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State of Punjab v. Piara Singh
Structured Summary of the Opinion — M.M. Punchhi, J. (Oral)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion disposes together Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984 and Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M of 1984. The immediate factual matrix arises from an incident dated 15 July 1984 in Jalandhar in which four accused allegedly assaulted Harvinder Pal Singh (who later died) and Randhir Singh PW. Harbans Singh is alleged to have struck the fatal spade blow; other accused gave blows with sticks. The Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, in an order in the matter Piara Singh v. The State, held that the Court of Session had jurisdiction to entertain applications for anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code and bail under section 439 for persons charged with scheduled offences who did not fall within the definition of "terrorist."
The State of Punjab challenged that order by way of Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984. Separately, in Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M of 1984 the complainant sought cancellation of bail granted to certain accused in F.I.R. No. 100 dated 15 July 1984 (an order which was based on the Sessions Judge's interpretation). The Sessions Judge had declined bail to Harjit Singh but granted bail to Bhajan Singh and Toti on the view that their acts did not fall within the Ordinance/Act's definition of "terrorist."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Special Courts constituted under the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance/Act have exclusive jurisdiction to try scheduled offences committed in a judicial zone declared to be a terrorist affected area, regardless of whether the accused are technically "terrorists" under the definition in section 2(h).
- Whether ordinary Courts of Session retain jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail (section 438 CrPC) or bail (section 439 CrPC) applications in respect of accused charged with scheduled offences committed in a terrorist affected area when those accused are alleged not to be "terrorists."
- What limitations the Ordinance/Act places on the grant of bail in scheduled offences (including the effect of section 15(4)–(6) and the interplay with sections 439 and 439-A of the Code as applicable).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Punjab)
- The State sought revision of the Sessions Judge's order (Piara Singh v. The State) on the ground that the Judge's interpretation—allowing Sessions Courts to entertain bail applications in respect of non-terrorists charged with scheduled offences—was legally incorrect and affected many pending and future bail applications.
- The State challenged the Sessions Judge's conclusion that scheduled offences committed by non-terrorists are triable by ordinary courts, thereby preserving the Sessions Court's jurisdiction to grant bail under section 438/439 of the Code.
Respondents / Accused
- The accused (as accepted by the Sessions Judge) argued that the Special Courts would try scheduled offences only if committed by "terrorists" as defined in section 2(h) and not otherwise. On that basis, the Sessions Judge granted bail to Bhajan Singh and Toti, concluding their acts did not fall within the definition of "terrorist."
- In Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M of 1984 the learned counsel for the respondents attempted to justify maintenance of the bail order on the merits under the Ordinance/Act, but the Court observed that the respondents should approach the Special Court in the first instance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Piara Singh v. The State (order of the Sessions Judge, Jalandhar) | The Sessions Judge held that the Court of Session had jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail under section 438 CrPC and bail under section 439 CrPC for persons charged with scheduled offences who were not "terrorists." | The High Court treated that order as the subject matter of Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984, analysed the legal correctness of the Sessions Judge's interpretation, and set aside the Sessions Judge's order to the extent it confined the Ordinance/Act to "terrorists" only. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded from the text, purpose and scheme of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 (now an Act) and its interaction with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Key statutory provisions and their import as set out by the Court:
- Section 3: Empowers the Central Government to declare areas as terrorist affected areas where offences specified in the Schedule are being committed by persons who can be termed "terrorists" on such a scale as to justify recourse to the Ordinance/Act. The notification can create judicial zones for trial of such offences.
- Section 2(h): Defines "terrorist" (the definition is quoted in the opinion) but, the Court observed, the plural term "terrorists" is used in section 3 and hardly elsewhere; the definition assists identification of areas but does not limit the jurisdiction of Special Courts to try only those offenders who are "terrorists."
- Section 7: Provides that a scheduled offence committed in a judicial zone declared a terrorist affected area shall be triable only by the Special Court established for that judicial zone; pending cases are to be transferred to the Special Court (with a narrow exception where all prosecution evidence had already been taken).
