- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gopa Debi Ojha v. Surjit Paul & Anr.
Judgment Summary — Revision under Section 138 N.I. Act
Factual and Procedural Background
The accused petitioner challenged the order dated 26.7.94 passed in complaint case No. C/314/94 by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta taking cognizance under s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and directing issuance of process against accused No. 1 (the petitioner). The factual matrix as recited in the opinion:
- The petitioner and her husband held 620 shares of Nazareth Engineering Company Private Limited and agreed to transfer 50% of those shares to the opposite party and his wife for Rs. 6,50,000. The opposite parties paid Rs. 5,00,000 in cash and Rs. 1,50,000 by bank draft.
- The petitioner and her husband failed to transfer the shares and did not return the money.
- On 11.6.94 the petitioner issued a cheque for Rs. 5,79,000 drawn on United Bank of India in favor of the opposite party and his wife. The cheque was deposited and returned with the endorsement "insufficiency of funds into the account."
- On 24.6.94 a demand notice was sent by the opposite party through his Advocate asking for payment within 15 days. From the record it appears the demand sought Rs. 6,50,000 (the purchase price) rather than Rs. 5,79,000 (the cheque amount).
- The petitioner (and husband) claimed they did not receive the notice on 1.7.94 but on 29.6.94 and replied; however they did not pay the claimed sum, prompting the complaint.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complainant (opposite party No. 1), who is one of the payees named on the cheque, is competent to file a complaint under s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (i.e., whether a complaint by one payee alone is maintainable when the cheque is drawn in the names of two payees).
- Whether a demand notice under the proviso to s. 138 which demands an amount different from the amount stated on the cheque (here Rs. 6,50,000 demanded vs. Rs. 5,79,000 shown on the cheque) is valid, or whether such a mismatch renders the notice insufficient and illegal.
- Whether the proviso to s. 138 (particularly clause (b)) must be strictly and rigidly construed because the Section is penal in nature.
- Whether procedural defects in the notice (e.g., notice served by only one payee where two payees are named) affect the validity of taking cognizance under s. 138.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Accused) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Sunit Deb
- Reliance on s. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: cognizance under s. 138 can only be taken upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder in due course. Since the cheque was drawn in the names of opposite party No.1 and his wife, a complaint by both is required; a complaint by either alone is incompetent.
- Interpretation argument invoking s. 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 — the meaning of 'payee' should be read so that singular and plural are interchangeable, which, in his view, supports the contention that both named payees must join the complaint.
- The demand notice was illegal because it was issued by the opposite party No.1 alone and not jointly by both payees.
- The notice demanded Rs. 6,50,000 while the cheque was for Rs. 5,79,000; this mismatch renders the notice or complaint bad.
- Although not all papers were initially before the magistrate, the revision court may take notice of annexures filed in the revision petition.
- Authorities relied upon included N.C. Nag Pal v. The State (Single Bench of this Court), Babu Xavier v. Lal Chand Munoth (Madras High Court) and Arcon Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sri Amitava Goswami — cited to support strict construction and mandatory nature of proviso (b) to s. 138.
Opposite Party's (Complainant's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Sekhar Basu
- Reliance on definitions in the Negotiable Instruments Act: s. 7 defines "payee" as the person named in the instrument, and s. 8 defines "holder" as a person entitled in his own name to possess and recover the amount due. The opposite party No. 1 qualifies as a "payee" or a "holder" and thus is competent to file the complaint.
- Rigid construction of s. 138 is not warranted; the Madras High Court view (Babu Xavier) was said to have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai.
- Citing S. Kiran v. L.C. Corporation, Mr. Basu argued that claiming a larger amount in the notice than the cheque amount would be superfluous but would not invalidate the notice.
