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Babu Lal v. State

Allahabad High Court
May 21, 1951
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion (P.L. Bhargava, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision application was filed by Babu Lal and Madhusudan, who were charged and tried for an offence punishable under Section 435 of the Indian Penal Code by a First Class Magistrate at Mohamdi in the district of Kheri. The learned Magistrate convicted both applicants, sentencing each to one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100. The applicants challenged the conviction by way of revision.

The prosecution case, as found by the courts below, was that on the night between 17 and 18 March 1950 Madhusudan and Babu Lal set fire to a double-thatched shed in which Dalla's horse was tethered. Madhusudan allegedly sprinkled kerosene and Babu Lal set the shed alight; the horse was badly burnt and the shed was burnt. Dalla raised an alarm and the applicants fled. The applicants denied the allegations and contended they had been falsely implicated because of enmity and domestic disputes.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the damage caused by the fire amounted to Rs. 100 or upwards so as to fall within Section 435, I.P.C.
  2. Whether the proper charge was under Section 436, I.P.C. (which relates to mischief by fire in respect of buildings used for the custody of property and is triable exclusively by a Court of Session), and if so whether the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the sentence imposed on the applicants was excessive.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • Contended that the prosecution failed to prove that damage to property amounted to Rs. 100 or more; only actual replacement/treatment costs should be included, not consequential losses.
  • Argued that, on the facts proved, the case fell within Section 436, I.P.C., meaning it was triable only by a Court of Session and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction.
  • Contended that the sentence imposed was excessive.
  • Denied the substantive allegations and asserted false implication due to enmity (including allegations concerning the character of Dalla's wife and disputes over use of a latrine).

Prosecution / Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned Sessions Judge and prosecution treated the evidence as establishing damage exceeding Rs. 100 by adding the costs of repairing/replacing property and consequential loss (loss of income during the period the horse was incapacitated).
  • Prosecution derived support from the first information report, charge-sheet and answers under Section 342 Cr.P.C. indicating the shed was constructed for keeping the horse (i.e., ordinarily used for that purpose).
  • The learned Government Advocate argued that the thatched-shed could not be considered a "building" within the meaning of Section 436, I.P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the findings of the courts below that the prosecution story was proved and the defence version rejected. The analysis proceeded in these principal steps:

  1. Interpretation of the statutory requirement of monetary damage under Section 435, I.P.C.:

    Section 435 requires that the mischief by fire must cause "damage to any property to the amount of one hundred rupees or upwards." The court examined the meaning of "damage to any property" by reference to Section 425 (definition of "mischief"), which the opinion reproduces: "the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously."

    The court reasoned that "damage to any property" is not confined to direct replacement costs but includes diminution of value and impairment of utility. Consequently, incidental and consequential losses to the owner that directly flow from the injury to the property (for example, loss of income while the horse was incapacitated) are relevant to the monetary assessment of damage.

  2. Application of the rule to the facts:

    The Sessions Judge's computation of damage was set out and accepted:

    • Damage to thatched-shed: Rs. 25.
    • Expenses on treatment of the horse: Rs. 50.
    • Loss of income while the horse was incapacitated (Rs. 8/day for 15 days): Rs. 120.

    Adding these items produced an aggregate exceeding Rs. 100. The court held that the Sessions Judge's method of calculation was correct and upheld the finding that damage exceeded Rs. 100, thereby bringing the case within Section 435, I.P.C.

  3. Question of jurisdiction under Section 436, I.P.C.:

    The applicants argued that the offence fell under Section 436 (which applies to mischief by fire in respect of a "building" ordinarily used for custody of property), making the offence triable only by a Court of Session, and that the Magistrate therefore lacked jurisdiction.

    The court examined whether the thatched-shed amounted to a "building" "ordinarily used" for the custody of property. Although the first information report and charge-sheet referred to the shed as constructed for keeping the horse, the court analyzed the statutory notion of "building" and the concept of "custody" used in Section 436.

    The court noted a Law Commissioner observation quoted in the opinion about distinctions between huts and substantial houses, and then held that an ordinary double-thatched shed resting on bamboos or wooden/brick pillars without doors and without security features cannot properly be treated as a "building" within Section 436's meaning. The word "custody" imports a sense of security which is lacking in such a shed that merely provides shelter from sun and rain.

    Therefore, the court concluded the thatched-shed in the present case was not a "building" used for the custody of property within Section 436, and the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case under Section 435.

