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Sukaj Kam Khur Ana v. Hari Rattan .
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision petition challenges the trial court's order dated 16 April 1970 which held that the Hundi in question was a bill of exchange payable on demand and therefore not liable to any stamp duty. The plaintiff had filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,555/- based on a Hundi under Order 37 Rule 2 (as stated in the opinion). The defendant objected that the Hundi was insufficiently stamped and a preliminary issue was framed:
“Whether the document in question is insufficient in stamp? If so its effect.”
The trial court found that the document did not require any stamp duty. The defendant (petitioner in revision) challenged that finding in this civil revision. The opinion reproduces the Hundi's text (dated 4th November 1968, stating "Hundred and eighty days after this date ... promise to pay ... Rs. 1500/-") and addresses whether a Hundi promising payment 180 days after its date can be treated as payable on demand.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Hundi in question — which contains a promise to pay 180 days after its date of execution — is a bill of exchange or hundi payable on demand or payable otherwise than on demand.
- Whether the document is insufficiently stamped under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and, if so, what is the legal effect (in particular, admissibility in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel for the Petitioner (defendant in the original suit)
- Asserted that the instrument is a Hundi payable otherwise than on demand and therefore should have borne stamp duty as provided in Article 13(b) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
- At one stage, sought to argue that the document was not a hundi but a promissory note and that even if treated as payable on demand it would require a stamp under Article 49(a) of Schedule I — an argument rejected by the court because the document was expressly described and written as a hundi.
Counsel for the Plaintiff / Respondent
- Contended that the document is a hundi payable on demand, and for such a document there is no provision in the Stamp Act requiring the stamp in question, so insufficiency of stamp would not render it inadmissible.
- Mr. Bhatia (learned counsel for the respondent) argued that clause (b) of Article 13 applies only when two periods are specified (a lower and an upper limit), and that because the Hundi here only specified "180 days after date" and not a range, it falls outside the sub-clauses of Article 13(b) and must be treated as payable on demand; the court rejected this interpretation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai, AIR 1955 Tra. Co 65 | Explains that the words "payable on demand" mean "at once", "forthwith" or "immediately"; a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period is payable otherwise than on demand. | Used to support the proposition that an instrument specifying a future period for payment cannot be treated as payable on demand; applied to show that a promissory note or hundi payable after a period (e.g., one year) is payable otherwise than on demand. |
| Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder, AIR 1945 Mad 42 | Held that a promissory note agreeing to pay within two years is not payable on demand because the specified period gives the debtor time and the promisee cannot enforce payment during that period. | Followed as a similar authority for the proposition that specifying a time period excludes payment "on demand"; the court relied on this reasoning to treat time-specified instruments as payable otherwise than on demand. |
| Thenappa Chettiar v. Addiyappa Chettiar, 1971 1 M.L.J 214 | Approved the view in Alamelu Ammal that a promissory note promising to pay after two years is by necessary implication not payable on demand. | Relied upon to reinforce the legal principle that a specified period for payment renders a note not payable on demand. |
| Tikam Chand v. Laxmichand, A.I.B. 1961 Raj. 87 | The single-judge decision held that a hundi payable after a particular date is not one payable otherwise than on demand; it treated such a hundi as payable on demand after the due date and exempt from stamp duty. | The trial court had relied on this decision; the revising court examined it, found it distinguishable and disagreed with its reasoning, noting absence of discussion and failure to address relevant authorities relied upon by the revising court. |
| Partab Chand Ratan Chand v. Gilbert, A.I.R. 1934 All. 695 | Dealt with whether a post-dated cheque is a bill of exchange (held that a cheque is a bill of exchange and negotiable despite being post-dated). | The Tikam Chand decision relied on this case; the revising court distinguished it as addressing cheques (which by definition are payable on demand) and therefore not controlling on the question whether a hundi promising future payment is payable on demand. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began from the statutory framework in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the definitions linking the Stamp Act to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Section 35 of the Stamp Act makes instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence. The court examined whether the instrument was a hundi or a promissory note and applied the definitions and authorities cited to determine whether the instrument was payable on demand.