- Sections 8 and 10: Authorize the Special Court to try offences connected with scheduled offences (including non-scheduled offences connected to scheduled offences), to convict for such offences and to exercise powers akin to a Court of Session; section 10 permits the Special Court to take cognizance on complaint or police report and to exercise summary or regular jurisdiction as appropriate.
- Section 13: If a Special Court, after taking cognizance, finds the offence is not a scheduled offence, it may transfer the case to a competent court under the Code.
- Section 16: Declares the Ordinance/Act to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in the Code, but where there is no inconsistency the Code applies; for procedural purposes a Special Court is to be deemed a Court of Session.
- Section 15(4)–(6) and related provisions: Section 15(4) renders section 438 CrPC inoperative in relation to scheduled offences in a terrorist affected area. Section 15(5) prescribes conditions for grant of bail to persons accused of scheduled offences (including requirement that Public Prosecutor be given notice and, if opposing bail, the court must be satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit an offence while on bail). Section 15(6) makes these limitations additional to existing limitations under the Code or other laws.
- Sections 439 and 439-A CrPC (where applicable): The Court noted that Special Courts, being courts of Session for the purposes of trial, may exercise powers under sections 439 and 439-A read with section 15(5) to grant bail in appropriate cases, but section 438 is inoperative for scheduled offences in a terrorist affected area.
Applying this scheme, the Court reasoned:
- The Ordinance/Act establishes Special Courts for the speedy trial of scheduled offences committed in declared judicial zones; the object is to deal with an uncommon situation caused by terrorist activities in a declared area.
- Although the definition of "terrorist" helps identify the areas to be declared, the statutory scheme demonstrates that Special Courts are to take cognizance of scheduled offences committed in the judicial zones and to determine offenders "without distinction." The Special Court's jurisdiction extends to scheduled offences irrespective of whether the accused are technically "terrorists" under section 2(h).
- Because section 7 makes scheduled offences triable only by the Special Court in a declared zone, and because sections 8 and 10 enable the Special Court to try connected non-scheduled offences or convict for them, the Sessions Court cannot exercise parallel jurisdiction to decide whether a given accused in respect of a scheduled offence is a "terrorist" and therefore outside Special Court jurisdiction.
- The Ordinance/Act's overriding character (section 16) and the specific exclusion of section 438 CrPC in section 15(4) mean that the Sessions Judge's reliance on section 438 to grant anticipatory bail in relation to scheduled offences in a terrorist affected area was impermissible. Bail applications in such matters fall to be entertained by the Special Court, subject to the limitations set out in section 15(5) and (6) and by sections 439/439-A as applicable.
- The Court concluded the Sessions Judge's approach—confining the scope of the Special Courts to "terrorists" only and permitting ordinary Sessions Courts to entertain bail for non-terrorists accused of scheduled offences—was not supported by the statute and was therefore incorrect.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
1. The impugned order of the Sessions Judge dated 8th August 1984 (subject matter of Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984) is set aside.
2. Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M of 1984 is allowed and the bail of the accused-respondents is cancelled.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The Court held that Special Courts established under the Ordinance/Act have exclusive jurisdiction to try scheduled offences committed in a declared terrorist affected judicial zone, irrespective of whether the accused fit the statutory definition of "terrorist." Accordingly, bail applications in such cases must be entertained in the first instance by the Special Court and not by ordinary Sessions Courts relying on section 438 CrPC (which is rendered inoperative for scheduled offences in a terrorist affected area by section 15(4)).
- The cancellation of bail in Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M means the accused whose bail was set aside are left free to apply to the Special Court of the judicial zone for bail; that Special Court must apply the statutory constraints (notably section 15(5) and (6), and sections 439/439-A as applicable) when considering such applications.
- The Court expressly rejected the Sessions Judge's distinction that Special Courts try only "terrorists" and not others charged with scheduled offences; the Special Courts are to try scheduled offences and exercise the attendant powers without such a limited reading.
- No separate new procedural rule beyond the statutory interpretation was announced; the decision enforces the statutory scheme and directs the appropriate forum for bail and trial in the declared zones.
