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Devendra Prasad Gupta v. The State Of Bihar & Others

Patna High Court
Jan 12, 1977
Smart Summary (Beta)

Court Opinion Summary — Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner sought quashing of a resolution dated 21 September 1972 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue (Annexure-1), which had set aside an order dated 3 July 1969 passed by the Charge Officer (Annexure-5). In Saharsa district a draft record-of-rights was prepared under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885. Respondent No. 6 filed objections; the Assistant Settlement Officer (A.S.O.) issued an order dated 29 May 1969 deleting the petitioner's name from possession entries in the draft (Annexure-2).

The petitioner applied to the Settlement Officer (complaining lack of hearing) and the Charge Officer, a revenue officer specially appointed by the State Government, on 3 July 1969 ordered that the A.S.O. be allowed to reopen the case and dispose it after hearing all parties (Annexure-5). That order, it is said, was passed without hearing respondent No. 6. Respondent No. 6 applied for review of the 3 July 1969 order, but before that application was finally disposed of, the A.S.O. reheard the matter and passed an order on 25 July 1969 partially correcting the draft publication (Annexure-3).

Both the petitioner and respondent No. 6 filed revision applications under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A of the Act before the Charge Officer; by order dated 1 February 1971 the Charge Officer allowed the petitioner's revision and dismissed respondent No. 6's (Annexure-4). Respondent No. 6 then filed appeals to the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, which the Commissioner dismissed in limine on 30 November 1971 on the ground that other remedies were available. Respondent No. 6 subsequently filed revisions before the Board of Revenue. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue heard those revisions and, by the impugned resolution dated 21 September 1972, concluded that the Charge Officer could not have remanded the matter on 3 July 1969 and treated that order as an impermissible review.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Charge Officer's order dated 3 July 1969 directing the Assistant Settlement Officer to reopen the case was a valid exercise of power under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, or whether it amounted to an impermissible power of review.
  2. Whether the Commissioner was justified in dismissing respondent No. 6's appeals in limine on 30 November 1971 instead of deciding them on their merits.
  3. What relief should follow if the Additional Member, Board of Revenue's resolution of 21 September 1972 is quashed (i.e., what orders should be set aside or directed to be reconsidered).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The resolution of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue contained an error apparent on its face in holding that the Charge Officer's order dated 3 July 1969 was not sanctioned by the Act.
  • Reliance was placed on the provisions of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act (particularly Section 103A as amended) to show that a Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government has revision/review power under Sub-section (3), so the Charge Officer was within his rights to direct rehearing.

Respondent No. 6's Arguments

  • The Charge Officer's order of 3 July 1969 was vitiated because respondent No. 6 was not given an opportunity to be heard when that order was passed, contrary to the procedural requirement in Sub-section (3) of Section 103A.
  • The Charge Officer's order constituted a prohibited review (a power not available to settlement authorities absent statutory sanction) and therefore was invalid.
  • The Commissioner erred in dismissing respondent No. 6's appeals in limine because the appeal before the Commissioner was a proper remedy under the Act and rules; the Commissioner should have decided the appeals on merits.
  • Neither the Commissioner nor the Additional Member of the Board of Revenue examined the merits of the orders dated 25 July 1969 (A.S.O.) and 1 February 1971 (Charge Officer) based on materials produced by the parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram-dayal Missir v. The State of Bihar (1957 B.L.J.R. 292) Authority for the proposition that a Settlement Officer has no power of review; that power of review is a creature of statute and cannot be exercised unless specifically conferred. The Court noted the Additional Member relied on this decision but held that he overlooked statutory amendment (Act I of 1963) which conferred revision/review power on a specially empowered Revenue Officer under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A; thus the principle did not preclude the Charge Officer's action after the amendment.
State of Bihar v. Ram Dayal Missir (1962 B.L.J.R. 385) Affirmation that, as the law then stood, Revenue Officers exercising judicial/quasi-judicial powers had no power of review. The Court observed this earlier position but distinguished it from the present facts because of the 1963 amendment to Section 103A that vested revision powers in a specially empowered Revenue Officer.
Abdul Maid v. The State Transport Authority (1960 B.L.J.R. 282) Principle that a writ court should not quash an illegal order if the effect of quashing would be to revive another illegal order. The Court applied this principle to quash both the Additional Member's resolution of 21.9.1972 and the Commissioner's order of 30.11.1971 simultaneously so as not to revive an earlier illegal order, and directed that the appeals be heard on merit by the appropriate Commissioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory and historical analysis of Section 103A of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 as amended:

  • It set out the pre-1963 form of Section 103A and then described that Act I of 1963 introduced two new sub-sections (3) and (4), conferring power on a "Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government" to revise, on application or suo motu, any entry in the draft record-of-rights after reasonable notice and to provide for an appeal (sub-section (4)).
  • Act I of 1967 amended sub-section (3) to introduce a three-month limitation for filing revisions. Act VII of 1969 deleted sub-section (4) (the internal appeal provision), but the Court noted that appeal rights continued to exist under other provisions.
  • The Court read the current text of Sub-section (3) (as in force at the relevant time) to mean that a specially empowered Revenue Officer may, within three months of an order or decision on any objection, and before final publication, revise any such order or decision after giving reasonable notice to the parties to appear and be heard.
  • Applying this provision, the Court held that the Charge Officer's order dated 3 July 1969 directing the A.S.O. to reopen and dispose after hearing parties was an exercise of power under Sub-section (3) and thus permissible in law. The Additional Member erred in treating it as an impermissible review not sanctioned by the Act.
  • The Court acknowledged the procedural defect that respondent No. 6 had not been heard before the Charge Officer passed the 3 July 1969 order; however, respondent No. 6 later appeared and the matter was heard by the A.S.O., and the Charge Officer did not pass any final order on 3 July 1969 that finally affected respondent No. 6's rights — the Charge Officer only remanded for rehearing.
  • On the question of appeals, the Court examined the deletion of Sub-section (4) of Section 103A by Act VII of 1969, and observed that Sub-section (1) of Section 104G provided a right of appeal within two months from every order passed by a Revenue Officer prior to final publication (thus including orders under Section 103A(3)). The Court also referred to Rule 63A (which provided appeals to the Commissioner) and Rule 76, resolving a conflict in limitation periods in favour of the two-month period under Section 104G.
  • Consequently, the Court held that respondent No. 6's appeals to the Commissioner were maintainable and that the Commissioner erred in dismissing them in limine on the ground that other remedies were available.
  • For relief, the Court applied the principle (from Abdul Maid) that it should not quash an order where doing so would revive another illegal order. Therefore the Court quashed both the Additional Member's resolution of 21 September 1972 and the Commissioner's order of 30 November 1971, and directed that the appeals filed by respondent No. 6 be heard on merit by the Commissioner now having jurisdiction (Commissioner, Kosi Division), with a specific caveat set out below about one issue already decided in favour of the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the resolution dated 21 September 1972 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, and also quashed the order dated 30 November 1971 passed by the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division.

Direct Consequences / Relief Ordered:

  • The appeals filed on behalf of respondent No. 6 are to be heard on the merits by the Commissioner who now has jurisdiction (Commissioner, Kosi Division).
  • The appeals are to be heard and disposed of on grounds other than the ground that the Charge Officer lacked jurisdiction to pass the order dated 3 July 1969 — that point was decided in favour of the petitioner by this Court.
  • If respondent No. 6 filed three appeals (as it was said he had), then the Commissioner will hear and dispose of all three appeals after hearing the parties.
  • In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Broader Implications: The Court interpreted the effect of statutory amendments to Section 103A and related provisions (including the removal of an internal appeal in 1969 and the continued availability of appeal under Section 104G). The decision clarified that a "Revenue Officer specially empowered" may exercise revision under Section 103A(3) (subject to procedural requirements), and that appeals under Section 104G are available for orders prior to final publication. The opinion did not purport to set out a novel general precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and the specific relief granted in these proceedings.

Order delivered by Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.; concurrence by B.S. Sinha, J. — "Order accordingly."

Show all summary ...

Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.:— This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing a resolution dated the 21st September, 1972 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, a copy whereof is Annexure-1 to the writ application. By the impugned resolution, the respondent-Additional Member, Board of Revenue has set aside an order dated 3.7.1969 passed by the respondent Charge Officer, a copy whereof is Annexure-5 to the writ application.

