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Jatav Panchayat Committee v. Viith Additional District Judge

Allahabad High Court
Jan 13, 2000
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Original Suit No. 157 of 1986 was instituted by one Karan Singh in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Etawah. Karan Singh died on 1 December 1995. On 18 March 1996 one Ashok Bhaskar filed an application to bring himself on record in place of the deceased plaintiff (this application is part of Annexure III to the writ petition). Subsequently, on 11 December 1996 an application was filed to amend the substitution application so that Swamy Jatav Panchayat Committee Manhaiya Khayali Ram, City and District Etawah could be incorporated.

Both the initial application and the amendment were dismissed by order dated 10 February 1998 of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Etawah. The petitioner moved Civil Revision No. 49 of 1998; the Additional District Judge VII Court, Etawah dismissed that revision on 24 February 1999. The orders of the lower courts were then challenged by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applications for substitution should have been governed by Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (O.22 R.10) (i.e., continuation against/to a person to whom interest has devolved by assignment/creation/devolution other than death) or by Order 22, Rule 3 (substitution as legal representative, with the 90-day limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act).
  2. Whether the application filed on 18 March 1996 (about 107 days after death) required a prayer for setting aside abatement and/or an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, given the interaction of Article 120 (90 days) and the 60-day period for setting aside abatement (i.e., the 150-day window).
  3. Whether the applications were maintainable in the absence of verification/affidavit supporting them.
  4. Whether the delay (approximately six months) in filing the writ petition under Article 226 rendered the petition liable to be dismissed as time-barred or unreasonable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. R.K. Porwal)

  • The initial application was under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so the relevant limitation is residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act (three years); therefore abatement under Article 120 (90 days) is irrelevant.
  • Even if abatement under Article 120 were to be relevant, an application made within 60 days after expiry of 90 days (i.e., within 150 days from date of death) would not require reliance on Section 5 of the Limitation Act; the initial application was filed within 107 days of death and thus within the 150-day window.
  • The two courts below erred in dismissing the applications for lack of an accompanying Section 5 application or an application to set aside abatement.

Opposite Parties' Arguments (Mr. K.N. Misra)

  • Order 22, Rule 10 has no application: the claimant (or claimant by will) is asserting rights as a legal representative, so substitution should have been sought under Order 22, Rule 3, governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act (90 days).
  • Because substitution under O.22 R.3 is time-barred after 90 days, any substitution application made after that period must be accompanied by a prayer to set aside abatement; if the application is beyond the 150-day window the delay must be explained and condoned by a Section 5 application.
  • The applications filed on 18 March 1996 and 11 December 1996 were not supported by any affidavit or verification; Order 22 applications must be supported by affidavit and without it the applications could not be entertained.
  • The impugned revisional order (dated 24 February 1999) was challenged after a delay of nearly six months; this delay militates against entertaining the writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rikhu Dev v. Som Dass, (1976) 1 SCC 103 : AIR 1975 SC 2159 Distinction between succession to an office (where O.22 R.10 can apply) and succession as a legal representative; devolution of interest by election or by operation of law in an office-holding context. Distinguished. Court held Rikhu Dev concerned succession to an office (mahantship) and not representation by legal heirs or successors under a will; therefore Rikhu Dev does not help the petitioner in this case.
Ratnam Pillai v. Nataraja Desikar, AIR 1924 Mad 615 Authority cited (in Rikhu Dev) for the proposition that O.22 R.10 can apply where interest devolves on a successor in office. Referenced within Rikhu Dev discussion; treated as supporting the office-succession principle but not applicable to the present facts.
Thirumalai v. Arunachella, AIR 1926 Mad 540 Holds that a succeeding trustee elected during pendency is not a legal representative of the predecessor in office; O.22 R.10 can apply to add elected successors. Cited in the Rikhu Dev passage; used to underline the difference between succession to office (covered by R.10) and legal representation by heirs.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sheikh Asghar, AIR 1963 All 357 State seeking to enter as plaintiff where property escheated to Government — example of a person on whom interest devolved and not a legal representative; O.22 R.10 applicability. Distinguished. Court observed the State in that case did not claim as legal representative; the present case involves a claimed legal representative (heir or beneficiary under a will), so Sheikh Asghar does not assist the petitioner.
S.K. Masood alias Zafar v. Wahid Ahmad Ansari, 1997 All Supp 100 : 1998 AIHC 602 Held that where a copartitioner or co-tenant is already on record, abatement may not arise; additionally discussed application of Art.137 in revision proceedings. Distinguished. Court noted S.K. Masood involved joint tenancy/co-tenancy facts and issues about substitution in revision proceedings; those facts differ from the present case, so the decision is not applicable here.
Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1972 All 504 (FB) Full Bench observations that the Limitation Act may need amendment to remove anomalies between suits/appeals and revisions regarding substitution and limitation (Art.120 vs Art.137). Cited in discussion of Art.137 vs Art.120; Court noted the legislative observation but also observed there has been no amendment to the Limitation Act to address that recommendation; decision thus does not change the legal position relied upon by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the issues in stages and applied statutory provisions and precedent distinctions as follows.

