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Sheetal Manikrao Dupare v. State Of Maharashtra Through Its Secretary & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was born in village Shivpuri in Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh and belongs to the Mahar caste. She was appointed in Western Coalfields Ltd., headquartered at Nagpur. After obtaining a caste certificate, the petitioner’s claim required verification by respondent No. 3, the Divisional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee. Her claim and documents were referred to that Committee, which, by communications dated 24-11-2004 and 3-12-2004, refused to entertain the petitioner’s caste claim on the ground that she was a migrant. Following unsuccessful subsequent representations, the petitioner filed the present writ petition on 16-01-2006.
Notice was issued. Respondent No. 3 filed an affidavit stating that because the petitioner was born in Chhindwara District, Madhya Pradesh, and not a resident of the State of Maharashtra, her caste claim could not be entertained in view of Government Resolutions dated 24-08-1995 and 21-08-1996. The matter was heard by consent of the parties.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person who became a migrant as a result of re-organisation of States (i.e., whose locality was severed from the State to which it originally belonged) can have his or her caste claim scrutinized and be entitled to reservation benefits in the State of migration.
- Whether respondent No. 3 was correct in refusing to entertain the petitioner’s caste claim on the basis that the petitioner was a migrant and not a resident of Maharashtra, having regard to relevant Government Resolutions and the jurisprudence on migrant entitlement after State reorganisation.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent No. 3 (Caste Scrutiny Committee)
- The Committee’s affidavit stated that the petitioner was born in Chhindwara District, Madhya Pradesh, and therefore was not a resident of the State of Maharashtra.
- On that basis, and in view of Government Resolutions dated 24-08-1995 and 21-08-1996, the Committee maintained that the petitioner’s caste claim could not be entertained by respondent No. 3.
Petitioner
- The record shows the petitioner sought verification of her caste certificate from the Divisional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and, after receiving communications refusing scrutiny, pursued representations and ultimately filed the writ petition seeking judicial relief. The opinion does not set out additional detailed legal submissions by the petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sudhakar Vithal v. State of Maharashtra, 2004 (5) Bom. C.R (S.C) 921 : 2004 (4) Mh. L.J 784 | The Apex Court's consideration of caste claims of persons who became migrants because of re-organisation of States. | The court relied on Sudhakar's case as foundational authority on entitlement of migrants whose localities were divided by State reorganisation. |
| Hitesh v. State, 2007 (4) Bom. C.R (N.B) 784 (Writ Petition No. 3668 of 2006), judgment dated 15-03-2007 | This Court's elaboration and summary (points (i)–(x)) of principles governing entitlement of migrants to Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe status after State reorganisation, following Sudhakar Vithal. | The court followed Hitesh v. State and adopted the reasoning and the numbered conclusions (i)–(x) in deciding the present petition. |
| Marri Chandra v. Dean, S.G.S Medical College, 1990 DGLS 275 : (1990) 3 SCC 130 | Ratio that a migrant is disentitled to reservation in the State of migration if his caste was not notified as Scheduled Caste/Tribe in the State of migration. | The court described this ratio narrowly and explained that it does not preclude entitlement where the caste is recognized in the State of migration; the decision was distinguished and not extended to deny benefits where the caste is notified in the State of migration. |
| Action Committee (as referred to in the opinion) | The Apex Court's explanation and following of Marri Chandra's ratio, using the expression "same nomenclature". | The court interpreted Action Committee as having sought to deny benefits only to migrants where the caste was of the "same nomenclature" (not necessarily the "same caste"), and read that decision as not denying benefits to persons belonging to the "same caste". |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court heard the parties and examined the question in light of Supreme Court authority (Sudhakar Vithal) and this Court’s prior decision in Hitesh v. State. It summarized and relied upon the principles set out in Hitesh (which in turn follow Sudhakar), including:
- That Articles 341/342 and the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Orders must be given full effect to identify beneficiaries with reference to the State and locality.
- That the object of scheduling castes/tribes is to address disadvantage in the local areas where they resided; the crucial test is whether the migrant suffers the same disadvantage as local members of the caste.
- That entitlement of migrants is to be decided with reference to the origin of the migrant and identification of the caste as backward in relation to the State of origin and, importantly, to the date of inclusion of the caste in the schedule (the relevant date is date of inclusion, not date of migration).
- That reorganisation of States (on linguistic basis) may divide localities but does not, by itself, defeat entitlement of migrants whose caste was recognized in the relevant localities both before and after reorganisation.
- The court distinguished Marri Chandra as holding only that a migrant is disentitled if his caste is not notified in the State of migration, and read Action Committee as limited to denying benefits where only the "same nomenclature" (but not the "same caste") was involved.
Applying these principles, and "for the reasons stated" in Hitesh v. State, the court concluded that the communications of respondent No. 3 (dated 24-11-2004 and 03-12-2004), which declined to consider the petitioner’s caste claim on the ground of migration, were not tenable.
Consequently, the court quashed and set aside those communications and directed respondent No. 3 Committee to decide the petitioner’s caste claim, as far as possible, within six months from 2 July 2007, with the petitioner to appear before the Committee on that date with requisite documents and thereafter as directed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The impugned communications dated 24-11-2004 and 03-12-2004, whereby respondent No. 3 declined to consider the petitioner’s caste claim, are quashed and set aside. Respondent No. 3 Committee is directed to decide the petitioner’s caste claim, as far as possible, within six months from 2 July 2007, with the petitioner to appear before the Committee with all requisite documents on that date and thereafter as directed.
Implications: The immediate practical consequence is that the petitioner’s caste claim must be reconsidered by the Scrutiny Committee within the specified period. The court applied existing precedents (Sudhakar Vithal and Hitesh v. State, among others) to permit scrutiny of caste claims of persons who became migrants due to State reorganisation when those principles are satisfied. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying and following the cited precedents. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
Chavan R.C, J.:— Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard by consent of parties.
