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Des Raj (Deceased) Through Lrs. And Others v. Union Of India And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Under a notification dated 23-01-1965 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, several agricultural lands (including those of the present appellants) were acquired. An award passed in March 1969 fixed compensation at Rs 2,000 per bigha. Dissatisfied, the landowners sought a reference under Section 18, whereupon the Reference Court enhanced compensation to Rs 2,200 per bigha.
The appellants and four other claimants appealed to the High Court. By a common judgment dated 11-10-1984 the High Court further enhanced compensation to Rs 4,000 per bigha. The present appellants accepted that judgment and pursued no further remedy. However, Pratap Singh and others—parties to the same common judgment—filed Civil Appeal No. 4099 of 1988. The Supreme Court allowed their appeal on 22-11-1988 and remanded the matter to the High Court, which thereafter awarded a much higher compensation (counsel stated Rs 40,000 per bigha).
Long afterwards, the present appellants filed review applications before the High Court, invoking Section 28-A and parity with Pratap Singh. On 22-10-1997 the High Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that its 11-10-1984 judgment had attained finality for the appellants. The appellants now appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether landowners who obtained a Section 18 reference and whose appeals were finally decided in 1984 can later invoke Section 28-A to seek redetermination of compensation on the basis of a higher award made in another party’s appeal arising from the same acquisition notification.
- Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant the appellants compensation parity with Pratap Singh and others despite the finality of the 1984 judgment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The higher rate of Rs 40,000 per bigha, awarded to Pratap Singh after remand, should equally apply to the appellants because the lands were acquired under the same notification and the claimants are “similarly placed.”
- Section 28-A embodies a legislative intent to ensure uniform compensation; hence, its benefit ought to be extended to the appellants.
- Even if statutory relief is unavailable, the Supreme Court, exercising plenary power under Article 142, may order equalisation of compensation “to do complete justice.”
- Several prior decisions (e.g., B.N. Nagarajan, Shenoy & Co., Ram Chand, Union Carbide) were cited to illustrate instances where Article 142 was used to extend relief beyond the immediate parties.
No counsel appeared for the respondents despite service of notice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Land Acquisition Collector, (1996) 6 SCC 746 | Limitation and scope of Section 28-A | Relied on by the High Court; led appellants’ counsel to abandon Section 28-A plea during review. |
| B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1942 | Use of Article 142 to extend benefits to non-appealing parties | Distinguished; Court noted that unlike in Nagarajan, no direction under Article 142 was issued in Pratap Singh’s appeal. |
| Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC 512 | Effect of allowing an appeal in one case on similarly situated parties | Held inapplicable; concerned statutory revival affecting all persons, not analogous to compensation parity. |
| Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 | Grant of equitable relief because of inordinate delay in making award | Found irrelevant; factual matrix different. |
| Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 | Scope of Article 142 | Court affirmed Article 142 power exists but declined to use it in the present case. |
| Bihar State Housing Board v. Ban Bihari Mahato, AIR 1988 SC 2134 | Directions given on peculiar facts without deciding legal issue | Held not to support appellants; case turn on unique facts. |
| Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 174 | Section 28-A available only to claimants who did not seek Section 18 reference | Treated as governing authority; Court applied its ratio to reject appellants’ Section 28-A claim. |
| Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 151 | Conditions precedent for seeking redetermination under Section 28-A | Cited within Scheduled Caste Coop. and followed. |
| Babua Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689 | Reiteration that Section 28-A excludes parties who pursued Section 18 reference and appeals | Quoted to reinforce statutory bar against appellants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised the finality of the High Court’s judgment dated 11-10-1984 as to these appellants, who neither appealed further nor sought timely redetermination before the Collector. It held:
- Inapplicability of Section 28-A: The provision benefits only those who did not seek a Section 18 reference. Because the appellants had (i) obtained a Section 18 reference, (ii) appealed to the High Court, and (iii) allowed that judgment to become final, they fell outside Section 28-A. Authorities such as Scheduled Caste Coop., Mewa Ram, and Babua Ram were applied.
- Laches and Limitation: Even assuming arguendo that Section 28-A applied, the appellants filed no application to the Collector within the prescribed 30-day period.
- Article 142 not attracted: The Court acknowledged its broad discretionary power but found no equitable basis to invoke it. Unlike in B.N. Nagarajan, the prior order in Pratap Singh’s case contained no direction extending benefits to non-appellants. Exercising Article 142 here would defeat the statutory scheme and undermine the finality of judgments.