2. It appears that in the district of Saharsa steps for preparation of record of rights in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) were taken and the respondent Assistant Settlement Officer prepared a draft record of rights which was published in the prescribed manner. Respondent no. 6 filed an objection which was heard by the said Assistant Settlement Officer, and he, by his order dated 29.5.1969, corrected the said draft publication by deleting the name of the petitioner in respect of several plots which had been shown in his possession in the draft publication. A copy of the said order is Annexure-2 to the writ application. Being aggrieved by the said order, this petitioner filed an application which was addressed to the Settlement Officer, Saharsa making a grievance about the order dated 29.5.1969 and praying therein that he should be given opportunity to produce relevant materials, as the correction on the objection filed by respondent no. 6 had been made without hearing the petitioner. The Charge Officer who was a revenue officer specially appointed by the State Government, on 3.7.1969, passed the following order on the application filed by this petitioner:

“Heard.

The A.S.O is allowed to reopen the case and dispose in accordance with law after hearing all the parties concerned.

Sd. P.K Singh, C.O 3.7.69”

3. A copy of the application of the petitioner along with the orders passed thereon, as aforesaid is annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner and has been marked as Annexure-5. It is said that this order dated 3.7.1969 was passed by the respondent Charge Officer without hearing respondent no. 6. Respondent no. 6 also filed an application for review of this order before the Charge Officer concerned, but before any final order could be passed on that application, the dispute was heard by the Assistant Settlement Officer before whom the petitioner as well as respondent no. 6 appeared and the Assistant Settlement Officer, by his order dated 25.7.1969, only partially corrected the draft publication of the record of rights, i.e, he accepted some of the objections raised by respondent no. 6, but rejected the same in respect of the remaining plots. A copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure 3 to the writ application. The petitioner as well as respondent no. 6 being aggrieved by order dated 25.7.1969 filed two revision applications before the Charge Officer, Page: 578under Sub-section (3) of Section 103 A of the Act. The Charge Officer, however, allowed the revision application filed on behalf of the petitioner, but dismissed that filed on behalf of respondent no. 6, by his order dated 1.2.1971 A copy of the said order is Annexure-4 to the writ application.

4. It is an admitted position that respondent no. 6 filed applications by way of appeals to the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division as then Saharsa district was within his jurisdiction (we are informed now it is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, Kosi Division). It appears that the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division dismissed the appeals in limine on 30.11.1971 saying that other remedies were available to respondent no. 6. Thereafter, respondent no. 6 filed revision applications before the Member, Board of Revenue which were heard by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue who passed the impugned order on 21.9.1972, as already stated above. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue by the impugned order came to the conclusion that on 3.7.1969 (Annexure-5) the Charge Officer could not have remanded the matter to the Assistant Settlement Officer for a fresh consideration after hearing the parties. According to him, this order amounted to an order of review which was not sanctioned by the provisions of the Act. In this connection, it may be mentioned that respondent no. 6 had not moved the Board of Revenue against the order dated 3.7.1969 He had approached the Board of Revenue for quashing the order dated 1.2.1971 passed by the Charge Officer and order dated 30.11.1971 passed by the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the resolution of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue when he has held that order dated 3.7.1969 was not sanctioned by the provisions of the Act. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on the different sections under Chapter X of the Act which relate to preparation of record-of-rights and settlement of rents. Before I discuss the points at issue, it will be advisable to give the legislative history of Section 103A and certain other sections under that Chapter. Prior to 1963, Section 103A was as follows.—

“103A. Preliminary publication, amendment and final publication of record-of-rights.—(1) When a draft record-of-rights has been prepared, the Revenue Officer shall publish the draft in the prescribed manner and for the prescribed period, and shall receive and consider any objections which may be made to any entry therein, or to any omission therefrom, during the period of publication.

(2) When such objections have been considered and disposed of according to such rules as the State Government may prescribe, and if a settlement of land-revenue is being or is about to be made the Settlement Rent-roll has been Incorporated with the record under Section 104F, Sub-section (3), the Revenue Officer shall finally frame the record, and shall cause it to be finally published in the prescribed manner: and the publication shall be conclusive evidence that the record has been duly made under this Chapter.

(3) Separate draft or final records may be published under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) for different local Page: 579areas, estates, tenures or parts thereof.”

6. By Act I of 1963 a new Sub-section (3) and a new Sub-section (4) were added and the original Sub-section (3) was made as Sub-section (5). The newly added Sub-sections (3) and (4) by Act 1 of 1963 were as follows:—

“(3) A Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may, on application or of his own motion, at any time after the publication of the draft record-of-rights and before its final publication, after reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter, revise any entry in such draft or any order or decision under this Section, whether made by himself or by any other Revenue Officer.

