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Srimut Moottoo Vijay... v. Rany Anga Moottoo Na...

Privy Council
Jun 18, 1844
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This document contains portions of multiple reported appellate opinions concerning disputes over zemindary (landlordship) rights and related matters of succession, evidentiary proof, and the validity of wills and agreements. The principal and most fully reported matter concerns an appeal (Rany Anga Moottoo Natchiar, 1844) that arose from litigation in the Provincial Court for the Southern Division of Madras and an appeal to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, followed by an appeal to Her Majesty in Council.

In the Rany Anga Moottoo Natchiar matter, the respondent (Rany Briga Moottoo Natchiar), the fifth wife and eldest surviving widow of a deceased zemindar, sued for recovery of the zemindary as the sole and legal heiress in default of male issue under caste custom and Hindu law. The other parties included descendants and relatives claiming through a male line and asserting alternative bases of title (including adoption and alleged will). The Provincial Court initially dismissed the respondent's plaint; on appeal, the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut reversed and decreed in favour of the widow, awarding the zemindary to her and certain profits and costs. The Sudder Court's decision turned substantially on a finding that a division of paternal property between two brothers had occurred prior to the grant by government, which, under the pundits' exposition of Hindu law, determined succession in favour of the widow rather than male heirs.

After the Sudder Adawlut's decree, the appellant sought review on newly discovered documentary evidence (records alleged to show the brothers were undivided). The Sudder Court investigated and found alleged documents to be falsified, rejected the review application, and attached an extract to be sent with the appeal to Her Majesty in Council. The appeal to Her Majesty in Council was thereafter revived and heard. The Judicial Committee (including Dr. Lushington) considered whether the Sudder Adawlut had erred in deciding the case on a factual question (division) that had not been pleaded and on which evidence had been received without compliance with the Madras Regulation XV of 1816 concerning points to be raised and evidence to be taken.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the fact of a division of paternal (patrimonial) property between the two brothers was proved and, if so, whether that fact determined succession to the zemindary in favour of the widow rather than the male descendants.
  2. Whether evidence and findings on the question of division could properly be received and acted upon by the Sudder Adawlut when the fact of division had not been pleaded or made a distinct point in the pleadings, in light of Madras Regulation XV (1816).
  3. What effect should be given to an alleged Will and to a deed of agreement (both alleged to be forged by opposing parties) on the title to the zemindary?
  4. Procedural: whether, given procedural irregularities, the appropriate relief is to affirm a lower court decree, reverse the appellate decree, or to permit a fresh suit within a specified period.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued that the two relevant brothers (Woya Taver and Gowery Vallabha Woodia Taver) were undivided; consequently, on Gowery's death without male issue, the appellant — as eldest male descendant of the elder brother — was entitled to the zemindary.
  • The appellant contended that the Sudder Adawlut had decided against the facts and upon a question (division) not raised in the pleadings, contrary to the express provisions of the Madras Regulation XV of 1816 (the text sometimes referenced as Reg. SV., 1816, sec. 10, cl. 3, in the materials).
  • Following the Sudder Court's earlier refusal to grant review based on documentary evidence, the appellant sought to have the higher court examine whether the Sudder Court had properly handled the evidence and the review application.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (the widow) asserted that the zemindary was her proper inheritance under the customs of caste and the Hindu law of inheritance, relying upon adoption and succession principles as presented to the courts and to the pundits.
  • She maintained that the alleged Will set up by the defendant was a forgery and that she had consistently asserted her title, including immediate protest to the Collector after her husband's death.
  • The respondent denied that the documents subsequently produced by the appellant (records from the Zilla Court of Madura) were genuine and alleged those records had been falsified and interpolated to suggest an undivided family.
  • The Sudder Adawlut, relying on the evidence (including witness testimony and corroborating circumstances), found that partition had occurred and that the widow was entitled; she relied on that finding in opposition to the appellant's claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
3 Moo. Ind. App. 293–294 (as cited in the record) Example where, because of a miscarriage and because the conditions of the Regulation were imperative, a decree of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut was reversed; leave was given to institute a fresh suit within three years. The opinion refers to this decision to illustrate that, in prior instances, reversal coupled with leave to institute a fresh suit had been granted where procedural or regulatory imperatives required it.
3 Moo. Ind. App. 317–318, 323 Under Mahomedan law, continual cohabitation and acknowledgment of parentage is presumptive evidence of marriage and legitimacy. The principle is cited in the later Khajah Hidayut Oollah discussion as authority for presuming marriage and legitimacy from continual cohabitation and acknowledgment of parentage.
Unspecified prior "decisions of this Court" concerning sunud-i-milkeat-i-istimrar grants That prior decisions of the Court treat the grantee of the sunud-i-milkeat-i-istimrar (deed of permanent lordship) as holding the zemindary as self-acquired property (i.e., grant viewed as act of government will, not strictly hereditary). The Sudder Adawlut relied upon that line of decisions to frame questions to the pundits and to consider the legal nature of the zemindary (self-acquired or not) when resolving succession.
9 Moo. Ind. App. 539; 11 Moo. Ind. App. 50; L.R. 2 Ind. App. 169; L.R. 8 Ind. App. 99 These citations are provided as references to subsequent litigation connected with the same subject-matter (the Shivagugna case and related proceedings). The Court's opinion notes these citations for further reading on subsequent litigation but does not rely on them as decisive authority in the present reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Note: The materials contain two layers of appellate reasoning — (A) the reasoning of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut that originally reversed the Provincial Court and (B) the reasoning of Her Majesty's Judicial Committee on the subsequent appeal. Both are summarized below in the order presented in the opinion.

