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M/S. India Paint & Commercial Co. Ltd. v. The State Of Manipur And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.C. Reddi, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, which obtained government permission to extract teak from Unclassed Forest areas in Chandel district, Manipur. The Government of Manipur accepted the petitioner’s offer to pay a monopoly fee of Rs. 2,25,000 by letter dated 6 September 1984 and directed the Chief Conservator of Forests to issue a permit. The Chief Conservator issued a permit dated 19 September 1984 with conditions including payment of royalty and issuance of transit/check passes before removal and permitting carriage outside Manipur only after obtaining a fresh check pass from the Divisional Forest Officer.
The petitioner complied with registration formalities (property mark registration and declaration of collection depots), opened collection and storage depots, paid instalments of monopoly fee and royalties (including payment of Rs. 13,70,936 for 3036.137 cubic metres of teak timber transported out between 4.12.84 and 3.4.85), and incurred substantial expenditure on roads, bridges, transport and labour in reliance on the permit.
On 29 March 1985 the Government of Manipur issued an order imposing a temporary and complete ban on export of all kinds of timber outside the State, citing Article 48A of the Constitution and directing enforcement pending final decision. When the petitioner applied for check passes on 10 April 1985, the Divisional Forest Officer declined to issue them by letter dated 11 April 1985, enclosing the Government order. After an unsuccessful representation to the Minister, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking certiorari to quash the Government order dated 29 March 1985 and mandamus to direct issuance of the necessary check passes to transport teak timbers outside Manipur.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complete ban on transportation/export of timber imposed by the Government of Manipur interferes with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India and violates Articles 301 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- Whether the petitioner has a right to transport teak timber extracted under the permit dated 6.9.84 (having paid monopoly fees and royalties) and whether the Government is estopped from preventing such transportation on grounds of environmental protection and forest conservation.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The complete ban on transportation/export of timber outside Manipur violates Articles 301 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- The petitioner incurred heavy expenditure and acted in bona fide reliance on the permit issued on 6.9.84; having paid monopoly fees and royalties, the petitioner had a right to transport the timber outside the State and the Government is estopped from imposing the ban.
- The ban lacks nexus with the object in Article 48A (protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding wildlife).
Respondent / Advocate General (State of Manipur) Arguments
- Article 19(1)(g) protection can be claimed only by a citizen and not by a company (relying on Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board).
- The grant of monopoly permit was illegal.
- The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable to enforce mere contractual rights not based on statute.
- The executive action issuing the monopoly permit violated Article 166 of the Constitution (implying procedural non-compliance in issuance).
- The impugned ban was issued as a temporary regulatory measure to ensure environmental protection and conservation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Automobile-Transport v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406 | Distinction between regulation (permissible regulatory control) and restriction (impermissible obstruction) of trade under Article 301; regulations may promote flow whereas restrictions obstruct it. | Used to frame the analysis whether the impugned order was a regulation or a restriction; court concluded the impugned order was a restriction (not a regulation) and therefore violative of Article 301. |
| State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, AIR 1967 SC 1189 | Held that provisions imposing restrictions on freedom of trade can be invalid if they infringe Article 301; addressed validity of rules regulating transit of forest produce. | Cited to show that state-enacted restrictions/provisos which infringe Article 301 are invalid; supported court's conclusion that the temporary ban offended Article 301. |
| Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 | Authority relied on by the State for the proposition that Article 19(1)(g) protection is available only to citizens. | The court noted the State's reliance but observed Article 301's protection extends to all individuals; the court did not find it necessary to decide the Article 19(1)(g) point after concluding the order violated Article 301. |
| Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 | Scope and application of promissory estoppel against the Government — where Government makes a promise intended to be acted on and the promisee acts in reliance, the Government may be bound even absent formal contract or consideration. | Applied to hold that the Government of Manipur, having issued the permit and the petitioner relying on it, was bound by the promise and could not suddenly impose the ban to the petitioner’s detriment. |
| Union of India v. India Tobacco Company Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 | Reaffirmed Motilal Padampat as correctly stating the law on promissory estoppel and held that conflicting later authority (Jit Ram) could not prevail over Motilal Padampat. | Relied upon to reinforce that promissory estoppel applies against the Government and that the Government of Manipur was bound by its promise embodied in the permit. |
| Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 : AIR 1980 SC 1285 | Earlier decision taking a different view on enforceability of contractual/executive promises (as noted by the court). | Not followed by the court; the court observed that Union of India v. India Tobacco Company reaffirmed Motilal Padampat and that Jit Ram's contrary view could not prevail. |
| AIR 1952 SC 181 | (Case name not specified in the opinion) Cited for the proposition that provisions of Article 166 are directory and not mandatory. | Used by the court to conclude that non-compliance with the formality in Article 166 does not necessarily render the Government order void where it is otherwise established that the Government approved the decision. |
| AIR 1964 SC 1823 | (Case name not specified in the opinion) Cited alongside AIR 1952 SC 181 regarding Article 166 being directory. | Supported the court’s conclusion that the Government decision (letter of 6.9.84) was a valid expression of government approval despite not being issued in the name of the Governor. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a twofold legal analysis: (1) whether the impugned executive order of 29 March 1985 imposing a complete ban on export of timber outside Manipur violated Article 301 (and related constitutional guarantees), and (2) whether the petitioner could rely on promissory estoppel to prevent the Government from enforcing that ban as against the petitioner.