Key steps in the court's analysis:
- Characterisation of the instrument: The document was expressly described and written as a hundi; the court rejected the petitioner's alternative contention that it was a promissory note.
- Meaning of "payable on demand": The court relied on established authorities (including Aiyappankutty and Alamelu Ammal) holding that "payable on demand" means payable immediately and that instruments specifying a definite future period for payment are payable otherwise than on demand. These authorities were used to show that a promise to pay "after a specified period" precludes immediate enforceability.
- Application to the present Hundi: The Hundi contains an express promise to pay 180 days after the date of its execution. The court reasoned that if the promisee cannot enforce payment until that period elapses, the instrument cannot be accurately described as payable on demand.
- Assessment of contrary authority: The trial court's reliance on Tikam Chand v. Laxmichand was scrutinised. The revising court found Tikam Chand distinguishable and its reliance on Partab Chand Ratan Chand (which dealt with post-dated cheques) misplaced because the law relating to cheques (which are, by definition, payable on demand) differs from that applicable to hundis promising deferred payment.
- Interpretation of Article 13 of Schedule I (Stamp Act): The court rejected the respondent's narrower reading of Article 13(b) (that it only applies when a document specifies an inner and outer time limit) as rendering clause (b) otiose. The court held that both clauses (b) and (c) relate to bills of exchange payable otherwise than on demand (distinguished by the period), and that the presence of a specified future period (180 days) brings the Hundi within the ambit of "payable otherwise than on demand."
On this basis the court concluded that the trial court's finding that no stamp duty was required was legally incorrect: the document is payable otherwise than on demand and therefore insufficiently stamped under the Stamp Act.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition is allowed. The order of the trial court was set aside and the court held that the Hundi is payable otherwise than on demand and is therefore insufficiently stamped. The preliminary issue was decided in favour of the petitioner-defendant. The petition is allowed with no order as to costs, and the parties (through their counsel) are directed to appear before the trial court.
Implications:
- The immediate consequence for the parties is that the Hundi is treated as insufficiently stamped. (Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act was cited in the opinion as the provision making instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence; the court's finding of insufficient stamping bears on admissibility in that statutory context.)
- The trial court's exemption from stamp duty determination was reversed; the case is remitted for further proceedings consistent with the revising court's finding.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying existing authorities; the court distinguished and disagreed with a prior single-judge decision (Tikam Chand) and relied on established precedents concerning the meaning of "payable on demand." The opinion does not state that it is creating new precedent beyond resolving the dispute between the parties.
Rajinder Sachar, J.:— When is a Hundi payable on demand or otherwise than on demand is the question that calls for determination?
2. This revision petition is directed against the order of the trial court dated 16th April, 1970 holding that the Hundi in question being a bill of exchange payable on demand was not liable to any stamp duty.
3. The plaintiff filed a suit for ‘he recovery of Rs. 1,555/- on the basis of a Hundi under Order 37 Rule 2 C.P G. Objection having been taken by the defendant that the Hundi was insufficient in stamp, the following preliminary issue was framed:—
Whether the document in question is insufficient in stamp? If so its effect.
4. The trial court found that the document in question did not require any stamp duty.
5. It is this order which is being challenged in the civil revision. The document in question reads as follow:—
‘Rs. 1500/- Dated 4th November, 1968. Due Date 4th April, 1969.
Hundred and eighty days after this date l Suraj Ram Jvhurana 40/1 Shaktinagar Delhi-7 promise to pay to Shri Hari Rattan and Smt. Prem Vati (either or survivor) R/o H. No. 1/339 Hari Chand Building Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantt. a sum of Rs. 1500/- (Rupees one thousand and 5 hundred onlvl for the value received in cash.
