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Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur v. Maharani Deepinder Kaur

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 8, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.K. Jhanji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The present two civil revision petitions (Civil Revision Nos. 4212 and 4306 of 1997) arise out of a common order dated 30.08.1997 of the Senior Sub-Judge, Chandigarh, directing the plaintiff(s) to correctly assess the market value of the suit property and make up any deficiency in court fee. The factual matrix (drawn from Civil Revision No. 4212) is as follows:

  • Raja Harinder Singh (erstwhile ruler of Faridkot) executed a Will dated 01.06.1982 purportedly creating the Maharwal Khewaji Trust, managed by named trustees.
  • The plaintiff (one of Raja Harinder Singh's daughters) filed a suit challenging the validity of the Will, alleging misrepresentation, undue influence and that the Will is fictitious and not voluntary. It was alleged an attesting witness (an advocate) exercised undue influence and the Will was suspicious and most unnatural.
  • The plaintiffs sought multiple reliefs: declaration of ownership (a one-third share or alternatively 100% if certain principles applied), declaration that the Will and Trust are invalid, reliefs declaring trustees personally liable, setting aside transactions made by the Trust, injunctions restraining alienation or transfer, and consequential reliefs including deemed joint possession.
  • During pendency, defendants applied for rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-payment of proper court fee, contending the properties were of high market value and consequential reliefs attracted court fee on market value.
  • The trial Court held the suit was not properly valued and directed the plaintiff to correctly assess market value and make up deficiency in court fee. The present civil revisions challenge that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court-fee payable on the plaint must be assessed on the basis that the suit, although framed as for declaration, also seeks consequential reliefs (including possession and injunction), thereby attracting valuation under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act and valuation as per Section 7(v).
  2. Whether admissions or statements in the defendant's written statement (for example admitting the plaintiff is in joint possession of some properties) can be relied upon at the preliminary stage to reduce or alter the court-fee liability assessed from the plaint.
  3. Whether the trial Court's direction to the plaintiff to assess market value and make up any deficiency in court fee was legally sustainable.
  4. Whether the civil revision(s) impugning the trial Court's order are maintainable (this question was raised but the Court observed it was not necessary to decide it in the present judgment).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended the suit is essentially for a simpliciter declaration (deemed joint possession) and that consequential reliefs such as injunction, if any, are independent reliefs and not consequential—thus the suit should not attract court fee based on market value of property.
  • The plaintiff relied on several authorities (including Commercial Aviation & Travel Co. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, Kesho Mahton v. Ayodhya Mahton, Daljit Singh v. S. Joginder Singh Shekhon, BPC etc. v. Sat Parkash, Kaushiklal Nanalal Parikh v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd.) to argue that the question of court-fee valuation is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot properly be determined at a preliminary stage; the trial Court could not, without evidence, determine the value of reliefs sought.
  • The plaintiff further argued that certain admissions by defendants in their written statements (regarding joint possession and vesting of certain properties in a declared Trust) precluded defendants from claiming the plaintiff was out of possession and thereby militated against court-fee being assessed on market value (relying on Gurjivan v. Jagar Singh etc.).
  • The plaintiff sought remand for redetermination by the trial Court as the impugned order had not specified the value of the suit or the deficiency in court fee.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants maintained that the suit was not a mere action for declaration but one which also sought consequential reliefs (such as cancellation/avoidance of documents, injunction and possession-related reliefs), and therefore Section 7(iv)(c) of the Panjab Court Fee Act applied and court fee should be levied on the market value of the property as provided in Section 7(v).
  • Defendants relied on several authorities (including Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Parshad, Labh Singh v. Puran Singh, Hukam Singh v. Massammat Gian Devi, Bura Mal v. Tulsi Ram, Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, Ranjit Singh v. Balkar Singh) to support the contention that where cancellation/avoidance of documents or consequential reliefs are sought, court fee under Section 7(iv)(c) is leviable.
