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Williams v. The Queen (Saint Vincent and The Grenadines)

Privy Council
Nov 23, 1998

Williams v. The Queen (Saint Vincent and The Grenadines) [1998] UKPC 45 (23rd November, 1998)

Privy Council Appeal No. 4

of 1998

Cardinal

Williams Appellant

v.

The Queen Respondent

FROM

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN COURT OF

APPEAL (ST. VINCENT AND THE

GRENADINES)

---------------

JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE JUDICIAL

COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,

Delivered the 23rd November 1998

------------------

Present at the hearing:-

Lord Browne-Wilkinson

Lord Steyn

Lord Hoffmann

Lord Hobhouse of

Woodborough

Lord Millett

[Delivered by Lord

Hoffmann]

------------------

1. On

16th November 1994, at about 8.00 in the morning, Cardinal Williams, a farmer

of Evesham in St. Vincent, killed his common law wife Caroline in the road

outside their house by cutting her throat and stabbing her repeatedly with a

knife. Almost immediately afterwards

their two children, Hazell Ann, who was nearly 5 and Brenton, who was 2, were

found dead with their throats cut in separate rooms in the house. At midday the appellant made a statement

under caution at Mesopotamia Police Station.

2. In

his statement, the appellant said that in recent times Caroline had on several

occasions gone off with other men. His

cuckoldry was well known in the area and his friends made jokes about it. On one occasion she lived with another man

for six months and then returned. He

took her back. A few days earlier she

had stayed out all night with another man and the next day the police had

relayed to him her request to remove her possessions from the house. When he returned he found that almost

everything in the house had been taken.

He did not see her again until that morning, when she passed the house

carrying water. He went out and asked

her for the return of a pot in which to prepare the children s lunch. She refused and he went back into his

house. From there he saw her walk away

holding the hand of a neighbour, Kenmore Robertson, known as Fleggie. At this he picked up a knife, ran out into

the road, threw her to the ground and cut her throat. He then went back into his house and told Hazell Ann that she was

not going to school because he had just killed her Mummy. He said that he would be hanged and they

would be left without a Mummy or Daddy.

So that they should not suffer, he was going to kill them. The little girl said that someone would take

care of them but he proceeded to cut their throats with the same knife, killing

them in separate rooms so that one should not witness the death of the

other. He then set fire to the house,

walked to Mesopotamia Police Station and gave himself up.

3. The

appellant was indicted only for the murder of Caroline. But the depositions also included references

to the killing of the children. Thus

Lexcina Williams, an Evesham resident, deposed to seeing their bodies. Julia Williams, a nurse, said that she had

been with Caroline in the road, trying to feel her pulse, when the appellant

looked out of his window, asked whether she was dead and said that he was going

to kill the children. Fleggie and his

sister Desiree Plaugh gave similar evidence and Fleggie said that he saw the

dead children in the house. So did the policeman who came upon the scene

shortly after the tragedy.

4. At

the trial it was agreed between counsel and the judge that the introduction of

evidence tending to show that the appellant had killed his children would be

prejudicial to his defence.

Accordingly, the prosecution witnesses tried in their evidence in chief

to skirt round the subject of the children s deaths and there was no

cross-examination on the subject. The

effect on the general narrative was untidy: thus evidence was given of the

appellant s statement that he intended to kill the children but nothing was

said about what had happened to them.

More than one witness described the children in the present tense, which

may have given the jury the impression that they were still alive. The appellant s statement under caution was

read without objection to its admissibility but edited, at the request of

defence counsel, by the removal of the account of the children s deaths. It included, however, his telling the

children that he had killed their mother.

5. This

well-meaning conspiracy of silence between prosecution and defence was thrown

into confusion when the appellant came to give evidence. At first it followed the lines of his statement,

enlarging somewhat upon Caroline s infidelities and other failings but adhering

substantially to his account of their meeting in the road up to the point at

which she refused his request for the return of a cooking pot. But then he said that Caroline had asked for

the return of her children, which he had in turn refused. She replied saying that if she could not

have the children, he would not have them either. He said that when he went back into the house he did not see the

children and went out again and ran after Caroline, saying Why you kill my

children? . A fight ensued in which he

killed her. This account in chief was

somewhat incoherent, containing as it did no mention of any discovery that the

children were dead. But the appellant

repaired this gap in cross-examination by saying that he had found the children

in the house with their throats cut before going after Caroline in the road.