Seen and accepted Surajram 4th November, 1968. Suraj Ram Khurana, 4th November. 1968.
Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter called the Act) makes instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence. The argument of the counsel for the petitioner is that the instrument in question is a Hundi payable otherwise than on demand and, therefore, it should have borne stamp as provided in Article 13(b) of Schedule I of the Act. The document in question is written on a paper of Rs. 1/-. It is not disputed that if this document is taken to be payable otherwise than on demand then it is insufficiently stamped. The contention of the counsel for the plaintiff/defendant, however, is that it is a hundi payable on demand and for such a document there is no provision in the Act and, therefore, the question of it being inadmissible in evidence because of insufficiency of stamp does not arise.
Section 2(2) of the Act defines a bill of exchange to mean a bill of exchange as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and includes also a hundi and any other document entitling or purporting to entitle any person, whether named therein or not, to payment by any other person of, or to drawupon any other person for, any sum of money.
Section 2(3) of the Act defines Bill of exchange payable on demand to include an order for the payment of any sum of money by a bill of exchange or promissory note or for the delivery of any bill of exchange or promissory note in satisfaction of any sum of money, or for the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any Condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen.
Section 2(22) defines promissory note to mean a promissory note as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Counsel for the petitioner defendant sought to urge that the document in question was not a hundi but a promissory note and even if it was to be treated as being payable on demand it has to bear a stamp as provided under Article 49(a) of Schedule I of the Act and as this document did not bear the stamp prescribed it was not admissible. This argument has no force as the document in question is admittedly written on a paper which is described as hundi. The language of the document also shows that it was being written as a hundi and not as a promissory note. I must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the document in question is a hundi and not a promissory note. The document states that 180 days after the date mentioned in the hundi which is 4th November, 1968, executant promises to pay the amount of Rs. 1500/-. The question, therefore, arises whether when a hundi incorporates a promise to pay 180 days after the date of its execution, it can be called a hundi payable on demand.
Section 19 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provides that a promissory note or bill of exchange in which no time for payment is specified and a cheque, are payable on demand.
6. ‘The words ‘payable on demand’ occuring in a promissory note mean payable ‘at once’, ‘forthwith’ or ‘immediately’ and a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period or within a certain time can hence be considered only as a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A promissory note payable on demand is payable without any demand and the true import of the words on demand’ is that the debt is due and payable immediately’, vide Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai . AIR 1955 Tra. Co 65. In that case the promissory note was payable after one year and it was held that it was liable to stamp duty under Article 49(b) of Schedule I of the Act as being a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A similar view was also taken in Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder . AIR 1945 Mad 42, where the promissory note agreeing to pay within two years.was held to be not payable on demand, as the words ‘payable within two years’ were introduced to give the debtor time within which to pay the debt and that within that time the promisee could not enforce the debt.
7. The case of Alamelu Ammal was approved by the Division Bench in Thenappa Chettiar v. Addiyappa Chettiar . 1971 1 M.L.J 214., where it was held that a promissory note promissing to pay after two years was by necessary implication not a document payable on demand as a period of two years was specified and it cannot be said to be payable on demand.