  • It was also contended that the civil revision was not maintainable, relying on Mahant Sunder Dass Chela Mahant Arjan Dass v. Gurpartap Das.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurjivan v. Jagar Singh etc., 1990 (1) PLR 261 Cited by plaintiff to argue defendants' admissions in written statement preclude them from asserting plaintiff is out of possession and hence court-fee should not be on market value. The Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on this authority for the purpose of altering court-fee assessment, holding that admissions in written statement cannot determine court-fee liability which is fixed by the plaint.
Commercial Aviation & Travel Co. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, (1988) 3 SCC 423 : AIR 1988 SC 1636 Cited by plaintiff to contend that valuation and question of court-fee is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be decided at preliminary stage. The Court noted the reliance but held that court-fee is to be determined by the plaint's allegations; the plaintiff's contention that the issue was preliminary and mixed was not accepted for changing valuation.
Kesho Mahton v. Ayodhya Mahton, AIR 1983 Patna 67 One of the cases cited by plaintiff for the proposition that court-fee valuation is a mixed question not to be decided preliminarily. The Court recorded the reliance but proceeded on the principle that the nature of the suit for court-fee purposes is determined by the plaint, not by such preliminary contentions.
Daljit Singh v. S. Joginder Singh Shekhon, AIR 1985 P&H 184 Cited by plaintiff on the mixed-question point regarding court-fee valuation. The Court did not accept this as a basis to avoid assessment under Section 7(iv)(c) where the plaint itself sought consequential reliefs flowing from a declaration.
BPC etc. v. Sat Parkash etc., 1992 PLJ 220 Cited by plaintiff in support of the proposition that valuation may require evidence and is a mixed question. The Court reiterated the governing principle that court-fee is determined by the plaint's allegations and thus the cited authority did not alter the result.
Kaushiklal Nanalal Parikh etc. v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd., AIR 1995 Gujarat 115 Cited by plaintiff in support of the contention that valuation is not to be determined preliminarily. The Court treated the reliance as insufficient to displace the rule that the plaint determines court-fee liability.
S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 Authority for the proposition that the question of court-fees must be considered in light of the allegations in the plaint and cannot be influenced by pleas in the written statement or the final decision on merits. The Court expressly relied on this Supreme Court precedent as the governing principle: court-fee is determined from the plaint alone and not by defenses or admissions in the written statement.
Mahant Sunder Dass Chela Mahant Arjan Dass v. Gurpartap Das, 1978 PLR 21 Cited by defendants to contend that the present civil revision is not maintainable. The Court noted the contention based on this authority but observed that the question of maintainability need not be decided for disposing of these revisions.
Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Parshad, 1973 SC 2384 Cited by defendants for the proposition that suits seeking cancellation/avoidance or consequential reliefs attract court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c). The Court accepted the general proposition that suits seeking consequential reliefs (including cancellation/avoidance) fall within Section 7(iv)(c) and thus attract valuation as per Section 7(v).
Labh Singh v. Puran Singh (deceased), 1978 PLR 28 Cited by defendants to support the contention that consequential reliefs bring a suit within Section 7(iv)(c). The Court counted this among authorities supporting the defendants' position and used the combined weight of such authorities to hold Section 7(iv)(c) applicable.
Hukam Singh v. Massammat Gian Devi, Recorded Civil Judgment No. 87 (1916) Cited by defendants for the principle that cancellation/avoidance consequential reliefs attract appropriate court-fee. The Court referenced this older authority as part of the line of cases supporting the applicability of Section 7(iv)(c) to suits seeking avoidance or cancellation.
Bura Mal v. Tulsi Ram, 1927 Lahore 890 Cited by defendants in the same strain—suits seeking cancellation/avoidance are to be treated as involving consequential reliefs for court-fee purposes. The Court included this authority among those confirming that such suits attract fee under Section 7(iv)(c).
Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, 1998 (3) RCR (Civil) 135 (P&H) : 1998 (2) PLR 417 Cited by defendants as recent authority that suits involving cancellation/avoidance and consequential reliefs attract fee under Section 7(iv)(c). The Court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that the present suit falls under Section 7(iv)(c).