Note: This summary is limited to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the opinion's text.
M.M. Punchhi, J. (Oral) - The causes in Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984 and Criminal Misc. No 5033-M of 1984 being conglomerated would require a judgment. Accordingly they shall be disposed of together.
2. In the wake of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance. 1984 (for short, the Ordinance) which now stands replaced by an Act of the same name (having received the assent of the President of India on 31st August, 1984) Shri J.S. Sekhon. Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, was required to deal with a number of bail applications. The question being of jurisdiction. affecting the power of the Court of Sessions Under Sections 438, 439 and 439A (as applicable to the State of Punjab and extended to the Union Territory, Chandigarh) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he dealt with it the application Piara Singh v. The State, holding that the Court of Session had the jurisdiction to entertain applications for anticipatory bail tinder section 438 of the code of criminal Producer, and baril under section 439 of the said code, of those persons whose description does not fall within the ambit of the word `terrorist' though charged of the offences specified in the Schedule of Ordinance Committed during the relevant period. That order is the subject matter of Criminal Revision No. 1292 of 1984 preferred by the State of Punjab, though accused Piara Singh by a sequential order was not granted bail Since the order aforesaid had the effect of interpreting the law and was the governing factor in bail applications pending before him and to be instituted thereafter. the aggrieved State of Punjab prayed for revision of that order. And in Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M of 1984, the complainant has prayed for cancellation of bail of the accused-respondents in F.I.R. No 100 dated, 15th July, 1984. Police Station Division No 2. Jalandhar, which is sequentially based on the aforesaid order of the Sessions Judge. So facts only of the latter need to be noticed.
3. The prosecution alleges that on 15th July, 1984 at about 12.30 p.m. four accused-persons namely, Toti alias Jaspal Singh, Harjit Singh) Bhajan Singh and Harbans Singh quarrelled with Harvinder Pal Singh (since deceased) over the distribution of `Langer' at the Gurdwara of Ramgarhias Jalandhar. Thereafter when Harvinder Pal Singh (since deceased) and Randhir Singh PW. reached near their house while returning from the Gurdwara at about 2.30 p.m. all the four accused waylaid them. Harbans Singh accused was armed with a spade and rest of them with sticks (dangs). The attack was opened by Harbans Singh accused who gave a spade blow on the head of Harvinder Pal Singh which by itself proved fatal as the victim died on 18th July, 1984. while admitted in a hospital. Harjit Singh accused gave a stick blow on his left leg. Bhajan Singh and Toti accused gave two injuries each on the person of Randhir Singh when the latter tried to rescue his companion. Toti and Harbans Singh accused had also received some minor injuries due to the altercation in the Gurdwara. The accused, other than Harbans Singh, filed an application for bail before. the Sessions Judge, Jalandhar. The learned Judge declined bail to Harjit Singh accused on the ground that it could well be inferred that he shared the common intention with his co-accused Harbans Singh for killing Harvinder Pal Singh deceased and having waylaid him for the purpose. However, he observed that the case of Bhajan Singh and Toti accused stood on a different footing as they had given simple injuries to Randhir Singh injured. No comment was passed by the learned Sessions Judge with regard to their pervading common intention vis-a-vis the deceased or the injured P.W. Straightaway, It was observed that the act of Bhajan Singh and Toti accused did not fall, within the definition of `terrorist' as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance and accordingly they were ordered to be released on bail. Thus the conglomerated view of the learned Sessions Judge in both cases is that the Special Courts created tinder the Ordinance in the Judicial zones which cover up the entire State of Punjab, have jurisdiction only over those accused which would be tried before them for scheduled offences, if they were terrorists and not. otherwise. According to him, scheduled offences committed by persons other than terrorists are triable by the ordinary Courts and thus the Court of Session of Division had the jurisdiction to grant bail or anticipatory bail to an accused other than a terrorist.
