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Maharajah Hetnarain Sing v. Baboo Modnarain Sing (India)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns litigation between two brothers (the Appellant, the elder, and the Respondent, the younger), sons of Maharajah Mitterjeet Sing, concerning a deed of partition and related family arrangements. A compromise instrument (a Razanamali and Ikrarnamah) dated 7 February 1824, and partition deeds and a Sudder Court decree of 4 March 1824, set out agreed proportions (nine annas to the elder, seven annas to the younger) for division of the father's estate. Their father died on 3 October 1840.
Following disputes after the father's death, the Revenue Commissioner of Patna recommended an amicable arrangement. On 24 December 1840 the brothers agreed to settle, and on 30 December 1840 a deed of partition of the Zemindary was executed (the opinion also contains an earlier reference to a deed said to have been executed in December 1810). The Appellant initially accepted the partition but later, on 3 August 1849, brought suit in the Zillah Court of Behar to set aside the partition deed on grounds of fraud, inequality, concealment, undue haste, coercion by the Commissioner and incapacity due to illness.
The Zillah Court (before Mr. William St. Quintin) dismissed the Appellant’s suit on 7 June 1847, holding the deed valid and finding no proof of fraud, coercion or incapacity. The Appellant appealed to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut which, on 24 April 1848, affirmed the Zillah decree with costs. The present appeal to the Judicial Committee followed from that affirmation. The opinion also contains an earlier passage (distinct within the text) concerning a different procedural application for review that the writer concludes was improperly granted for failure to comply with applicable Regulations; in that passage the advice is to reverse a decree of 8 June 1848 and affirm one of 8 March 1842, with costs to be paid by Government in the proceedings since 8 March 1842.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deed of partition executed after the death of the father (the partition of the Zemindary) could be set aside for fraud, deceit, concealment or inequality of division.
- Whether the deed was invalid because it was obtained by threats, undue haste or coercion attributed to the Revenue Commissioner.
- Whether the Appellant was incapacitated by illness at the time of execution so as to vitiate the deed.
- Whether, more generally, the partition should be set aside for mistake or negligence in preparing the deed.
- Related procedural issue (in a distinct portion of the opinion): whether a review was properly granted in compliance with the governing Regulations (and consequences if not).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The partition deed was procured by fraud and deceit, and should be set aside.
- There was gross inequality in the division (the Appellant alleges the division operated unjustly against him), amounting either to fraud or mistake.
- The deed was concluded with undue precipitation and haste, preventing proper inquiry into its terms.
- The Revenue Commissioner exerted threats or coercion (including reference to a Rs. 10,000 recognizance) that forced the Appellant to assent.
- At the time of signing the deed the Appellant was too ill to understand or protect his own interest.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Appellant failed to prove any of the alleged grounds (fraud, coercion, mistake or incapacity) and bore the burden of proof for those charges.
- The settlement and partition were bona fide and made with the full knowledge and active cooperation of the Appellant; the deeds were prepared by agents of both parties and executed deliberately and publicly.
- The Appellant subsequently took steps and conducted himself in ways inconsistent with repudiating the partition (acts of acquiescence and confirmation).
- The provisions of the partition deed excluded a subsequent division (reference made to Ben. Reg. NIS of 1814 as a textual citation in the opinion).
Table of Precedents Cited
The opinion includes several cited authorities as printed in the text. The provided opinion does not explain the specific legal rules drawn from each citation; the table below records each citation as it appears in the opinion and notes that the opinion does not specify the rule or its application in detail.
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Forbes v. Bruce?~oonissa Begum, 1565, 10 Moo. Ind. App. 359 | Not specified in the provided opinion. | The opinion lists the citation but does not explain the rule taken from it or how it was applied. |
| Sheonath v. (garbled citation), 1865, 10 Moo. Ind. App. 423 | Not specified in the provided opinion. | The opinion lists the citation but does not explain the rule taken from it or how it was applied. |
| Skah Mukhm Lal E. & Bob, Sree Kishem (garbled), 1868, 12 Moo. Ind. App. 185 | Not specified in the provided opinion. | The opinion lists the citation but does not explain the rule taken from it or how it was applied. |
| (Garbled) v. (garbled) Singh, 1874, L.R. 2 Ind. App. 68 | Not specified in the provided opinion. | The opinion lists the citation but does not explain the rule taken from it or how it was applied. |
| Ben. Reg. NIS. of 1814 | Not specified in the provided opinion (appears cited as a textual authority regarding provisions of the deed). | The opinion references this registry entry in support of an argument that the deed's provisions excluded a new division; no further application is elaborated. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the evidence and applied established principles governing the setting aside of executed deeds of partition, particularly when those deeds implement a family compromise or settlement.