On Article 301 and the nature of the order:
- The court explained Article 301: "trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free" but noted the freedom is not absolute — subject to laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures under Articles 302–305 and to reasonable restrictions under Article 304(b) (with presidential assent required for certain state legislative measures).
- Relying on the established distinction between regulation and restriction (citing Automobile-Transport v. State of Rajasthan), the court examined whether the Government’s order was a permissible regulatory measure or an impermissible restriction on freedom of trade.
- On close reading the order, which imposed a "temporary and complete ban on export of timber outside the State," the court concluded it was clearly a restriction — not a regulation — because it suppressed lawful trading activities and obstructed the freedom guaranteed by Article 301. The court therefore held the impugned executive order offended Article 301.
On the Executive permit and Article 166:
- The Advocate General contended that the 6 September 1984 letter granting monopoly permit violated Article 166 procedural formalities. The court observed the letter indicated government decision and was signed by an Under-Secretary; it noted precedent that Article 166 provisions are directory, not mandatory (citing earlier authorities), and the order itself demonstrated government approval. Consequently, the objection that the permit was invalid for Article 166 non-compliance was rejected.
On promissory estoppel and estoppel against Government:
- The court analysed whether the petitioner, having paid monopoly fees, royalties, registered property marks, incurred heavy expenditure on infrastructure and labour in reliance upon the permit, could rely on promissory estoppel to prevent the Government from imposing the ban.
- Citing Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills and Union of India v. India Tobacco Company Ltd., the court reiterated that promissory estoppel is available against the Government where the Government makes a promise it intends to be acted upon and the promisee alters his position in reliance. The court quoted and relied on these authorities to hold that executive necessity alone cannot be an indefinite shield for the Government to repudiate a promise where the promisee has acted in reliance.
- Accordingly, the court concluded it would be inequitable to permit the Government to go back on its promise to the petitioner; the Government was bound by the permit and could not suddenly impose a total ban detrimental to the petitioner.
On the Advocate General's contention that only citizens can claim Article 19(1)(g):
- The Advocate General relied on Barium Chemicals to contend that Article 19(1)(g) is available only to citizens. The court observed that the protection of Article 301 extends to all individuals and, after finding the executive action offended Article 301, declined to decide the Article 19(1)(g) point on the merits.
Synthesis and result of analysis:
- The impugned order of 29 March 1985 was a restriction on inter-state trade and thus violative of Article 301.
- The Government was bound by the earlier permit and the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevented it from enforcing the ban against the petitioner where the petitioner had acted in reliance and incurred substantial expenditure.
- The court therefore quashed the impugned order, and directed respondents to issue necessary passes to transport teak timbers covered by the monopoly permit, in accordance with the rules in force on the date when the permits were granted (6 September 1984).
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling):
The writ petition is allowed: the impugned Government order dated 29 March 1985 is quashed, and the respondents are directed to issue the necessary passes to enable the petitioner to transport teak timbers covered by the monopoly permit outside the State of Manipur in accordance with the rules as they stood on 6 September 1984.