4. A situation arose in Northern Indian States in particular, necessitating the President of India to promulgate the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance. 1984 which as said before is now an Act of the same name. with effect from 31st August, 1984. The preamble thereto suggests that the measure adopted is to provide for the speedy trial officer tain offences in terrorist affected areas and for matters connected therewith. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to declare terrorist affected areas. Section 3 is in the following terms :-
"3(1) If the Central Government is of the opinion that offences of the nature specified in the Schedule are being committed in any area by terrorists on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient for the purpose of coping with activities of such terrorists to have recourse to the provisions of this Ordinance, it may, by notification :-
(a) declare such area to be a terrorist affected area; and
(b) constitute. such area into a single judicial zone or into as many judicial zones may deem fit.
(2) A notification issued under sub-section (1) in respect of an area shall specify the period during which the area shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be a terrorist affected area, and where the Central Government is of the opinion that terrorists had been committing in that area. from a date earlier than the date of issue of the notification, offences of the nature specified in `the schedule on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient to commence the period specified in the notification from such. earlier date, the period specified in the notification may commence from that date : Provided that -
(a) no period commencing from a date earlier than six months from the date of publication of the notification shall be specified therein; and
(b) so much of the period specified in such notification as is subsequent to the date of publication of the notification shall not, in the first instance exceed six months, but the Central Government may by notification extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding six months at any one time. if the Central Government. having regard to the activities of terrorists in such area. is of the opinion that it is expedient so to do".
The word 'terrorist' has been defined in section 2 (h) in the following manner :-
(h) "terrorist" means a person who indulges in wanton killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of services on mean of communications essential to the community or in damaging property with a view to (i) putting the public or any section of the public in fear; or
(ii) affecting adversely the harmony between different religious, racial language or regional groups or castes or communities; or
(iii) coercing or overwing the Government established by law; or
(iv) endangering the sovereignty and integrity of India;"
5. In pursuance of the provisions under sub-section (2) of section 3, the central government issued notification No. GSR-56 (F) dated 23rd July, 1984, declaring the entire territory of the State of Punjab as a terrorist affected area, besides stating that the notification shall come into force from 28th January, 1984, and shall remain in force till 23rd July, 1985. Thereby three Judicial Zones viz. Jalandhar. Patiala and Ferozepur were constituted. This notification was modified vide another notification dated 28th July, 1984. Under the latter notification, the Central Government, established Special Courts to try the scheduled offences in all the three Judicial zones and further it was notified that the ordinary place of sitting 'Of the Special Courts shall be at Jalandhar, Patiala and Ferozepur, as the case may be. BY latter notifications the Special Courts stand manned, with the concurrence of the Acting Chief Justice of this Court, by some senior members of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The Schedule to the Ordinance/Act comprises of some offences under the Indian Penal Code. The Explosive Act, 1884, The Indian Telegraph Act, 1835, The Indian -Railways Act. 1890, The Explosive Substances Act, 1908, The Arms Act, 1959, The Anti-Hijacking Act, 1932, The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation, and The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
6. On the side of the accused, it was contended, as was successfully done before the Sessions Judge, that those offences in the Schedule would be triable by the Special Courts only if committed by `terrorists' and not otherwise, despite the fact that there was no specific provision in the Ordinance/Act giving a clear pointer. It was contended that the scheme of the Ordinance/Act suggested this course inevitably, as suggestedly, it was not intended that cases of all i.e. terrorists as also non-terrorists involved in scheduled offences shall go to the Special Courts, which were less in number and covered a large area otherwise manned by a number of Sessions as also Additional Sessions Judges. These contentions have to be tested on the anvil of the provisions of the Ordinance/Act.