2. Petitioner born at village Shivpuri in Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh to parents who belong to Mahar caste, was appointed in Western Coalfields Ltd., which has its Headquarter at Nagpur.
3. She obtained caste certificate which had to be got verified by respondent No. 3 Divisional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee. Accordingly her claim, with relevant documents, was referred to the Caste Scrutiny Committee. The Committee, by its impugned communications dated 24-11-2004 and 3-12-2004, refused to entertain petitioner's caste claim and informed Page: 333her that since the petitioner was a migrant she was not entitled to have her caste claim scrutinized. Since her subsequent representations did not yield any results the petitioner has ultimately approached this Court by filing present petition on 16.1.2006
4. Notice was issued to the respondents. On behalf of respondent No. 3-Caste Scrutiny Committee an affidavit in reply has been filed, where it has been reported that since the petitioner was born in Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh she was not resident of State of Maharashtra and therefore, in view of GRs dated 24th August, 1995 and 21st August, 1996 her caste claim cannot be entertained by respondent No. 3.
5. We have heard both, learned Advocate for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent State.
6. Chhindwara was a part of erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh with Nagpur as its capital. The question about caste claim of persons who become migrants because of re-organisation of State had been considered by the Apex Court in (Sudhakar Vithal v. State of Maharashtra), reported at 2004 (5) Bom. C.R (S.C) 921 : 2004 (4) Mh. L.J 784. While considering a case similar to that of the petitioner, in (Hitesh v. State), reported in 2007 (4) Bom. C.R (N.B) 784, Writ Petition No. 3668 of 2006, decided by judgment dated 15th March, 2007, following the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudhakar's case, this Court had concluded as under:
“41. To sum up:
(i) It is necessary to give full effect to both the expressions “for the purpose of this constitution” as well as “in relation to the State”, appearing in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution and Clause 2 of the Constitution Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Castes Orders, 1950, in order to identify the beneficiary correctly i.e by ensuring that he belongs to caste identified with reference to a state as Scheduled Caste or Tribe.
(ii) The object of including a caste or a tribe in the schedules to the orders was to do away with their disadvantaged position in the areas where they resided vis-a-vis other population. The crucial test would therefore be whether the person concerned suffers the same degree of disadvantage vis-a-vis other segments, as other local people of his caste suffer or whether as a migrant, he is placed on a higher pedestal.
(iii) Extending benefits to a migrant does no offence to the expression ‘in relation to the State’ in Articles 341/342 of the Constitution or Clauses 2 of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes Orders, 1950, since entitlement of such a person would have to be still decided with reference to the origin of such migrant and identification of migrant's caste as backward in relation to such State.
(iv) Date too is equally relevant in order to identify the person as belonging to caste included in the schedule on the date of such inclusion with reference to locality identified in the schedule. Therefore, a person claiming benefit would have to show that his ancestors hailed on the date of inclusion of caste in schedule from a place identified in the schedule. In other words, the relevant date is not date of migration but date of inclusion of caste or tribe in the schedule.
(v) Reorganization of States did not proceed on the basis of castes or tribes but on linguistic basis and therefore, localities of persons entitled to the benefit of reservation got divided in different States.
(vi) if upon removal of area restrictions, in the entire area of the State as originally existed on the date of notification of Constitution (Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes) Orders, the persons concerned could avail of the benefits of reservation, there is no reason why they should be denied such benefits upon reorganization of the States, in which a part of their locality was included.
(vii) The ratio of the decision in (Marri Chandra v. Dean, S.G.S Medical College), 1990 DGLS 275 : (1990) 3 SCC 130 is only that a migrant would be disentitled for reservation in the state of migration if his caste is not notified as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in the State of migration. (Since in Marrie Chandra's case the caste ‘Couda’ was notified in the State of Andhra Pradesh but not in Maharashtra). It would be impermissible to conclude that even though his caste is so notified in the State of migration, he would be disentitled to benefits, since such conclusion would frustrate the very object of providing benefits enumerated at (ii) above.
(viii) In Action Committee while explaining and following the ratio in Marri Chandra's case, Page: 334the Apex Court must be held to have merely sought to deny benefits to migrants belonging to a caste of same nomenclature, by consciously choosing the expression ‘same nomenclature’ and avoiding the use of words “same caste”. This implies that if persons belong to the ‘same caste’ they were not to be denied the benefits.
(ix) Sections 26 and 27 of the Bombay State Reorganization Act merely amend the schedules as a corollary to creation of State of Maharashtra and have no bearing on the question of entitlement of the migrants to reservation with reference to date on which the state was created.
(x) As held by the Apex Court in Sudhakar v. State, if a migrant belonged to a community which was recognised as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any locality which has been divided upon reorganization of states and his caste is recognised as Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe even in such newly formed states, the migrant would be entitled to benefit of reservation even in the State in which part of the locality other than his place of origin has gone.”
7. In Hitesh v. State we have elaborately dealt with the question of scrutiny of caste claims of the persons like petitioner, who become migrants simply because their localities get severed from the area to which they naturally belong, due to reorganization of States. Rather than repeat those reasons, for the reasons stated in the said judgment, we hold that the impugned communications dated 24.11.2004 and 3.12.2004, whereby respondent No. 3 Committee declined to consider caste claims of the petitioner, are quashed and set aside and respondent No. 3 Committee is directed to decide petitioner's caste claim, as far as possible, within a period of six months from 2nd July, 2007 on which date the petitioner shall herself appear before the Committee with all requisite documents and shall continue to so appear before the Committee as and when directed by the Committee.
8. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.
9. Order accordingly.
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