Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Lalit Kumar v. Saroj Kumari

Delhi High Court
Mar 24, 1969
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary — Opinion by V.S. Deshpande, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by a tenant against concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Rent Tribunal directing the tenant's eviction. The eviction was ordered on the ground that the respondent-landlord required the premises bona fide for her own residence and had no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation within the meaning of proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("the Act").

Relevant facts as found in the opinion: the respondent is a deserted wife and a midwife by profession. She acquired the premises in 1962 while she was occupying rented accommodation for which she paid Rs. 35 per month. In 1963 she let the acquired premises to the appellant (tenant) at a contractual rent of Rs. 60 per month. Relations later became strained. The appellant applied to the Rent Controller for fixation of the standard rent, and the respondent filed a petition for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal residence. Meanwhile the standard rent for the premises was fixed at Rs. 35 per month (the same amount the landlord paid for her rented accommodation).

The sole legal question identified by the court was whether the respondent-landlord satisfied the requirements of proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The Rent Controller and the Rent Tribunal had ordered eviction, and the appeal challenged those concurrent findings. The opinion was delivered by V.S. Deshpande, J., who dismissed the appeal and allowed the tenant two months to vacate, making no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the premises were "required" by the landlord for occupation as her residence within the meaning of proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the landlord's requirement was "bona fide" — i.e., genuinely needed and not motivated by extraneous considerations such as re-letting for higher rent.
  3. Whether the landlord had "no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation" available to her (including whether the rented accommodation she occupied was reasonably suitable).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The principal argument urged against the landlord's claim was that when the landlord acquired the premises in 1962 she did not occupy them but let them to the appellant; that conduct gives rise to a presumption she was satisfied with her rented accommodation at that time.
  • Implicit in that position was the contention that, ordinarily, if a landlord lets her own house and continues to live in rented premises, she must show a change in circumstances to justify a subsequent desire to occupy her own house.

Respondent-Landlord's Position (as found and relied on by the court)

  • The landlord asserted a genuine need to occupy the premises for her own residence: she was a deserted woman who required a decent residence appropriate to her status and the protection such a residence affords.
  • She explained that she let out the premises originally to obtain rent that would cover her rent for the accommodation in which she was then living; after the tenant applied for fixation of standard rent she feared the contractual rent might be reduced and therefore sought possession so she could live in her own house instead of continuing to incur rent.
  • The landlord pleaded that her current rented accommodation was one room (allegedly with a tin roof) and therefore physically and economically unsuitable compared to the premises let to the tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the three elements of proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 in sequence: (1) that the premises are "required" by the landlord for occupation as a residence; (2) that the requirement is "bona fide"; and (3) that the landlord has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation.

1. Meaning of "required"

  • The court interpreted "required" to mean that the landlord is in actual need of the premises for residence — an objective question to be judged by the Rent Control authorities and, if necessary, by the court.
  • The need must be based on "hard reality," not mere sentiment, fanciful desire, or opinion; it should be assessed by reference to the facts of the case and by the standard of a reasonable person, taking into account the landlord's particular circumstances.
  • Applying that test, the court accepted that the respondent, being without the protection of her husband and in need of a decent residence, had a legitimate aspiration to live in her own house rather than continue in rented accommodation.

2. Change of mind after letting out the house

  • The court acknowledged the general presumption that a landlord who lets out her house and continues to live in rented accommodation was satisfied with that accommodation at the relevant time, and that a later change of mind normally requires evidence of changed circumstances.
  • However, the court recognized that this rule is not absolute: a landlord may have let the house for reasons (for example, to obtain income sufficient to pay her own rent) even while being uncomfortable in rented accommodation.
  • The court accepted the respondent's explanation that she let the premises to earn rent to cover her rented accommodation and that the tenant's application for fixation of standard rent changed the economic calculus and justified her changed decision to occupy her own house.
  • On that basis the court found the landlord did "require" the premises for residence.

3. Meaning of "bona fide"

  • The court treated "bona fide" as having two aspects: (a) the need must be genuine (not frivolous), and (b) the landlord must not be motivated by extraneous considerations such as an intention to recover possession only to re-let the premises at a higher rent.
  • Objective considerations determine bona fides. The court found that the landlord's need was genuine and that there was nothing to show an intention to re-let the premises for higher rent — especially because the standard rent had already been fixed, preventing immediate advantage from re-letting at a higher contractual rent.
  • Consequently, the court concluded the requirement was bona fide.