- Both sides discussed limitation; the court found the actions were within time and thus limitation arguments became irrelevant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| N.C. Nag Pal v. The State, 1979 (II) CHN 198 (Single Bench of this Court) | Relied upon by petitioner to support a strict/technical reading of requirements under s. 138 and related procedure. | The court noted that the ratio in N.C. Nag Pal has been overruled in principle by the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawakar Lal, and therefore could not be followed as authoritative. |
| Babu Xavier v. Lal Chand Munoth, 1990 TLNZ (Crl.) 121 (Madras High Court) | Advanced to show that s. 138 (being penal) and proviso (b) must be construed strictly and that non-compliance makes s. 138 nugatory. | The opinion recorded that this view (as taken by the Madras High Court) has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai, and thus the rigid approach advocated therein was not accepted in full. |
| Arcon Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sri Amitava Goswami, 1993 (1) CHN 298 | Invoked to support the proposition that the notice must strictly demand the amount mentioned in the cheque; deviation makes notice insufficient. | The court found support in Arcon Engineering for the view that a demand notice must refer to the cheque amount; the decision was cited as consistent with the court's conclusion that a notice demanding a different amount is invalid. |
| Anil Kumar Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai, Crimes XII-1993 (3) 1064 (Supreme Court) | Referred to by the opposite party to show that the rigid construction (as in Babu Xavier) is not warranted — i.e., to limit the strictness of earlier High Court approach. | The court accepted Mr. Basu's submission that Babu Xavier's strict view had been overruled by this Supreme Court decision and, on competence of complainant, agreed with the opposite party's position (while differing on the notice-amount issue). |
| S. Kiran … v. L.C. Corporation …, All India Criminal Law Reporter 1994 (2) Mad 644 | Cited to support the proposition that claiming more than the cheque amount in the notice may be superfluous but not fatal to the notice. | The court recorded the contention but rejected it: the court held that a notice demanding an amount other than the cheque amount makes the notice vague and insufficient, and therefore illegal. |
| Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawakar Lal, 1992 Cri. L.J. SC 1956 (Supreme Court) | Held to have overruled in principle the ratio in N.C. Nag Pal (as noted by the court in this opinion). | The court expressly stated that the ratio in N.C. Nag Pal has been overruled in principle by this Supreme Court decision and relied on that observation in assessing the precedential value of N.C. Nag Pal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner applying statutory definitions and the wording of s. 138 and its proviso:
- Competence of Complainant: The court accepted the opposite party's submissions based on statutory definitions — s. 7 (definition of "payee") and s. 8 (definition of "holder") of the Negotiable Instruments Act — and held that opposite party No. 1 was competent to file the complaint as he was a "payee" or a "holder" within those definitions. Accordingly, the challenge that only both named payees could jointly complain was rejected.
- Interpretation of Clause (b) to the Proviso of Section 138: The court analyzed the wording of clause (b) — which speaks of "a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque" — and concluded that the phrase "the said amount of money" must be read as referring to the cheque amount itself. The court emphasized that the notice must demand the cheque amount and no other amount.
- Consequences of a Mismatch between Notice and Cheque Amount: The court reasoned that if a notice demands a larger or smaller amount than the cheque specifies, it creates uncertainty for the drawee as to how much is to be paid, rendering the notice "insufficient and vague" and, therefore, illegal. The court found support for this view in the Arcon Engineering decision.
- Application to the Instant Case: Because the cheque was for Rs. 5,79,000 but the demand notice sought Rs. 6,50,000, the court found the notice to be defective (vague and insufficient). Taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of such a notice was therefore held to be wrong and illegal.
- Precedential Considerations: The court observed that certain authorities cited by the petitioner (e.g., N.C. Nag Pal) had been overruled in principle by a Supreme Court decision (Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawakar Lal), and that the Madras High Court's strict approach (Babu Xavier) had been called into question by the Supreme Court (Anil Kumar Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai). The court nevertheless applied its interpretation of s. 138's proviso to invalidate the notice in the present facts.
- Other Procedural Points: Both parties argued limitation issues but the court found that everything was done within time and thus limitation was not a live issue in the decision.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revisional application is allowed and the order impugned (the Magistrate's order dated 26.7.94 taking cognizance under s. 138) is set aside. The court explicitly states: Revisional application allowed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The magistrate's order taking cognizance on the basis of the defective demand notice (which demanded an amount different from the cheque amount) has been quashed; the revisional application succeeded.