6. It

may be questioned whether counsel could have known the nature of her client s

defence before he gave evidence. He had

been pretending to have lost all memory of what happened, which must have made

it difficult to take instructions. No

cross-examination had been directed to the killing of the children, which, from

having been, in the suppressed part of the statement, a tragic epilogue to

Caroline s death, had now been promoted to being its precipitating cause. It would not be surprising if the jury were

puzzled. Until that moment they had

been left with the impression that the children were alive.

7. The

defence called one witness in addition to the appellant himself. This was Dr. Debnath, a psychiatrist

employed by the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines who also had some

private practice. He is, their

Lordships were informed, the only psychiatrist on the Island. According to an affidavit which he

subsequently swore and which has been tendered by the appellant, he was asked

by defence counsel to examine the appellant only for the purpose of discovering

whether he was unfit to plead by reason of the amnesia which he claimed to

have. He was not asked to investigate

his mental condition at the time of the offence and did not do so. His conclusion on amnesia was that the

appellant was shamming.

8. In

the event, no issue was taken on the appellant s fitness to plead but Dr.

Debnath was nevertheless pressed into service by defence counsel in the hope

that his evidence might support a defence of diminished responsibility. The result was pretty much a failure. The

defence of diminished responsibility requires the accused to establish, in the

words of section 160(1) of the Criminal Code of St. Vincent and the Grenadines,

that he was at the time of the killing:

suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of

arrested or retarded development of mind or other inherent cause [or] induced

by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for

his acts in doing, or being a party to, the killing.

9. Dr.

Debnath said that he had been requested to look into two things: the

appellant s mental condition a fortnight before the trial, when the examination

took place, and his amnesia. He said

that the appellant was mildly depressed but that the amnesia was faked. He might also have been depressed at the

time of the killing seven months earlier but Dr. Debnath was not in a position

to say. After an adjournment, defence

counsel tried again on the following day.

Dr. Debnath was recalled and gave evidence dealing more broadly with the

nature of depression in its various degrees.

He said that the appellant probably had passive aggressive personality

disorder , which, their Lordships learn from another psychiatrist s report to

which they will later return, means passivity or inertia used as a form of

aggression. At no time did Dr. Debnath address the questions of whether the

appellant was suffering from an abnormality of mind , whether its aetiology

was one of those mentioned in section 160(1), or whether it would have

substantially impaired the appellant s mental responsibility for his acts.

10. In

summing up, the judge withdrew the issue of diminished responsibility from the

jury. He said there was no evidence

upon which they could find that the statutory requirements had been made out. The only defence which he left to the jury

was provocation, on which the law is codified in sections 161 and 162 of the

Criminal Code:-

161.Any

person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the

provisions of this section, would constitute murder, who does the act which

causes death in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, as

hereinafter defined, and before there is time for his passion to cool, is

guilty of manslaughter only.

162.(1) The term provocation means and includes

any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be likely, when done to an

ordinary person, or in the presence of an ordinary person to another person who

is under his immediate care, to whom he stands in a conjugal, parental, filial

or fraternal relation, to deprive him of the power of self-control and to

induce him to assault the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered.

(2)

Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find

that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or things said or

both) to lose his self-control, in determining the question whether the

provocation was enough to make an ordinary person do as he did the jury shall

take into account everything, both said and done, according to the effect

which, in its opinion, it would have on an ordinary person.

(3)

For the purposes of this section, the expression an ordinary person

shall mean an ordinary person of the community to which the accused belongs.

(4)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall be open to an accused person to

establish provocation by proving that the person alleged to have done or said

the things relied upon by the accused to establish provocation actually knew of

certain circumstances touching and concerning the accused and that an ordinary

person who knew of those circumstances would have reasonably believed that the

accused would have been provoked by the things done or said to or concerning

the accused.

11. In

his summing up the judge quoted from sections 161 and 162 and emphasised that the provocation had to

be sudden and followed immediately by the killing. He went on to say that the only matter capable of amounting to

provocation was the appellant s discovery, according to his evidence, of the

dead children and his belief that Caroline had killed them. There was no evidence that Caroline had done

any wrongful act or used insulting words in respect of the appellant. No question of provocation therefore arose

out of the evidence of the prosecution or the confession statement. The history of Caroline s marital

infidelities had nothing to do with the issue.

