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Pt. Ram Prasad And Others v. State Through Jai Narain And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Brij Mohan Lall, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
A reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Agra recommending that the conviction of Ram Prasad Vaidya and four others, recorded by a learned Magistrate, first class of Agra under Section 297/149, be set aside and that the parties be directed to seek redress in the proper civil courts.
The underlying complaint was filed by Sidh Behari (described as Manager and trustee of a temple) and Jai Narain (described as a Pujari) against Ram Prasad Vaidya and four companions, alleging forcible entry into a temple on 17.9.1948, digging out the Singhasan/platform and throwing away the idols. The accused's defence was that the building was not a temple but a private house sold two days earlier, and that the purchasers lawfully entered and obtained possession.
The learned Magistrate framed a charge under Section 295/149, I.P.C., found that the building was a temple, found that the accused had forcibly entered, removed the platform and thrown away the idols, and convicted the accused under Section 297/149, I.P.C., sentencing each to pay a fine of Rs. 50.
On revision, the Sessions Judge considered it difficult to hold that idols were defiled or thrown away, but recognized that the Magistrate's findings were not shown to be perverse or unsupported by evidence. The Sessions Judge nevertheless advanced several legal objections to the conviction and recommended setting it aside, leading to the present reference which the Court is deciding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether omission in the charge to state expressly that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly invalidates the conviction under Section 149, I.P.C.
- Whether the absence of a conviction under Section 147, I.P.C. prevents application of Section 149, I.P.C.
- Whether the trespass required by Section 297, I.P.C. must be a criminal trespass, or whether any trespass suffices.
- Whether a conviction under Section 297, I.P.C. can be recorded when the charge was framed under Section 295, I.P.C., i.e., whether conviction for a different offence is permissible under Sections 236–238 and in particular Section 237, Cr. P.C.
- Whether the facts of this case fall within the "doubtful case" contemplated by Section 236, Cr. P.C., thereby making Section 237 applicable and permitting conviction for an offence different from that charged.
Arguments of the Parties
Learned Sessions Judge's Arguments
- The charge did not explicitly state that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly; therefore the conviction under Section 149 is bad.
- Since the accused were not convicted under Section 147, Section 149 could not be invoked against them.
- The accused were asserting a bona fide civil right (ownership/purchase), so any trespass was at most civil and not criminal; therefore, Section 297 (it was argued) requires criminal trespass for completion of the offence.
- Because the charge was framed under Section 295, a conviction under Section 297 could not be recorded; Section 297 could not be treated as a "minor offence" relative to Section 295, and therefore Section 238 could not justify the conviction under a different section.
Accused (Defence)—Position Presented in the Record
- The defence asserted that the building was not a temple but a private house sold two days earlier; the purchasers lawfully entered and obtained possession, negating criminal culpability.
Learned Counsel Supporting the Reference
- Conceded that Section 237 can permit conviction for an offence different from that charged, but maintained that Section 236 did not apply in this case because it was not a doubtful case; counsel argued it was clearly a Section 297 case and hence conviction under Section 295 could not be supported.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Begu v. King-Emperor | Illustrates a case where the accused was charged with one offence (Section 302, I.P.C.) but convicted of a different offence (Section 201, I.P.C.). | Used as an authority to show that conviction under a different section from that charged can be sustained where applicable (supporting the application of Section 237, Cr. P.C.). |
| Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State of West Bengal, 1952 A.L.J. 268 | Example where accused was charged under Section 307, I.P.C. but convicted under Section 326, I.P.C. (the latter containing an additional ingredient), and the conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court. | Employed to demonstrate that conviction for an offence with additional ingredients can be upheld even if the charge named a different offence, supporting the proposition that Section 237 may justify such a conviction. |
| Amir Hassan v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 414 | A case where the charge was under Section 295, I.P.C. but conviction was recorded under Section 297, I.P.C. | Described as "still more to the point" and relied on to support the conclusion that recording a conviction under Section 297 while the charge was under Section 295 is justified by Section 237 when Section 236 applies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded on the assumption that the learned Magistrate's findings of fact were correct, because the Sessions Judge had not demonstrated that those findings were perverse or unsupported by evidence.
On the objection that the charge did not explicitly mention membership of an unlawful assembly, the Court held this omission to be non-prejudicial. The inclusion of Section 149 in the charge indicated that the accused were being treated as members of an unlawful assembly. The Court relied on Section 537(a), Cr.P.C. (as cited in the opinion) to the effect that a sentence shall not be reversed for an error, omission or irregularity in the charge if there has been no failure of justice; accordingly, the accused were not prejudiced and there was no failure of justice.
Addressing the contention that Section 149 could not be invoked because there was no conviction under Section 147, the Court rejected the argument. It referred to Section 535(1), Cr.P.C. (as cited in the opinion) to state that a conviction can be recorded even in the absence of a charge if there has been no failure of justice. The absence of a conviction under Section 147 was held not to be a valid ground for setting aside a conviction under another proved offence.