Direct consequences and implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner may obtain the check/transit passes required to transport the teak timbers covered by its monopoly permit and which were paid for, subject to compliance with the rules in force on 6.9.1984. The writ was allowed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 500/-).
- On legal implications: The court applied existing precedents on the scope of Article 301 (freedom of trade) and on promissory estoppel against the Government (Motilal Padampat and Union of India v. India Tobacco Company Ltd.) to reach its decision. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel principle of law beyond its application of those authorities; it enforces established doctrines that (a) executive orders that amount to restrictions on inter-state trade offend Article 301 and (b) promissory estoppel can bind the Government where the Government’s promise was acted upon to the detriment of the promisee.
Costs and formal order:
The writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee awarded: Rs. 500/-.
P.C Reddi, C.J:— Two questions of considerable interest and importance pre-eminently come to the fore in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government of Manipur dated 29th March, 1985 under which a complete ban on export of all kinds of timber either through contractors or departmentally outside the State of Manipur untill further orders was imposed:
(1) A complete ban on transportation of any kind of timber imposed by the Government of Manipur interfere with the freedom of free trade throughout the Union of India and is violative of Articles 301 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
(2) The Petitioner has got a right to transport timber collected from the forest reserve within the period covered! by the permission granted to the petitioner on 6.9.84 by the Government of Manipur and the petitioner having incurred huge financial expenditure in the bonafide belief that the teak timbers extracted by the petitioner under the said permit issued in favour of the petitioner (sic), the Government of Manipur is estopped from banning the petitioner from transporting the teak timbers outside the State of Manipur on the alleged ground of ensuring protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forest and wildlife.
2. Before embarking on a consideration of the questions the material facts giving rise to the questions may conveniently be made plain at the outset. The petitioner is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at 90, Prince Gulam Hussain Shah Road, Calcutta. In the State of Manipur with an area of 22,327 Sq. Kms., 15,154 Sq. Kms. constitute the Forest areas. Out of the total forest area of 15,154 Sq. Kms., 1,377 Sq. Kms. have been declared and constituted as Reserve Forest, 4,171 Sq. Kms. as Protected Forest and 9,606 Sq. Kms. as Unclassed Forest under the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and the Rules framed thereunder. There grow in the Unclassed Forest areas of Manipur various types of trees. The Unclassed Forest areas where various types of trees grow are situated in the interior hill area which are not easily accessible because of high terrain. Though trees of higher qualities are available in the Unclassed Forest areas the Government of Manipur could not explore the forest products available in Unclassed Forest area because of the geographical location and it was not economically feasible on the part of the Government of Manip??? to extract the forest products from the Unclassed Forest areas of Manipur. To augment forest revenue by extracting forest products from the Unclassed Forest areas of Manipur, the Government of Manipur used to give exclusive right of extracting teak timbers and Agar wood from the different Unclassed Forests on payment of monopoly fee or fee of exclusive rights of collection of teak timbers and on payment of royalty and other Government dues to different interested persons, firms and companies who are dealing in forest products. In the Unclassed Forest areas of Chandel district of Manipur also teak trees grow abundantly. The said teak trees are available ia the areas which are not easily accessible for want of motorable roads and because of high altitude of the places. The Government of Manipur initially leased out two Teak mahals situated within the Unclassed Forest areas of Chandel district to one S. Biren Singh of Moreh and Shri Khuma Sanate of Sielmat of Churachandpur for the year 1983–84 on payment of monopoly fee of Rs. 60,000/- only for each Teak mahal for a period of one year for extracting teak timbers from. the said Unclassed Forest area of Chandel district. The petitioner offered to pay a sum of Rs. 2.25 lakhs as monopoly fee for extracting teak timbers from the two Teak mahals situated within the Unclassed Forest area of Chandel district for a period of 18 months from the date of expiry of the period of lease of, the original lessees. The Government of Manipur on a consideration of the offer made by the petitioner accepted the same by a letter issued under letter No. 57/5/81- Forest (Pt.) Government of Manipur dated 6.9.84 addressed to the Chief Conservator of Forest, Govt. of Manipur. The letter further directed the Chief Conservator of Forest to issue the necessary permission to the petitioner after fixing the number of instalments for payment of the monopoly fee of Rs. 2,25,000/-. On receipt of the order of the Government of Manipur, the Chief Conservator of Forest issued the order dated 19th September, 1984 granting permission to the petitioner to extract teak trees from the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. Two of the terms and conditions mentioned therein which are relevant may be extracted here.
