Ramloll Thackoorseydass, and Others v. Soojumnull Dhondmull and Mooltan Chund Cuppoorchund (India)

R. THACKOORSEYDASS v. s. DHONDMULL [1848] IV MOORE IND. UP., 339

[339] RAMLOLL THACKOORSE,YDASS, and Others,-AppeZZamts; SOOJUMNULL

DHONDMULL and MOOLTAN CHUND CUPPOORCHUND,--Respot&dents *

[Feb. 22, 18481.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Judicature, Bmhbay.

By the common law of Eagland, in force in India, an action may be maintained

on a wager, although the parties had no previous interest in the subject-

matter on which it is laid, if such wager be not against the interest or feelings

of third persons, does not lead to indecent evidence, and is not contrary to

public policy [4 Moo. Ind. App. 3481.

The mere circumstance that a wager concerns the public revenue, or creates a

temptation te do a wrong, will not render it illegal [4 Moo. Ind. App. 3491.

A wager upon the average price which opium should fetch at the nest Govern-

ment sale at Calcutta, the Plaintiffs having to pay the Defendants the differ-

ence between such price and a sum named, per chest, and the Defendante

having to pay the difference between such price and the sum so named, if the

price should be above that sum ; is not an illegal wager, or contrary to public

policy, though the proceeds of the opium sold a t Calcutta formed part of the

Government revenue. ! h e Judgment of the Court below, holding such wager

illegal, reversed.

The Statute, 8 and 9 Vict., c. 109, amending the law relating to games and wagers,

does not extend to India [4 MOD. Ind. App. 3491.

This was an action on proniises, brought by the Appellants in the Supreim Court

of Judicature a t Bombay, against the Respondents. The declaration or plaint

contained seven counts. The first count was for breach by the Defendants, of a

proniise made on the 24th of October, 1846, whereby, in consideration [340] that

the Plaintiffs, at the request of the Defendants, then promised the Defendantb

to pay the Defendants within a reasonable time after notice of the first

public Government sale of opium, to take place at Calcutta, next after

the making of the said promise, such a sum of money as should be

equal to five times the amount of the difference between the average

price of one chest of Patna opium, of the opium to be sold at such first

public Government sale, (to be calculated according to the actual price which the

whole amount of Patna opium, which should be sold a t such first public Government

sale, should be sold for and realize,) and the sum of Rs. 1395, if such average should

be less than the sum of Rs. 1395 per chest, the Defendants promised the Plaintiffs

to pay the Plaintiffs, within a reasonable time after notice of such first public

Government sale of opium a t Calcutta, such sum as should be equal to five times the

amount of the difference between the sum of Rs. 1395, and the average price of one

chest of Patna opium, of the opium to be sold a t such first public Government sale,

to be calculated as aforesaid, if such average should exceed the sum of Rs. 1395 per

chest.

The remaining six counts were for breaches by the Defendants, to the same effect,

iipon similar promises, made on other dates.

To each of these counts, the Defendants filed a demurrer for the following causeb.

" That the Plaint is not sufficient i n law, and the Defendants, according to the

iorm of the Statute in such case made and provided, state and show to the Court

here, the following causes of demurrer to each and every of the several counts of the

said plaint, that is to say, that it does no t appear in the several counts, [M1] by

whom the opium in the several promises in the Plaint mentioned was to be sold, or

to whom the said opium belonged, or what certain quantity of opium was to be sold

nt the several sales, in the promises in the Plaint respectively mentioned, or withi11

what certain period o r time the said several sales were to take place, or what ab

Feveral counts in the Plaint, stated with sufficient certainty, and does not appear

* Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-Lord Langdale, Lord Campbell,

the Right Hon. Dr. Lushington, and the Right Hon. T. Pemberton Leigh.

Privy Councillors,-Assessors,-Sir A. Johnston, Knt., and Sir E. Ryan. Knt.