- No valid ground for review: The High Court correctly dismissed the review petitions because the grounds advanced were barred by the settled law governing Section 28-A and because the earlier judgment had attained finality.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED.
The Court affirmed that claimants who have pursued the statutory reference and appellate remedies cannot later invoke Section 28-A to piggy-back on a higher award obtained by others. The decision underscores the principle of finality in land-acquisition litigation and clarifies that Article 142 will not be used to bypass explicit statutory limits. No new precedent was set; rather, existing precedent was applied to deny relief. Each party shall bear its own costs.
Shivaraj V. Patil, J. Certain agricultural lands including lands of these appellants were acquired pursuant to the notification dated 23-1-1965 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”). Award was made in March 1969 fixing the compensation @ Rs 2000 per bigha. The appellants and other claimants, not satisfied with the amount of compensation so awarded, sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Additional District Judge i.e the Reference Court enhanced the compensation @ Rs 2200 per bigha from Rs 2000. The appellants and four other claimants filed appeals before the High Court seeking further enhancement of the compensation amount. The High Court disposed of six appeals including two appeals of these appellants by common judgment on 11-10-1984 fixing the compensation @ Rs 4000 per bigha. These appellants did not pursue the matter any further, if aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of the High Court. However, Pratap Singh and others, appellants in one of the six appeals before the High Court, approached this Court aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of the High Court. This Court allowed their Civil Appeal No. 4099 of 1988 by the order dated 22-11-1988 and remanded the case to the High Court with certain observations to redetermine the amount of compensation. The appellants filed review applications long thereafter before the High Court seeking review of the judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1984 on the ground that Pratap Singh and others whose lands were also acquired under the same notification and who were similarly placed, got higher rate of compensation for the lands acquired along with the statutory benefits, hence the appellants also were entitled to higher amount of compensation; under Section 28-A of the Act, the appellants were also entitled to the amount of compensation at the same rate which was allowed to Pratap Singh and others. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned judgments dated 22-10-1997, dismissed the review applications. Hence, these appeals.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that when this Court has set aside one of the cases covered by common judgment of the High Court i.e the case of Pratap Singh and others and after remand of the case, the amount of compensation has been considerably enhanced, the same benefit ought to have been given to the appellants; having regard to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act and keeping in view the legislative intention, the benefit of enhanced compensation as determined in the case of Pratap Singh and others ought to have been extended to these appellants as well and this Court, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to equalise the compensation in respect of similarly placed people in all respects, could enhance the amount of compensation @ Rs 40,000 as fixed in the case of Pratap Singh and others after remand of the case. In support of his submissions, he cited a few decisions.
3. Despite service of notice, none represented the respondents.
4. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. The facts that are not in dispute are the following:
The first appeals filed by these two appellants and four others were disposed of by the High Court by the common judgment dated 11-10-1984. These two appellants did not challenge the said judgment of the High Court any further. Pratap Singh and others, who were also the appellants in the said judgment of the High Court, approached this Court and at their instance, their appeal was allowed by this Court and the case was remanded. It is thereafter the High Court has enhanced the amount of compensation in the case of Pratap Singh and others. The judgment dated 11-10-1984 rendered by the High Court in the case of these appellants had become final. Long thereafter, the appellants filed review applications seeking the review of the judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1984. The High Court dismissed the review applications by the impugned judgments.
5. In the impugned judgments, the High Court has taken note of the fact that the appellants did not challenge the judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1984 in appeal, as was done by Pratap Singh and others. As a result, judgment and decree dated 11-10-1984 in their cases became final. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has stated thus:
“It is pertinent to note that the applicants herein, namely, the appellants in RFAs Nos. 143 of 1975 and 130 of 1975, did not challenge the judgment dated 11-10-1984 in appeal, as was done by Pratap Singh and others. As a result, judgment and decree dated 11-10-1984 in their case became final.”
6. The High Court also has noticed that although in the review applications reliance was sought to be placed on Section 28-A of the Act claiming redetermination of the amount of compensation equal to that awarded to other interested persons in the same village, however, during the course of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellants abandoned that plea in the light of the judgment of this Court in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Land Acquisition Collector (1996) 6 SCC 746, JT (1996) 10 SC 573. In this view, the High Court, by the impugned judgments, dismissed the review applications filed by the appellants.