It depended entirely upon the credibility of the appellant s evidence

about the deaths of the children.

Finally he summarised the point succinctly for the jury:-

He

is asking you to find that ... when he looked he saw his two children dead

and so he lost his self-control. So,

this act he said which Caroline did by cutting his children s throats he was

provoked by this act when he saw it ... Well, Members of the Jury, this is the

only evidence on which the issue of provocation arises in this case and it is a

question of what you accept, whom do you believe.

12. The

verdict shows that the jury rejected the appellant s evidence.

13. Mr.

Guthrie Q.C., who appeared pro bono for the appellant and to whom their

Lordships are greatly indebted, criticised the terms of the summing up as

founded upon too literal a reading of sections 161 and 162. In particular, he said that the judge ought

not to have excluded earlier events from consideration. The history of the relationship between the

appellant and Caroline could properly be taken into account in deciding whether

the final provocation was enough to make the statutory ordinary person act as

he did: see Reg. v. Thornton (No. 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1174. He should also have instructed

the jury to consider whether even if they rejected his evidence that Caroline

had killed the children (which was inconsistent with his caution statement,

even in its edited form, saying that he told them he had killed their mother

and with the evidence of witnesses who said that after attacking Caroline he

had said he would kill the children) they might still believe that Caroline had

asked for the children and that this might have been an ultimate provocative

act. Finally, he should have told the

jury that the savage and multiple stabbings inflicted, according to the medical

and eye-witness evidence, on Caroline s body after he had cut her throat, were

evidence of loss of self-control.

14. Their

Lordships are willing to accept that these matters should ideally have been

left to the jury. Although section

162(2) is plainly a re-enactment (with immaterial verbal variations) of section

3 of the Homicide Act 1957 (U.K.), the Criminal Code does not present the same

problems of construction as the Codes of Belize and The Bahamas which were

considered by the Board in Logan v. The Queen [1996] AC 871 and Culmer v. The Queen [1997] 1 WLR 1296

respectively. This is because section

162(2) has not, as in those cases, been inserted as a foreign body into a group

of provisions which reflect an earlier and inconsistent state of the common

law. Until the adoption of the Code in

1988, the law of provocation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was the pre-1957

English common law: see Hamilton v. The Queen (1984) 33 W.I.R.

122, in which the Court of Appeal noted that section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957

had been adopted in most of the Caribbean states and urged that it should be

enacted in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well. It seems likely, therefore, that the opportunity was taken to

introduce this reform when the Code was adopted in 1988 and that the other

provisions of sections 161 and 162 are intended to flesh out the law of

provocation consistently with section 162(2). Their Lordships therefore think

that there is substance in Mr. Guthrie s submission that sections 161 and

162(1) should not be given a literal and free-standing construction which would

impose arbitrary limits upon the material ( everything, both said and done )

which section 162(2) says that the jury must be allowed to take into account in

deciding whether whatever it was that actually did provoke the person charged

to lose his self-control was enough to make an ordinary person do as he

did . To construe the Code more

narrowly would be to diminish the effect of the reform and produce

inconsistency with the laws of other Caribbean states which have adopted section

3 of the Homicide Act 1957 (U.K.).

15. Their

Lordships do not however find it necessary to express any concluded view on

these questions and did not invite submissions on the construction of sections

161 and 162 from Sir Godfray Le Quesne Q.C., who appeared for the Crown. This is because they are satisfied that even

if a direction had been given in the most generous terms for which Mr. Guthrie

contends, the defence of provocation was bound to fail. The nature of the assault was certainly

evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the appellant had lost

his self-control, but once they had rejected, as they must have done, the

appellant s evidence that Caroline had killed the children, there was nothing

left which could have provoked the ordinary man to act as he did. Her saying, according to his evidence I

want my children , even taken against the background of her desertion and the

removal of the cooking pot and other possessions, does not in the opinion of

the Board come anywhere near the required threshold. This ground of appeal therefore fails.

16. The

second ground of appeal is that the judge was wrong to withdraw the issue of

diminished responsibility from the jury.