  4. Sentencing:

    The court considered the applicants' contention that the sentence was excessive and observed that, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offence, the sentence imposed was deserved. The court therefore declined to interfere with the sentence.

Holding and Implications

Revision rejected; convictions under Section 435, I.P.C. upheld.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The court upheld the Sessions Judge's finding that the aggregate damage exceeded Rs. 100, bringing the offence within Section 435, I.P.C.
  • The court held that the thatched-shed did not qualify as a "building" used for the custody of property within the meaning of Section 436, I.P.C., and therefore the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case.
  • The sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 for each applicant was affirmed; the applicants, who were on bail, were ordered to surrender immediately to serve the remaining portion of their sentence.
  • No broader precedent was announced beyond the court's reasoning in this case; the decision resolves the revision by affirming the conviction and sentence on the facts and legal analysis presented in the opinion.

End of summary based solely on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

P.L Bhargava, J.:— This application in revision has been filed by Babu Lal and Madhusudan, who were charged and tried for an silence punishable under Section 435 of the Indian Penal Code by a Magistrate of the first class of Mohamdi, in the district of Kheri, The learned Magistrate found them guilty, convicted them of the offence with which they were charged and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to a fine of Rs. 100.

2. The case for the prosecution was as follows: On the night between the 17th and 18th March, 1950, at about 10 p.m the applicant Madhusudan went to Dal Chand alias Dalla, a tongawala, and asked him to get ready his tonga as he had to go somewhere. Dalla refused saying that his horse was tired and he himself was unwell. This is said to have annoyed Madhusudan, who threatened Dalla to see him and break his limbs. Dalla and his wife, Shanti, went to sleep in their house. Dalla's horse was, as usual, tethered in a double-thatched shed (bangla) near his house. About a couple of hours later Dal Chand and his wife heard the noise of their horse jumping in the shed. As they came out of their house they noticed the applicants near the shed. Madhusudan was sprinkling kerosene oil over the shed and Babu Lal lighted a match and set fire to the shed, which was burnt and the horse was badly burnt. Dalla raised an alarm and the people arrived on the scene, whereupon the applicants fled away. The applicants denied all the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution and alleged that they had been falsely implicated due to enmity. It was suggested that Shanti, the wife of Dalla, was a woman of loose character and Babu Lal often cut jokes with her; that Dalla suspected illicit intimacy between his wife and Babu Lal, and that on account of that suspicion he had been falsely implicated in this affair. Madhusudan alleged that he had Page: 559allowed Dalla's wife to use the latrine in his house and since the time when he prevented her from using the latrine, there arose some dispute on that account and that on account of that dispute he had been falsely implicated.

3. On a careful review of the entire evidence on the record the courts below accepted the prosecution story and rejected the defence version. Learned counsel for the applicants has contended that even on the facts found by the courts below the conviction of the applicants, under Section 435, I.P.C, was not warranted by law. Section 435 is in these terms:

Whoever commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, damage to any property to the amount of one hundred rupees or upwards or (where the property is agricultural produce) ten rupees or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

4. In the first place, it has been argued on behalf of the applicants that the prosecution has failed to prove that the damage to the property affected by fire amounted to Rs. 100 or upwards. The learned Sessions Judge has found that the damage to the property, viz., the shed and the horse, to the amount of over Rs. 100 has been proved. He worked out the amount on the basis of the evidence produced in this manner:

5. Damage to thatched-shed Rs. 25.

6. Damage to the horse—the amount spent on its treatment Rs. 50.

7. Loss of income suffered by the owner of the property during the period the horse was incapacitated at Rs. 8 per day for 15 days—Rs. 120.

8. On behalf of the applicants, it has been argued that only the actual damage to property and not the consequential loss or damage suffered by the owner of the property is contemplated by the expression “damage to any property” used in Section 435, I.P.C Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code defines “mischief” and clearly indicates what the expression “damage to any property” means. It means

the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously.

9. In other words, if the property is destroyed, diminished in value or utility or is otherwise injuriously affected the damage is done to the property. Such a damage may be occasioned by fire or by any other means. Therefore, the damage to any property contemplated by Section 435 must be of the nature aforesaid. So far there is no difficulty.