Ranjit Singh v. Balkar Singh, 2001 (1) RCR (Civil) 573 (P&H) : 2000 (2) PLR 382 Cited by defendants for the proposition that consequential reliefs in declaration suits attract court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c). The Court relied on this authority among others to hold that the present suit attracted fee as per Section 7(iv)(c).
Mt. Zeb-Ul-Nisha v. Chaudhry Din Mohammad, AIR 1941 Lahore 97 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that where a co-parcener sues to declare an alienation null and void, a declaratory relief must be held to include consequential reliefs (and thus attract appropriate court-fee). The Court invoked the Full Bench decision as a direct precedent supporting the view that a declaration seeking avoidance of documents includes consequential reliefs and therefore attracts Section 7(iv)(c) fee.
Iqbal Kaur v. Chanan Singh, 1978 RLR 62 Decision of this Court holding that suits seeking avoidance/cancellation consequential to declaration attract fee under Section 7(iv)(c). The Court relied on this Court's earlier decision as corroborative authority that the present suit falls under Section 7(iv)(c).
Joginder Singh v. Major Singh, 1983 PLR 225 Another decision of this Court holding that court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c) applies where consequential reliefs (such as setting aside transactions) are sought with a declaration. The Court cited this case with Iqbal Kaur and the Full Bench to conclude the suit is not a simpliciter declaration suit but attracts Section 7(iv)(c) valuation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in several discrete steps, closely tied to the allegations and the provisions of the Court Fee Act:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court set out Section 7(iv) and Section 7(v) of the Court Fee Act, explaining the categories of suits enumerated in Section 7(iv) (including suits for declaratory decrees with consequential relief in clause (c)) and the valuation rules for suits for possession of lands, houses and gardens in Section 7(v).
  2. Fundamental principle: The Court reiterated the well-established proposition (citing S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245) that the court-fee payable is determined by the allegations in the plaint alone; it cannot be fixed by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision on merits. The "nature of the suit" is determined by the plaint.
  3. Effect of admissions in written statement: The Court examined the plaintiff's contention that admissions in the written statement (that the plaintiff is in joint possession of certain properties) ought to alter court-fee liability. Applying the cited Supreme Court authority, the Court held that admissions in the written statement cannot be given substance for altering court-fee liability; the plaint itself does not state that the plaintiff is in joint possession. Therefore the admission cannot preclude the court-fee assessment based on the plaint.
  4. Substance over form: The Court emphasized that application of a particular clause of the Court Fee Act depends on the substance of the plaint and not on mere words. Nothing should be imported into the plaint which it does not actually or necessarily imply.
  5. Characterisation of reliefs: On examining the plaint, the Court concluded the claim was "clearly one for declaration with consequential relief of joint possession and also for injunction." The Court found that the consequential reliefs are not merely ancillary or superfluous; they directly flow from the central declaration sought (i.e., unless the declaration against the Will is granted, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to be in individual joint possession nor obtain injunctions).
  6. Reliance on precedent: The Court observed a line of authority (including the Full Bench decision in Mt. Zeb-Ul-Nisha, and earlier decisions of this Court such as Iqbal Kaur and Joginder Singh) holding that suits which seek to avoid or cancel documents and which thereby seek consequential reliefs fall within Section 7(iv)(c) and attract fee as provided in Section 7(v). The Court considered decisions cited by defendants and concluded the present suit falls within that category.
  7. Conclusion on trial Court's order: The Court found no illegality in the trial Court's direction that the plaintiff must correctly assess market value and make up deficiency in court-fee. It therefore dismissed the civil revisions challenging that direction.
  8. Amendment and further procedure: The Court noted the plaintiff may apply to amend the plaint to omit consequential reliefs; if the trial Court allows such amendment, defendants may file an amended written statement and the trial Court shall frame an issue regarding sufficiency of court-fee and decide it on merits after evidence is led.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The civil revisions (Civil Revision Nos. 4212 and 4306 of 1997) were disposed of by dismissing the revisions and upholding the trial Court's order directing the plaintiff to correctly assess the market value of the suit property and make up any deficiency in court-fee.