“3. That the permit holder shall pay royalty and sale-tax at the rates prescribed by the Government of Manipur from time to time and shall not be entitled to remove any timber until the royalty, sale tax and other Government dues in respect of each log has been paid and transit pass in respect thereof has been issued by the-Forest Revenue Station Officer.
9. That the permit holder will be allowed to carry/transport the teak wood outside Manipur after obtaining fresh Check pass from the Divisional Forest Officer, Central Forest Division, Imphal.”
3. After issue of the order by the Chief Conservator of Forest granting permission to the petitioner to extract teak timber from the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district, the Divisional Forest Officer, Tangnoupal Forest Division, Chandel District, directed the-petitiener to get their property mark registered with the Divisional Forest Officer and to declare the depots for extracting teak: timbers tinder the provisions of Rule 40, 41 and 58 of the Manipur Forest Rules, 1971. Accordingly, the petitioner on 11th October, 1984 submitted their property mark and on 18th October, 1984 declared seven places as their collection depots for extracted teak timbers from the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district. On receipt of the letters, the Divisional Forest Officer, Tangnoupal Forest Division issued a certificate registering the property mark and also declared the seven places mentioned by the petitioner as collection depots. The petitioner in terms of the per???t issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest opened a teak timber collection depot at Moreb, which is outside the Reserved Forest within the Chandel District, Manipur and also a storage depot at Mantripukhuri, Imphal, for storing whatever the leak timbers extracted by them after payment of royalty and ot???er Government dues at the Moreh Forest Range situated within the Chandel district, Manipur. The petitioner also invested a huge-amount of money in constructing roads and bridges for trans-???tation of teak timbers extracted from the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district situated in the hilly region upto their collection depot at Moreh. The petitioner had also to acquire animal transport for lifting the teak timbers from the Unclassed Forest upto the motorable roads constructed by them. The petitioner also entered into agreements with labourers for working for a period of 18 months for extraction of teak timbers from the Unclassed Forest area of Chandel district and paid advances to the labourers. In terms of the order issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest, the petitioner also paid the first and second instalments of monpoly fee of Rs. 75,000/- each. The petitioner extracted a huge quantity of teak timbers and paid royalty and such timbers are stored in the storeyards situated at Mantripukhuri. Some of the felled and extracted teak timbers for which royalty has not yet been paid are lying inside the Unclassed Forest area for being transported upto the specified collection depots. The petitioner had paid between 4.12.84 to 3.4.85 the royalty of Rs. 13,70,936/- for 3036.137 cubic metres of teak timbers which were transported out of the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district in terms of the permit issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest, under Annexure—A/4 to A/4(66) to the writ petition. The Forest officials put the property marks on each of the teak logs and beams for which royalty had been paid by the petitioner.
4. While the petitioner was extracting further teak timbers from the Unclassed Forest of Chandel district in terms of the permit issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest, the Government of Manipur issued an order on 29th March, 1985 imposing a complete ban on export of timbers outside the State of Manipur either departmentally or through Forest contractors until further orders, purporting to be an order under Article 48(A) of the Constitution of India in order to ensure protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forest and wildlife and directed the Chief Conservator of Forests to take immediate action for enforcing the temporary ban on export of all kinds of timber outside the State. The petitioner on 10.4.85 submitted an application to the Divisional Forest Officer, Central Forest Division, Imphal on 10.4.85 for the issue of check pass in order to enable the petitioner to carry/transport the teak timbers bearing the property mark of the petitioner for which royalty had already been paid for transportation outside Manipur. The Divisional Forest Officer informed the petitioner of his inability to ???ue any check pass for transportation of teak timbers outside Manipur by the letter dated 11th April, 1985. Along with the said reply, a copy of the Government order dated 29th March, 1985 was also enclosed. On receipt of the letter, the petitioner made a representation to the Minister, Forests for modification of the order, but no action was taken on the said representation. The petitioner; therefore, approached this Court invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the Government of Manipur dated 29th March, 1985 and for a Mandamus directing the Divisional Forest Officer, Central Forest Division, Imphal to issue the accessary check pass for transportation of teak timbers outside Manipur.