729

IV DBOORE IND. APP., 342- RAMLOLL ~ H A ~ ~ O O R ~ ~ Y D A ~ ~

therein how, or in what inanner, or on the price of what certain opium the averages

in the promises in the Plaint respectively mentioned, were to be calculated. The

~ e f e n d a n t s intend to argue, that the wagers declared on a re illegal and void,

because they have a tendency to interfere with a public sale, in which neither the

~ ~ a ~ n t i ~ s nor De~endants had any interest ; because the wagers have a tendency to

diminish the public revenue, by creating a n iaterest in the Defendant*, to exert

~ ~ i e ~ ~ s e ~ v ~ in reducing the price of opium, at the sales, in the Plaint ~ ~ l ~ t ~ o ~ l e d ;

because the wagers bring into discussion the public revenue of India, at the instance

of parties who are not shown to have any. interest in the subject Olf the wagers, or

any right to bring the revenue into discussio~ ;because the wagers have a tei~dency

to affect unduly., public markets and pricm; and because the wagers are against

p u ~ l ~ c policy; also that the p~omiaes in the Plaint ~ e n t i o n e d , were void by reavm

cf the infancy of one of the Plaintiffs, and that the Supreme Court is precluded from

~ n t e ~ ~ a i ~ ~ i i i ~ questions of reve~ue.”

The Plaintiffs having joined in deniurrer, the ~auie was argued on the 22nti.

23rd and 24th of Febsuary [m] 1541, before S i r D. Polloek, Chief Justice, and Sir

E. Pwry, Puisne Judge.

The learned Judges differed in opinion; Sir E. Perry being of opinion, that the

~~ppe l l an t s were entitled to recover ; the wager declared upon, being legal. Sir

David Pollock was of a contrary opinion, aa such contract tended to interfere wit‘i

the price of opium i r k the i i ~ a s ~ e t , and was, therefore, contrary to public policy, and

Ire gave judgment for the Defendants, on the demurrer, ordering each party tu pay

7 heir own costs.

From this decision the P ~ a i n t ~ ~ s in the Court beluw appealed to Her Xajesty i T r

Council.

Sir F. Kelly, end Mr. Peacock, for the Appel~ant.-The simple point in this case,

is, whether, according to the principles of the common law of England, prevailing

and in force in India, the contract made between the parties is a legal and ~ i n ~ i ~ ~ g

contract.--[lord Campbell: Is not this, i n form and substance, a wager on the price

of opium? It cannot be said to be a mercantile transaction.]--We admit tkitt.

upon the record, it, must be taken as a wager cor~tract : and the question then i6,

whether as a wager, it is a good contract in law. It is admitted that the late

~ . ~ a ~ n b l ~ K ~ ~ Act, 8 and 9 Viet., e, 109, does not extend to India. A wager i s not, pi*

SP. illegal. at coniinon law, and it lies on the Defendants, who resist i ts enforceuient,

to show that this is not good. The exceptions are, where the wager is p r o i ~ ~ ~ ~ t e d

by. Act of Parliament, or has a tendency to injure the feelings of private individuals,

no t parties to the contract ; or if the contract be against [343] morality, decency,

or tending to a breach of the peace. done.? v. ~~~~~~~ (Cowp. 37) ; &E Costa V. Jones

tCowp. 729) ; Good v. BEiott (3 Term. Rep. 693) ; and B1l.n v. Uecrra (1 Term. Rep.

56). Unless, t h ~ ~ e f o r e , the wager in this case, falls within one or other of these

objections, it i s valid. It can only be argued against this wager, that it holds out a

t e i n p t a ~ ~ o i ~ . to tlie parties intereated, to commi~ a fraud, in depreciating or en-

hancing the prices of opium in the market.-[lord Campbell: We are i r & to

presume that a fraud will be perpetuated; it is not necessary for the legality of a

rhai there should be no t e ~ p t a t j ~ n to c o m ~ i t a wrong.]--ln the of

.Ifa~cii v. I*igot (8 Burr., 2803)) it was held that the circumstance of there being ltii

in~ucenient o kill, or shorten a life, tvould uot make the wager bad. So agaiii, in

~ ~ ~ Z b e r t v. S y h s (16 East, 150), the wager, on the life of Napoleon Bonaparte, was

held bad, not on the ground that it was an ~nducement o procure the a s s a ~ s ~ I ~ a t ~ o n

of the Emperor, but that it was against public policy, that foreign Sovereigns should

Ire able to complain, that a subject of this country had laid a wager favouring their

~s sas s i~a t ion . It i s well settled that t ir~ie-~~argains the EngIish funds were good,