Direct implications and consequences:

  • The Court affirmed that the plaint's allegations determine the nature of the suit for court-fee purposes; because the plaint sought declaratory relief together with consequential reliefs (including joint possession and injunction), the suit falls within Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act and must be valued as provided in Section 7(v).
  • The trial Court's direction that the plaintiff should assess the market value and make up the deficiency in court-fee stands; there was no illegality found in that direction.
  • The plaintiff remains at liberty to apply to the trial Court to amend the plaint to omit consequential reliefs; if the plaint is amended, the trial Court will permit the defendants to file a written statement to the amended plaint and (after pleadings) will frame and decide an issue on sufficiency of court-fee on merits after evidence.
  • The Court did not decide the separate contention as to maintainability of the civil revision(s); it held that question was unnecessary to decide for disposal of the matter.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond application of existing authorities and the statutory provisions; the outcome was the application of established rules to the pleadings and case at hand.
Dispositive order (as recorded in the opinion): "Revisions dismissed of."

Note: This summary has been prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion and does not include information beyond what appears in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

V.K Jhanji, J.:— This order will dispose of Civil Revision No. 4212 and 4306 of 1997 as both have arisen out of order dated August 30, 1997 passed by Senior Sub-Judge, Chandigarh whereby plaintiff have been directed to first correctly assess the market value of the suit property and then make up deficiency in court fee. Questions of law and facts involved in both these civil revisions are common. Facts have been taken from Civil Revision No. 4212 of 1997.

2. Raja Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur was the ruler or erstwhile Faridkot State. He had three daughters and one son. Raja Harinder Singh died on 16.10.1989 whereas his only son, namely, Tikka Harmohinder Singh died on 13.10.1981 i.e during his life time. Raja Harinder Singh allegedly executed Will dated 1.6.1982 whereby he is purported to have created a Trust known as Maharwal Khewaji Trust to be managed by the Trustees named in the said Will. Plaintiff who is daughter of Raja Harinder Singh filed the present suit challenging the Will in question on the ground that the same is a result of misrepresentation, undue influence and is fictitious, not made voluntarily and one Baljinder Pal Singh Brar, Advocate who is one of the attesting witnesses to the Will, exercised undue influence upon Raja who also left to Maharani Mohinder Kaur, his mother who was alive at the time of execution of the Will. It is further alleged that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and is most unnatural. Raja who was Jat Sikh by caste was governed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 after the merger of the State of the Union of India.

3. It is not necessary for me to go into the various grounds attacking the Will and creation of Trust because the short question for adjudication before me is with regard to the quantum of court fee leviable on the claim set up in the plaints.

Page: 2854. In the suit filed by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, she has claimed the following reliefs:—

1. Issue a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner to the extent of ⅓rd share in the properties, the details whereof are given in Annexure 1 and that the plaintiff is deemed to be in joint possession of the said properties along with defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and such consequential relief as may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice;

2. Issue a decree of declaration that the alleged Will of his Highness the Raja of Faridkot is invalid, void and unenforceable and that accordingly the purported Maharwal Khewaji Trust is illegal and any action taken by it was and is void ab initio;

3. In the alternative, if this Hon'ble Court holds that the Will of Late Raja of Faridkot is valid, issue a decree of declaration that the alleged Meharwal Khewaji Trust is illegal as being in perpetuity, and or contrary to the provisions of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 and or any other law in force;

4. Issue a decree of declaration that the trustees of the purported Meharwal Khewaji Trust are personally liable for all their actions executed whilst perpetuating the fraudulent/illegal trust and are liable to account for any and all amounts howsoever had and received or spent in their capacities as ‘trustees’;

5. Issue a decree of declaration to the effect that any and all transactions and or conveyance executed by the alleged Meharwal Khewaji Trust are liable to be set aside;

6. In the alternative, if this Hon'ble Court holds that the law of primogeniture and or the Raja of Faridkot's Estate Act, 1948 are applicable, issue a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner to the extent of 100% share in the properties, the details whereof are given in Annexure-1 along with such consequential relief as may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice;

7. Restrain the defendants from alienating, mortgaging, transferring, leasing, encumbering, exchanging, or in any manner charging the suit probities or transferring possession of such properties.”

5. During the pendency of suits, defendants filed an application for rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-payment of proper court fee. In the application, it was inter-alia contended that the suit properties involved are worth several crores of rupees and the suit is not simplicitor for declaration but consequential reliefs have also been claimed whereon the court fee is leviable on the market value of the property.

6. Upon contest, trial Court held that the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and the plaintiff is required to first assess the market value of the suit property correctly and then make up the deficiency in court fee. Against the said order, present civil revisions have been filed.