5. It is pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that the complete ban on transportation of timbers outside the State is violative of Articles 301 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and that the petitioner had incurred huge financial expenditure in the bona fide belief that the teak timbers extracted by the petitioner would be allowed to be transported outside Manipur and the respondents are, therefore, estopped from banning the petitioner from transporting the teak timbers outside the State of Manipur. It is further argued that the ban on transportation of timber cannot be said to have any nexus to the object enshrined in Article 48A of the Constitution of India to ensure protection and improvement of environment and of safeguarding the wildlife.
6. The learned Advocate General, Manipur appearing for the State of Manipur submits that the protection of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution cannot be claimed by a company and can only be claimed by a citizen; that the very grant of monopoly permit is illegal, that the doctrine of estoppel is not applicable for violation of mere contractual rights not based on statutes and that the executive action under Article 166 of the Constitution granting the monopoly permit is violative of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution.
7. The principal question and the most formidable question that arises is whether the imposition of total ban on export of all kinds of timbers outside the State of Manipur under the impugned order dated 29th Marclv 1985 is violative of Article 301 of the Constitution. Article 301 provides:
“Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.”
8. The freedom declared by the Article extends not only to inter-state trade but also to intra-state trade and transportation. The avowed object of the Article is obviously to ensure that the economic unity of the country may not be broken by geographical barriers on the free flow of trade and commerce. But the freedom ensured is not, however, absolute but freedom from all restrictions except those imposed by the Parliament and Legislature of a State by law under the other Articles of part XIII, namely, Articles 302 to 305. Article 304 insofar as is relevant for our purpose may now be read:
“Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law—
(a)………
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.”
9. The State Legislatures have the power under clause (b) to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse; but under the proviso no Bill or amendment for the purpose may be introduced in the State Legislature without the previous assent of the President. It is, however, firmly established that even apart from the provisions in Article 304, the Legislature of a State has the power to exercise regulatory control over the freedom of trade and commerce which does not amount to restriction on the freedom of trade declared by Article 301. Restrictions obstruct the freedom of movement of interstate transactions but regulations promote it. (Automobile-Transport v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406 at p. 1430
10. Let us, therefore, have a close and careful look at the impugned order and examine whether it is a restriction or a regulation. The order reads:
“No. 75/3/85—For.
GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR
SECRETARIAT: FOREST DEPARTMENT.
Imphal the 29th March, ′85.
The Chief Conservator of Forests,
Manipur, Imphal.
Subject:— Immediate ban on export of timber from the State.
I am directed to refer to your letter No. 81 (a) 84 Forest/8467 dated 18th March, 1985 and to say that the Govt. of Manipur is active (sic) examining the question of imposing complete ban on export of timber outside the State of Manipur in order to ensure protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forest and wildlife in pursuance of Article 48A of the Constitution of India and to inform you that the State Government of Manipur has decided to impose temporary and complete ban on export of timber outside the State either departmental or through Forest Contractors until further orders, pending final decision on the subject matter.
You are, therefore, requested to take immediate action for enforcing temporary ban on export of all kinds of timber outside the State under intimation to this Govt.
Yours faithfully,.
Sd/— H. Chamaikho
Joint Secretary (Forest), Govt. of Manipur.”
11. It is manifestly clear from a reading of the order that the Government of Manipur imposed complete ban on export of timber outside the State of Manipur. It is admitted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government that the practice of giving exclusive right for extraction of teak timbers and Agar wood on payment of Monopoly fees, royalties, etc. was prevailing in the past. It is also stated that the impugned order was passed by the Government as a temporary regulatory measure to ensure environmental protection and conservation of the fast diminishing forest of Manipur. It is undoubtedly not a regulatory measure. It is clearly a restriction on the freedom of trade declared and assured by Article 301 of the Constitution. It is not a regulatory measure. The executive action undoubtedly suppresses free lawful trading activities and is violative of Article 301 of the Constitution.