Iry the c0?11fxnon law, prior to the Statute, 1 Geo. 11,, e. 8 ; that being so, why should not

this wager, which is a time bargain, be good? It may have been, at one time, ~h

question whether that Statute extended to foreign funds. In ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ? . ~ ~ v. P&mr (4

Scott, 230), it was held, that a wager on the price of foreign funds was legal. That

rase i s in accordance with Wells v. Potstev ( 2 Bing. N.C. 722), ~a~~ v. Rir~by (2

Bing. N.C., 732); the law [3M] is, th~rcfore, settled that wagers, as to the price of

foreign funds, are legal. In ~~a~~ v. Jorres (5 Nee. and Wel. 71), a wager as to the

%cquittal or discharge of B prisoner, on t r ia l on a criminal charge, was declareZ

730

The appeal now came on for hearing.

E. SOOJUMNULL DHONDMULL [ 18481 IV MOORE IND. APP., 346

illegal, on the ground that, according to the ordinary course of things, the wager

gave an interest to one of the parties, to do what would be against his duty. The

principle laid down in that case was this, that a man should not be allowed by a

wager to acquire an interest in doing what was contrary to his evident duty.

Atherford v. Beard (2 Term. Rep., 610), which was a wager respecting the amount of

hop duties to be collected, was decided on the ground that individuals having nothing

t o do with t.he affairs of Government, as the collection of the revenue, should not make

wagers upon the amount of revenue in a particular department, because it would

lead to an improper discussion, and was contrary to sound policy. It is no objection

to a wager that it may have some connection with the revenue. It is only bad where

the wager cannot be determined without doing that which is against public policy.

This was expressly decided, by Lord Ellenborough, in Movtimer v. Sa?keZd (4 Camp.

42). It was urged by the Defendants below that the wager in this case was illegal,

because the parties to the wager had no interest in the subject-matter of the wager.

This position is distinctly displaced by the decisions (see cases collected in 1 Marshal1

on Insurance, p. 119) prior to the 19 Geo. II., c. 37, which decided that a party

might insure a ship in which he had no interest. Craufurd v. Hunteir (8 Term. Rep.,

83). A contract for sale is not bad, merely because

the party who is to [345] deliver the goods at a future day is not possessed of the

goods, and has no reasonable expectation of heing possessed by the day named.

Hzhbleiohite v. M'iCloriozte (5 Mee. and Wel. 462). From these cases, the following

conclusions are to be drawn : That a wager is only bad a t common law, where, by the

ternis of the wager. the object is illegal or immoral, or where it can only be deter-

mined i~pon the result of inquiries which it is against public policy to allow, or

where the wager itself places the parties in a position where their interests are

immediately in opposition to their duties. I n the present case there was no natural

tendency arising from the wager, either to raise or depress the prices of the

Government sales of opium, and it can only be argued as to its invalidity by reason

of there heing a natural tendency one way or the other. We submit, therefore, first,

that the several promises declared 011 are legal, and do not interfere with or influence

public sales, o r prejudicially affect the public revenue of India: secondly, that the

promises declared on are in no respect contrary to public policy, or have a tendency

for either party to violate public morality.-[Lord Campbell : Both the parties to the

record are Hindoos, and, as such, under the Charter of Justice, the contract may be

governed by the1 Hindoo law; do you raise any question on that point?]-None,

The contract has been treated in the Court in India, as one of English law.

Mr. Serjeant Channell, and Mr. Smirke, for the Respondents.-The cause of

action is founded on a mere wager, and not upon any bona fide contract for the sale

of opium, [346] the parties to the wager having no interest in the subject-matter of

the wager. The event of the wager was subject to be determined or influenced by the

acts of the Plaintiffs, viz., by bidding an excessive price a t the opiuin sales. We

admit that the Statute, 8 and 9 Vict., c. 109, does not apply to India, neither do we

deny that a wager may be good by the common law, but the omus is not thrown upon

us to bring this wager within any particular class. It is enough for us to show that

this wager has a tendency to work injuriously to individuals, and that it is not

necessary to assume that the party will so act as to cause a wrong. This wager

clearly affected, or had a tendency to affect, the sale of a Government commodity:

it concerned a branch of the public revenue of the East India Company (Bengal

Reg. XIII. of 1816), received aud appliud by the Company in trust for the Crown,

for the Government of India. It was admitted in the argument below, on both sides,

that the Court wa6 bound to take notice that the wager concerned the public revenue.