10. The difficulty arises when we have to determine the extent of damage in terms of money. The relevant phrase used in Section 435 is “damage to any property to the amount of” and in this case it is necessary to find out the extent of damage in money caused by fire to the thatched-shed and the horse. As already stated, the thatched-shed was destroyed and the horse was badly burnt with the result that it was incapacitated and unfit for work for about 15 days. Learned counsel for the applicants urged that only the costs of the replacement of the shed and the expenses incurred over the treatment of the horse should be taken into account in assessing the amount of damage to the property. The cost of replacement of the shed as well as the expenses of treatment of the horse are to be borne by the owner of the property, and the extent of loss in money suffered by the owner would afford the real basis for the assessment of damage. The damage to the property and the consequential loss to the owner are, therefore, co-related and one cannot be treated as independent of or separate from the other. There can be little doubt that the owner, apart from the expenses over the treatment of the horse, suffered loss of income, which he would have otherwise earned if the horse had not been incapacitated by burns. This loss is as much consequential to the damage to the property as the loss to be incurred in the replacement of the shed and in the treatment of the horse. In my opinion, the expression “damage to any property” is wide enough to include the entire incidental loss suffered by the owner; for example, if the horse became lame or was incapacitated due to injury or burns its value-would be diminished and its utility to the: owner will also be impaired. The loss in both cases would be to the owner and the extent of damage to property will have to be calculated with reference to the loss to the owner. In a case where mischief is done by straying of cattle in a field in which the crops are standing, the damage will have to be calculated with reference to the extent of loss of crops suffered by the owner.

11. Consequently, the correct measure of damage to property is the extent of loss suffered by the owner of the property; and there appears to be no reason to exclude the loss to the owner occasioned by the horse having been incapacitated. The method adopted by the learned Sessions Judge for calculating the amount of damage to property is correct, and I uphold the finding of the learned Judge that the damage to the property in this case exceeded the amount of Rs. 100.

12. The case was, therefore, fully covered by Section 435, I.P.C

13. In the next place, it has been argued that the conviction under Section 435, I.P.C is bad in law, inasmuch as on the facts proved the case fell within the purview of Section 436, an offence punishable whereunder is exclusively triable by a court of session and that the learned Magistrate had wrongly assumed jurisdiction which he did not possess. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that the case was not covered by Section 436, I.P.C inasmuch as there was nothing on the record to show that the shed was always or even “ordinarily” used for keeping the horse. There is ample evidence on the record to show that the shed was ordinarily used for keeping the horse. The very first sentence of the first information report speaks about the shed having been constructed for keeping the horse and that the horse was tied under it. In the charge-sheet the same thing was clearly indicated by the use of the words:

The thatch-shed of Dalla where he used to the up his horse.

14. Same thing was made clear in the question put to the applicants under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution, however, had to prove that the shed was a “building which is ordinarily used …. as a place for the custody of property.” The learned Government Advocate has pointed out, firstly, that the thatched-shed could not be considered such a building. On behalf of the applicants it has been urged that the term “building” does not necessarily mean a finished structure. He relied upon the following observation of the Law Commissioner:

The grass or mat huts of the lowest classes are placed on a level with the substantial, secure, and valuable dwellings of the better classes …. It is obviously proper that in the case of mischief by fire a distinction should be made between the huts …. and substantial houses, but there is sufficient room for such a distinction between the maximum of fourteen years and the minimum of one year, and between rigorous and simple imprisonment …. and we think it best that the distinction should be left to the discretion of the Judge.

15. A structure made of straw and not of bricks and mortar may be considered a building if it has got the necessary furnishing needed for a building, such as doors, bars, etc. An ordinary double-thatched-shed resting on bamboos or wooden or brick pillars having no doors etc. cannot be treated as a building within the meaning of that term used in Section 436, I.P.C The building referred to in the section is a building which can be used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property. The word ‘custody’ is undoubtedly different from the word “keeping” and it implies a sense of security which would be wanting in the case of a shed, which is only meant to provide shelter from sun and rain and which has no doors etc., Consequently, the thatched-shed in the present case could not be considered a building which was used for the custody of property. The learned Sessions judge was, therefore, right in holding that the present case was not covered by Section 436, I.P.C The learned Magistrate, therefore, had the jurisdiction to try the case against the applicants, and the conviction of the applicants under Section 435, I.P.C is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction.

16. Lastly, it has been contended on behalf of the applicants that, in any case, the sentence imposed upon the applicants is excessive; but, having regard to the nature of the offence committed and the circumstances in which it was committed, I am of opinion that the sentence imposed on the applicants is fully deserved. Accordingly, there is no force in this revision and I reject it. The applicants, who are on bail, shall immediately surrender to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence.

17. Revision rejected.