4. No other reasonable suitable residential accommodation

  • The court observed that "other reasonable suitable residential accommodation" includes rented accommodation which the person has the legal right to occupy (i.e., protected by the Act).
  • The landlord pleaded that her rented accommodation consisted of one room with a tin roof. The Rent Controller conducted a spot inspection, concluded the accommodation was one room, and inferred the landlord had to live and cook in the same room.
  • The tenant did not plead that the landlord had additional accommodation. The Rent Controller preferred the landlord's evidence over the tenant's on the spot inspection — a factual finding supported by cogent evidence.
  • The court found that the rented accommodation was materially worse than the premises in question; it was extremely uncomfortable and inconvenient (e.g., single room with cooking in same space, and a tin roof in Delhi's summers), and thus not reasonably suitable.
  • Economic considerations reinforced this conclusion: the landlord paid Rs. 35 per month for the cramped rented accommodation while the same amount represented the standard rent of her own house. Shifting to her own house would not increase her net outgoings but would improve comforts.

On the totality of these findings, the court agreed with the concurrent findings of fact and law made by the Rent Controller and the Rent Tribunal that the landlord satisfied all the requirements of proviso (e) to Section 14(1) of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was DISMISSED. The court agreed with the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Rent Tribunal directing eviction of the tenant on the ground that the landlord bona fide required the premises for her own residence and had no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation.

Direct consequences and remedial directions:

  • The eviction order in favor of the respondent-landlord was upheld.
  • The appellant-tenant was allowed two months' time to vacate the premises.
  • The court made no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies an objective standard to the assessment of "requirement" and "bona fide" under proviso (e) of Section 14(1) and confirms that economic and physical suitability of alternative accommodation are relevant factors. The opinion does not state that it establishes any novel legal principle beyond applying these standards to the facts, and it does not purport to set a new precedent.

A.N.K — Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

V.S Deshpande, J.:— This is a tenant's appeal against the concurrent orders of the Controller and the Rent Tribunal ordering his eviction from the premises on the ground that they are required by the respondent-landlord bona fide for her own residence and that she has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation within the meaning of proviso (e) to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called “the Act”).

The facts are not really in dispute. The respondent-landlord is a deserted wife and a midwife by profession. She acquired the premises in 1962 when she was occupying rented accommodation paying rent of Rs. 35/- per month. She nevertheless let out the premises to the appellant in 1963 on a monthly rent of Rs. 60/-. The relations between the parties later became strained. The appellant applied to the Rent Controller for fixation of standard rent and the respondent filed a petition before the Controller for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that the respondent wanted the premises bona fide for her own residence. The standard rent has, in the meanwhile, been fixed at Rs. 35/- per month, that is at the same figure at which the landlord has to pay for the rented accommodation in which she is living. The sole question for decision, therefore, is whether the respondent-landlord has satisfied the requirements of proviso (e) to sub-section(1)of Section 14 of the Act. I shall deal with each of these requirements one by one.

The premises were admittedly let by the respondent-landlord to the appellant-tenant for residential purposes and it is not disputed before me that the respondent-landlord is the owner of the premises.

The first aspect of the question in dispute is whether the premises are “required” by the landlord for occupation as a residence for herself. The word “required” means that the premises are needed by the landlord. That is to say, the landlord, in fact, is in need of the premises for her residence and that her desire for the premises is not merely fanciful or unjustified by some other reason. The need of the landlord is the sole justification of the requirement of the premises by her. This need, in my view, is to be judged as an objective fact by the Rent Control authorities and, if necessary, by this Court. The need is based on a hard reality. It is not a question of sentiment or desire not based on reality. Nor is it a question of opinion whether the opinion is of the landlord or of the Rent Control authorities or of this Court. On the contrary, the need is to be assessed on consideration of the facts of each case and according to the standard of a reasonable person. The standard of the need would, of course, vary according to the circumstances of each case and of the special particulars of the need of the landlord in a particular case. The respondent is already without the protection of her husband. She is in need of a decent residence suitable for her status in life which will give her the protection needed by a single woman as to her residence. The desire to live in one's own house and to abandon the rented accommodation is a legitimate aspiration which has to be given effect to by the Rent Control authorities and by this Court unless there are reasons to show that this desire is unjustified in any particular case.

