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Satish Kumar Jhunjhunwala v. The State Of West Bengal Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Mar 11, 2008
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Employees Provident Fund Organisation lodged multiple FIRs against the petitioners, alleging criminal breach of trust under sections 406/409 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for failing to deposit Employees' and Employers' Provident Fund contributions with the appropriate authority and misappropriating those funds. The prosecutions were initiated by Provident Fund Inspectors appointed under section 13 of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The revisional applications arose from these prosecutions, with the petitioners challenging their liability as directors under the criminal charges.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the directors of an establishment can be held answerable and prosecuted under sections 406/409 IPC for criminal breach of trust related to non-deposit of Provident Fund dues.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Supreme Court's decision in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. S.K Agarwal (1998 CRI LJ 4027) clarified that for prosecution under section 405 IPC, the term "employer" does not include directors.
  • The definition of "employer" in section 2(17) of the ESI Act, 1948, which excludes directors, cannot be borrowed for IPC prosecution since it is not incorporated in section 405 IPC.
  • Subsequent High Court decisions, including R.L Kanoria v. State and B.P Gopta v. M.L Goenka, have followed the S.K Agarwal ruling, holding directors not liable as employers under section 405 IPC.
  • The Bombay High Court decision in Shard Mittersatn Jain v. State of Maharashtra also supports that directors cannot be prosecuted as employers under section 406 IPC.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The definition of "employer" under section 2(e) of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, 1952 includes managers, managing directors, or agents, thereby allowing prosecution of directors for non-payment of Provident Fund dues.
  • The Special Bench decision in Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India emphasized that the term "employer" is a legal fiction to identify the person liable for recovery of dues under the EPF Act, supporting prosecution of directors.
  • The EPF Act is a social welfare legislation, and liability for PF dues extends to those in control, including directors.
  • The State argued that the criminal proceedings should not be quashed at this stage as the charge sheet has been filed after investigation completion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Employees State Insurance Corporation v. S.K Agarwal, 1998 CRI LJ 4027 The word "employer" under section 405 IPC does not include directors; thus directors cannot be prosecuted under this section. The Court held this Supreme Court decision as binding and dispositive on the issue, holding prosecution of directors under sections 406/409 IPC as illegal.
R.L Kanoria v. State, 2003 C Cr LR (Cal) 341 Followed the S.K Agarwal ruling that directors are not employers under section 405 IPC. Reinforced the principle that directors cannot be prosecuted as employers under IPC breach of trust provisions.
B.P Gopta v. M.L Goenka, 2000-I-LLJ 1138 Confirmed that directors are excluded from the definition of employer for prosecution under section 405 IPC. Supported the petitioners' position based on S.K Agarwal.
Shard Mittersatn Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2004-II-LLJ 369 Held that directors cannot be held responsible as employers under section 406 IPC for breach of trust. Cited by petitioners to argue that prosecution of directors under IPC is impermissible.
Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2005 (3) CHN 428 Explained the definition of "employer" under the EPF Act as a legal fiction to identify the person liable for dues recovery. Respondents relied on this to argue directors can be prosecuted under the EPF Act but Court found it not applicable for IPC prosecution.
Rabindra Chamaria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1992 SC 3980 Discussed responsibility under sections 14A and 14(1A) of the EPF Act for non-payment of PF dues. Court noted this decision is in a different context and does not apply to prosecution under IPC sections 406/409.
State of Harayana v. Bhajanlal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 Guidelines for quashing criminal prosecutions only if no prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed. Applied as a procedural standard for considering quashing of the proceedings.
R.B Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 Guidelines on quashing criminal prosecution. Used alongside Bhajanlal to frame the standard for quashing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that the sole legal question was whether directors can be prosecuted under sections 406/409 IPC for criminal breach of trust regarding Provident Fund dues. The Court examined the definition of "employer" under various statutes and the Indian Penal Code. It noted the Supreme Court's ruling in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. S.K Agarwal that the term "employer" under section 405 IPC does not include directors, and this interpretation is binding. The Court distinguished the context of the EPF Act, where "employer" may include directors or managing agents, from the IPC provisions, which do not incorporate such definitions.