A. Sudder Dewanny Adawlut (as recited in the record)

  • The Sudder Court examined the factual evidence, including direct testimony that purported to show that the two brothers had divided their paternal property (a partition said to have occurred in 1792) and various corroborating facts (allocation of talook, separate residences, treatment by the Government at the time of a grant in 1801, impressions of adoption, and conduct indicating separate interests).
  • The Court weighed witness testimony, accepting the direct evidence for the Plaintiff and finding much of the defendant-side testimony to be undermined by demonstrable falsehoods and contradictions (including assertions that were "notorious falsehoods").
  • Relying on the answers of learned pundits applying Hindu law (citing texts such as Vrihaspati, Nareda, Smriti Chandrika, and others), the Sudder Court concluded that if a division of paternal property had taken place, then the widow would succeed to a self-acquired estate in preference to collateral male heirs. The Court therefore found the widow entitled to the zemindary.
  • On the issues of an alleged Will and a deed of agreement (both alleged to be forged), the Sudder Court concluded the Will was likely a fabrication (observing the improbability that the zemindar would have made such a disposition earlier rather than at his last moments, and that he was in a condition at the time that would deprive the Will of validity). The Court treated the deed of agreement as unnecessary to decide because, even if executed, it would not be binding against the widow whose legal right was deemed superior.
  • The Sudder Court therefore reversed the Provincial Court, declared the appellant (the widow) the rightful zemindar, awarded profits from the date of the original suit, and ordered costs against the opposing party.

B. Judicial Committee (Her Majesty in Council) — review of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut decision

  • The Judicial Committee examined the procedural record and focused on a single, decisive point: whether the fact of division (found by the Sudder Adawlut to be determinative of title) had ever been properly pleaded and made a distinct point in the pleadings in accordance with Madras Regulation XV (1816).
  • The Committee emphasized the mandatory character and importance of Regulation XV, which requires that the points on which evidence is to be taken be distinctly set forth, that the Court must record any further points on which evidence is to be taken, and that no exhibits or witnesses should be received except in proof or refutation of those declared points.
  • Because the pivotal factual question (division) had never been alleged as a point in any pleading, and because there was no satisfactory explanation for how evidence on that point came to be admitted, the Committee concluded that the Sudder Adawlut's decision rested upon material that had been admitted in breach of the Regulation.
  • Given the regulatory breach and the centrality of the division question to the Sudder Adawlut's decision, their Lordships considered it "indispensably necessary" to act in conformity with Regulation XV and therefore determined they could not sustain the Sudder Adawlut decision.
  • Nevertheless, the Committee declined to finally dispose of the matter in favour of the Provincial Court. Observing that the parties had "unfortunately lost their way" procedurally and that it would be unjust to finally determine the merits at once on that basis, the Committee reversed the Sudder Adawlut decree but granted leave to the respondent (the widow) to bring a new suit within a specified period (three years after the Decree is received and disclosed to the parties in India).
  • The Committee explained that the consequence was to preserve adherence to the Regulation while affording parties a fair opportunity to litigate the true points of controversy properly in compliance with procedural requirements.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reversed the Decree of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut (i.e., the appellate court decision that had awarded the zemindary to the widow) on the ground that the decisive factual question (whether a division of paternal property had taken place) had not been pleaded as required by Madras Regulation XV (1816), and evidence on that point had not been properly taken in conformity with the Regulation.

Implications and Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut's decision in favour of the widow was set aside. However, rather than finally affirming the Provincial Court's decree, the Judicial Committee granted leave for the respondent to institute a fresh suit within three years after the Decree is made known in India. Thus, the substantive dispute over title remained open to renewed, properly framed litigation.
  • Procedural principle reinforced: The opinion strongly reinforces the mandatory nature of Madras Regulation XV (1816) as to the necessity of clearly alleging the issues on which evidence is to be taken and not receiving evidence on unpleaded points. The Court stressed the importance of adhering to the Regulation to prevent confusion and to preserve regularity in proceedings.
  • No final determination on the merits: Because the Judicial Committee reversed the Sudder Court on procedural grounds and permitted a fresh suit, it did not make a final adjudication on the substantive question of succession (division) beyond holding that the Sudder Court erred in basing its decision on evidence admitted contrary to Regulation XV.
  • No new substantive precedent beyond procedural enforcement: The decision's principal legal effect in the provided text is to enforce compliance with Regulation XV rather than to establish a new rule of succession; the Court also acknowledged prior authorities on the legal effect of sunud-i-milkeat-i-istimrar grants and relevant texts of Hindu and Mahomedan law as part of its consideration of relevant legal principles.

If further elaboration of any particular segment of the opinion (for example, detailed examination of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut's evidentiary findings, the pundits' answers, or the forgeries inquiry) is required, please specify which aspect should be extracted in greater detail from the provided text.

Show all summary ...

SRTMUT TATER 9. RARY A. &I, NATCNfXR [18&&] 111 RQORE IND. APP., 271

concur with the Court below, in thinking that they are entitled to be i n d e ~ ~ ~ n i ~ e d ,

for the loss acoruing from the wrong done to them.

'&e A ~ p e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,

the Zemindar of ~ u r d w a ~ i , the original propr~etor and lessor, or the r e ~ r e s e ~ ~ t a t i ~ . e s

of Suroop Chund Roy, who form another set of I ~ e s ~ o ~ ~ d ~ n t ~ in this case ;Chund Rup

haring, on the dm'ch of the grantee of Skis lease, take11 a p t n y taloolr of the whole

ehtate of which this farm formed a part.