7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff contended that the plaintiff is in joint possession of the property and she has claimed simpliciter declaration regarding deemed joint possession by way of present suit and that defendants in their written statements have admitted that property known as Fairy Cottage (Country Club) situated in Bir Chahal, Tehsil and District Faridkot, Flat No. 32 Rivera Apartment, The Mall, Delhi and one another property stand vested in a declaratory Trust known as Faridkot Ruling Family Housing Trust created by the late owner Col. Sir Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur KCSI and the beneficiaries of this Trust are all the three daughters of the settlers and the said properties are in possession of the beneficiaries. He contended that in view of this admission, defendants stand precluded from agitating that the plaintiff is out of possession of the properties and require to pay court fee on the market value of the properties in dispute so as to seek possession thereof in view of judgment of this Court in case Gurjivan v. Jagar Singh etc., 1990 (1) PLR 261. He further contended that the suit is merely for declaration and the injunction, if any, claimed is an independent relief and not the consequential one flowing from the declaration sought and thus plaintiffs cannot be asked to pay court fee. He also contended that it was not possible for the trial Court at a preliminary stage to determine the value of the reliefs sought in the plaint. In this regard, he has placed reliance on Commercial Aviation and Travel Company v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, (1988) 3 SCC 423 : AIR 1988 SC 1636 and Kesho Mahton v. Ayodhya Mahton, AIR 1983 Patna 67, Daljit Singh… v. S. Joginder Singh Shekhon…, AIR 1985 P&H 184, BPC etc. v. Sat Parkash etc., 1992 PLJ 220 and Kaushiklal Nanalal Parikh etc. v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd., AIR 1995 Gujarat 115 to contend that question of treating the issue of court fee as preliminary does not arise because it is a mixed question of law and facts and can only be proved after leading evidence along with other issues. He further contended that the trial Court while passing the impugned order has not indicated as to what is the value of suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and what amount of court fee is deficient and as such the matter is required to be remanded to the trial Court for redetermination of the issue in regard to the value for the purpose of court fee and the court fee leviable thereon.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Sarin appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that the present civil revision is not maintainable in view of Mahant Sunder Dass Chela Mahant Arjan Dass v. Gurpartap Das, 1978 PLR 21. He further contended that the suit in the present case is not for mere declaration but is one for consequential relief also and as such court fee under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Panjab Court Fee Act is leviable on the Memorandum of Suit. In this regard, he placed reliance on Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Parshad, 1973 SC 2384, Labh Page: 286Singh v. Puran Singh (deceased), 1978 PLR 28 : 1978 Revenue Law Reporter 72, Hukam Singh v. Massammat Gian Devi, Recorded Civil Judgment No. 87 (1916), Bura Mal v. Tulsi Ram, 1927 Lahore 890, Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, 1998 (3) RCR (Civil) 135 (P&H) : 1998 (2) PLR 417 and Ranjit Singh… v. Balkar Singh…, 2001 (1) RCR (Civil) 573 (P&H) : 2000 (2) PLR 382 because in such suits cancellation of the documents is necessary to be sought which falls within the definition of consequential relief.

9. Section 7 of the Court Fee Act deals with computation of court fee payable in certain suits. Sub-section (iv) of said section reads as under:—

(iv) in suits—

(a) for moveable property of no market value. —

for moveable property where the subject matter has no market value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to title.

(b) to enforce a right to share in joint family property.— to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property,

(c) for a declaratory decree and consequential relief.—to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.

(d) for injunction—to obtain an injunction.

(e) for easement—for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and

(f) for accounts.—for accounts.

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the values the relief sought for:

Provided that minimum court-fee in each case shall be (thirteen rupees).

Provided further that in suit coming under sub-section (c) in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for any clause (v) for this section.

10. Sub-section (v) of Section 7 of the Court Fee Act reads as under:—

“(v) for possession of lands, houses and gardens.—in suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens-according to the value of the subject-matter; and value shall be deemed to be-where the subject-matter is land, and—

(a) where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue

and such revenue is permanently settled-ten times the revenue so payable.

(b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid:

and such revenue is settled, but not permanently (ten) times the revenue so payable;

(c) where the land pays no such revenue or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue

and net profits have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint—

fifteen times such net profits:

but where no such net profits have arisen therefrom-the amount at which the Court shall estimate the land with reference to the value of similar land in the neighbourhood;

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned-the market value of the land.”