12. The Supreme Court in State Of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah., AIR 1967 SC 1189, while dealing with validity of the Rules framed by the State Government under section 37(1) of Mysore Forest Act to regulate the transit of forest produce, held that—
“Article 301 in terms prohibits the imposition of any-restriction on trade, commerce and intercourse throughout, the territory of India, and by the enactment of the two provisos clearly a restriction is imposed upon the freedom of trade. The provisos to the rule enacted by the State Government roust, therefore, be deemed-to be invalid as infringing the guarantee under Article 301 on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse.”
13. The learned Advocate General, Manipur however argues that only a citizen can claim the right conferred by Article-19(1)(g) and not the petitioner-company. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295. But the protection given by Article 301 extends to all individuals. Therefore, when once it is found that the executive action is arbitrary and derogates freedom of trade and commerce and thereby offends Article 301 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to enter into the merit of the contention.
14. The learned Advocate General also made a feeble attempt to contend that the very executive a???tion of the Government dated 6th September, 1984 by which the monopoly permits in respect of teak Mahals at Chandel district were issued to the petitioner is rot in conformity with Article 166 of the Constitution and is, therefore, illegal and void; but a look at the order clearly shows that the letter indicated the decision of the Government and was signed by the Under-Secretary to the Government of Manipur. No doubt the letter was not issued in the name of the Governor. But it is now well-settled that the provisions of Article 166 were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they were not complied with, it could still be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued by the State Government. It was not denied in the counter affidavit that the order was not issued by the Government and the order ex-facie shows that the Government of Manipur approved the same. Therefore, we see no merit in the contention of the learned Advocate General and it must fail, vide AIR 1952 SC 181 and AIR 1964 SC 1823.
15. The next question is whether the Government is estopped in imposing a total ban on the export of timber outside the State? The petitioner had acquired undoubtedly the right on the timbers on having paid the monopoly fee and the royalty and accepted by the Government. He was entitled to export the said timbers outside the State but for the ban imposed by the impugned order. Undispuvedly there was no such ban when permission was granted by the Government on 6.9.84 The petitioner had incurred heavy expenditure in laying roads and constructing bridges for transportation of timber from the unclassified forest after the permission was granted. He engaged labourers for extraction of teaks from the hilly region and animal transport for carrying the timbers to the road margins from the hilly region. The Supreme Court in (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh) dealing with the meaning and content of promissory estoppel observed that—
“the doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic Government by the rule of law, no one, however high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception-It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter.”
It was also further observed—
“It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency, nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it on an exparte appraisement of the circumstances.”
16. Again in (1985) 4 SCC 369 (Union of India v. India Tobacco Company Ltd.) the Supreme Court reiterated that what has been laid down in Mis Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill's case ((1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621) on the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a correct proposition of law and the different view taken in the subsequent decision in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 : AIR 1980 SC 1285, cannot prevail over the earlier view-expressed in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill's case. The Government of Manipur is, therefore, bound by the promise and they cannot all of a sudden impose a total ban on the export of timber to the detriment of the petitioner. We consider it inequitable to allow the Government to go back on its promise and impose ban on the export of timber by the petitioner.
17. The learned Advocate General, however, pleaded that the petitioner had only a contractual right to export timber not based on the statute and is therefore not enforceable in a writ procee???g. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jit Rem Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 : AIR 1980 SC 1285. In Union of India v. India Tobacco Company Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369, the Supreme Court held that the law laid clown in Motilal Pada mpat Sugar Mill, on the doctrine of promissory estoppel alone is the correct law and the subsequent decision in Jit Ram's case cannot prevail. Therefore, the Government of Manipur is bound by the promissory estoppel to grant the permits to the petitioner to export timbers for which he has also paid the monopoly fees and royalties, outside the State of Manipur. In the result, the impugned order of the Government of Manipur dated 29th March, 1985 is quashed and the respondents are directed to issue the necessary passes to transport teak timbers covered by the monopoly permit outside the State in accordance-with the Rules in force on the date when the monopoly permits were granted, namely, 6th September, 1984.
18. The writ petition is allowed accordingly with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 500/-.
provisions of Article 166Alert