The Court further clarified that the decision in Rabindra Chamaria related to different provisions of the EPF Act and did not affect the interpretation under IPC. The Special Bench decision cited by the respondents was also found not to assist in expanding the scope of "employer" for IPC prosecution. Applying the principles from State of Harayana v. Bhajanlal and R.B Kapoor v. State of Punjab, the Court concluded that the prosecution against directors under sections 406/409 IPC did not disclose a prima facie cognizable offence as per the binding Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the prosecution was deemed illegal and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

The revisional applications are allowed, and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners as directors under sections 406/409 IPC are quashed.

The direct consequence of this ruling is that directors cannot be prosecuted under sections 406/409 IPC for failure to deposit Provident Fund dues, as they do not fall within the definition of "employer" under the IPC. The Court emphasized that prosecution under the special Provident Fund legislation remains possible but was not initiated in these cases. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the binding authority of the Supreme Court's interpretation in S.K Agarwal.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

All the revisional applications are being disposed of by a common Judgment and order because the parties are the same and common question of law and fact has arisen.

2. Employees Provident Fund Organisation lodged a good number of FIRs before the Police station concerned against the petitioners alleging offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under sections 406/409 IPC in respect of diverse sum of money by not depositing the Employee's and Employer's Provident Fund Contribution with the appropriate authority and by misappropriating the same. All the prosecution were launched by the Provident Fund Inspector who were appointed as such under section 13 of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. It is not necessary to advert to the details of the FIRs and amounts allegedly misappropriated in respect of each of the prosecution cases.

3. Only one question of law has been raised in this revisional application. This is whether the directors of an establishment can be made answerable to the charge under sections 406/409 of the IPC. FIRs were lodged against the petitioners under sections 406/409 IPC because of alleged commission of criminal breach of trust on account of non deposit of the PF dues, both of Employees and Employer's share with the PF Authorities.

4. I have heard Mr. Krishnendu Gooptu, learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. S.C Prasad, learned advocate appearing for O.P No. 2 and Mr. R.S Chatterjee and Ms. Krishna Ghose appearing for the State of West Bengal.

5. Mr. Gooptu, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. S.K Agarwal reported in 1998 CRI LJ 4027 has made it clear once for all that for the purpose of prosecution of an employer under section 405 of IPC the word “employer” does not include the “director”. Therefore, as in the instant case prosecution was launched against the directors and not against the establishment/the Company they as directors are not answerable to the charge. Their Lordships, of the Supreme Court took into consideration the definition of the word “employer” as it occurs in section 2(17) of the ESI Act, 1948. According to the definition, “principal employer” in a factory means “owner” and or “occupier” of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier or legal representative of deceased owner or occupier and where the person has been named as manager of the factory persons so named. Their Lordships held that for the purpose of prosecution of employer under section 405 of IPC the definition of the word “employer” as it occurs in the ESI Act 1948 cannot be borrowed simply because of the fact that such definition has got no manner of application in either of the explanation to section 405 of the IPC. Therefore it was held that in the absence of any express provision in the Indian Penal Code incorporating the definition of “Principal Employer” in Explanation 2 to section 405 the definition in ESI Act cannot be held to apply to the term “Employer” in Explanation 2. My attention has been drawn, however, to this Court's decision in R.L Kanoria v. State reported in 2003 C Cr LR (Cal) 341 which in fact has followed the decision in S.K Agarwal (supra). The decision of the Patna High Court in 1. B.P Gopta v. 2. M.L Goenka reported in 2000-I-LLJ 1138 has also been referred to. This decision also followed the decision in S.K Agarwal (supra) which I have discussed already. Here the learned single Judge observed that the definition of the term “employer” did not include the directors of the Company and they could not be prosecuted for commission of default in the criminal prosecution under section 405 IPC. Yet, the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shard Mittersatn Jain v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2004-II-LLJ 369 has also been cited. Here the accused persons who were prosecuted under section 406 of IPC sought for quashing of the proceeding on the grounds that as Directors they cannot be held responsible for alleged commission of the breach of trust because they cannot be termed as “employers” of the establishment. The decision of the Supreme Court in S.K Agarwal (supra).