In the Provincial Court, and in the Sudder ildawiut, there has been xi3ucli lirigs-

tion on this point, and niucli evidence takcn, but it does not seem to their l~ordships

necessary to set forth the details of those proceedings. By the final j u d ~ ~ i e n t of the

Sudder Adawlut, the Zeniindar of Burdwan, the ~ p ~ e ~ ~ ~ n t , has bec decreed to itay

the damage which has accrued. He is the original and ~noving cause of a11 the I+)\.s

which has loefaIlen the Respondents. ~ ~ i t h o u t due regard to the contract he had

entered into, atid W h i k t &at contract was still s ~ ~ b s i s t ~ ~ i ~ , he demises to Chum? Rov

the whole eshte, iiicfuding. this farm, for an increased rental. Tl\e Xf~aha-raj~b

indeed contends that in the ~ a ~ o l i a t to Suroop Chund he had s t ~ ~ u ~ a t e d for the

observance of csisting leases, but Mr. Harington disposes of this argument by showi~ig

that tliir ~ t ~ I ) ~ ~ ~ a t i ~ n muid notz r e ~ s o n a b l ~ be extended to cover this grant : for, i f

the old lease merc to continue, tbers would be no source from which the new lessre

could fuffif his e r ~ ~ a g e ~ n e n t ~ as o a p r o h ~ ~ ~ t i n ~ clause, with regard to this lease

it is utterly at variance with the main case of the Mahha-raja, naniely, that the lease

had expired by the death of the lessee.

[27r] The Naha-raja has, 'cherefore, by his own acts, and through the medium of

others whoin he h w empowered to act, violated h i s own engagements, and thcrehp

ocensioned great loss to the Respondenb. For this loss their Lordships are of opinion

that the Xudder Adawlut h a w justly made him r~spoI~s~b€e. The a n ~ o ~ ~ r ~ t of tlir

dania-ges given appears to have been fairly fiwd, according to the increased rei&?

u-iiich the new Iessm undertook to pay; the Court below gave f o r the three years tlia

R e s p o n ~ e ~ ~ t s were dispossessed, 42,000 rupees, being the amount the new tenant

undertook to pay-certairi€~ not an ~ ~ o r b i ~ a n t estimate of the r e d Iobs. Their

Lordships are, therefore, of opinion th&t the Decree o i the Sndder Dewannr AdanIiit

must be affir ined. arid with costs.

[See Gobifid Lal! Eoy v. 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ " u ~a~~~~ Rvp C?mo

But a quwtion renlains, as to who is liable to make good this loss.

y, 1889, X.L.H. 17 Pale. 686 :

Wheeler'$ f ' t-ky ~~~~~~T La741, 1893, p. 664.1

12783 S R ~ M ~ T ~ ~ ~ U ~ T ~ U YIJAPA R A ~ 1~~~~~~ ~~~~E~~ ~~~~~~~~

FERIA K O 0 DI A ~ A ~ ~ E R * , - ~ z ~ / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ?at ; RAN Y' A RGA MOO TTOO N 81'

~ r A ~ , - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n ~ ~ ~ tfi [June 13.14, and 18,1844].

Oqa Appeczl from the ~~~~e~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a q ~ ~ ~ y Court nt .Vc&dms.

In a suit for possession of a zeniindar~, the P l a i i ~ t ~ ~ s title depended upon the

fa& of a division having taken place between the family. No averment crf

such division was made in the plaint, nor did the Courts in India, as r e t ~ ~ ~ ~ r e ~

by the Madras ~ e ~ ~ i ~ a t ~ o n SV. of 1816, sec. 10, make i t a point t~v be estal)-

lisbed, ~ ~ ~ o u ~ h s me evidence was given of the fact. &Id, on appeal, that

there had been a miscarriage, the conditions of the Regulation beiiig inipern-

tive, and the Decree of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut reversed [ 3 Moo. Ind.

App. 293-41.

But, as the parties had acted under 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ r e h ~ ~ s ~ o ~ of the ~ e ~ u ~ a ~ o r . leave

was given to institute a fresh d t ; within three pears [3 Moo. fnd. App. 2941.

* Presem : Members of the Judicial Co~nniittee,-~he Lord President, the Vice-

Chancellor ~ - ~ g r a ~ i , the Right Hon. &. Lushington, and the Right Hon. T. Pein-

berton Leigh.

Privy Cou~c~lIors,-A~sessors,-Sir E. 1%. East, Bart., and Sir E. Ryan, Knt.

503

" - - ~ _ x x

Tfrc sit it out of which ilie prqsent Appeal arose, was o r i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ y i ~ s t i t u ~ e d in the

l>rociitcial Court for the Southern Dixvision of Madras, by the Respondent Rany

Brtg:a &loottoo Natcbiar, the fifth wife and eidest survii-ing widow of the late Mootton

yijaya, ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 i a I i a d ~ i a Gowerv PallsLLlia Perria Woodia Taver, Zeniindar of Shim-

guaaa &ceased, against hloottoo Vij aya ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ a n ~ d l ~ a Bodtru Gooroo S ~ a ~ i ~ y I’erria

Woodia Tarer (since also deceased, aiid now represented by the Appellant), the so11

uf Moottuo \-acloog~~iadlia Tarer, and the great nephew of the deceased ~ e n ~ ~ i i d a r ,

Moottoo V i jaya ~ ~ ~ ~ a n a d ~ ~ a Gowery V ~ l l ~ ~ ~ ~ Yerria T ~ d i aT ser, for the

yecovery of the zemindary of S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ u ~ ~ g ~ . [2W] claimed by her as the sole mrd 1eg.i

l~eiress (being the senior surviving widow of Gowery ~ a l ~ a ~ ? ~ i a Woodia T’aver), in

default of male issue of the late Zeniindar, according to the customs of his caste,

nud the Hindoo law of inheritance.