Their Lordships have set out the exiguous medical evidence on the

question of whether he was suffering from an abnormality of mind. This could be regarded as supplemented by

the evidence of the multiple injuries which he inflicted upon Caroline after

the fatal wound and certain other bizarre behaviour of which the eye-witnesses

had spoken: he had announced that he would kill the children, asked an onlooker

to shoot him and set fire to the house. It would have been strengthened if

there had also been evidence of the actual killing the children, of whom he

appears to have been very fond. But for

the reasons which their Lordships have explained, no such evidence was tendered

by prosecution or defence. In the

circumstances, and bearing in mind that the onus of proof of diminished

responsibility is upon the accused, their Lordships do not think that the judge

was wrong to withdraw the issue from the jury.

Counsel who represented the appellant at the trial and in the Court of

Appeal took the same view: although the point was taken in the notice of

appeal, she abandoned it at the hearing in the Court of Appeal.

17. Before

the Board, however, Mr. Guthrie made an application for leave to tender new

evidence in the form of a report by Dr. N.L.G. Eastman, a distinguished English

forensic psychiatrist, who went to St Vincent and interviewed the appellant in

prison for over 5 hours on 19th February 1998.

Dr. Eastman was asked, unlike Dr. Debnath, to express an opinion on the

appellant s mental condition at the time of the killing. It is unnecessary for their Lordships to say

more than that the report, if accepted, would be material upon which a jury

could have found that the appellant was suffering from diminished

responsibility.

18. The

admission of new evidence in the Court of Appeal is governed by section 45 of

the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) Act, c.

18. This provides that unless satisfied

that the evidence, if received, would not afford any ground for allowing the

appeal, the court shall exercise the power to receive it if:

(a)it

appears to it that the evidence is likely to be credible and would have been

admissible at the trial on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and

(b)it

is satisfied that it was not adduced at the trial, but that there is a

reasonable explanation for the failure so to adduce it.

19. Their

Lordships consider that Dr. Eastman s evidence is likely to be credible in

the sense that it satisfies the test of being apparently credible, though it

need not be incontrovertible (per Denning L.J. in Ladd v. Marshall

[1954] 1 WLR 1489 at page 1491. It

may be that after cross-examination or the consideration of evidence in

rebuttal, Dr. Eastman s evidence would be controverted and rejected. This is a matter going to weight; their

Lordships consider that it passes the threshold test for admissibility under

section 45(a). As for (b), their

Lordships consider that if one has regard to the realities of the position of a

relatively indigent defendant on a capital charge in St. Vincent and the

Grenadines, a reasonable explanation for the appellant s failure to adduce such

evidence earlier readily suggests itself.

20. Their

Lordships would therefore on this ground remit the appeal to the Court of

Appeal to decide how best to deal with Dr. Eastman s evidence. The Court may consider it expedient to order

a new trial, so that the evidence can be given subject to cross-examination and

any rebutting evidence before a jury.

Or it may decide in the first instance to hear such cross-examination

and rebutting evidence itself. Their

Lordships consider that the procedure to be followed must be a matter for the

Court of Appeal to decide.

21. Finally

their Lordships must mention a submission of Mr. Guthrie that the decision to

charge only the murder of Caroline and the exclusion of all reference to the

killing of the children produced a trial on assumed facts which were so far

from reality as to be incapable of producing a fair verdict. Their Lordships do not accept that the

prosecution were wrong to charge only one murder. This was the normal practice in England when murder was a capital

offence. It would not, and did not,

preclude the introduction of evidence of other offences by the defence or, in

cases in which it would be admissible under the similar fact rule, by the

prosecution. Thus it would have been open to defence counsel to elicit evidence

of the deaths of the children in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses

if she thought it advantageous to do so.

22. It

is true that in the event, when the appellant came to give his evidence, the

absence of any previous reference to the deaths of the children may have been

damaging to his credibility. On the

other hand, his case may have suffered even greater prejudice if the evidence

of the killing of the children had been introduced by the prosecution. The decision faced by defence counsel in

agreeing to the exclusion of the evidence was a difficult one and their

Lordships think it is impossible to say that she (or the prosecution or the

judge) were wrong in taking the course they did. They would therefore reject this ground of complaint.

23. Their

Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the matter should be

remitted to the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean for further hearing in

accordance with the opinion of the Board.