7. It is significant that though the word terrorist' has been defined in section 2 (h), the word, in plural terms, has been employed only once in the Ordinance/Act and that too in section 3 afore-quoted and none thereafter, for the term outlives its utility thereafter. To recall the language, section 3 (1) operates when the Central Government holds the opinion that offences of the nature specified in the Schedule are being committed in any area by people who can be termed as terrorists. Further such commission is on such a scale and in such a manner that it becomes expedient for the purpose of coping with the activities of such terrorists to have recourse to the provisions of the Ordinance/Act. And to achieve the object it may by notification (a) declare such area, to be a terrorist affected area; and (b) constitute such area into a single judicial zone, or into as many judicial zones as it may deem fit. It is obvious from the language of the said provision that when activities of criminals are of such kind and result oriented in a particular area so as to term them as terrorists within the meaning of section 2 (h), the central government takes stock of the situation and declares such area to be a terrorist affected area and constitutes in it judicial zone or zones for the purpose of coping with the activities of such terrorists. In plain language it means that the purpose is to successfully deal with the uncommon situation arising from the activities of such terrorists in area declared as terrorist affected areas, and divide it into a zone or zones, wherein Special Courts are established under section 4 for the speedy trial of scheduled offences. The scheme is in keeping with the jurisprudential principle of criminal law, that the Courts take cognizance of offences and not of offenders. The distinction brought about under the Ordinance/Act, to term a criminal as a terrorist is only for the limited purpose of identifying the area which might engage the attention of the Central Government for its being declared as a terrorist affected area. But in no case can such a declaration have the effect that Special Courts set up for the purpose are only to try terrorists and not others. It is a fallacy to say that Special Courts are set up to try special offenders, whether terrorists or non-terrorists. For the polluted air of terrorism and combat of an uncommon situation the Special Courts have been set up, so that the offenders are brought to trial speedily for, when justice can be speeded up it meets the clamour of the society to bring the offenders to book. Thus it seems to me, that the Special Courts set up for the purpose under section 7 of the ordinance/act have alone to take cognizance of scheduled offences and to determine the offenders for being punished without distinction.
8. section 7 of the ordinance/act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in any other law a scheduled offence committed in a judicial zone, in a State, at any time during the period during which, such judicial zone is, or is part of a terrorist affected area shall be triable, whether during or after the expiry of such period, only by the Special Court established for such judicial zone in the State. The provisions thereto envisage that, cases, involving scheduled offences committed in an area and pending before any court immediately before the date of issue of notification under section 3 (2) shall stand transferred to the Special Court having jurisdiction under this section, and, the said Court to which such proceedings stand transferred, shall proceed with, such cases from the stage at which they were pending at that time; the only exception being when the whole of the evidence for the prosecution has been taken before the date of issue of such notification, in which case the trial can conclude before the Court of its initiation Section 8 (1) authorises a Special Court to also try any offence other than the scheduled offence with which the accused may under the Code, charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with the scheduled offence. Section 8 (2) provides that if, in the course of any trial, it is found that the accused person has committed any offence. whether such offence is or is not a scheduled., offence, the Special Court, can convict such person of such offence and pass any sentence authorised by law for the punishment thereof. These provisions are a pointer to show that in the trial of scheduled offences, the Special Court can try even non-scheduled offences, if they are connected with the scheduled, offences and even record conviction solely for nonscheduled offences, in the course of the trial and punish the offenders accordingly.
9. Section 10(1) provides that a Special Court may take cognizance of any Scheduled offence. without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offance or upon a police report of such facts. This provision envisages that a Special Court may change colours at its convenience. While trying those scheduled offences which normally are triable by a Magistrate Ist Class, it can hold a summary trial under sub-section (2) thereof besides trying them as a regular court in place of that of a Magistrate. A Special Court is even entitled under section 10 (3) to tender a pardon to any person, and the pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of section 308 of the code, be deemed to have been tendered under section 307 thereof And finally subject to the other provisions of the Ordinance/Act, a Social Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session, as envisaged in subsection (4) of section 10. section 13 warrants a Special Court where, after taking cognizance of any offence, it is of the opinion that the offence is not a scheduled offence, it shall, notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer the case for trial of such offence to any Court having jurisdiction under the Code, and the Court to which the case is transferred may proceed with the trial of the offence as if it has taken cognizance of the offence.