11. It is the allegation in the plaint that determines the court fee payable in a suit. The nature of the suit is determined by the plaint and the plaint alone, and the court fee has to be paid on the determination and scope of it. It is not to be determined upon the please taken by the defendant in his written statement. The main test is what is sued for because the word used is ‘suit’ and the test has reference to what is asked for in the plaint and not to any question or dispute that may arise upon any pleadings of the defendant. The application of any particular clause of court fee depends upon the substance of the plaint and not on mere word used in the plaint and further nothing should be imported into the plaint which it does not contain actually or by necessary implication. Plaintiff has every right to insist that the court fee should be assessed on the basis of which he has framed his plaint although there might be room for suspicion that the plaint has been so drafted as to avoid inconvenient facts and payment of higher court fee. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 wherein it was held that the question of court fees must be considered in the light of allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas raised in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits.

12. If the first argument raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff that defendants have admitted in written statement that plaintiff is in joint possession of some property is examined in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred to judgment, then that argument fails simply on the ground that no substance can be attached to the admission made in the written statement in regard to possession and quantum Page: 287of court fee has to be strictly assessed as per claim set up in the plaint. In the plaint, it is no where stated that the plaintiff is in joint possession of any property. Thus, the relief claimed in regard to ‘deemed joint possession’ is nothing else but a consequential relief flowing from the declaration sought in regard to the Will being a fictitious document having been obtained by misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence.

13. The claim set up in the plaint is clearly one for declaration with consequential relief of joint possession and also for injunction. The consequential reliefs set up are neither superfluous nor ancillary but directly flows from the declaration. The argument of learned counsel for the plaintiff that these claims are independent and have been properly valued, is thus not tenable. Only those claims which do not flow from each other are termed as ‘Independent claim’. In the present suit, so long as declaration in regard to the Will whereby a Trust has been created, is not granted in favour of the plaintiff, defendants cannot be restrained as prayed for nor the plaintiff can be deemed to be in joint possession in her individual capacity.

14. The question of cancellation of such documents has arisen time and again and this Court from time to time, in such suits where declaration for avoiding any document is sought, has held that suits containing consequential relief of avoiding such documents, court fee is leviable under Section 7(iv)(c) of Court Fee Act. Similar question had come up for consideration before Full Bench of Lahore High Court in case Mt. Zeb-Ul-Nisha v. Chaudhry Din Mohammad, AIR 1941 Lahore 97 wherein dispute was within regard to cancellation of sale deed made by Karta of the family. In that case, Hon'ble Full Bench held that if the alienation of joint family property is effected by a Manager of Joint Hindu Family, for such an alienation is binding on the other members of the family (even if they are not party to it) and if a co-parcener sues for declaration that such an alienation is null and void, the declaration must be held to include consequential relief. Similarly, this Court in case Iqbal Kaur v. Chanan Singh, 1978 RLR 62 and Joginder Singh v. Major Singh, 1983 PLR 225 has held that in such suits court fee is leviable under Section 7(iv)(c). The claim set up in the present suit if examined in light of the judgment of Full Bench and the judgments rendered by this Court is the above referred to cases, it is evident that the present suit is not simpliciter suit for declaration, joint possession and injunction but the one which falls under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act and court fee on the memorandum of suit is leviable as provided under Section 7(v) of the Act.

15. In this view of the matter, I do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment. The question raised by Mr. Sarin that the present civil revision is not maintainable, is not necessary to be gone into.

16. At this stage, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff urged that his client may be allowed to amend the plaint so as to omit the consequential reliefs claimed by her. In this regard, he moved civil miscellaneous application No. 15829-CII-2001 filing therewith copy of the amended plaint. Mr. Sarin opposed the said application saying that simpliciter suit for declaration will not be maintainable. Without going into the question whether the suit would be maintainable or not, it is stated that plaintiff is always at liberty to move application for amendment of plaint and omit any of the reliefs claimed by her at any stage by making a prayer to the trial Court in this regard. I have no manner of doubt that if such an application is made to the trial Court, it shall allow the plaintiff to amend his plaint and in that eventuality defendants shall also have an opportunity to file written statement to the amended plaint by taking all defences available to them including the one that suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. On completion of the pleadings, trial Court shall frame an issue in regard to sufficiency of court fee leviable on the memorandum of suit and decide the same on merits along with other issues after affording the parties to lead evidence in support of the same.

17. The present civil revisions are disposed of in the terms indicated above.

Revisions dismissed of.