- On broader precedent: The opinion discusses and distinguishes earlier authorities and notes where High Court or Single Bench decisions have been overruled by the Supreme Court, but the court did not purport to lay down any sweeping new precedent beyond its application of the textual requirement that the demand notice must request the cheque amount. Therefore, no broader precedent beyond this decision's application to the facts was announced in the opinion.
Order: Revisional application allowed. Impugned order set aside.
Nripendra Kumar Bhattacharyya, J.:—By this revision the accused petitioner has challenged the order dated 26.7.94 passed in complaint case No. C/314/94 by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta under s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and directed issuance of process against accused No. 1, the petitioner herein.
2. A short conspectuous of the case is that the petitioner and her husband Ghanashyamlal Ozha hold 620 shares of Messers. Nazareth Engineering Company Private Limited and they agreed to transfer 50% of such shares of the said company to the opposite party herein and her wife Smt. Sheuli Paul. The consideration was fixed at Rs. 6,50,000/- for transfer of such shares and the opposite parties paid Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash and the balance of Rs. 1,50,000/- by bank draft.
3. The petitioner herein and her husband failed and neglected to transfer the said shares in favour of the opposite party herein and her wife nor did the petitioner and her husband return the said sum or any part thereof to them.
4. In 11.6.94 the petitioner issued a cheque for an amount Rs. 5,79,000/- drawn on United Bank of India, Lansdowne Branch, Calcutta in favour of the oppposite party and her wife and on the same date, the said cheque was deposited by the opposite party herein and his wife in their bank account at Fariapukur Branch, Calcutta but the cheque was returned with the Bank endorsement “insufficiency of funds into the account.”
5. On 24.6.94 the opposite party herein through his learned Advocate sent a notice demanding payment of money of Rs. 5,79,000/- within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice.
Page: 406. From the record it appears that actually a demand was made for a payment of amount not 5,79,000/- but 6,50,000/-.
7. The petitioner and her husband alleged that the said legal notice was not received on 1.7.94 and in fact they received it on 29.6.94 and replied that notice. However, they failed and neglected to pay the said sum to the opposite party and her wife hence the petition of complaint by the opposite party.
8. Mr. Sunit Deb, the learned Advocate appearing with Advocate Mr. A.K Ghosh contended for the petitioners in reference to s. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 that no court shall taken cognizance of any offence punishable under s. 138 except upon a complaint in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. He contended that in the instant case the cheque was drawn in the name of the opposite party No. 1 herein and his wife Smt. Sheuli Paul and that the meaning of ‘Payee’ as appears in s. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be read in reference to s. 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which means that the words in singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.
9. According to him as the cheque was drawn in the name of opposite party No. 1 and his wife Smt. Sheuli Paul a complaint by both of them is competent and not by either of them and upon such complaint by either of them the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence.
10. That was also the argument in reference to s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act where the term ‘person’ has been used in that section.
11. From the record it appears that the notice was issued under s. 138 only on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 herein by his lawyer.
12. According to Mr. Deb the said notice is also illegal as the notice was not given by the opposite party No. 1 and his wife but by the opposite party No. 1 alone.
13. His second contention was that the amount claimed in the notice was Rs. 6,50,000/- but the complaint has been made for a sum of Rs. 5,79,000/- and as such either the complaint is bad or the notice is bad.
14. The third contention of Mr. Deb was that though all the papers were not before the court but as the papers have been filed as annexure in this revision the court can take notice of the same.
In support of his submission of Mr. Deb relied upon a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of N.C Nag Pal v. The State, reported in 1979 (II) CHN 198.
He also referred to a Single Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Babu Xavier v. Lal Chand Munoth 1990 TLNZ (Crl.) 121 Page: 41to point out that s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act being a penal provision, proviso (b) to that Section, is mandatory. Non-Compliance of its requirements make the entire s. 138 nugatory.