  1. Delay in filing the writ petition: The Court rejected the submission that the writ was barred because the petition was filed about six months after the impugned order of 24 February 1999. The Court observed that a petition under Article 226 has no prescribed limitation; such petitions should be filed within a reasonable time. On the facts the delay was not so unreasonable as to merit dismissal of the writ on limitation grounds.
  2. Nature and timing of the initial application: The initial application filed on 18 March 1996 (about 107 days after death) was not supported by any affidavit or verification and contained cryptic prayers. The applicant claimed to be an heir or legal representative. The Court treated this initial application as one falling under Order 22, Rule 3 (i.e., substitution as legal representative), not under Order 22, Rule 10.
  3. Statutory limitation framework: The Court explained Article 120 of the Limitation Act prescribes a 90-day period for substitution when a plaintiff dies. If substitution is not effected within 90 days, the suit abates; a prayer to set aside abatement can be made within 60 days after expiry of the 90 days (i.e., within 150 days from death). An application made after 90 days is effectively an application for substitution upon setting aside abatement; if it is within 150 days a separate Section 5 application is not required because the substitution application itself can include a prayer for setting aside abatement. However, if substitution is sought after 150 days, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is necessary to explain and condone the delay.
  4. Requirement of a prayer to set aside abatement and verification/affidavit: The Court held that the initial application could not be maintained without a prayer to set aside abatement where appropriate. Moreover, applications under Order 22 must be verified or supported by affidavit; the absence of verification or affidavit in the initial application rendered it defective. The amendment application (11 December 1996) was verified but not supported by affidavit; even if it had been properly supported, the initial application's irregularity would not have been automatically cured by amendment.
  5. Inapplicability of Order 22, Rule 10: The Court analyzed O.22 R.10 and concluded it applies to assignments/creation/devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit other than death — for example, succession to an office or election to an office which takes effect during pendency. A will-based devolution of interest becomes effective only on the death of the testator; thus a devolution by will is not within the scope of O.22 R.10. The petitioner’s claim, based on a will purportedly executed on 11 November 1995 in favour of Swamy Jatav Panchayat Committee, therefore amounted to legal representation/succession by will and fell within O.22 R.3 rather than R.10.
  6. Application of precedents: The Court reviewed decisions relied upon by the petitioner (Rikhu Dev, State of U.P. v. Sheikh Asghar, S.K. Masood) and found them distinguishable on the facts — primarily because those cases involved succession to an office, escheat to State, joint tenancy or revision contexts, whereas the present case concerned representation under a will and defective/unverified substitution applications.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Because the initial application was filed after the 90-day substitution period, lacked any prayer to set aside abatement and was not supported by affidavit/verification, and because the amendment application (11 December 1996) was made after the period for setting aside abatement (thus requiring a Section 5 application and a prayer for setting aside abatement), the courts below were justified in dismissing the applications. The Court therefore dismissed the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. (Order: "Petition dismissed." The Court also ordered no costs.)

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the writ petition challenging the two impugned orders (the dismissal of the substitution/amendment applications and the dismissal of the revision) fails and the decisions of the courts below stand.
  • The Court treated the applications as governed by Order 22, Rule 3 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act (90-day substitution period with a 60-day window to set aside abatement), not by Order 22, Rule 10; it emphasised the requirement of a prayer to set aside abatement where applicable and the necessity of verification/affidavit for applications under Order 22.
  • No broader change to precedent or statutory interpretation was announced beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and the distinctions drawn from prior cases; the decision resolves the dispute on the facts before the Court and does not purport to set a new general proposition beyond that factual application.
Show all summary ...