The pliiint represeiited her claim to be, that ~ o o t t o o ~ 7 a d o o g a n a d ~ ~ ~ , tlie

Xerniiidar, xas upon his death succeeded by his widow, and that Iris widow adopted

the late ~ e r ~ ~ i n d ~ ~ , G o ~ e r y~ ~ a l l a b h a ~ ~ o o d ~ a Taver ; that ~ o w e r ~ ~ a ~ ~ a L l i u Woodia

Taver was placed in poswsjsioit of the zeniindary at the death of his a d q t e d mother ;

that lie xaz; ousted of that posjsessi~ri by ~ ~ u r d o o ~ a r ~ a c a r , and r e - in~ ta~ed by the

Govrrii twiit , and then invested with a permanent potta ; that a11 alleged Will of

. (;onery Vallablia Woodia Taxrer, Mlticli was set up by the Defe~~dant , and under

xd1ich he had procured himself to be put in possessiori of the zeiuindary by the

~ ~ n I ~ e c ~ o ~ , was a forgery ; and that she, the ~ ~ e s p o ~ ~ d e n t , had, iii an arzi, addressed to

the Collector on the third day after her husband’s death, protested against the

validity of the Will, and had insisted upon her own title to the z ~ ~ i n d a r ~ ; that in

ansver to certain takeeds, ~ o r ~ r a r d e d to her by the Cdlector, demariding to know

witether she was willing to admit the Will, she directed her son-in-law to w r i t e to the

Colleutor, and repeat the allegation that the Will was fabricated, and that she was

bcrself the legal heiress; and that she was info~med by her s o n - ~ ~ i - l a ~ that he had

accordingly addressed the ColIeotor to that effect, and that upon the possession being

c o ~ ~ i t t e d to Moottoo ~ a d o o g a Taver, she had sent her father to the Col~ector for

the purpose of inakiug the same re~reseii tat~on.

The aiisn-er of Bodha Gooroo Swaiuy Woodia Taver, @80] denied that the title

U € &\~;ery Tallablia was derived by adoption; and stated that W o p Taver and

~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ e r ~ ~ ‘ a ~ l a ~ ~ l i a Woodia Trier were co-heirs of the z e ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ d a ~ ~ y , w h i c ~ i was ~ ~ i d ~ v ~ s ~ ~ l e ,

red upon his own right, in effect, on the ground-first, that the original

I Tt’oya Taver, and was not pre~~idiced 1)s the potta issued to Covrerp

Vdlablia Koodia Tarer ; secondly, that he was the eldest rrrale heir of the deceased

~ ~ i I I i I ~ d ~ ~ : thirdly. that the effect of the Will, in the c o n t i n ~ ~ ? n c ~ wliicli had

I~a~peIied, was to vest the title in Lim; and, fourthly, that the acquiescence and

acknomledgiiierit of the Respondent, as shown by her arzi to the Collector, nrtd her

;tcceptance of a provision from Moottoo Vadooga Taver out of the xeinindary, had

de^^ her from d i s ~ ) u t ~ ~ i g the d i s ~ o s i ~ ~ o n s which the Will had made.

?‘he reply of the Respondent deiiied die authority of the Will, and of the other

~ ~ ( ~ e u ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ s which had been adverted to in the answer of the ~ e f e i ~ d a n t ; and the

Respondent insisted that the zeiuiiidarp vas not h ~ I ~ e d ~ t a r y , but was separatel?

acquired bp Gowery ~ a ~ l u ~ ~ ~ u ~ o o d i a Taver, and that us such separate a c q ~ ~ i ~ i t i o l ,

i~ belnuged to his widow, i ir preference to the male descendants of his brother.

Ti t t i l e almve p ~ o c e e d i ~ ~ s , no issue was raised as t o a divisiot~ of tlre c o t l i ~ l o ~ ~

~)ropr”‘p of the brothers, having t akeii place.

011 the 6th of DecenrLer, 1834, the ~ r o v i ~ ~ c i a l Court pronou~k~ed a Decree, dis-

dsUirtg the Respondent’s plaint with costs. Against this Decree the Respondent

,ippeaIed to the Sudder ~ e ~ a i ~ ~ y Adawllit. insisting on the same case as before, but

without raising any issue as to ~t division of property between the rot hers,

E2811 On the 17th of April, 1837, the Sudder Adawlut proceeded to pronounce

tlie €ollo~\ ing Decree :-

‘‘ In proceeding to de t e~ in~ne upon this claim to succeed to the ~ e ~ ~ ~ i ~ l d a ~ . ~ ~ of

S h i ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ g a , as between the Appellant (the present, R ~ ~ o ~ i d e n t ) , Anga moottoo

~ a t ~ h ~ a ~ , the sur vi vi^^ widow of the lu t e ~ e ~ ~ ~ d a r , ~ o o ~ o o Vijaya ~ a ~ 1 l ~ i ~ a d h a

Gomery Vallabha Pevria Woodia Taver, and the Respondent (the no\lr appellant^,

Hodha Goorno Smanw Taver, who has ~ u c ~ e e ~ e ~ , in the possessio^^ of that zemindarr,

his father, who was the son of the elder I w d e r nf the said deceased %niirrc.tnr. tllr

504

.’

'U. RANY ANGA MOOTTOO NATCHIAR [1844] I11 MOORE IND. APP., 289

Court deeni it proper to notice decisions of this Court, of which the effect appears to

them to be that the grantee of the sunud-i-milkeat-i-istimrar (deed of perinanent

Lordship) must be held to hold the zemindary, under that grant, as self-acquired

property. There is indeed in the present case especial ground, as obserred in the

question put by the Provincial Court to the pundits, for so regarding the tenure of

t h e above-named Zemindar, and that ground is mentioned in the Proclamation

of this Government, bearing date the 6th of July, 1801, which is an exhibit m

record.