On whether the trespass required for Section 297 must be criminal trespass, the Court observed that Section 297 refers to "any trespass" and not specifically to criminal trespass. Therefore, whether the trespass was civil or criminal in character, if trespass occurred it satisfied the ingredient for Section 297. Given the Magistrate's finding of trespass, the requirement of trespass for Section 297 was present.
The more complex point was whether a conviction under Section 297 could be recorded when the charge was under Section 295. The Court acknowledged that Section 297 is not a "minor offence" relative to Section 295 because it contains an additional ingredient (trespass) absent from Section 295; hence Section 238 could not be relied on in isolation to justify conviction under Section 297 when the charge was under Section 295.
However, the Court examined Sections 236 and 237, Cr.P.C. and concluded that if the case fell within Section 236 (i.e., it was doubtful which of two offences the proved facts constituted), Section 237 permits conviction for the offence shown by evidence even if not specifically charged. The Court found that whether the building was a public temple (bringing Section 295 into play) or a family idol/private shrine (bringing Section 297 into play) was in dispute from the outset; thus it was not possible to state with certainty which offence the evidence would establish. Consequently, the matter was "doubtful" within Section 236, and Section 237 therefore applied, authorizing conviction under Section 297/149 despite the charge being framed under Section 295/149.
The Court supported this interpretation with the cited precedents (Begu v. King-Emperor; Bejoy Chand Patra; and Amir Hassan v. Emperor) which showed instances where convictions under offences different from the charge were sustained.
On this basis the Court concluded that the legal objections raised by the Sessions Judge were without force and that the recording of conviction under Section 297/149 was justified by Section 237 in the circumstances of this case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference recommending that the conviction be set aside is REJECTED.
Direct consequences: The conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate under Section 297/149, I.P.C. (and the sentence of a fine of Rs. 50 on each accused as recorded in the Magistrate's order) stands; the papers are to be returned. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying Sections 236–237, Cr.P.C. to the facts; it relies on existing authorities. No broader new precedent is announced in this opinion beyond the Court's application of the cited statutory provisions and precedents to the facts.
Reference rejected. (Final line of the opinion: "Reference rejected. The papers shall be returned.")
Brij Mohan Lall, J.:— This is a reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Agra recommending that the conviction of Ram Prasad Vaidya and four others recorded by a learned Magistrate, first class of Agra, under Section 297/149 “be set aside and the parties be directed to seek redress in the proper civil courts if they are so advised.”
2. A complaint was filed by two persons, viz. Sidh Behari and Jai Narain, against Ram Prasad Vaidya and his four companions charging them with having committed offences punishable under “Sections 295/297/147/149 of the Indian Penal Code”. Sidh Behari described himself as the Manager and trustee of a temple and Jai Narain called himself a Pujari thereof. It was alleged that the accused persons had forcibly entered the temple on 17.9.1948, dug out the Singhasan and the platform and thrown away the idols. The defence was that the building in question was not a temple but a private house which had been sold two days before by Shrimati Bibbo (the mother of one of the accused, viz. Gutti) to the wife of another accused, Ram Vinod, and the purchasers had, in lawful exercise of their civil right, entered the house they had purchased and obtained possession thereof. A charge was framed by the learned Magistrate under Section 295/149, I.P.C It ran as follows:—
“That you on or about the 17th day of September, 1948, at 1 p.m at Jumna Kinara damaged, defiled and destroyed the idols at Sri Laxmi Narain Ji temple with intent to cause insult to the religion of the complainant and in doing so all acted with the common object and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 295/149 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.”
3. The learned Magistrate held that the building in question was a temple and in a portion of the said building Jai Narain was living as a Pujari. Further, he held that Sidh Behari, the other complainant, was neither the Manager nor the trustee of the said temple. As regards the occurrence, he was of the opinion that the accused persons had, in fact, forcibly entered the temple, dug out the platform and thrown away the idols. On these findings, he recorded a conviction under Section 297/149, I.P.C and sentenced every one of the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 50.
4. The accused persons filed a revision and the learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that it was “difficult to hold that any idols were defiled or thrown away.” There was, however, Page: 687evidence in favour of the idols being thrown away and, if the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that evidence was believable it was not for the Sessions Judge to set aside that finding of fact in revision and to substitute his own finding in place thereof. It cannot be contended for a minute that the Magistrate's finding was either perverse or unsupported by evidence. This reference must, therefore, be decided on the assumption that the learned Magistrate's findings of fact are correct.
5. The learned Sessions Judge had further held that, even accepting the findings of fact recorded by the learned Magistrate, the conviction is vitiated by several legal defects. It is stated, in the first instance, that the charge does not contain a statement to the effect that the accused persons were members of an unlawful assembly and therefore the conviction is bad. With this argument I am unable to agree. The accused knew full well what the allegations against them were. They were not prejudiced by the fact that membership of an unlawful assembly was not specifically mentioned in the charge. The charge, as already stated, was framed under Section 295/149, I.P.C The mention of Section 149 was a clear indication that the accused were being treated as members of an unlawful assembly. Section 537(a), Cr. P.C is clear on the point. It says that no sentence or order passed by a competent court shall be eversed or altered by any court of appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge, if there has been no failure of justice. I am satisfied that the accused were not prejudiced and there has been no failure of justice on account of this omission.