10. These provisions put the Special Court undoubtedly at a higher pedestal. Cases involving scheduled offences, or apparently scheduled offences, have to be brought to the Special Court and it is that Court alone which has the jurisdiction to opine whether the offence which it has taken cognizance of, is or is not a scheduled offence. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken before any Court other than the Special Court for a scheduled offence or an apparently scheduled offence. Cases cannot be thus brought before the Sessions Court for him to exercise the choice in that regard. And as is known, Court of Session try offences only on committal of cases before them but significantly in that regard there is no impediment with the Special Court. The Special Courts are otherwise Courts of Criminal justice set up for a special purpose That is the reason that section 16 provides that the provisions of the Ordinance/Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, but save as expressly provides in the Ordinance, the provisions of the Code shall, in so for as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance, apply to the proceedings before a Special Court. and for the purpose of the. said, provisions of the Code, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session. In other words, it means that the provisions of the Ordinance/Act have a paramount character over the Code in so far as the provisions of the Code are, inconsistent with those of the Ordinance. To other provisions to which there is no inconsistency, the provisions of the Code apply. And thus the Special. Court for those purposes is to be deemed to be the Court of Session. It becomes deducibly clear that proceedings envisaged under section 16 are all proceedings under the Code, necessarily including that of bail, save as those touched by the Ordinance, and for such proceedings the Special Court is the Court of Session. Thus, it seems to me, clear that a Special Court as a Court of Session alone has the power to entertain applications for bail in the exercise of its powers under sections 438, 439 and 439-a of the code of criminal procedure in so far as those provisions are not inconsistent with that of the ordinance/act. section 438 of the code has specifically under section 15 (4) been provided to be inoperative in relation to scheduled offences in a terrorist affected area. Thus, the Court of Session. as is the Special Court such a court, is precluded from employing section 438 of the code in relation to any case involving the accusation of a scheduled offence committed in a terrorist affected area. But the Special Court as a Court of Session is entitled under sections 439 and 439-a read with sub-section (5) of section 15 of the ordinance/act to grant in appropriate cases bail even in scheduled offences. The latter provisions of section 15 (5) is of paramount importance which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of a scheduled offence shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an to oppose the bail and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. sub-section (6) of the section 15 of the ordinance/act specifically curtails the power of the Court by providing that the limitations on grant of bail specified in sub-section (5) of section 15 are in addition to the limitations under the Code or 'any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. And as is now noticeable section 439-a of the code of criminal procedure in punjab and chandigarh over-shadows section 439 (section 438 being out of picture) and permits the Court to grant bail only on the existence of grounds enumerated therein which are (i) that the Court of Session for reasons to be recorded in writing is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is not guilty of any of the specified offences; and (ii) that the Court of Session for reasons to be recorded in writing is satisfied that there are exceptional and sufficient grounds to release the accused on bail, cases of women, children etc. apart.
11. Thus in view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that the distinction between a terrorist and a non-terrorist is totally out of tune with the setting up of Special Courts, which are set up to try scheduled offences and so claims of bail of offenders charged of those offences have only to be entertained by the Special Courts who have their powers regulated under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the ordinance/act, section 439-a (wherever applicable) and section 439 of the code of criminal procedure and other laws applicable limiting the scope. I am also of the considered view that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in confining the scope of the Ordinance/Act to terrorists accused of scheduled. offences, is uncalled for in the scheme of things Thus I have no hesitation in upsetting the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 8th August, 1984, subject matter of Criminal Revision No.1292 of 1984. It is accordingly so ordered.
12. As a sequel to the reasoning afore-stated, the orders of the Sessions Judge in granting bail to the accused respondents would. have to be set aside, cancelling the bail of the accused-respondents, leaving them open in the first instance to approach the Special Court of the judicial zone for, the purpose, of bail which, if approached for the purpose, shall apply its mind in that connection in the light of the observations afore-made. Accordingly, Cr. Misc. No. 5033-M-of 1984, is allowed and the bail of the accused-respondent is cancelled.
13. Before closing the judgment, I must, in fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents in Criminal Misc. No. 5033-M-of 1984, notice that he made an effort to justify the maintenance of the bail order on merits on the anvil of the provisions of the Ordinance/Act, but as said earlier, it would be. appropriate for the respondents to approach the Special Court for the purpose in the first instance. JUDGMENTed accordingly.
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