" It is plainly deducible from Regulation XXV. of 1802, that previously to the

fixing of the permanent assessment, succession t o Lemindary tenures was not governed

exclusively by the laws of inheritance, but that the ruling power created, tolerated,

abolished, or disposed of these tenures, as might be considered most expedient for

the purpose of realizing the public revenue from the lands. It is clear, therefore,

that in rejecting the claims of the original Plaintiff, whatever might -be the specific

grounds of such rejection, and in granting the zemindary to the original Defendant,

the [282] British Government exercised a right which, according t o the declared

usages of the country, was vested in the ruling power.

" Other decisions on claims to zemindaries have gone to affirm the decision that

the grant of the sunud-i-niilkeat-i-istimrar was in each instance an act of the mere

will and pleasure of the Government, irrespective of the rules of hereditary succes-

sion, and the Court contemplating therefore the property conferred by that sunud

as the self-acquired property of the original grantee, put the following questions to

the pundits of the Court with reference to the claim under consideration. Ques-

tion :-

(' 1. A. and B. were brothers, of whom the younger, B., acquired, without the aid

of any paternal property, a distinct and separate estate, in which A. was not entitled

to, and did not participate. A. died, leaving a son, and afterwards B. died. leaving

a widow and daughters, but no son, son's son, or son's grandson. Upon B.'s death,

under the foregoing circumstances, is his widow entitled to succeed t o his said estate,

or is the son of A. entitled to succeed thereto, in preference to B.'s wido\T?

" (The authorities for the answer to the above question to be stated at large.)

'' Answer. If A. and B., the Brothers, had not divided their common property,

acquired by their father, or paternal grandfather, or others, ths son of A., the elder

brother of B., is entitled upon B.'s death to succeed t o the estate mentioned in the

question, which was acquired by B. himself.

" 2. If A. and B., the brothers, had divided their coiniiion property acquired by

their father, or paternal grandfather, or others, the widow of B. is entitled to [283]

succeed to his self-acquired estate mentioned in the question.

'' Authorities are,-The text of Vrihaspati, and the commentary thereof, on the

subject of the right of succession to the estate of one who leaves no inale issue, in

the law-books called Smriti Chandriki Madhaviyam, etc., Dharnia Sastras. It must

be undcrstood that the widow has this right in case of her husband being separated

from his co-heirs. Accordingly, Vrihaspati declares the several kinds of property

received in mortgage, etc. the (jaya) wife shall take, with the exception of real

property, in cases of divided family. The meaning of this text is explained by

the author of Smriti Chandrika as follows: (The widow) shall in cases of divided

family take the whole estate, real and personal, received in mortgage, etc., belonging

to her husband. By the term ' divided family,' it follows, that in the case of un-

divided family, the wealth of a person who died leaving no male offspring, shall

devolve solely upon his father, brothers, etc., who lived together.-The term (jaya)

means the wedded wife; the passage, ' with the exception of real property.' regards

the widow who has no daughter.

" 2 . The text of Nareda and its commentary on the subject of the right of

succession to the estate of one who leaves no male issue in the lam books called

Vyahavahara, Myukha, etc., Dharma Sastras, Xareda says, ' Aniong the brothers,

if any one die without issue, or enters a religious order, let the rest of the brethren

divide his wealth, except the wife's separate property. Let them allow a mainte-

nance to his women for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord.

If they behave otherwise, the brethren may resume that allowance.' ' This." Madana

505

111 ~~~E IND. APP., 284

sap, [2$4] ' relates to the widow of 8x1 undivided or re-united brother, since it is

read under that head.'

'' 3. The commentary on the test of ~agnyawalkya, declaratory of the right of

l%*idow, daughter, etc., to inherit the estate of one who leaves no male issue, inserted

in clause 39, section 1, chapter 11, of the law-book called 34itacskam, ' Therefore it

i s 8 settled rule, that a wedded wife being chaste, takes the whole eatate of a man,

aho. being sep~ra ted from hi8 co-heirs, and not s ~ b s e ~ u e n t l y re-united with them,

dies leaving no male issue.'

* ' The answer of the pundits makes the decision between the parties to this appear

dependant on the fact of there having been o r not been a division of paternal

property between the Iate Zernindar and his elder brother.

"The Provincial Court have assumed the negative of this question, but on

w h . t ~ r @ u ~ ~ d ~ does not appear, for the Decrees of that Court take no notice of the

evidence i ? r o d u c ~ by the parties in the original suit on this point.

'' The Court are of opinion, that the direct evidence to the fact of a partition of

p a t r i ~ o n i a ~ property between the said two brothers, in the year 1792, including

the ' cavel ' land a t ' Padamattoor,' which i s given by witnesses for the Plaintiff in

the original suit, is entitled to mueh consideration.

" It is incidentally mentioned in the course of that evidence, that the late usurper

of the estate deprived the younger brother of the share which fell to him upon that

i )~r t i t ion , a circumstance accordant with what i s stated in Mr. G. A. ~ u g ~ ~ e s ' s

to the treatment which he had received from the ' Murdoo family.'

The whole tenor of Mr. G. A. Nughes's evidence tends to strengthen the

presumption of the separation of the brothers. The facts of the allotment$ by the

younger brother to the elder, of the talook of Padamattoor, of the latter's doing

homage with other head inha~i tan ts on the occasion of his younger brother's in-

vestiture as Zemindar in 1801, of the fostering care extended by the late Rany to

the y o u n ~ ~ r brother, which induced a general im~ressiun of his claim to be her

s~iccessor, and would seem to have given rise to a belief of his adoption by her, all

tend to corroborate the direct evidence to the state of separation between the

brothers, previously to the grant of the zemindary by the Government, to the

husband of this Appellant.