7. The decision in B.N Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942, (1966) 3 SCR 682 does not help the appellants. That was a case dealing with the power of the executive to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services — whether the executive was entitled to frame rules retrospectively. Further, in that case, in para 24, specific directions were given exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to cover the cases of those appellants who had not prosecuted their appeals. AIR para 24 of the judgment reads: (SCR p. 697 A-B)
“[24.] In the result the appeals both of the State and the other appellants are allowed and judgment of the High Court set aside. We may mention that some of the appellants have not prosecuted their appeals but there is no reason why they should not have the benefit of this judgment, and exercising our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that in order to do complete justice they should also have the benefit of the judgment given by us. There will be no order as to costs.”
No such direction was given by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4099 of 1988 of Pratap Singh and others and the directions given there were confined to them only.
8. In Shenoy and Co. v. CTO (1985) 2 SCC 512, AIR 1985 SC 621 this Court was concerned with validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979. That was a case where the validity of the provisions of the Act was challenged by a batch of writ petitions and the Division Bench of the High Court struck down the Act as invalid. The State Government filed an appeal to the Supreme Court against only one party and the appeal was allowed. As a result, there was revival of the Act and it was binding on all the persons though they were not parties to the appeal. Hence, this decision also does not advance the case of the appellants.
9. The decision of this Court in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44, JT (1993) 5 SC 465 is also of no avail to the appellants. In that case, the Court was concerned with the long delay of 15 to 21 years in making the award after declaration was made and certain directions were given to give benefit of the compensation amount having regard to the long delay.
10. The decision of this Court in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584, AIR 1992 SC 248 dealt with the power of this Court under Article 142 in relation to the facts of that case. It cannot be denied that this Court can exercise power under Article 142 in appropriate cases. We fail to understand how this case helps the appellants having regard to the fact that, in their cases, the common judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1984 had become final and that judgment could not be reviewed as sought to be done by the appellants. This is not a case where power under Article 142 may be exercised having regard to the statutory provisions as applied to the facts of the case.
11. The case of Bihar State Housing Board v. Ban Bihari Mahato AIR 1988 SC 2134 also does not support the contention of the appellants as is evident from para 2 of the judgment itself. It was on the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases that certain directions were given and no issue of law was decided.
12. In our view, the appellants are not entitled to claim enhanced compensation pressing into service the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants before the High Court did not press the claim of the appellants on this ground as recorded in the impugned judgments, having not made the applications within the prescribed time. Moreover, benefit of Section 28-A is available only to the parties who had not sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. This provision is not available to persons who seek reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation and do not challenge judgment of the Reference Court or the judgment of the High Court thereafter. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 174 in this regard, in para 4, has held thus:
“4. … Any person who does not accept the award so made may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred for the determination of the court whereupon the provisions of Sections 18 and 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18. It is obvious on a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28-A that it applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The redetermination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court in the reference under Section 18 of the Act and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred this right to apply to the Collector for redetermination and not all those like the petitioners who had not only sought a reference under Section 18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the Reference Court. The newly added Section 28-A, therefore, clearly does not apply to a case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under Section 18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court. This view, which we take on a plain reading of Section 28-A finds support from the judgment of this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana (1986) 4 SCC 151, (1986) 3 SCR 660.”
13. This Court again in the case of Babua Ram v. State of U.P (1995) 2 SCC 689 following the decision in Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 174, in para 36, has stated thus:
“36. The next question is whether an interested person who sought and secured reference under Section 18 but was either unsuccessful and filed no appeal or had carried in appeal but unsuccessful, would be entitled to redetermination when the compensation was enhanced by the appellate court either under Section 54 or on further appeal under Articles 132, 133 and 136 of the Constitution. In Mewa Ram case (1986) 4 SCC 151, (1986) 3 SCR 660 this Court held in paragraph 5 that Section 28-A provides for the determination of amount of compensation subject to the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such redetermination, the forum is the Collector and the application has to be made before him within 30 days from the date of the award under Section 26 and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under Section 18 of the Act. If these conditions are satisfied, the petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided under Section 28-A of the Act.”
14. Admittedly, the appellants in these cases did seek for reference under Section 18 of the Act; filed appeals before the High Court and after the High Court delivered the judgment on 11-10-1984, did not challenge the same. The applications were not made under Section 28-A of the Act within the prescribed period of limitation also in these cases. At any rate, the grounds raised in the review applications were not grounds which could be accepted to review or modify the judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1984. In our view, the High Court was right in dismissing their review applications for the reasons stated in the impugned judgments.
15. Thus, having regard to all aspects of the matter, it is not possible to find fault with the impugned judgments. Further, in our view, these are not fit cases to exercise power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India having regard to what is stated above and in view of the clear legal position as stated in Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 174 Hence, finding no merit in these appeals, they are dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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