8. The finding of the trial court that the Hundi in question is payable is based on a decision of a single judge in a case Tikam Chand v. Laxmichand . A. I. B. 1961 Raj. 87.. In that case the learned judge held that a Hundi payable after a particular date specified therein is not one payable otherwise than on damand it is payable on demand after the due date and is exempt from payment of stamp duty The learned judge relied on Partab Chand Ratan Chand v. Gilbert . A. I. R. 1934 All. 695 1. in order to come to this conclusion. A reference to Partab Chand Ratan Chand's case, however, shows that this case dealt with the proposition whether the post dated cheque was a bill of exchange or not. The lower court had-there come to the conclusion that a post dated cheque was not a valid negotiable instrument within the meaning of Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This conclusion was not accepted by the single judge of Allahabad High Court who held that a cheque is a bill of exchange nonetheless and as a bill of exchange it is negotiable. In my view this case is clearly distinguishable. Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines a cheque to mean that a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise on demand. Now a post dated cheque becomes immediately payable on demand on the date which it bears. In point of law it makes no difference whether it is ante-dated or post dated it is still payable on presentation after the execution of date. It may be that a cheque is delivered to a party on a particular date say 1st January but if it bears a particular date say 15th January, it is still payable on demand immediately on the date it bears. There is no question of a cheque being payable on a date subsequent to the date of its execution as by the very nature of its definition a cheque cannot be expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand. Merely by delivering a cheque earlier to the date of its execution does not mean that cheque is not payable on demand. But these considerations do not apply to the case of a Hundi which though executed on a particular date containing a promise to pay only 180 days after the date of execution of the Hundi. In order that a Hundi should be treated to be payable on demand it is implicit that it should be payable immediately, that is on the date of its execution. If a promisee cannot enforce payment before a certain period it is hard to imagine how the hundi can still be called one payable on demand. Article 13 (b) of Schedule I of the Act deals with stamp to be affixed on bills of exchange which are payable otherwise than on demand depending on the amount and the period being within one year. Sub-clause (ii) of Article 13 (b) covers cases where it is payable more than 6 months but not more than 9 months after date or sight. Sub-clause (c) of Article 13 provides those cases where bill of exchange is payable at more than one year after date or sight. Mr. Bhatia learned counsel for the respondent sought to urge that clause (b) of Article 13 is only applicable if there were two periods i.e where before which the bill of exchange is not payable and the outer limit within which it is payable. Accord--ing to the learned counsel if in the present Hundi it was stated that it was payable more than three months but not more than 6 months after date or sight, it would be covered by sub clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Article 13 of Schedule I of the Act, but as the document in question only states that it is payable 180 days sifter the date of execution, it is taken out of the purview of any of the subclauses of clause (b) of Article 13 and becomes one payable on demand. In my view there is no force in this contention. This argument, if accepted would make the whole clause (b) of Article 13 totally redundant, and otiose. I can see no logic why if a document in the first instance contains a period of 180 days after its execution when alone it is payable that it should be treated as payable on demand, while a document which mentions that it is payable more than three months but not more than six months after date or sight it would be covered by Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of Article 13 of the Act. This argument also cannot be accepted if a reference is made to clause (c) of Article 13 which specifically provides that if a bill of exchange is payable at more than one year after date or sight a particular stamp has to be paid. According to Mr. Bhatia had the present document mentioned instead 180 days, a period of over 365 days, he would not have contended that it was payable on demand and would have conceded that it would in that case be covered by clause (c) of Article 13 as according to him this sub clause (c) covers a case of bill of exchange whether payable on demand or otherwise than on demand. I am afraid, I cannot accept this interpretation, which is not supposed by the scheme of the Article. The only difference between clause (b) and Clause (c) of Article 13 is with reference to the period, i.e clause (b) dealing with period of less than one year and clause (c) dealing with period of more than one year. But both clause (b) and clause (c) deal with cases of bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand. Once a document is accepted as payale on demand neither clause (b) nor clause (c) is applicable. I cannot for the reason mentioned above agree, with respect, with the view expressed in Tikam Chand's case. It may be mentioned that there is no discussion in the case nor are the authorities mentioned by me noticed therein. In my view the case of Pratab Chand Rattan Chand, was dealing with a different matter and reliance on that case was placed wrongly (if I may say with respect) in Tikam Chand's case.
9. For the reasons mentioned above, in my view the trial court has acted illegally in holding that the document in question did not require any stamp duty. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the trial court and hold that the document in question is payable otherwise than on demand and is hence insufficiently stamped. I would, therefore, find the preliminary issued in favour of the petitioner-defendant.
10. The result is that the petition is allowed, but with no order as to costs. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the trial court.
11. Petition allowed.
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