(4) An appeal shall lie, in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed officer, from any order passed under Sub-section (3).”

7. In the year 1967, the aforesaid Sub-section (3) was again amended by Act I of 1967. The main difference appears to be only this that for filing revision a period of limitation of three months was prescribed. In the year 1969, by Act VII of 1969, Sub-section (4), which had been introduced in 1963, was deleted. At the relevant time, Section 103 A was as follows:—

“103A. Preliminary publication, amendment and final publication of record-of rights—(1) When a draft record-of-rights has been prepared, the Revenue-Officer shall publish the draft in the prescribed manner and for the prescribed period, and shall receive and consider any objections which may be made to any entry therein or to any omission therefrom, during the period of publication.

(2) When such objections have been considered and disposed of according to such rules as the State Government may prescribe, and if a settlement of land revenue is being or is about to be made the Settlement Rent-roll has been incorporated with the record under Sec. 104F, Sub-sec (3), the Revenue-Officer shall finally frame the record, and shall cause it to be finally published in the prescribed manner, and the publication shall be conclusive evidence that the record has been duly made under this Chapter.

(3) A Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may, on application made to him within three months of any order or decision on any objection made under Sub-section (1) or on his own motion after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter, revise at any time before the final publication of the record-of rights any such order or decision, whether made by himself or by any other Revenue Officer.

(4) (Omitted by Act VII of 1969).

(5) Separate draft or final records may be published under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) for different local areas, estates, tenures or parts thereof.”

8. In view of Sub-section (3) of Section 103A it has to be held that a Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government within three months of any order or decision on any objection may under Sub-section (1) or on his own motion revise at any time before the final publication of record-of-rights, any order whether made by himself or by any other Revenue Officer. According to the learned counsel, in view of this Sub-section, on 3.7.1969, the Charge Officer was within his rights in directing the Assistant Settlement Officer to re-open the case Page: 580and dispose of the same after hearing all the parties concerned. In my opinion, this contention has to be accepted. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue has relied on a decision of this Court in (1) Ram-dayal Missir v. The State of Bihar (1957 B.L.J.R 292) for the preposition that a Settlement Officer has no power of review. It is well settled that power of review is creature of a Statute. Unless such power is vested by specific provision, a judicial authority cannot exercise any such power for correcting a wrong. The view expressed in the aforesaid Bench decision of this Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court also in the case of (2) State of Bihar v. Ram Dayal Missir (1962 B.L.J.R 385) where it was observed that the law, as it stood on that day, the Revenue Officers, while exercising judicial powers, or quasi judicial powers, have no power of review. But, the Additional Member, Board of Revenue overlooked the fact that by the amendment by Act I of 1963, the Revenue Officer, who was specially empowered by the State Government, was vested with the power of revision and review. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A, he can review his own order as well as revise any other order passed by any other Revenue Officer. Of course, under the terms of that very Sub-section (3), he has to pass any such order only after giving a reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and to be heard in the matter. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 6 pointed out that the Charge Officer, while passing the order dated 3.7.1969, did not give him an opportunity of being heard, and, as such, the order dated 3.7.1969 was vitiated on that ground alone, it cannot be disputed that while passing the order dated 3.7.1969, the Charge Officer did not conform to the procedure prescribed by Sub-section (3) of Section 103A. But, respondent no. 6 except filing an application to recall the said order, did not take any further steps in the matter, rather he appeared before the Assistant Settlement Officer where the whole matter was heard in presence of both the parties and before the application of respondent no. 6 could be disposed of, the Assistant Settlement Officer passed the order on 25.7.1969 Respondent no. 6, thereafter, pursued different forums by way of revision and appeal only against the order dated 25.7.1969 He filed a revision before the Charge Officer; thereafter, an appeal before the Commissioner and then the revision before the Board of Revenue. Apart from that, on 3.7.1969, the Charge Officer did not pass any final order affecting any right of respondent no. 6. He simply directed the Assistant Settlement Officer to re-hear both the parties and then to pass an order on the objection of respondent no. 6. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that order dated 3.7.1969 had been passed by the Charge Officer in exercise of the power under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A and the Additional Member, Board of Revenue took an erroneous view of law when he held that it amounted to an order of review which was not sanctioned by the provisions of the Act.

9. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 6 has submitted that his application before the Board had been allowed only on the ground that the Charge Officer could not have passed an order directing the Assistant Settlement Officer to reopen the matter which had attained Page: 581finality. According to learned counsel, even if that decision of the Board is held to be bad, respondent no. 6 was entitled to urge either before the Commissioner or before the Board that the order dated 25.7.1969 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer and the order dated 1.2.1971 passed by the Charge Officer were bad on merits, and neither the Commissioner nor the Additional Member of the Board of Revenue has examined the legality of those orders on the basis of the materials produced on behalf of the parties. In that connection, learned counsel for respondent no. 6 has also pointed out that his appeal before the Commissioner was a proper remedy provided for him under the Act and the rules framed thereunder and the Commissioner was not correct when he dismissed the same in liming saying that respondent no. 6 had other alternative remedies. I have already pointed out that by Act I of 1963 a new Sub-section (4) had been introduced into Section 103A which has been reproduced earlier. Under that Sub-section (4) an appeal had been provided in the prescribed manner to the prescribed officer from any order passed under Sub-section (3). Under this Sub-section (4) an appeal against order dated 1.2.1971 passed by the Charge Officer was clearly maintainable, but this Sub-section (4), as I have already pointed out above, was deleted by Act VII of 1969. We have looked into Act VII of 1969. From the statement of objects and reasons of that Act it appears that Sub-section (4) was deleted because a right of appeal was available under Sub-section (1) of Section 104G even against an order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A. From Sub-section (1) of Section 104G it appears that an appeal can be presented within two months from every order passed by a Revenue Officer prior to the final publication of the record of-rights. This will include even an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 103A. From Clause (c) of Rule 63A it appears that an appeal will lie to the Commissioner of the Division from an order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 103 A if the same has been passed by the Charge Officer. On a plain reading of Rule 63A it appears that this was introduced along with the aforesaid Sub-section (4) of Section 103A which had provided an appeal under Section 103-A itself. But, as this Rule 63A does not appear to have been deleted when Sub-section (4) of Section 103A was deleted, it has to be held that on proper reading of Rule 63A along with Rule 76, Commissioner of the Division will be deemed to be superior Revenue Authority before whom an appeal shall lie. There is some conflict in the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 63A and under Sub-section (1) of Section 104G for filing such appeals. It is obvious that the period of two months prescribed under Section 104G will prevail.

10. In view of the aforesaid interpretation it has to be held that the appeals filed by respondent no. 6 before the Commissioner of the Division concerned were maintainable and the said appeals ought to have been heard on merit. Accordingly, I hold that the Additional Member, Board of Revenue was in error when he held that there was no power of revision vested in the Charge Officer when he passed the order dated 3.7.1969, and I also hold that the Commissioner was not justified in dismissing the appeals of respondent no. 6 in limine saying Page: 582that other remedies were open to him.

11. Now the question is to what relief the parties are entitled under aforesaid circumstances. If only the resolution dated 21.9.1972 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue is quashed, then the effect of this order will be that an illegal order dated 30.11.1971 passed by the Commissioner will be revived. It is well settled that the writ jurisdiction of this Court should not be exercised for the purpose of quashing an illegal order the effect whereof will be to revive another illegal order. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision in (3) Abdul Maid v. The State Transport Authority (1960 B.L.J.R 282). Accordingly, I quash the resolution dated 21.9.1972 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, as well as the order dated 30.11.1971 passed by the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, and I direct that the appeals filed on behalf of respondent no. 6 should now be heard, on merit by the Commissioner, Kosi Division, because we are informed that now he has jurisdiction to hear the said appeals. It is, however, made clear that the appeals will be heard and disposed of on the grounds other than the ground that the Charge Officer had no jurisdiction to pass order dated 3.7.1969 because I have already decided the said point in favour of the petitioner. It is said that respondent no. 6 had filed three appeals and thereafter he had filed three revisions, before the Board of Revenue and they had been heard and disposed of together by the Commissioner as well as the Additional Member, Board of Revenue. If three appeals had been filed on behalf of respondent no. 6, then the Commissioner will dispose of all the three appeals after hearing the parties in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

12. B.S Sinha, J.:—I agree.

Order accordingly.