Key elements of the Court's analysis were:
- The burden on a party seeking to impeach such a deed is high: deeds prepared and executed in the course of a compromise of suit require the strictest proof before they will be set aside. The Court emphasizes caution in allowing such instruments to be impeached on weak evidence.
- Evidence showed the details of the division were drawn up by agents of both parties; the deed and contemporaneous instruments were prepared under the direction and supervision of the Revenue Commissioner and executed openly. The Respondent's witnesses established the Appellant's participation and the apparent due execution and soundness of mind at the time of signing.
- The Appellant's evidence was characterized as weak, indirect and argumentative. He failed to call key witnesses (subscribing witnesses to the deed, his dewans, servants, or those privy to the division) who could have tested the alleged fraud or inequality.
- The Court rejected the allegation of deception: if deception had occurred, the Court reasoned, it likely would have been discovered and could have been proved by direct evidence (for example, by proof of actual receipts or value shortly after partition). The Appellant offered no direct proof of gross inequality of value.
- As to coercion or threats attributed to the Commissioner, the evidence did not establish force or coercion. The Commissioner’s communications, including an allusion to Rs. 10,000, were treated as suggestions or references to a recognizance customary in such transactions rather than evidence of unlawful coercion. The Court acknowledged that the Commissioner's influence might have induced assent but found no proof of coercion invalidating the deed.
- The Appellant's contention of incapacity due to illness was undermined by the fact that his agents participated in the negotiations and individuals called by him did not prove total incapacity; moreover, subsequent conduct (such as letters of thanks and taking possession) pointed to acquiescence and knowledge of the partition's effects.
- Given the weakness of the evidence on value and fraud, the Court held it unnecessary to rule on every ancillary point; the decisive factual deficiency was the absence of strong, direct proof that would justify setting aside a partition deed made in the course of a family compromise.
- Separately, in an earlier passage concerning a procedural review application, the Court concluded that the reasons advanced for granting review were insufficient, that requisite Regulations were not complied with, and that no just and reasonable cause was shown for delay — leading to the conclusion that the review (and acts done under it) should be set aside. The Court advised Her Majesty to reverse and affirm particular earlier decrees and to award costs against Government in those proceedings (the opinion states these conclusions without further elaboration in the provided excerpt).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- The Judicial Committee (their Lordships) recommended to Her Majesty that the appeal concerning the partition deed be DISMISSED, with costs. The Court sustained the conclusions of the lower courts that dismissed the Appellant's suit and affirmed the validity of the partition deed executed in the course of the family compromise.
- In a distinct portion of the opinion addressing a procedural review, the Court concluded that the review was improperly granted for failure to comply with the applicable Regulations and advised Her Majesty to reverse the decree of 8 June 1848, to affirm the decree of 8 March 1842, and to condemn the Government in the costs incurred in the proceedings since 8 March 1842 (as the opinion explicitly states).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Appellant's attempt to set aside the partition was unsuccessful; the partition deed stands as valid and binding according to the orders affirmed by the appellate process, and the Appellant's suit was dismissed with costs. The Respondent's title under the partition is upheld under the facts found by the courts.
- Procedural consequence (in the review matter stated in the opinion): where a review was granted without compliance with governing Regulations, that review and acts taken under it are to be treated as void, and costs may be awarded against Government for proceedings improperly conducted.
- The opinion underscores the rule (stated in the judgment) that Courts in India require the strictest proof to impeach deeds made in furtherance of a compromise of suit; the opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new legal principle beyond applying that standard to the facts of this case.
No information beyond what is contained in the provided opinion has been added. Where the original text was unclear or contained garbled citations, the exact text as printed in the opinion has been reproduced in the precedents table without reconstruction.