Such a wager is, therefore, illegal and void, on the ground of public policy, and

especially on the ground that i t gives one of the parties to it an immediate interest

in diminishing the revenue arising from Government opium sales. The Govern-

inent must be desirous that every sale should be conducted so as to be fa i r to the

public, fa i r to the trade, and fair to itself. The case of Bryan v. Lewis (Zyan a d

dloody, 386), shows that to make time-bargains invalid, it was not necessary that the

articles bought and sold should in any way belong to the Government.-[Lord

Cainpbell: Where there is a contract for goods to be delivered on a given day, a t a

given price, that is not what is properly called a time [%7] bargain. What is

73 I

Goss v. Withers (2 Burr. 683).

IV MOORE IND. APP., 348 RAMLOLL THACKOORSEYDASS

generally understood as such, is where there is a fictitious sale of goods, a t a

particular price, and an agreement to pay or receive the difference between that

price, and the price a t which the goods shall be, on a particular day.]-It was the

evident interest of one of the parties to this contract to depress, and of the other t o

raise, the price of opium: we submit that it is against public policy that public

auctions should be tampered with. The case of Mortimer v. SaJkekF [4 Camp. 421,

relied on by the other side, has no bearing on the present question : i t merely decided

that dealings in lottery produces were not within the stock-jobbing Acts. Neither

is the case of The Earl of March v. Pigot [5 Burr. 28031, considered as an authority.

Eltham v. Kingsman (1 B. and Ald. 683). The Kimg v. Berenger (3 Mau. and Sel.

67). Upon the whole, we submit that no wager relating to a subject-matter of State

is legal. Neither is a wager, with respect to the subject-matter of which the parties

have no interest, and that no action can be maintained on such wager. Murrey V.

Kelly (cited Selwyn N.P. 1411 (11 Edit.). Z'hov-&on v. Thackray (2 Y. and J. 156).

Harrtley v. Rice (10 East, 22). Squires v. Thi sken (3 Camp. 140). Shirley v.

Sankey (2 Bos. and P. 130). Brown v. Liswn

(2 H. Bla. 43). Fisher v. WaEthain ( 4 Q.B. Rep.

889).

Mr. Peacock, in reply.-It cannot be maintained, that the mere circumstance

[%8] of a wager having a tendency to make a party act immorally, will vitiate the

wager ; if i t were so, prior to the Statute, 19 Geo. II., c. 37, all policies on ships, in

which the insured has not an interest, would have been bad, as tending to procure

the loss of the ship. So in the case of horse-racing, the legality or illegality of the

wager depends, not on whether the tendency was an injurious one, but only on the

circumstance whether the wager be for a sum of money less than ten pounds.

Ewans v. Jones (5 Mee. and Wel. 77).

Henkin v. Guevss (12 East, 247).

Pope v. St. Leger (Lutwyche, 484). Levi v. Levi (6 Car. and P. 239).

Lord Campbell (Feb. 28).-This was an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme

Court of Judicature, a t Bombay, holding, on a demurrer to a declaration, that

the contract therein set out was illegal, and could not be enforced in a court of

justice. The contract amounts to a wager upon the average price which opium

should fetch a t the next Government sale a t Calcutta, the Plaintiffs having to pay

the Defendants the difference between this price, and a sum named, per chest, if this

price should be below that sum; and the Defendants having to pay the Plaintiff the

difference between this price and tha t sum, i f this price should be above the sum.

We are of opinion that we must take judicial notice, that the opium to be sold

was the property of the Government of India, and that the produce was to form

part of the public revenue.

I regret t o say that we are bound to consider the common law of England to be,

that an action may be maintained on a wager, although the parties had no previous

interest in the question on which it is laid, if i t be not against the interests or feel-

ings of third persons, and does not lead to indecent evidence, and is [349] not con-

t ra ry to public policy. I look with concern and almost with shanie, on the subter-

fuges, and contrivances, and evasions, t o which Judges in England long resorted,

in struggling against this rule, and I rejoice that i t is a t last constitutionally abro-

gated by the Legislature, an event which probably would have happened much

sooner without the abortive attempts to accomplish the object by judicial decision.