1. One Karan Singh had filed Original Suit No. 157 of 1986 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Etawah. The said Karan Singh died on 1st Dec. 1995. One Ashok Bhaskar had filed an application to bring himself on record in the place and stead of the deceased plaintiff. The said application was filed on 18th March, 1996, which is a part of Annexure III to this writ petition. Subsequently another application was filed on 11th Dec. 1996 for amendment of the application for substitution to the extent that Swami Jatav Panchayat Committee Manhaiya Khayali Ram, City and District Etawah may be incorporated in the said application. These applications were dismissed by an order dated 10th Feb. 1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Etawah. A revision being Civil Revision No. 49 of 1998 was moved by the petitioner. By an order dated 24th Feb. 1999, the Additional District Judge VII Court, Etawah had dismissed the said Civil Revision. These two orders have since been challenged.

2. Mr. R.K Porwal, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since the application was an application under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, the question of abatement has no manner of relevance. Inasmuch as where substitution is to be made under Rule 3, 4 and 5 of Order 22, of the Code in such cases abatement sets in on the expiry of 90 days, namely, after the expiry of limitation for substitution, which is prescribed under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act as 90 days. Where, in case an application under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code, the limitation being prescribed under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, which is three years, the abatement can set in only after the expiry of the said period of three years and not before. Therefore, the petitioner was not required to apply for setting aside abatement. He also contends that even if abatement sets in after expiry of 90 days from the date of death, then also if the application is made within 60 days thereafter, namely within 150 days from the date of death, in that event it would not be a belated application requiring aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Inasmuch as it is well within time to apply for setting aside abatement. Therefore, the petitioner was not required to file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application was filed within 107 days from the date of death. Therefore, according to him both the courts below having dismissed the application on the ground that it did not accompany any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act nor an application for setting aside abatement is wholly perverse, illegal and cannot be sustained. Therefore, the said two orders are liable to be set aside.

3. Mr. K.N Misra, learned counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand contends that in the present case Order 22, Rule 10 has no manner of application. According to him even if the petitioner claims by virtue of a will, he is claiming as legal representative of the deceased and not by virtue of devolution of interest. Therefore, the substitution was to be made under Order 22, Rule 3 of the Code, for which limitation is 90 days, on the expiry whereof application for setting aside abatement was mandatory. He had also contended that the said 60 days after expiry of 90 days is prescribed for limitation for applying for abatement. According to him, there is a distinction between setting aside abatement and substitution. Limitation for substitution having expired after 90 days, the application for substitution is required to be accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the delay. He further contends that neither the application filed on 18th March, 1996 nor the application filed on 11th Dec. 1996 are supported by any affidavit. According to him, an application under Order 22 of the Code is to be supported by affidavit. Without an affidavit the application cannot be entertained. Therefore, both the courts below were justified in dismissing the application. He also conteds that the impugned order of revisional Court was passed on 24th Feb. 1999 and the same is being challenged almost after six months. On these grounds, he pray that the writ petition be dismissed.

4. I have heard both the learned counsel at length.

5. So far as the question that this petition was moved after six months from the date of the impugned order, namely, 24th February, 1999 is concerned, I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Mishra. This application has been titled as application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for which no limitation is prescribed. Normally such an application can be made within a reasonable time. No limitation having been prescribed, the same cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation if it is moved after 90 days from the date of the order after adjusting the time taken for obtaining certified copy. However, in the present case the delay is about six months. Even if there is any delay the same cannot be said to be an unreasonable delay for not entertaining this application under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this contention of Mr. Mishra cannot be accepted.

6. On the facts as discussed, which are not disputed between the parties, it is apparent that the first application was filed on 18th March, 1996, which is about 107 days after the date of death, by one Sri Ashok Bhaskar. The said application which is part of Annexure III to this writ petition does not appear to have been affirmed by any affidavit. Prayers made appear to be cryptic. Mr. Ashok Bhaskar had claimed himself an heir to the deceased while making the said application. He did not disclose as to how he was related to the deceased. Be that as it may. The initial application was purported to have been made as heir or legal representative, as the case may be. Thus initial application was one under O. 22, R. (sic) of the Code. Admittedly the said application was not accompanied by any application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act nor was it accompanied by any application for setting aside abatement.

7. So far as the question of filing an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, Art. 120 of the Limitation Act provides that unless the application for substitution is made within 90 days from the date of death, the suit abates. Such abatement can be set aside within 60 days after the expiry of 90 days. Thus an application made after 90 days from the date of death, is an application for substitution upon setting aside abatement. The prayer for abatement being made within the period of limitation, the substitution would be made only after setting aside the abatement, and, therefore, no application explaining the delay would be necessary if such application is made with a prayer for setting aside abatement within 150 days from the date of death. Thus the contention of Mr. Misra with regard to the necessity of filing application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be acceded to.