VXX MOOBE XND. APP., SlO MAHARAJAH HETNARMN SIKG
the parties must have been cognizant at the time, and, therefore, would be 110 excuse
for delay; and a reference to certain proceedings had in the Foujdary Court. We
are somewhat surprised that this last c i rcum~ance should have been introduced as
a reason for a review; for we apprehend that tha jurisdiction of that Court is
confined to cases of ~ o s s ~ s i o n , and %hat it i s beyand their province to inquire into
and ascertain the titles to landed property.
We derive no light from the decision of the Commissioner allowing this review;
110 further reason is assigned. Upon a consideration of all these proceedings, we
have come to the conclusion that, in granting this review, the reasons alraigned are
wholly iKisu~c~ent; that the requisites of the Regulations have not beeri complied
with; that 110 just and reasonable cause has been shown for the delay in presenting
the petition; and that that petition does not state any circumstances which, i n
justice, require the granting the review, It necessariIy follows that i f the review
was granted without due regard to the Regu~ations ~ o v ~ r n i n g such proceedings,
it, and all that hae been done under it, must fall to the ground. We shall, therefore,
humbly advise Her Majesty to reverse the decree of the 8th of June, 1848, and to
aErm the decree of the 8th of March, 1842; and, further, as imperatively required
b? justice, to condemn the [310] Government in all the costs incurred both in the
Courts below and upon the appeal, in all the proceedings since the 8th of March,
1842.
We believe that a decree of this tenor will be in strict conformity with the
Regulations which have the force of law in India, and, at the same time, may con-
tribute to ensure a just confidence that these special jurisdictions, which in some
degree displace the ordinary Tribunals of the country, will carefully observe those
rules whieh have been prescribed to regulate their proceedings ; rules which have
been wisely introduced to guard against the possible abuse of authority, and a
departure from which would be likely to produce distrust, and to defeat the principal
objects of their institution.
[See Forbes v. Bm+ee?~oonissa Begum, 1565, 10 Moo. Ind. App. 359; Sheonath v.
~~~~~~~~ 1865, 10 Moo. Ind. App,. 423; Skah M u k h m LalE 8. Bob,, Sree
Kishem ' S ~ ~ 9 7 ~ ~ 18G8, 12 Moo. Ind. App. 185; ~ ~ € r k ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~ v, S h ~ ~ T ~ ~ ~ e ~ e
Singh, 1874, L.R. 2 Ind. App. 68.1
[311] ~ A H ~ ~ A JAH HE~NARAIN S I ~ ~ , - ~ ~ ~ e Z ~ o ~ ~ ; BA300 MODNARA~N
SING,-Reqmndeat * [June 17,18, 18591.
On ~~~e~~ from t i ~ e S'i&fer ~e~~~~~ Adadut of CaZcu.tta.
A deed of partition of a ~ e n ~ ~ n d a r ~ between two brothers, c a r r ~ i n g into effect
a solunamah and family arrangement to put an end to litigation previously
entered intoby their father, and for a division of the family estates, upheld.
Such a deed call only be set aside upon strong evidence, either of mistake, in-
equality, undue influence, coercion or fraud.
This appeal arose out of a suit brought by the Appellant against the Re-
spondent, in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen of Zillah Behar. The object
of the suit was to set &ide and cancel on the ground of fraud and deceit, a deed
of partition executed in December, 1810, by the Appellant and Respondent, to give
effect to a e o m p r ~ m i s ~ and adjustment of family disputes, and to set aside an agree-
ment for a division of the family estate, including an apportionment and division of
estates at Patna.
* Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-~he Right Hon. The Lord
Justice Knight Bruce, the Right Hon. Sir Edward Ryan, the Right Hon. The Lord
Justice Turner, and the Right Hon. Sir John Taylor Coleridge. Assessor,-The
Right Hon. Sir Lawrence Peel.
_I--
326
V. BABOU MODHARAIN SING E18591 VI1 MOORE IND. APP., 312
The circuI~stances under which the suit arose were as follows:-
The parties were brothers, the Appellant being the eldest, and the Respondent.