6. The next point of law urged by the learned Sessions Judge is that since the accused have not been convicted of an offence under Section 147, I.P.C the provisions of Section 149 could not be invoked against them. This contention is also without force. Section 535(1), Cr. P.C lays down that a conviction can be recorded even in the absence of a charge, if there has been no failure of justice. The circumstances were such that the accused could be convicted of an offence punishable under Section 147 even in the absence of a charge. If they have not been convicted, so much the better for them. But the absence of a conviction under Section 147 is no ground for setting aside their conviction of any other offence which might have been proved against them. In the circumstances, I see no force in this argument also of the learned Sessions Judge.
7. Another argument advanced by the learned Sessions Judge is that the accused were endorcing a bona fide civil right and the trespass committed by them was, at the most, a civil and not a criminal trespass. He seems to be of the opinion that, unless there is a criminal trespass, an offence under Section 297 is not complete. This argument too is not sound. Section 297 speaks of “any trespass” and not of criminal trespass. Therefore, whether the trespass is of a civil or a criminal nature, the offence becomes complete. Since there is a clear finding by the learned Magistrate that there was a trespass in the present case, the ingredient of trespass required by Section 297, I.P.C is present. For the completion of the offence it is not necessary to record a finding that the trespass committed was necessarily a criminal trespass.
8. The next point put forward by the learned Sessions Judge is that since the charge was one under Section 295, a conviction could not be recorded under Section 297, I.P.C and that Section 297 cannot be described as a “minor offence” with reference to the offence punishable under Section 295. This contention is no doubt true. A minor offence means an offence made out by some of the ingredients of the major offence. For instance, an offence punishable under Section 323 is a minor offence with respect to an offence of grievous hurt punishable under Section 325, I.P.C Similarly, an offence of causing assault or using criminal force punishable under Section 325, I.P.C is a minor offence with respect to an offence of causing assault or using criminal force with a view to dishonour a person punishable under Section 355, I.P.C The offence punishable under Section 297 does not satisfy this test. In this offence there is an additional ingredient, viz. that of trespass, which forms no part of the offence punishable under Section 295, I.P.C Because of the presence of this additional ingredient the offence punishable under Section 297 cannot be treated as a minor offence with respect to the offence punishable under Section 295, I.P.C Therefore, a conviction under Section 297 while the charge was under Section 295, cannot be justified by the provisions of Section 238, Cr. P.C But Section 238, Cr. P.C is not the only section which permits the recording of a conviction of an offence different from the one mentioned in the charge sheet. Section 237 is another such section which says that
“If, in the case mentioned in Section 236, the accused is charged with one offence, and it Page: 688appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of that section, he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.”
9. It is, therefore, obvious that if the case is one which is covered by Section 236, Cr. P.C, a conviction can be recorded for an offence made out by the evidence even if it happens to be an offence different from that mentioned in the charge. The learned counsel, who appeared in support of the reference, conceded that this was so, but he maintained that in the present case Section 236, Cr. P.C did not apply. He contended that it was not doubtful which of the two offences the facts proved would constitute. According to him, it was a clear case of Section 297 and nobody could ever entertain a doubt that it was possible to record a conviction under Section 295, I.P.C This contention is not correct. From the very beginning there was a dispute between the parties whether or not there was a temple and, secondly, whether the temple was a public temple or it consisted of a simple family idol. In case it was a public temple, throwing away of the idol and digging of the Chabutra would have amounted to insulting the religion of a “class of persons” and would have been covered by Section 295, I.P.C On the other hand, if it was only a family idol, Section 295 had no application and an offence under Section 297, I.P.C could be made out. It could not be stated with certainty as to whether the evidence would establish that the temple was a public or a private temple. In the circumstances, the matter was entirely a doubtful one and the case fell within the four corners of Section 236, Cr. P.C Therefore, Section 237, Cr. P.C became applicable, and by virtue of this section a conviction could be recorded for an offence with which the accused were not specifically charged. In the case of Begu v. King-Emperor1 the accused was charged with an offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C but was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 201, I.P.C Similarly, in the recent case of Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State of West Bengal 1952 A.L.J 268 the accused was charged with an offence punishable under Section 307, I.P.C but was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 326, I.P.C which consists of an additional ingredient, viz., that the injury must have been caused by an “instrument of shooting, stabbing or cutting or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death.” This conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court. The case of Amir Hassan v. Emperor A.I.R 1940 Pat. 414 is still more to the point. In that case the charge was, as here under Section 295, I.P.C but a conviction was recorded under Section 297, I.P.C I am, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of Section 237, Cr. P.C justified the recording of a conviction under Section 297/149, while the charge was under Section 295/149, I.P.C The reference is rejected. The papers shall be returned.
10. Reference rejected.
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