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Bani Kanta Das And Another v. State Of Assam And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by Smt Jayanti Das and Shri Bani Kanta Das, challenges an order of the Governor of Assam commuting the death sentence of Rajnath Chauhan alias Ramdeo Chauhan to life imprisonment. The death penalty had been imposed by the trial court for the brutal murder of four members of a family, affirmed by the Gauhati High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. After dismissal of the review petition, the Governor’s order of commutation—communicated through the Secretary, Judicial Department—was issued. The petitioners contend that the commutation relied on recommendations from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and was issued without recorded reasons.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the NHRC possessed statutory jurisdiction under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 to entertain a complaint (suo motu or otherwise) and recommend commutation of a sentence confirmed by the Supreme Court.
- Whether the Governor’s order commuting the death sentence without disclosing or recording reasons is legally sustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments
- No reasons were supplied for the commutation despite the heinous nature of the crime and prior judicial affirmation of the death sentence.
- The commutation order appeared to rest solely on NHRC’s recommendation, which itself was beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.
- The accused had engaged in dilatory tactics to delay execution of the lawful sentence.
NHRC’s Position (through counsel)
- Claimed the initiation was suo motu and permissible under Sections 12(a), 12(b), 12(j), 13 and 18(1) of the Protection of Human Rights Act.
- Suggested that the Commission could requisition judicial records and make recommendations “for the protection of human rights.”
State of Assam’s Position
- Asserted that factors beyond NHRC’s recommendation were considered, yet the commutation order itself did not articulate any of those reasons.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramdeo Chauhan alias Rajnath Chauhan v. State of Assam, (2000) 7 SCC 455 | Factual backdrop: decision confirming the death sentence. | Referenced to show that the prisoner’s conviction and sentence had attained finality in judicial proceedings. |
| Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8 SCC 161 | Clemency orders must rest on legitimate, relevant reasons even if those reasons are not communicated to the convict. | Invoked to hold that the Governor’s order, devoid of recorded reasons, fell foul of constitutional requirements. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Arijit Pasayat examined whether NHRC’s intervention was sanctioned by the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. The Court observed:
- Section 17 permits inquiry only into alleged human-rights violations perpetrated by an identifiable violator against an identifiable victim. NHRC failed to identify any violator; its records even listed the Supreme Court’s judgment date as the “cause of action,” implying the Court itself had violated human rights—an untenable position.
- Sections 12(a) and 12(b) allow NHRC to act on a “direction or order of any court” or to “intervene in any proceeding with approval of such court.” Neither condition was satisfied.
- Section 13 empowers the Commission to requisition records but does not authorise it to review or overturn judicial decisions.
- Reliance on Section 12(j) (“such other functions”) could not expand jurisdiction contrary to the express scheme of the Act.
- Consequently, the Commission’s proceedings were ultra vires and its recommendations “non est.”
Turning to the Governor’s order, the Court cited Epuru Sudhakar to underscore that, although reasons for clemency need not be disclosed to the prisoner, they must nonetheless exist and be demonstrable if the order is judicially challenged. The impugned order was silent on any such reasons, rendering it arbitrary. The State’s submission that other considerations were examined could not cure the absence of recorded reasons.
Holding and Implications
The Supreme Court set aside the Governor of Assam’s order commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment and directed fresh consideration of the convict’s mercy application.
Implications: The death sentence presently stands, subject to a legally compliant reconsideration by the constitutional authority. The judgment clarifies that (i) NHRC cannot intervene in or review final judicial orders absent statutory authority, and (ii) executive clemency must be supported by legitimate, articulable reasons, reinforcing transparency and accountability in the exercise of constitutional mercy powers.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 has been filed by Smt Jayanti Das, w/o late Jay Ram Das and Shri Bani Kanta Das, s/o late Jay Ram Das. Challenge in the writ petition is to the legality of the order passed by the Governor of Assam, conveyed by the Secretary, Judicial Department, Government of Assam. By the said order the Governor of Assam had directed to commute the sentence of death awarded to one Rajnath Chauhan @ Ramdeo Chauhan (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) to that of life imprisonment. The death sentence awarded to the convict by the trial court was confirmed by the Gauhati High Court and was upheld by this Court.
2. It is basically submitted that no reason has been indicated to direct such commutation and apparently the order of commutation had its foundation on recommendations made by the National Human Rights Commission (in short “NHRC”). It is basically stated that no reason was indicated as to why the Governor decided to commute the death sentence to that of life imprisonment when the accused was guilty of heinous, abominable crime where a family was massacred, and considering the nature of crime the death sentence as awarded by the trial court came to be confirmed by this Court and a review petition filed was dismissed. Four persons of a family were brutally murdered by the accused.
3. It is submitted that the accused has taken various dilatory steps to undo the effects of this Court's judgment. It is submitted that NHRC had no role to play but it went beyond its jurisdiction to recommend purportedly on the basis of a complaint made by Prof. Ved Kumari.
4. Before we come to the merits of the case as regards the requirement to record reasons, considering the important issue raised relating to the jurisdiction of NHRC, learned counsel for NHRC was directed to file a copy of the entire record of the case. Notice was also issued to Prof. Ved Kumari to have her say in the matter. Certain important aspects are there which need to be gone into some detail.
5. In her affidavit Prof. Ved Kumari has stated that she was not the complainant and the proceedings were initiated suo motu by NHRC. Though the records point to the contrary, learned counsel for NHRC stated that actually the proceedings were initiated suo motu by NHRC. The other question which then arises is did NHRC have any jurisdiction to make recommendation in the manner done?