the youngest, son of Maharajah Mitterjeet Sing, the late Zemindar, who was [312]
seised of the entire Zeniindary. Family dissensions having arisen during the life-
time of MitterJeet Sing, certain proceedings were instituted, and on an appeal
to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, in a suit in which Mitterjeet Sing and the Appel-
lant arid Respondent were parties, a compromise was entered into, and a Razanamali
and Ikrarnamah, dated the 7th of February, 1824, was filed by Mitterjeet Sing, which
instrument was 'CO the effect, that the real and personal estates held by him, after his
death, was to be divided between the Appellant and the Respondent. The former
was to take a nine annag share, and the tateter a seven annas share. Partition deeds
of the same tenor were also filed, and on the 4th March, 1824, the Sudder Court
decreed, that the parties should act up to the terms entered by them in the ab0.i.e-
mentioned instruments. Mitterjeet Sing died on the 3rd of October, 1840, whe~i
disputes immediatel~ arose between the Appellant and the RespoAdent as to their
respective portions of the estate of the fate Mitterjeet Sing. The Revenue Com-
missioner of the Patna District having heard of the dissensions, recommended both
parties to settle their disputes by an amicable arrangement, which was agreed to
on the 24th of December, 1840, and accordingly, on the 30th of that nionth, a deed
of partition of the Zemindary, as well also another deed of partition of some house
property of the late Mitterjeet Sing, were executed by both parties in accordance
with the terms of the original compromise. This latter deed was, however, not in
dispute.
Tile Appellant a t first was satisfied with the partition. but soon afterwards
impu~ned the whole transaction, on the ground, that fraud had been practised [313]
upon him iu the division of the e&ate; and after proceedings before the Collector
of the District in which the estate was situate, and objecting to the transfer of
names, he brought the present suit in the Zillali Court of Behar, on the 3rd of August,
1849, against the Respondent, to set aside the partition of the Zem~ndary, alleging
in the plaint that gross fraud had been practised upon him in the division of the
property, and in preparing the partition deed, and also upon the grounds of in-
equality, concealment and fraud, and insisting that the deed of partition was on
those grounds fraudulent and void. The answer of the ~espondei~t stated, that the
claim of the Appellant was unfound~d, and set forth facts showing that the amicable
ndjustrnent and settlement, through the friendly intervention of the Commissioner,
was consented to by both parties with a full knowledge of all the facts; and further
stating that the deeds and instruments were all executed in the presence of the
Commissioner and other witnesses, and were to be considered as part of one and
the xanie ~ransaction. The answer also set forth s u b s ~ u e n t acts of the A~pel lar~t ,
which it was insisted operated as a confirmation of the partition. Witnesses were
examined by the Appellant. The evidence in support, of the Appellant's allegations
was weak and unsatisfactory. Three of these witnessee were examined as to the
alleged excess of the number of the villages, and the amount of produce of the entire
Zemindary, but without proving any fraud or deceit on the part of the Respondent,
or that the division and apportionment in the deed was different from that agreed
to by the parties. Other witnesses were examined as to the Appellant having been
ill previously to the execution of the deed of partition, but E3141 without proving
anything to lead to an inference even that he was not perfectly sound in mind and
understanding, or that he was otherwise than fully capable of protecting his own
interest when he personally attended before the Commissioner, and took part in
the adjustment and settlement of the disputes between him and the Respondent, or
when he executed the deed of partition. He did not examine any of the subscribing
witnesses to the deed, or his dewans, or servants, who were engaged on his behalf
in the e ~ a i ~ i n a t i o n f the Zemindary books and papers in preparing the list of the
villages and the draft of the deed of partition, or any one who was privy to the
division and apportionment of the villages or the principle and agreement on wliicli
such division was based and intended to Be carried out by the parties to the deed.
The fact of the due execution of the deed of partition and other cote~iporaneous
deeds, and that the AppeIlant was of sound mind at the time of execution, as also the
321
XOoRE MIt. UP., 316 ~ A ~ ~ ~ A ~ A H H ~ T A R A ~ ~ SING
participation of the Appellant and his agent in all the proceedings, was established
by the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses.
On the 7th. of June, 1847, Xr. William St. Quintin, the additional Judge of the
Civil Court of Zil’tah Behar, before whom the case came, considered the deed valid
and binding in every respect, and passed a decree in the ~espondent’s favour, dis-
missing the Appellant’s claim with costs. The material part of his decree was as
follows:-
The objections now raised by the Plaintiff to the deed in question, are,
first, that he was deceived by the Defendant as to the real income and extent of the
property under division; second, that the deed was exacted from him by the threats
and undue haste of the commissioner^ and, lastly, that a t the [316] time when he
signed the deed he was too ill to know what he was about. It is in evidence that the
details of this division of the property were drawn up by the agents of both parties,
so that the allegation of deception on the part of the Defendant is untenable.