The only reason urged against this aspect of the claim of the respondent-landlord is that when she acquired the premises in 1962 she did not occupy them herself, but leased them to the appellant-tenant. Ordinarily, a landlord, who prefers to stay in a rented accommodation and lets out her own house to a tenant, would be presumed to be satisfied with the rented accommodation. If she had not been so satisfied, she would not have rented house to a tenant. If she changes her mind later and wishes to evict the tenant from her own house, ordinarily she would have to show that circumstances have changed in the meanwhile, which justify the change of her mind. That is to say, though she was satisfied with her rented accommodation when she let out her own house to the tenant, the conditions are altered and she is not now satisfied with the rented accommodation and is now justified in desiring to live in her own house. This rule is, however, not an absolute one. There can be cases in which a landlord may let out his own house to a tenant, though the landlord is not really satisfied or comfortable in the rented accommodation. For instance, the landlord may wish to obtain such rent for her own house as would enable her to pay the rent of her accommodation and leave her a margin of profit. We cannot shut our eyes to this aspect of human nature. It cannot also be said that there is something inherently bad in a landlord doing so. It is obvious to me that this was precisely the reason why the respondent-landlord let out her own house to the appellant-tenant, while continuing to reside in the rented accommodation. As soon as however, the tenant made an application for the fixation of standard rent, the landlord feared that the contractual rent may be reduced and it would not be worthwhile for her to continue in the rented accommodation and forego the comforts of living in her own house. This explanation of the conduct of the landlord in changing her mind appears to me a good and sufficient explanation. I am satisfied, therefore, that the landlord “required” the premises for her own residence.

The next question is whether she required the premises “bona fide”. The meaning of “bona fide” in this context appears to be twofold. Firstly, her need must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one. It cannot be disputed that she genuinely needs her own house to reside in it. She cannot be blamed if she prefers to live in her own house rather than in a rented house. The second aspect of the bona fides is that the landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant on a higher rent. The provision made in Section 19 of the Act for the restitution of the possession to an evicted tenant in such a case would bring out this meaning of bona fide. There is nothing to show that the landlord intends to relet to a tenant on a higher rent. For, the standard rent of the premises has already been fixed and she cannot now think that she can get a higher rent by reletting the same premises. The bona fides of the landlord is also to be determined objectively by these considerations. The mere fact that the relations between the parties were strained or that the tenant had applied for the fixation of standard rent would not deprive the requirement of the premises by the landlord of its bona fides. The motives of the landlord are not relevant in this connection. It is the hard objective need and the legitimacy of the purpose which have to be seen. It is clear, therefore, that the premises are needed by the landlord bona fide.

The last requirement to be satisfied by the landlord is to show that she has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation. Such accommodation would include rented accommodation, inasmuch as a person has a legal right to hold the rented accommodation from which he cannot be evicted by the landlord except under the provisions of the Act. The rented accommodation in her possession was pleaded by her to be one room with a tin roof. The tenant did not plead that she had more accommodation. The Rent Controller actually inspected the accommodation in the possession of the landlord and came to the conclusion that it was one room only. He inferred, therefore, that she has to live and cook in the same room. The Rent Controller did not state in the spot inspection report that the room has a tin roof, but the learned counsel for the respondent stated at the Bar that this was so and expressed his readiness to have the accommodation seen again by another Commissioner to prove this point. The spot inspection of the Rent Controller enabled him to believe the evidence of the landlord and her witnesses in preference to the evidence of the tenant and his witnesses. This is a finding of fact, which is based on good evidence. On this finding it is clear that the accommodation in possession of the landlord is much worse than the accommodation afforded by the premises let out by her to the tenant. It must be extremely uncomfortable for a person to live in a single room with a tin roof in Delhi, which has a long summar. It is also very inconvenient to live and cook in the same room. It cannot be said, therefore, that the rented accommodation of the landlord is reasonably suitable for her.

The suitability of the rented accommodation can be judged not only by the physical sufficiency and the comforts of the accommodation, but also by economic considerations. The landlords is paying Rs. 35/- per month as rent for the said accommodation. For the same rent her tenant is enjoying much better accommodation. There is no reason why the landlord should continue to suffer not only physical discomfort but also economic loss and why she should not have her own house so that she can get better comforts by spending the same amount of money, viz. Rs. 35/- per month. She would be saved from the payment of the rent and she would also lose exactly the same amount of income, if she shifts from the present accommodation to her own house.

I, therefore, agree with the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal and dismiss the appeal, but make no order as to costs. I also allow the appellant-tenant two months, time to vacate the premises.

A.N.K Appeal dismissed.