" Of the state of division as between the said Zemindar and the descendants of

his said elder brother, there is strong evidence, deducible from their having lived

separately, having i i ~ a n ~ f e s t 1 ~ no c o ~ n i u n ~ t y of interest whatever ; and also from

the circumstances out of which the suit in the Provincial Court arose, and the t e r m

of the ruzinama in which that suit resulted.

" It is also worthy of observation, that while the direct evidence to the fact of

partition i s thus corroborated by facts, proved by other and independent evidence,

the tes~in~ony of the witnesses for the ~ e f e ~ ~ d a n ~ in this suit, who deny tire fact of

such division, and assert in contradictiori of the witnesses on the opposite side, that

the two brothers lived and pei.formed their religious ceremonies together, is shaken,

and their ~?re te~i~ions to credit are, inde~Y3, destroyed, by their having deposed to

notorious falsehoods, such as that the elder brother, on whom the ~ e ~ ~ n d a r y had

E2861 been conferred by the Government, gave it to the younger; that the two

brnthers managed the zetnindary jointly, and that the younger held it as the elder's

agent (' Kariastan ').

'' Upon the whole it appears to the Sudder Adawlut, that the fact of the division

is proved, and that' cons~uent ly , accord~r~g to the foregoing exposition of the Bindoo

Law by the pundits, the widow of the late Moottoo Vijaya Raghanadha Gowery

Vallabha Perria Woodia Taver, Anga Moottoo Natchiar, is entitled to succeed to

the zemindary, as the rightful heir of her said husband, in preference to the

dewendants of his elder brother.

" It remains for the Court to decide upon tBe effect of the Will alleged to haye

been executed by the said late Z e ~ i n d a r in favour of the father of the ~ e s ~ ~ o n d e r ~ ~

in this Appeal, and of the deed of a ~ r e e ~ i e n t dated the 29th of July, 1830, p u r ~ o r t ~ r ~ ~

to be executed by the Ap~~ellant, in cunjunct~on with two other widows of her deceased

h u s ~ a n ~ .

' 'As to the Will, there is in corroboration of the evidence to its fraudulent

fahricatinn, the obvious circumstance of the extreme improbability that the

506

S ~ I ~ U T M. PERRIA WOODIA TAVER

21. RANW ANGA MOOTTOO NATCBIIAR [ 18441 111 HOORE IND. APP., 281

Zemindar, had he intended to make such a disposition, would have put it off until

his last nioments. The Court of Sudder Adawlut, moreover, believe the evidence,

which shows that at the time of the alleged execution of this Will, the said Zeinindar

was in such a condition as tu deprive it of ail legal validitp.

" In the deed of agree~ient above m~ntioned, it is declared that the obligee and

'h is posterity shall enjoy the zemindary by the right which he possesses, and by

virtue of the T i l l left in his favour by the late Zemindar,' and the three widows

agree to receive certain villages E2871 described as granted by the other party for

their maintenance.

" The Appellant denies having been a party to the said agreement, which she

avers to be a forgery ; but it appears to the Sudder Court that i t is unnecessary to

pass any determination on that point, because in their opinion, even if she did

execute that deed, it is in no way binding upon her, whose legal right to succeed

as tfie heir of her late husband was preferable to that of the party to whom it was

executed, and in whom the ternis of the deed presuppose that a valid title vested at

the time of its execution.

Error, a3 well as ignorance of right, renders a contract or agreement irivrtlid,

by invalidating the assent given to it, and the Sudder Court entirely coneur in the

following erva vat ions by Sir Thomas Strange, in his ' Notes of Cases a t Madras,'

viz.,-A native woman is ' under the special protection of the Court, entitled to the

benefit of that principle, which in equity, subjects to be regarded with peculiar

jealousy all transactions with persons, whom the policy of the law considers io be, a t

the time, incompetent to maintain their own right, and to exact for theinselves

justice. d native woman can never be deemed sufficiently sui juir&, t o be held bound

by her personal acts, if there exists the slightest reason to apprehend, that advantage

map have been taken of her.' Again ; ' A Court udministering

Hindoo Law must, to do justice, often interpose between a native woman and her

acts, as Courts of Equity do at home, in all cases, betweeh persons standing together

in certain specified relations, giving to the one a presumed advantage over the other.'

(Vol. 11. p. 159.)

" In the present case, supposing that. the AppeIlant [288] did execute the deed

of agreement, it appears to the Court that there is the strongest reason to apprehend

that advantage was taken of her.

' The opposite party had obtained and held for more than a year, possession of

the zemindary. The Appellant's ignorance of her own right is presuinable from her

not then inipugning his, and acquiescing in his usurpation; by this deed, moreover,

she is made to accept a grant of villages belonging to the estate to which she is

herself entitled, and on this consideration admits the usurper's title.

" For the foregoing reasons, the Sudder Court resolve to reverse the Decree of the

Provincial Court in the original suit, and do adjudge the said Appellant, Anga

Moottoo Natchiar, to be the rightful Zemindar of Shivagunga ; and, on the principle

of the rule laid down in the circular order of the 22nd of October 1829, the Court

do award to tha said Appellant, in addition the said zernindary, the aniourit of tfie

profits thereof, from the date of the institution of the original suit to this date,

which amount the Provincial Court of Appeal will ascertain by the best procurabIe

evidence.

" And the Sudder Court do further adjudge that the Respondent in the Appeal

(the present Appellant) shall pay all costs of suit in this Court and in the Pro-

rincial Court."

On the 25th of September 1837 a motion was made before the Sudder Court by

the Appellant for a review of judgment, whereby he alleged that he had lately dis-

covered further documentary evidence, consisting of the records of the Zilla Court

of Madura in former suits by the late Zemindar, which would prove that the late

Zernindar and his grandfather were undivided brothers.