Besides, if deception was practised, the Plaintiff ought to have discovered it during
&e time the affair was under negotiation, and before his seal and signature to a
deed so complete in its legality as the one under review. The only threat on the
part of the Commissioner which appears in the proceedings in the Perwanah dated
the 24th of December, 1840, in which the Commissioner threatens a fine of Rs. 10,000
on the ~ l ~ ~ n t i f f if he did not refrain from disturb~ng the public peace of the Raj.
The Co~missioner obtained the consent of the brothers to an amicable ad~us tmen~
on the 24th of December, and the deed of adjustment was signed on the 30th of
that month. The allegations of threats and undue haste on the part of the Com-
missioner is, therefore, untenable. Besides, on the 3rd of March, 1841, the Plaintiff
addresses to the Commissioner his thanks for a Bhelut and other titular distinctions
about to bo conferred on him by the Government, and takes the same opportunity to
tliank hini for his amicable adjustment of the dispute between him. and his brother,
and to report that he has possession of his property in virtue of the deed of partition,
having, between the date of his address to the Commissioner and the date of the
deed of partition, brought to the notice of the Collector the frauds that had been
practised upon him at the time of the division of the Raj. It is proved Beyond doubt
that a t the time the Plaintiff signed this deed he was of sound mind and body.
the same day a second deed of partition E3161 was drawn out in the same legal
form, to divide the houses left by the late ~ a h a r a j a ~ ; and to this deed no objection
is urged by the Plaintiff .”
The Appellant appealed from that decree to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, ill
which Court he again urged and relied upon in support of the appeal the allegation
of the undue haste in which the deed of partition had been drawn up, and the
imperfect manner in which, in consequence thereof, the division of the property hitd
been affected.
The appeal was finafly heard in the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut on the 24th of
April, 1848, before Xobert. Haldane Rattray, Esq., one of the Judges of that Court.
when that Judge affirmed the decree of the Zillah Court of Behar with costs.
The present appeal was from that decree.
The case of the Appellant was, that the deed of partition of the Z e ~ ~ ~ n d a r y did
proof of intentional fraud to fail, he submitted that the error5 in the deed were so
gross and so ~ani fes t Iy unjust in their operation upon his interest that it could not
be upheld in a Court of Equity. The Appellant also urged that he was deceived
as to the real value of the estates comprised in the division ; that the matter had been
concluded with undue precipitation, and that he was coerced by the threats of the
Commissioner at a time when he was too ill to know what he was about, and to notice
the fraud which was practised By the Respondent.
The Respondent, on the other hand, insisted that the Appellant had failed to
prove the existence of any suck grounds of objection. That, notw~thstanding the
E3171 burthen of proving such charges lay on the Appe~lant, the Res~ondent had
proved that the settlement wm made bona! $a%, by and with the full knowledge and
active coaperation of the Appellant, and that the deed of partition, as weU as the
other deed respecting the houses, were prepared by the agents of both parties
8.cting tagether, and were deliberate~y executed by the Appellant with a full know-
ledge of their contents. Moreover, he insisted that the Appellant had shown l?y h i s
328
On ,
* not carry out the arrangement of the 7th of February, 1824 ; that even supposing the
9, BABOCI ~ O ~ ~ ~ R A I N SING [ 1 8 591 VII ~~~~ IND. UP., a8
subsequen~ conduct and acts that he acquiesced in the deed and in the division and
partition of the estate, and that he had so dealt with diiferent portions of t!e pro-
perty held by him under those deeds as now to prevent him putting the ~espondent
ill the same position with respect to such property as he would have been in if the
de& had not been executed; and lastly, he insisted that the p r ~ v ~ s i o n s of the deed
of p a r t ~ t ~ o n excluded a new d ~ y ~ s ~ o n , Ben. Reg. XIS. of 1814.
Nr, E. Palmer, Q.C., and Mr. W. Field, argued the case for the A ~ p e l ~ a i ~ t ; and Sir
Hugh Cairns, Q.C., and Mr. Leith, for the Respondent.