The Statute, 8 and 9 Vict., c. 109, does not extend to India, and although both

parties on the record are Hindoos, no peculiar Hindoo law is alleged to exist upon

the subject: therefore this case must be decided by the common law of England.

On the part of the Defendants, the general rule, as I have stated it, is admitted ;

but they contend that this wager is illegal, on the ground of public policy, as i t

concerns the public revenue, and i t gives the Defendants an interest unduly to lower

the price, whereby individuals dealing in opium, and the East India Company, may

be injured.

We are of opinion that the mere circumstance that this wager refers to the

public revenue does not establish its illegality. The case about the hop duties,

Artherfold v. Benrd (2 Term. Rep. 610), and Shirley v. Sunkey (2 Bos. and Pul. 130),

proceed on the ground, that the wagers could not be determined without calling as

witnesses, officers of the Government, and making them disclose what had been the

amount of a tau within a particular district. A wager on the amount received for

732

'U. SOOJUMNULL DHONDMULL [1848] IV MOORE IND. APP., 3w

a tax, as it shall appear, in a return published by the authority of the House of

Commons, I think would have been free from legal objection.

But the great question here is, whether the wager [350] gave either p a d y a n

interest, which is to be considered injurious to individuals or to the Government.

We are of opinion, that, although, to a certain degree, it might create a temptation

to do what was wrong, we are not to presume that the parties would commit a

crime; and as it did not interfere with the performance of any duty, and as if the

parties were not induced by i t t o commit a crime, neither the interests of individuals

or of the Government could be affected by it, we cannot say that it is contrary to

public policy.

Suppose the wager had been laid in England within a month before the sale was

to take place a t Calcutta, I see no valid objection to its legality; for it could not by

possibility have affected the result of the sale; and I can see no difference, in point

of law, from the fact, that they were residing at Calcutta, where the wager was laid

and the sale took place.

The Defendants' Counsel mainly relied upon the case of Evans v. Jones (5 Mee.

and Wel. U), in which it was held, that a wager upon the result of a criminal tr ial

was illegal : but this proceeded upon the ground, that it gave the parties an interest,

a t variance with duties they might have to perform as witnesses, or prejudice in the

same manner as a wager, upon the event of a law-suit, would be illegal with the

Judge who had to decide it, or a wager on the result of a parliamentary election

with one of the electors.

Had the case of Gilbert v. Sykes (16 East, 150), respecting the life of Napoleon,

been decided on demurrer, or in arrest of judgment, it would have been an authority

of great weight in support of the doctrine, that a wager that has any tendency to

tempt a man to offend against the law is illegal. But we must recollect that it was

discussed on a motion for a new trial, [%I] after a verdict for the Defendant against

evidence, and that the Court was mainly influenced in refusing a new trial, by the

consideration, that, according to the evidence, the wager arose out of a conversation

respecting the probability of Napoleon being assassinated, so that it was considered

tantamount to a wager, that he would be assassinated within one hundred days. It

is likewise remarkable, that Mr. Justice Grose, who, when he differed with the rest

of the Court, was generally thought by the profession to be right, was of opinion

that this wager, under all the circumstances, was lawful, although he concurred in

refusing a new trial.

The doctrine contended for, is disproved by the consideration that time-bargains

in English funds were not unlawful till the Stock-jobbing Acts, although such bar-

gains gave an interest to raise or to depress the funds, injuriously to individuals

and to the State; by the consideration that before the 19th Geo. 11. [c. 371, a n iri-

surance on a British ship was lawful, although the party assured had no interest in

the ship, and had a temptation to contrive her destruction before she reached her

destination; and by the consideration, that before the Statute, 14 Geo. 111. [c. 481,

insurance6 on lives were lawful, without any interest in the life insured, although

as soon as the policy was executed, the party who had paid the premium had a

temptation to commit murder.

The danger of such speculations is illustrated by Lord Tenterden's ruling, that

a contract fo r the sale of goods, the seller not having any such goods a t the time of

sale, was void; whereas it must now be considered as settled, that not only such a

mercantile contract is valid, but that there was no illegality a t common law in a

time-bargain for goods a t home, [%2] any more than in a time-bargain for foreign

securities.