8. But at the same time the said application cannot be maintained without the prayer for setting aside abatement. If such application for setting aside abatement is made after 150 days in that event definitely an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act would be necessary. Inasmuch as in the said case the period of limitation for setting aside abatement would also expire after expiry of 150 days from the date of death necessitating explanation of the delay and the condonation thereof by means of filing an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.

9. In the present case, it is not disputed that no prayer for setting aside abatement was ever made. No such prayer was sought to be incorporated even through any application for amendment. In the application for amendment filed on 11th December, 1996, the prayer was made that Swamy Jatav Panchayat Committee, Manhaiya Khyali Ram, City and District Etawah represented by Sri Ashok Bhaskar, be substituted in the place of stead (sic) of the plaintiff. If it is said that Swamy Jatav Panchayat Committee would persue the suit, in that event the first application for substitution appears to have been made on 11th December, 1996, which is after the period of limitation for setting aside the abatement. Therefore, it should have been accompanied by an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act as well as with a prayer for setting aside abatement.

10. The petitioner had been claiming by virtue of devolution of interest by reason of execution of a Will by the deceased in favour of the said Swamy Jatav Panchayat Committee. The Will was alleged to have been executed on 11th November, 1995.

11. Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code provides as follows:—

“10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit— (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.

12. The above provision provides that in other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of the suit, a person may be permitted to continue the suit or the suit may be continued against such person on whom interest devolves by reason of assignment, creation or devolution of interest. In order to attract this provision, the first condition that has to be satisfied is that such an assignment, creation or devolution of interest had taken place during the pendency of the suit. Second condition is that it should be with respect to cases which are not covered under O. 22, Rr. 1, 2. Inasmuch Rule 10 begins with the expression “in other cases.” Thus such devolution has to be other than death. Evolution of interest by virtue of a Will is a devolution on account of death. Inasmuch as a Will does not become effective so long the executor is alive. The Will comes to life only on the death of the executor. Therefore, the devolution becomes effective on the death and not otherwise. The interest may devolve upon the beneficiary by virtue of a Will but the same is a devolution outside the scope and ambit of R. 10 of O. 22 of the Code.

13. That apart by reason of the Will the beneficiary is seeking to represent the interest of the deceased. Thus he is a legal representative of the deceased on account of succeeding to the property by reason of the execution of the Will. Then again the initial application filed by Ashok Bhaskar was an application as heir of the deceased, which is definitely an application under O. 22, Rule 3 of the Code. The said application having been made after the period of limitation for substitution, the abatement had set in. Without a prayer for setting aside abatement, the said application could not be maintained. Then again the said application is neither verified nor supported by affidavit. All application to be made under the provisions of the Code are either to be verified or to be supported by an affidavit.

14. In the present case in the absence of any verification the said application cannot be treated to be an application for the purpose of substitution. An application for substitution is required to be supported by an affidavit. Thus even if the application for amendment is supported by verification or affidavits still that it cannot remove the irregularity or illegality in the initial application filed. The amendment application, however, is not required to be supported by an affidavit, which can be verified. The amendment application appears to have been verified. That was not supported by an affidavit. If it was supported by an affidavit, it could have been contended by Mr. Porwal that the irregularity in the initial application is removed or corrected. But the same having not been affirmed on affidavit, the same argument cannot also be adopted by Mr. Porwal.

15. Thus in the present case the application cannot be treated to be an application within the meaning of O. 22, R. 10 of the Code as contended by Mr. Porwal.

16. Mr. Porwal had relied on the decision in the case of Rikhu Dev v. Som Dass, (1976) 1 SCC 103 : AIR 1975 SC 2159. The said decision does not help Mr. Porwal in the facts and circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as in the said case, both the parties were claiming to represent Dera or its property as elected Mahant. Therefore, there was an uncertainty about the person who would succeed on the death of a Mahant since the Mahant was subject to election. There a distinction has been made between holder of an office and a legal representative. In the said case Mahant was an office. Therefore, the deceased was a predecessor in office and the persons sought to be substituted was a successor in office. Thus a Mahant was not claiming as a legal representative and as such he was governed by O. 22, R. 10 of the Code. It was so held in the said decision in paragraphs 9 and 10, which reads as follows:—

“It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that there was no devolution of the interest in the subject-matter of the suit on the death of Som Dass, since there was no certainty as to the person who would be elected as mahant to succeed him. The argument was that it was uncertain on the death of Som Dass as to who would become the mahant by election, that it was only when a person succeeded to the mahantship on the death of a previous mahant by virtue of law or custom that there could be devolution of interest in the subject-matter of the suit and, therefore, O. 22, R. 10 would not be attracted. We see no force in this argument. We are of the view that devolution of the interest in the subject-matter of the suit took place when Shiam Dass was elected as mahant of the Dera after the death of Som Dass.