6. As against tile decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shiv Chandra Prasad, the learned advocate for O.P, namely, the Regional P.F authorities takes me to the definition of the word “Employer” as is occurring in section 2(e) which reads as follows:

“employer “means—

(i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of deceased owner or occupier and, where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under clause (f) sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948, (63 of 1948), the person so named; and

ii) in relation to any other establishment, the person who or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent;”

7. Accordingly, it is submitted that the manager or managing agent or director or managing director can very well be prosecuted for not payment of PF dues with the appropriate authority under EPF Act, 1952.

8. I have also been taken to Special Bench Decision in the case of Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 2005 (3) CHN 428 where it was observed that the word “employer” is not an abstract idea and the definition in the 1952 Act created a fiction to identify the establishment with the employer who has got no existence without the establishment. It was further held that the purpose of definiting employer is to identify the person upon whom the liability can be fixed, and would be responsible for the purpose of recovery of dues from the establishment. The purpose of EPF Act 1952 has been analysed by the learned counsel for the O.P No. 2 and it is submitted that the object of this enactment is socio welfare legislation. The decision of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Chamaria v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1992 SC 3980 has also been referred to.

9. Mr. R.S Chatterjce, learned counsel for the State submits that the Court cannot quash the proceeding at this stage because charge sheet has been submitted after completion of investigation.

10. I have heard other learned advocates for the State whose argument were identical with that of Mr. R.S Chatterjee.

11. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties I must say at the outset that criminal proceeding can, only be quashed and that too after submission of charge sheet only when it fails to disclose prima facie cognizable offence. The decision in the State of Harayana v. Bhajanlal reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 and R.B Kapoor v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 are the guidelines in the matter of quashing of criminal prosecution. The only question that has been argued is as to whether for the purpose of prosecution of the petitioners under sections 406/409 IPC they can be prosecuted in the capacity of director or not, and no other point has been agitated in this revisional application. Having considered a good number of decisions cited by the learned advocates for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.K Agarwal and others has given a complete answer to the question and this Court is bound by such decision. It has been held by their Lordships in the said decision that in neither of the explanation under section 405 IPC there is found anything to the effect that the directors of the company or an establishment may be prosecuted under section 405 IPC for the alleged commission of criminal breach of trust. In both the explanations 1 and 2 to section 405 it is the person who is employer, and who deducts employees' contribution that is responsible for the commission of the offence. Necessarily the question is whether the person acting as Director can be termed as “Employer” of the establishment and Their Lordships in the Supreme Court in the case of S.K Agarwal (supra) has categorically stated that the word “employer” does not include director. This decision has been followed by other High Courts in the decisions which have been referred to above. And the Supreme Court decision in the case of R.K Chamaria v. State (supra) is in different context. Their Lordships analysed the persons who are responsible under section 14A and section 14 (1A) of EPF Act 1952 for non payment of PF dues with the PF Authority. This decision has no manner of application to the fact of the present eases. The Special Bench decision is in relation to the case of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and observation of Their Lordships of this Court in paragraph 66 is virtually exposition of the word “employer” and as such that exposition does not help us in any manner whatsoever. The word “employer” as has been defined in EPF Act, 1952 is pari materia the same and as in ESI Act, 1948 but the definition can cover the director when such director is sought to be prosecuted for offence under section 405 IPC as it has been held by the Supreme Court that the word “employer” does not include Director within any of the explanation 1, 2 of section 405 IPC. This being the legal position I am constrained to hold that launching of the prosecution against the petitioners as directors of the establishment is completely illegal and bad in law. They could have been prosecuted under the Special Act but that has not been done. In the circumstances, I find the revisional applications are quite maintainable within the guideline of Haryana v. Bhajanlal.

12. Accordingly, I allow the revisonal applicatons and quash the criminal proceedings.

Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned CJM, concerned for his information and necessary action.

Let urgent certified Xerox copy of this order be made available to the learned Advocates for the parties, if applied, for.

Revisional application allowed
D.S