it is found that there is no material on record to connect an accused with the crime, there is no meaning in prosecuting him. It would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit such proceedings to continue against such a person.
(See State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 , 1977 SCC (Cri) 404)
18. Unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an infringement of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
“60. … Article 21 assures every person right to life and personal liberty. The word personal liberty is of the widest amplitude covering variety of rights which goes to constitute personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation shall be only as per procedure prescribed in the Code and the Evidence Act conformable to the mandate of the Supreme law, the Constitution.”
(State of Bihar v. P.P Sharma 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 , 1992 SCC (Civ) 192)
19. Once the prosecution is of the view that no case is made out so as to prosecute an accused, unless the court finds otherwise, there is no point in making a request for sanction for prosecution. If the prosecution is simply vexatious, sanction for the prosecution is not to be granted. That is one of the main considerations to be borne in mind by the competent authority while considering whether the sanction is to be granted or not. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622 , 1997 SCC (Cri) 1120 , 1997 SCC (L&S) 1784, this Court has in unmistakable terms made it clear that no court can issue a positive direction to an authority to give sanction for prosecution. To quote:
“32. By issuing a direction to the Secretary to grant sanction, the High Court closed all other alternatives to the Secretary and compelled him to proceed only in one direction and to act only in one way, namely, to sanction the prosecution of the appellant. The Secretary was not allowed to consider whether it would be feasible to prosecute the appellant; whether the complaint of Harshadrai of illegal gratification which was sought to be supported by ‘trap’ was false and whether the prosecution would be vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge of the Government that the firm had been blacklisted once and there was demand for some amount to be paid to the Government by the firm in connection with this contract. The discretion not to sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by the High Court.”
20. The High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in substituting its views and that too without any legal basis. The impugned order Criminal Revision Application No. 361 of 2012, decided on 7-8-2013 (Bom) is hence set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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