E2891 This application for a review of judgment was met by a counter- eti it ion

of the Respondent. She also presented a further petition, stating that the docu-

ments forming part of the Record of the Zilla Court of Madura, referred to by the

Appellant in his petition for a review of judgment, as establishing that the late

Zernindar and his grandfather were an undivided Hindoo family, had been falsified,

507

(Vol. 11. p. 16.)

I11 MOORE IND. APP., 290

and that important erasures and interpolations, changing the whole context and

meaning of the pleadings, had been made.

The Sudder Court, on these representations, ordered the documents, forming

part of the record above alluded to, to be transmitted to them, and directed the

attention of the Acting Zilla Judge to those parts of the documents which declared

that the brothers were undivided, and required him to state whether there were

any grounds for the assertion that there had been fraudulent alterations.

Evidence having been taken, and a report made in pursuance of the above Order

to the Sudder Court, respecting the documents in question, that Court, after a

minute examination of the circumstances, pronounced the documents to have been

falsified, and expressed itself of opinion that " more palpable or more infanlous

forgeries than those exhibited in the originals never were detected, and never came

before a Court of Justice; and as the falsities they contain could benefit no other

person in existence than the Respondent, and as he, well knowing their falsehood,

availed himself of them by filing authenticated copies to deceive this Court, i t

appears to the Court morally certain that the forgeries in the originals were

perpetrated with his knowledge and by his agents.

" The Court had not the slightest hesitation in reject-[29O]-ing the Respondent's

application for a review of judgment, and i t was thereby rejected accordingly; and

they further directed that an extract from the proceedings be annexed to the record

of the suit, and submitted to Her Majesty in Council, with the appeal mhirh the

Respondent had preferred from this Court's Decree against him."

The Appellant afterwards applied for and obtained leave to appeal from so much

of the above decree of the Sudder Court of the 17th of April 1837 as related to the

suit originally brought by the present Respondent, to Her Majesty in Council.

Fending this gppeal, and on the 10th day of January 1841, the original Appel-

lant died, leaving Srimut Moottoo Vij aya Raghanadha Gowery Vallabha Perria

Woodia Taver and Namaseva Taver, his undivided brothers, and a widow, Magamoo

Natchiar, him surviving.

On the 1st of February 1541, Srimut Moottoo Vijaya Raghanadha Gowery

Vallabha Perria Woodia Taver, the present Appellant, presented a petition to the

Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, reporting the death of his brother, and praying to be

admitted to prosecute the Appeal, which, after an inquiry directed by the Court,

he was ultimately allowed to do.

These further proceedings having been transmitted to England, the Appeal was

ordered by Har Majesty in Council to be revived against the Respondent.

The Appeal now came on for hearing.

Mr. Kindersley, Q.C., Mr. Wigram, Q.C., and Mr. Jackson, for the Appellant ;

and [291] Mr. Burge, Q.C., Mr. E. J. Lloyd, and Mr. Edmond F. Moore, for the

Respondent.

It was argued by the Appellant, that Woya Taver and Gowery Vallabha Woodia

Taver were undivided brothers, and, therefore, Gowery Vallabha Woodia Taver

having died without male issue, the Appellant, as the eldest male descendant of

Woya Taver, was entitled to the zemindary. That the Sudder Adawlut, in holding

that Woya Taver and Gowery Vallabha Woodia Taver were divided brothers, decided

not only against the fact, but upon a question not, raised on the pleadings in the

cause, and contrary, therefore, to the express provisions of the Madras Reg. SV. of

1816, sec. 10, cl. 3.

SRIMUT M. PPRRIA WOODIA TAVER

The Right Hon. Dr. Lushington (June 18, 1844).-The present litigation is

between the widow of the party who was last seised of the zernindary, and his great

nephew, and various suits appear to have been instituted with regard to the rights

to this property and the claim of the parties put on various grounds, but their

Lordships are of opinion that the whole question is now narrowed t o a l-ery short

point.

In the Provincial Court, certainly, some notice was taken of the question whether

any division had actually been proved to have taken place between the two brothers

or not, and the Provincial Court were of opinion that there was not satisfactory

evidence to establish the fact of the division. But when the Appeal came to be

brought before the Sudder Adawlut, that Court cane to a contrary conclusion, and

508

1). RANY ANGA MOOTTOO NATCHIAR [ 18441 111 MOORE IND. UP., 299

decided this case in favour of the widow, on the express ground that the two brothers

had become divided, and that, in [292] consequence, this property, whether self-

acquired property or not, according to their opinion and judgment, would belong

to the widow, and not be inherited by either of the brothers or the nephew or the

great nephew.

With regard t o the question of law, as f a r as the opinion of the pundits could

determine it, there seems to have been no difference; they have all stated in sub-

stance to this effect; that the right and title to the zemindary depended on the fact

of division, and the fact of division therefore was, and is, a must substantial question

to be determined in this case. Now their Lordships find, upon an examination of

all these proceedings, that the fact of the division has never been alleged in any of

the pleadings. They find that, according to Regulation XV. of 1816, the division

ought to have been made a distinct point in the cause, and that an order ought to

have been given for the production of evidence in proof of such an averment.

Then it comes to tKs, that there has been no such averment, no such point made,

and no such direction given, and how it was that the evidence came to be taken on

the one side, or on the other, with respect to the question of division, no satisfactory

explanation has been afforded a t the Bar.