We were referred to the case of The King v. De Berenger (3 Mau. and Sel. 67),

to show the frauds which may be attempted, from the desire of gain in such specula-

tions ; but the Defendants' Counsel might as well cite the murders supposed to have

been committed a few years ago, which have been made the subject of a popular

novel, to show that insurance on lives ought t o be entirely prohibited. If the

doctrine contended for were established, i t ought to be followed up by an enactment.

that the life of the Queen (whom God long preserve) should never be introduced into

a lease, because by its introduction Her sacred person is endangered. But the law

believes that the awful penalties which i t provides, to enforce the dictaks of con-

733

Hibblewhite v. M'Morine (5 Mee. and Wel. 462).

IV MOORE IND. UP., 363

science and religion, will outweigh the temptation to commit spontaneous crimes,

for the sake of gain, where no conflict is introduced with a positive duty.

It is for the legislative Council of Calcutta to consider how far it may be con-

ducive to the benefit of our Indian empire, to introduce into i t the provisions of

the Statute, 8 and 9 Vict., e. 109.

We think that, by the common law of England, the wager in question is not

illegal, and may be enforced in a court of justice; and agreeing with Mr. Justice

Perry, we shall report to Her Majesty that, in our opinion, the judgment appealed

against, ought to be reversed.

SPOONER 0. JUDDOW [ 1848, 18501

[S.C. 6 Moo. P.C. 300. Wagers such as formed the subject of the above case were

prohibited by Act No. XXI. of 1848. See now Indian Contract Act (No. IX. of

1872), s . 30; and Kong Tee Lone and Co. v. Lozujee Nanjee, 1901, 17 T.L.R. 585.

See also Doolubdass Pettarnherdass v. RarntoTl Thackmrseyduss, 1850, 5 Moo.

Ind. App. 109 ; Rughoomuth Suhoi Chotayloll v. Manickchund, 1856, 6 Moo. Ind.

App. 251 ; and Juygomohun G?lose v. Manickciiund, 1859, 7 Moo. Ind. App.

263. ]

[353] RICHARD SPOONER and BOMANJEE NOWROJEE,-Appellants :

JUDDOW (Widow),-Respondent * [Feb. 19, 1848 ; Feb. 14, ISSO].

O n Appeal f r om the Supreme Court at Bombay.

By the Charter of Justice of the 23rd of December, 1823, establishing the Supreme

Court a t Bombay, that Court was prohibited (in like manner as the Supreme

Court a t Calcutta, under the 21st Geo. III., c. 70, s. 8) from entertaining any

jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, under the management

of the Governor apd Council, or any act done in the collection thereof.

In an action of trespass brought against the Collector of revenue a t Bombay,

for distraining for arrears of Government “ quit-rent,” the Defendant

pleaded “ Not guilty ” only. The Supreme Court at Bombay held, that the

“ quit-rent ” was not ‘( revenue ” within the meaning of the Charter, and

that the act complained of, was not warranted by the usage of the country

and the Company’s Regulations, and that the Court had jurisdiction to enter-

ta in the action ; and found for the Plaintiffs.

Held, reversing such finding and judgment,-

First, that the “ quit-rent ” was par t of the “ revenue ” of the East India Com-

pany a t Bombay [d Moo. Ind. App. 3791 ; and

Secondly, that i t being a matter concerning the revenue, and the collection

thereof, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, and that the Court being

excluded by the Charter from any matter concerning the revenue, the plea

of “ Not guilty )’ was sufficient, and that the Judge ought, a t the trial, to have

directed a non-suit, o r a verdict to be entered for the Defendants [d Moo.

Ind. App. 3781.

A plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the Court must point out another

Court before which the matter is cognizable. A plea in bar, if well founded,

is sufficient, without pointing out the Court in which the suit ought to

have been brought [4 Moo. Ind. App. 3751.

If a party bona fide, and not absurdly, believes that he is acting in pursuance of

a Statute, he is entitled to the special protection which the Legislature in-

tended for him, although he has done an illegal act [4 Moo. Ind. App. 3811.

The Supreme Court, in overruling the objections to the jurisdiction of the Court,

* Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-Lord Brougham, Lord Lang-

dale, Lord Campbell, the Right Hon. Dr. Lushington, and the Right Hon. T. Pem-

herton Leigh.

Privy Councillor,-Assessor,-Sir E. Ryan.

734

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