Their ~ordships’ judgment was delivered by
The Lord Justice night Bruce (June 23, l $ ~ ~ ~ . - ~ ~ l ~ s is an a p ~ e a l from a de-
cision of the Sudder Dewanny ~ d a ~ ~ l u t at ~ a ~ c u t t a , con f i rm~~~g a decision of the
Zillah Court of Behar, by which the Appe~~ant’s suit was dismissed with costs. That
stxit was instituted to set aside a deed of partition, which had [318f been executed by
the ~ p p e ~ ~ a n t , and his brother the Resp~ndent, and which p a r t i t ~ o ~ was, as to the
silares of the b r o ~ e r s , based on a ~olunamah, or inst~ument of c o ~ p r o m ~ s e of suit,
ratified by the decree of the Sudder Court. This compromise was entered into in a
suit in which the Appe~~ant was the ~ l a i n t i ~ , and his father, ~ a h a r a j a h ~ ~ t t e r j e e t
Sing, and the A p ~ e ~ ~ a n t 5 s younger brother, Nodnara~n Sing, were the
That suit i ~ v o ~ v ~ s ~ r ~ o u s and portan ant questions of d ~ ~ c u ~ t y concernii~g the parti-
bility of and success~on to the estate8 and property of the father, held by him in con-
nection with his Raj, and his power of disposing of any part thereof by alienation
in his lifetime. ‘It, involved also the validity of a donation by him to his son,
~ o d n ~ r a i n Sing, and a further ~ u ~ t ~ o n whether the P ~ a ~ n t ~ ~ had forfeited his
~nheritance by d~sgraceful ond duct ~nvo~ving s loss of caste.
The Appellant had succeeded in the i I~fer~or Court, and from the dec~sioK~ of that
Court the Naharajah had appealed. Xn the course of the suit, c ~ , i n ~ i ~ a t ~ o n s had
been ~ u t u a l ~ y made by th& father and the son, and the litipztiort, had it proceeded,
would probably have caused to the family niucli p e ~ u n i ~ r y loss and some disgrace.
By the con~promise, a family arrangement was effected, by whiclr the father agreed
to pay certain a~lowances to his sons respectively during his life, and they confirmed
certain gifts of the father ; he agreed to dismiss his appeal, and the sons agreed that
~ e t n a r a ~ n Sing ~ ~ ~ o u ~ d ~ after their father’s death, divide the a ~ c e ~ t r a ~ as well as
other pro~er ty between himself and ~ o d n a r a ~ n Sing, in the p r o ~ o r t i o ~ f nine to
seven annas, the elder son t ~ i n g the larger share. The Court acted on this
instrument, dismiesed the appeal, [319’J ordered’the costs of the Vakeels to be paid
out of a, moiety of the deposit, and the other moiety to be re-
turned to the fa~her, toge~her with the s ~ ~ ~ - m o n e y on the ~ n s t i t u t ~ o ~
of the appeal. The p a ~ i ~ ~ e nature of this estate, d i ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ % in these pro-
p o ~ i o n s , stood, ther%~ore, ~ t w e e n these bro t~ers oa the footing of this compromise
only. The i n s t r ~ ~ t , of c o ~ p r o ~ i s e , though termed by Hetnarain Sing one of
partition, contained no express prov~sion for a partition ; but that power flowed
from the relation of jo in t~wnersh~p in which they had agreed to stand.
After their father’s death, the sons acquiesced in the ~ n s t r u ~ e n t of compro~ise.
I t i s i m n ~ ~ t e r i a l to consider whether either could hav0 disputed it, and whether any-
thing had i n t e r ~ ~ i a t e l y been done which entitled either, a c c o r d i ~ ~ ~ to the law a&
a d n ~ ~ n ~ s t e r e d in the native ~ ~ u r ~ ~ , to recede from it. The disputes and ~ ~ ~ i ~ a t i o ~ r
wfiick s u ~ e q u e n t ~ y ensued turned upon matters e ~ n s ~ s t e R ~ with such acqu~es~ence ;
each claimed the share of the estate which the comprom~~e s cured them, and these
proportions had no other foundation.