15. Fourthly, Mr. Deb contended in reference to that Single Bench decision of Madras High Court (supra) that the proviso to s. 138 of the N.I Act being penal in nature the provision of the Sections are to be construed very strictly. In this connection, he also relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Arcon Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sri Amitava Goswami reported in 1993 (1) CHN 298 and he particularly relied on paragraph 7 of that decision at page 305 to point out that the requirements of the provisions under s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are to be followed to its letter and spirit.
In this connection, he also referred to s. 138 read with Clause (b) to the proviso of that Section and particularly laid stress upon the wording of that Section to point out that where any cheque has been drawn by a person or an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid by an agreement made with that bank then a proceeding under Section 138 of the Act is maintainable. He also laid special stress to the wording payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be’, as appearing in Clause (b) to the proviso to that Section to contend that the payment of the said amount of money can be demanded by such ‘payee or holder’ in due course by given notice in writing.
According to Mr. Deb the said amount connotes the amount mentioned in the cheque otherwise the notice of demand would be invalid.
16. Mr. Sekhar Basu, for the opposite party on the other hand, contended, in reference to the definition of ‘Payee’ as contends in s. 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, that payee is the person named in the instrument, to whom or to whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid.
Mr. Basu submitted that in the instant case the petitioner is the ‘payee’ as because at his instance the money mentioned in the cheque can be directed to be paid and as such, the petition of complaint filed by the opposite party No. 1 is maintainable.
17. In the second place he contended, by referring to s. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 that the meaning of the ‘holder’ is the ‘holder’ of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereof from the parties thereto.
Page: 42Where the note, bill of exchange or cheque is lost or destroyed, its holder is the person so entitled at the time of such loss or destruction.
Mr. Basu contended that the opposite party is a holder of the cheque within the meaning of the definition of “Holder” and as such, the complaint filed by opposite party herein is maintainable.
18. Both sides argued on limitation. In the instant case everything was done within time and that argument has become irrelevant and need no discussion.
19. In the fourth place Mr. Basu contended that rigid construction of the words in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not warranted though that was the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Babu Xavior (supra), because that decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai, reported in Crimes XII-1993 (3) 1064.
Mr. Basu contended in reference to a Single Bench decision of Madras High Court in the case of S. Kiran… v. L.C Corporation…., reported in All India Criminal Law Reporter 1994 (2) Mad 644 that if some more amount than the cheque amount is claimed in the notice than that would be a superfluous one but it will not invalidate the notice.
20. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and considering the materials on record I agree with the submission of Mr. Basu that the complainant—Opposite party No. 1 herein is competent to file the petition of complaint as he is a “payee” within the definition in s. 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or “a holder” as appearing in s. 8 of the said Act. But I disagree with the submission that demand of a more amount than the amount mentioned in the cheque in the notice will not invalidate the notice.
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contemplates that where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and clause (b) of the proviso of that Section contemplates that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, (under scoring is by me)
21. So the wording in clause (b) to the proviso of Section 138 “a demand for payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque”, refers to the cheque amount and not any other amount either smaller or higher than the amount mentioned Page: 43in the cheque. So the notice need to be given demanding the cheque amount. If any bigger amount or smaller amount than the cheque amount is mentioned, in my view, that will create difficulty to the drawee to know how much amount he has to pay or she has to pay, as the case may be, and that makes the notice insufficient and vague and the notice will become illegal. This view has found support in a Single Bench decision of this court in the case of Arcon Engineering Company Private Limited (supra).
22. In the instant case the cheque amount was 5,79,000/- whereas a demand was made from the petitioner herein by the opposite party No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/-. That was not the cheque amount, and as such, the notice is vague and insufficient and the said notice cannot be sustained in law.
23. The ratio in N.C Nagpat's case (supra) has been overruled in principle by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawakar Lal, reported in 1992 Cri. L.J SC 1956.
24. As I find that the notice is wrong taking cognizance of the offence on such notice is also wrong and illegal.
25. Accordingly, the revisional application is allowed. The order impugned is hereby set aside.
Revisional application allowed.
T.D.N
Alert