17. Som Dass was sued in his capacity as a person who claimed (though illegally according to the appellant) as mahant of the Dera. Som Dass contended that he was lawfully appointed as mahant of the Dera. He refer set up any claim which was adverse to the Dera or its properties. The suit against Som Dass was not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as de facto mahant. In other words, the suit was for possession and management of the Dera and the properties appertaining to it by the appellant purporting to be the de jure mahant against Som Dass as de facto mahant. The fact that it was after Som Dass died that Shiam Dass was elected to be the mahant of the Dera can make no difference when we are dealing with the question whether the interest in the subject-matter of the suit devolved upon him. The subject-matter of the suit was the interest of Som Dass in the Dera and its properties and it devolved upon Shiam Dass by virtue of his election as mahant subsequent to the death of Som Dass. And, as it was in a representative capacity that Som Dass was sued and as it was in the same representative capacity that the appeal was sought to be continued against Shim Daiss, O. 22, R. 10 will apply, see Ratnam Pillai v. Nataraja Desikar, AIR 1924 Mad 615 (1). In Thirumalai v. Arunachella, AIR 1926 Mad 540, the Court held that a succeeding trustee of a trustee who filed a suit and thereafter died during its pendency was not legal representative of the predecessor in office. The Court said that where some of the trustee die or retire during the pendency of a suit and new persons are elected to fill their place, it is a case of devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit and the elected persons-can be added as parties under O. 22, R. 10 notwithstanding that the period of limitation for impleading them had expired.”

18. Mr. Porwal had also relied on a decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sheikh Asghar, AIR 1963 All 357. The said decision also does not help Mr. Porwal in the facts and circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as in the said case the plaintiff having died heirless, the property was escheated to the Government and the Government sought to enter in the record as plaintiff not as a legal representative but as a person upon whom the interest of the plaintiff devolved under O. 22, R. 10 of the Code. Thus there also the State did not claim any interest as a legal representative. Whereas in the present case. Mr. Ashok Bhaskar had applied for substitution as heir of the deceased, namely, a legal representative Jatav Panchayat Committee had also sought to come into the picture as a legal representative by reason of claiming interest through the Will to the property left by the deceased.

19. Mr. Porwal had also relied upon a decision in the case of S.K Masood alias Zafar v. Wahid Ahmad Ansari, 1997 All Supp 100 : (1998 AIHC 602). The said decision also does not help the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case, it was held that since the opposite party No. 2 was already on record and the defendant applicant was one of the co-tenant, therefore there was no question of abatement. In the said case the question as involved in the present case, was not involved. In the said case the deceased was the tenant in respect of the property along with opposite party No. 2 and there was no pleading that there was splitting up for tenancy. On the other hand the tenancy was stated to be joint. Joint interest was existing in the opposite party No. 2 being one of the heirs and there being no conflict of interest between opposite party No. 2 and heirs of the deceased, it was held that there was no question of abatement. Then again the question of application of Art. 137 in the said case was applied in the facts and circumstances that the application for substitution was made in revision. A distinction was made that Art. 120 was applicable in respect of substitution in a suit or appeal. It did not include revision. In the absence of specific provision, Art. 120 could not be attracted for substitution in a revision, and, therefore, limitation would govern under Art. 137, being residuary article. It was so held in the decision in the case of Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1972 All 504 (FB) with the observations that the Legislature should amend the Limitation Act in order to remove the anomalies in the period of limitation in suits and appeals and in revisions in respect of substitution. But since the decision in the case of S.K Masood (1998 AIHC 602) (supra) there seems to have been no amendment in the Limitation Act. The attention of the Court was not drawn to any such amendment in the Limitation Act incorporated pursuant to the observations made in the Full Bench decision in the case of Chandra Deo (supra). Therefore, the said decision is distinguishable and cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case.

20. For all these reasons, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No cost.

21. Petition dismissed.