6. To substantiate her stand that the proceedings were initiated suo motu, Prof. Ved Kumari has annexed to her affidavit a copy of the article “Has child been executed in India” and copies of certain correspondences. One of them is a letter dated 20-9-2000. The same reads as follows:
“National Human Rights Commission,20-9-2000
Sardar Patel Bhawan, Sansad Marg,
New Delhi 110 001
M.L Aneja
Joint Registrar (Law)
Dr. Ved Kumari,
G3/47 Model Town,
3rd Stop, Opp. Chhatrasal Stadium,
New Delhi
Madam,
Apropos my telephonic talk with you regarding handing over of a copy of the record of the Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2000 decided by the Supreme Court on 31-7-2000 in Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam (2000) 7 SCC 455, kindly hand over the same to the bearer of this letter.
As already informed to you on telephone that the matter will be listed before the Full Commission on Monday, 25-9-2000 at 3.00 p.m, I am directed to request you to kindly appear before the Commission in the conference room at Sardar Patel Bhawan on the date and time mentioned above for further consideration of the matter.
(M.L Aneja)”
Strangely this letter does not form part of the copy of the records submitted by NHRC.
7. Though Prof. Ved Kumari's stand was that the proceedings before NHRC were initiated suo motu, the verification of the records points to the contrary. In Form 1 under Regulation 12 in Para 3 it has been stated that “Is it a public interest complaint”. The name and address of the complainant is that of Prof. Ved Kumari. The name of the “victim” is stated to be Ramdeo Chauhan. In the order dated 25-9-2000 the name of the complainant is stated to be Prof. Ved Kumari. In the said order there is a reference that on 20-9-2000 a direction was given by the Chairperson to list the matter. This direction does not form part of the record. In the proceeding dated 27-9-2000 it is noted by NHRC that a mercy petition is pending consideration of the Government of Assam. Prof. Ved Kumari stated that she would also get in touch with an advocate and steps would be taken to move this Court also through a lawyer in the matter.
8. In the order dated 16-10-2000 the name of the complainant is stated to be that of Prof. Ved Kumari. In the letter addressed to Dr. Ved Kumari dated 20-10-2000 the subject is “Your complaint dated 20-9-2000”. Similarly, in the order dated 27-11-2000 the name of the complainant is stated to be Dr. Ved Kumari. Similar is the position in the letter dated 16-5-2001 where it is clearly stated regarding the complaint of Dr. Ved Kumari. Then comes the order of 21-5-2001 where it refers to the complaint made by Dr. Ved Kumari and NHRC referred to the order passed by this Court in the review petition and ultimately made the following recommendations:
“Accordingly this Commission makes the above recommendation in terms of the opinion of Thomas, J. for due consideration by the Governor of Assam and/or the President of India, as the case may be in the event of a mercy petition being filed for the purpose.”
9. The basic question raised is whether NHRC could have entertained any complaint either suo motu or on the basis of an application filed by any person in respect of a judicial order.
10. In the documents filed before this Court by NHRC as noted above the name of the victim has been stated and cause of action is stated to be the date of judgment of this Court i.e 31-7-2000 (2000) 7 SCC 455. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (in short “the Act”) was enacted for constitution of NHRC, for better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The expression “human rights” is defined in Section 2(1)(d) which reads as follows:
“2. (1)(d) ‘human rights’ means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India;”
11. Section 17 in Chapter IV deals with inquiry into complaints regarding violation of human rights. Obviously, there have to be at least two individual persons. One whose human rights have been violated and the other who has violated the human rights. It was pointedly asked to learned counsel for NHRC who has violated the human rights of the accused. An evasive reply was given that when any action violated the human rights, there can be violation of the human rights. This situation is not conceivable in law.
12. Since the date of cause of action was indicated to be the date of this Court's judgment, it was pointedly asked to learned counsel for NHRC as to whether the Judges of the Supreme Court or the Court itself had violated the human rights. Here again an evasive reply was given stating that under Section 13 i.e “powers relating to inquiries” there is power of requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office. This is not the same thing saying that by an order of this Court there has been violation of human rights. Such a position can never be countenanced.
13. Learned counsel for NHRC also referred to Section 18(1) dealing with steps during and after the inquiry. Specific stress is led on the recommendation to the Government or authority concerned. That clause has absolutely no application to a case of the present nature.
14. Reference was also made to Section 12 (Functions of the Commission); more particularly clauses (a) and (b). The provisions do not provide any answer to the questions involved. Clause (a) authorises action to be taken on the basis of a direction or any order of any court. In the instant case there was no such direction. Clause (b) permits intervention in any proceeding “with approval of such court”. That also is not the situation here.
15. Learned counsel for NHRC also referred to Section 12(j) of the Act contending that the Commission shall perform all or any of the functions i.e such other functions as it may consider necessary for the protection of human rights. According to the learned counsel since there were certain observations by one of the Hon'ble Judges in the review petition, therefore the Commission had the rights to do it. Here again, the submission is without substance because the proceedings itself before NHRC were without sanction of law.
16. Therefore, NHRC proceedings were not in line with the procedure prescribed under the Act. That being so, the recommendations, if any, by NHRC are non est.
17. The State of Assam has indicated that not only the recommendations of NHRC but several other aspects have been taken note of. But the order directing commutation does not indicate any reason. This is contrary to what has been stated by this Court in Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P (2006) 8 SCC 161 In para 38 it was observed as follows:
“38. The same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order.”
Apparently, in the instant case that has not been done.
18. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment and direct reconsideration of the application filed by the accused for commutation of sentence. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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