The partition which took place, and which the suit of the A p p ~ l ~ a n t seeks wholly
to ; ~ K I X X U ~ and set aside, was, in c o ~ s ~ q ~ e n c e of fresh disp~tes between the ~)rot~lers,
a r~s ing from their unfr~endly feeling to each other, and their mixed enjo~nlent of
the estate under such e ~ t r ~ ~ ~ e ~ e ~ t , ~ ~ ~ ~ e s t e d by Mr. ~ v ~ n s ~ a ~ , the Revenue
~ o m m i s s ~ o n ~ r for the District ~her1‘8 the property wag situate. It was a measure
e u b s t a n t ~ ~ ~ l y in ~ u ~ h e r a n c 0 of the instrume~t of cor~promise. From the evidence
of the r e s p ~ t a b ~ e and wholly uni~peached witnesee8 who took part in the p r ~ ~ p a r a t i o ~
of the partition deed under the direction of the Gorn-[32~]-missioner, and, to some
extent, under his own superjntende~c~, it appears to their Lordships that, the par-
tition was prepared and settled with care and de~~bera t ion~ without haste or
p r e c ~ p ~ t ~ n c y , and was exscufed by the brathere openly and p u b ~ e l ~ , ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 0 ~ ~
P.C. VIXX. 329 1 ia
VI1 MOORE IND. APP., 321
restraint or coercion, and with full opportunity for inquiry; and 011 the part of
both, with presumable competent knowledge, a presumption which is not rebutted.
The Appellant, in excuse of his own appareat negligence, (supposing his case to
be as he states it,) alleges that he was sick at the time and incapable of attending
to business; but his own temporary incapacity would not have extended to his
competent agents and assistants in the work; and his own witnesses do not re-
prebent him a8 wholly incapable of acting in matters of business during this time,
but, on the contrary, as occasionally taking part in the transaction of them. The
alleged haste and precipitancy of the settlement, another explanatory cause which
he alleges as conducive to the success of the deceit which he alleges to have been
practised against him, is also disproved, in their Lordships’ opinion, by the evidence
as to the fmctum of the deed ; and the alleged force upon him, which is said by him
to have proceeded from the Commissioner, is altogether without proof. That the
wishes and influence of the Commissioner may have operated upon the mind of the
Appellant so as to induce hini to join in the partition which the Commissioner
applied himself to effect, is very probable ; and that species of influence a dissatisfied
party may readily transmute in his own mind into pressure and coercion. But
their Lordships can find no evidence in the case of anything amounting to force or
coercion [321] of the Appellant ; and the letter of the Commissioner to the Appellant,
on which so much stress was laid by Mr. Palmer in his reply, seems to the$ Lordships
to bear really the meaning which the Counsel for the Respondent gave to it. It
contains matter of suggestion ; and the allusion to the Rs. 10,000, is an allusion to
a species of recognizance not unknown in similar transactions, *hereby a landed
proprietor engages for the peace and good order of his Zemindary. If, then, there
really were any gross inequality in the partition, and, as it is said, the T aiina shiirer
really got in point of profit that which the 9 anna sharer should have received, so
that their positions were in a manner inverted, their ~ r d s h i p s would in this case,
under all the circumstances in proof of the participatioh in the transaction of the
Appellant’s own competent agents, be unable to ascribe the failure to negligence or
mistake.
But the case is
abandoned on the ground of fraud; and the same weakness, indirectness, and
argumentativeness of the evidewce, which displaces that ground ef charge, applies
equally, if not in greater degree, to the ground of mistake, which can have no
f o u ~ d a ~ i o n , if the inequality of value be not established. Now, if this inequality
really existed to any such extent as would have vitiated the partition, it is difficult
for their Lordships to conceive that stronger and more direct proof of it could not
have been given by the Appellant. He must have known, and have had the means of
"proving, his actual receipts soon after the partition ; the actual value was capable of"
direct proof, yet he offered none of that character.
E3221 The Courts in India are very particuIar in requiring the strictest proof
when a deed prepared and executed as this has been, especially where it is one in
furtherance of a compromise of suit, is sought to be set aside: a precaution which
should never be relaxed, where the spirit of litigation has so little check, and so much
wider means of mischief, than it has here. It appears, therefore, to their Lordships
that the Courts below rightly dismissed the suit, and that it would be of dangerous
consequence to allow a deed of this nature to be impeached on evidence no stronger
than that which this case presents.
The view which their Lordships have taken of the evidence as to value, renders
it unnecemary for them to express any opinion on the other parts of the case.
They have no hesitation in recommending to Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal,
with costs.
MAHARAJAH H. SING 21. 3381300 11. SING [ 18591
Corruption of such agents would be the more probable solution.
330
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