Now their Lordships entertain a very strong conviction of the absolute necessity

of adhering to this Regulation ; for i t is, in the first place, a Regulation emanating

from the highest authority, and is entitled to the force of law; and is, in the second

place, one, in their Lordships’ judgment, of the utmost importance for preserving

the regularity of the proceedings of the Court in that Country, and for preventing

constant confusion and uncertainty as to what really are or are [293] not the points

in litigation, and to which the evidence is to be directed. They conceive that this

Regulation has been most wisely framed ; first, in affirmatively directing that the

points on which evidence is to be taken shall be distinctly set forth, and that it

shall be a duty imposed on the Court, if those points do not appear to be sufficient

for the final termination of the litigation, that they should state distinctly, as a

matter of record, the further points on which evidence is to be taken. Further,

the Regulation, after having thus affirmatively stated what is to be done, goes on

to state what shall not be done. “ In like manner, i f proof shall be required on any

other points in the course of the trial, such points shall be recorded on the proceed-

ings, and the proper party shall be called upon for the requisite evidence, and no

sxhibit shall be filed, or witnesses summoned, unless expressly declared to be in

proof or refutation of some point upon which the Court may have directed that

evidence should be taken.”

Now this Regulation, important as it is, and most clearly expressed, points

directly against the course which has been unfortunately adopted in this case;

because the point on which the whoie case turns, and in the opinion of the Sudder

Dewanny Adawlut, beyond all question, the whole case was decided, never was

alleged as a point, in any of the proceedings, and the evidence which was read in

support of i t never was directed or sanctioned by the Court.

It is in the opinion of their Lordships, therefore, indispensably necessary, for

the purpose of supporting and securing the compliance with this most wholesome

Regulation, that they should act in conformity with this Regulation ; the inevitable

consequence is, that [294] they cannot sustain the decision of the Sudder Adawlut,

because i t is upon the ground of that point, as the point of division alone, on which

that judgment rests.

But, looking at the whole of these proceedings, they do not think that it would

be consonant with justice a t once to reverse the Decree of the Court below, and to

affirm the Decree of the Provincial Court: they think that the parties have un-

fortunately lost their way, and on that mistake and misapprehension it would be

going too far finally to dispose of the case now.

For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the Decree of the Sudder

Adawlut must be reversed, but that leave should be given to the Respondent to

bring a new suit, notwithstanding the Decree of the Provincial Court, at any time

within a period presently to be specified, and after full communication of Her

Majesty’s Order in Council shall have been made to the parties interested; and

though their Lordships can make no Order on that subject, i t would be exceedingly

509

I11 MOORE IND. APP., 296 KHAJAH BIDAYUT OOLLAH

desirable that it should be known to all those who are interested in this property,

that the question of fact as to division or no division, appears to be the orlly point

on which the main question of title to this property will ultimately depend. We

think three years is a proper time after the Decree is received in India and dis-

closed to the parties.

[For subsequent litigation in connection with the same subject-matter (commonly

referred to as The Shivagugna Case), see 9 Moo. Ind. App. 539; 11 Moo. Ind.

App. 50; L.R. 2 , Ind. App. 169; L.R. 8, Ind. App. 99.1

[295] KHAJAH HIDAYUT OOLLAH,--AppeZlant; RA1 JAN KHANUM,--Re-

spomdevzt-* [Aug. 1, 2, 18441.

O n Appeal from tJie SuddPi. Uewanny Adawlut a t Bengal.

By the Mahornedan law, continual cohabitation and acknowledgment of parentage

is presumptive evidence of marriage and legitimacy [3 Moo. Ind. App.

317-8, 3231.

The original parties to this Appeal were the widows and son of Fyz Ali Khan,

deceased, and the subject iii dispute was the right of the Respondent, Rai Jan

Khanum, as widow, suing for herself and on behalf of her son, Saadat Ali Khan, a

minor, for Rs. 188,525. 8 anas, 9 gundas, being a 15-ana share, the alleged amount

of their succession on a distribution according to the Mahomedan law of inheritance

of the real and personal estate of the late Fyz Ali Khan.

The following facts and circumstances gave rise to the Appea1:-

Fyz Ali Khan, deceased, was the Zemindar of kismut pergunna Atya, and other

real and personal property.

In the month of Phagoon 1203 (7th March 1797, A.D.), Fyz Sli Khan intermarried

with the Respondent, Rai Jan Khanum, who was then about ten or twelve years

o i age.

The marriage was celebrated in the presence of wit-[296]-nesses, and on the same

day Fyz Ali Khan, as it was alleged, executed a deed of marriage settlement, endow-

ing the Respondent with a dower of 2000 gold mohurs and 21,000 sicca rupees, thc

payment of a third of which was to be postponed as long as the marriage should

remain in force.

After the celebration of the marriage, the parties cohabited together as husband

and wife, and were so universally acknowledged and reputed by their neighbours

and acquaintances.

In the year 1215 (1808-9, AB.), the Respondent, Rai Jan Khanuni, gave birth to

a daughter, the issue of the marriage, which survived but a short time.

In the year 1813, A.D., Fyz Ali Khan was about to be married to the original

Appellant, Shums-oon-Nissa. The Respondent, Rai Jan Khanum, opposed this second

union, and she presented a petition to the Zilla Court of Mymensing, setting forth

the conditions contained in her marriage deed of settlement, and praying that her

husband might be prevented from granting a deed of marriage settlement without

her concurrence. On this occasion no question was raised as t o Rai Jan Khanum

being the wife of Fyz Ali Khan, but (apparently on the ground of Rai Jan Khanuni

not being entitled to require the interposition of the Court) the petition was, by

an Order of the 11th of December 1813, rejected; and on the 16th of December

1813 a marriage was celebrated between Fyz Ali Khan and Shums-oon-Nissa, and a

marriage settlement was thereupon executed in her favour by Fyz Ali Khan. Both

* Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-The Lord President, the Vice-

Chancellor Knight Bruce, the Right Hon. Dr. Lushington, and the Right Hon. T.

Pemberton Leigh.

Privy Councillors,-Assessors,-Sir E. H. East, Bart., and Sir E. Ryan, Knt.

510

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