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K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 14, 2015
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was appointed as a driver in the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) on 3-9-1985. On 3-9-1990, articles of charge were issued alleging that he had secured employment by producing a false transfer certificate. An enquiry commenced on 15-7-1992 and culminated in the Enquiry Officer’s report dated 13-3-2002 finding the appellant guilty. After a show-cause notice, the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellant from service on 1-10-2004.

Challenging the dismissal, the appellant raised Industrial Dispute No. 39 of 2005 before the III Additional Labour Court, Bangalore. By award dated 14-2-2007, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement with continuity of service, denied back wages, and substituted the penalty with withholding of four annual increments. The Labour Court relied on exhibits showing that other employees guilty of similar misconduct had received only minor penalties.

BMTC filed a writ petition. On 31-1-2008, a Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed the petition, holding that dismissal was proportionate. The appellant’s writ appeal (W.A. No. 390 of 2008) was dismissed by a Division Bench on 3-9-2012. The present appeal by special leave challenges that Division Bench judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in interfering, under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, with the Labour Court’s discretionary modification of penalty under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  2. Whether the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate in view of (a) an unexplained 12-year delay in concluding the enquiry and (b) parity with other employees who committed similar misconduct but received minor penalties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The 12-year delay in completing the disciplinary enquiry is unexplained and renders the proceedings unfair.
  • Other employees who produced bogus certificates were merely subjected to minor penalties; imposing dismissal on the appellant is discriminatory and excessively harsh.

Respondent Corporation’s Arguments

  • The finding of guilt is based on proper appreciation of evidence; the gravity of securing employment through fraud justifies dismissal.
  • The Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the disciplinary authority’s penalty; the Single Judge and Division Bench rightly restored the original punishment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Karnataka SRTC v. N. Ramachandra (KAR, 8-8-2005) Employees guilty of producing false certificates were reinstated with minor penalties. Used by the Labour Court, and accepted by the Supreme Court, to show discriminatory treatment of the appellant.
Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan (2007) 9 SCC 86 A person who obtained employment by fraud cannot seek equitable relief on the ground of delay. Relied on by the Single Judge to justify dismissal; the Supreme Court noted but did not adopt this view.
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 Limits of the High Court’s certiorari jurisdiction; writ court cannot act as an appellate court on facts. Quoted to emphasise that the High Court should not re-appreciate evidence when exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. (2014) 6 SCC 434 High Court under Article 227 cannot re-appraise evidence unless there is a serious error of law. Cited to demonstrate that the High Court exceeded its limited supervisory role in overturning the Labour Court’s award.
Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 Interference under Article 227 must be sparing; High Court cannot act as a court of appeal. Reinforced the proposition that the Division Bench should not have substituted its view for that of the Labour Court.
Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corp. (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146 Industrial statutes are social-welfare legislation and must be interpreted to protect workers’ rights. Used to underscore the pro-employee interpretative approach the High Court was expected to adopt.
State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 Concept of social and economic justice underpins labour jurisprudence. Cited illustratively in Harjinder Singh; supports the overarching welfare perspective.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted an unexplained 12-year delay between the framing of charges (1990) and submission of the enquiry report (2002), and a further two-year delay before dismissal (2004). During this entire period the appellant continued to work, reaching 45 years of age by the time of termination, making alternative employment improbable.

Exts. W-5 to W-11 showed that other employees guilty of the same misconduct were reinstated with only minor penalties. The Court held that, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court correctly exercised its discretion to reduce the penalty, taking into account delay, age, and parity.

Reviewing the High Court’s role under Articles 226/227, the Court relied on Syed Yakoob, Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar, and Shalini Shyam Shetty to reiterate that supervisory jurisdiction is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors or patent perversity, not re-appreciating evidence or substituting penalties. The award of the Labour Court was well-reasoned and free from fundamental flaws; therefore, the High Court’s interference was unwarranted.

The Court emphasised that labour laws are social-welfare legislation (Harjinder Singh) and must be interpreted to advance the goals of justice and worker protection.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED – The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment dated 3-9-2012 is set aside and the Labour Court’s award directing reinstatement with stoppage of four increments (and no back wages) is restored. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision re-affirms the limited scope of High Court interference under Articles 226/227 with industrial adjudications, underscores proportionality in disciplinary penalties, and highlights parity among similarly situated employees. It does not establish new legal doctrine but reinforces existing principles protecting workmen from disproportionate punishment.

Show all summary ...

R. Banumathi, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment dated 3-9-2012 Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR) passed by the High Court of Karnataka, in and by which, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant workman thereby, confirming the termination of the appellant.

2. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as under: the appellant was appointed on the post of driver in Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation on 3-9-1985 and was working on the same post since then. The appellant was served with article of charge dated 3-9-1990 alleging that he had secured appointment by producing a false transfer certificate. An enquiry was initiated on 15-7-1992 and the appellant submitted his explanation to the aforesaid charges. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 13-3-2002 holding the appellant guilty for his misconduct. After affording opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the proposed punishment, the disciplinary authority passed the order imposing punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 1-10-2004.

3. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant raised an industrial dispute bearing ID No. 39 of 2005 before the third Additional Labour Court, Bangalore. The Labour Court vide award dated 14-2-2007 directed the management of the Corporation to reinstate the appellant in his original post with continuity of service but without back wages. The Labour Court modified the punishment directing withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect. In the Labour Court, the appellant had produced notarised copies of orders passed by the respondent Corporation in respect of the other workmen, who have committed similar misconduct but were awarded lesser punishments. Referring to Exts. W-5 to W-11 which are the notarised copies of the orders passed in respect of the other workmen who have committed similar misconduct, the Labour Court held that those workmen were reinstated in service with minor punishment of withholding of few annual increments, whereas the appellant was imposed grave punishment of dismissal from service and thus was discriminated against. Referring to another judgment of the High Court in Karnataka SRTC v. N. Ramachandra WP No. 17316 of 2005, order dated 8-8-2005 (KAR) dated 8-8-2005, the Labour Court observed that when similarly situated workmen were imposed lesser punishment the appellant cannot be discriminated by imposing punishment of dismissal from service and the Labour Court in exercise of its discretion under Section 11-A set aside the punishment imposed on the appellant and directed reinstatement of the appellant without back wages.

4. Being aggrieved, the respondent Corporation filed a writ petition before the High Court. Vide order dated 31-1-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 46 , ILR 2008 KAR 1371, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the proved misconduct against the appellant. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant workman preferred the appeal before the Division Bench challenging the legality and correctness of the said order. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the charges levelled against the appellant are serious in nature and that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed by the disciplinary authority was just and proper. In this appeal, the appellant assails the correctness of the above judgment.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court erroneously held that the long delay of twelve years in holding the enquiry is not fatal to the case, although it is clearly evident that no reasonable explanation is forthcoming for the inordinate delay of twelve years in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. It was further submitted that in the similar cases of other workmen who produced bogus certificate, they were reinstated in the service withholding of few increments with cumulative effect and while so, the appellant alone cannot be discriminated by imposing harsh punishment of dismissal from service.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation contended that the finding of guilt was based on appreciation of evidence on record and having regard to the gravity of the charges, the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the award passed by the Court.

7. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the impugned judgment Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR) and other materials on record.

8. The appellant joined the services of the Corporation in the year 1985. In the year 1990, charges were framed against the appellant alleging that he had secured appointment by producing a false certificate and enquiry was initiated in the year 1992 and the enquiry officer submitted his report only in the year 2002, nearly twelve years after framing of charges. Even though the enquiry officer submitted his report on 13-3-2002, order of dismissal from service was passed only on 1-10-2004. The enquiry report was thus submitted after a lapse of twelve years and there was a delay of twelve years in conducting and completing the enquiry. As pointed out by the Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for such inordinate delay in completing the enquiry. The appellant continued in service from 1990 to 2004. Having allowed the appellant workman to work for fourteen years, by the time punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on the appellant, the appellant had reached the age of forty-five years. As observed by the Labour Court, the appellant having crossed forty-five years, he could not have sought for alternative employment. Further, as seen from Exts. W-5 to W-11, similarly placed workmen were ordered to be reinstated with lesser punishment of stoppage of few increments. While so, there is no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service.

9. It is settled proposition of law that while considering the management's decision to dismiss or terminate the services of a workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the decision of the management only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Considering the delay in completing the enquiry and the age of the appellant and the fact that similarly situated workmen were reinstated with lesser punishment, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement, in exercise of its discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

10. In the writ petition, while setting aside the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court passed in Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan (2007) 9 SCC 86 , (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 668 and also another judgment of the High Court and observed that a person who practices fraud for securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and the learned Single Judge faulted the Labour Court for exercising discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service. In our considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the tribunal, only, when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In our view, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court.

11. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477, the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)

“7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”
(emphasis supplied)

12. In Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. (2014) 6 SCC 434 , (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 291, it was held as under:

“15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well-settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.
16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338, with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that:
‘49. (m) … The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.’
It was also held that:
‘49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it.’”

13. Emphasising that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. (2010) 3 SCC 192 , (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146, this Court has held as under:

“21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
‘10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.’
(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923, AIR p. 928, para 10.)”

14. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR) cannot be sustained.

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR) passed by the High Court is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.