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Radhika B. v. State Of Kerala .
Factual and Procedural Background
These matters were referred to a Full Bench to consider certain provisions of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (the "Act"). The second matter was referred and tagged along with the first. A reasoned order of reference doubted the correctness of a prior Division Bench judgment in Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala, [ILR 2009 (4) Ker. 896]. The short issue described in the reference was whether occurrences counted in an earlier detention order — that was subsequently revoked by the Government under Section 10(4) of the Act on the advice of the Advisory Board — could thereafter be counted together with later prejudicial acts to justify another detention order under Section 3 read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
The Full Bench heard learned counsel for the parties, including the State Government's counsel. The petitioner relied on the correctness of Praseetha; the State contended that Praseetha's ratio was incorrect insofar as it held that occurrences relied upon for a revoked detention order cannot later be counted with subsequent prejudicial acts for a second detention order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether alleged occurrences that were taken into consideration for an earlier detention order which was revoked under Section 10(4) of the Act on the advice of the Advisory Board can be counted, together with later prejudicial acts, for the issuance of another detention order under Section 3 read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
- Whether the ratio of the Division Bench decision in Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala should be overruled to the extent it holds that such earlier occurrences cannot be counted for a subsequent detention order.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that the decision in Praseetha was correctly decided and therefore did not call for reconsideration or variation by the Full Bench.
State Government's Arguments
- The State Government's counsel contended that the ratio in Praseetha is wrong to the extent it holds that occurrences counted for an earlier detention order, subsequently revoked on the advice of the Advisory Board (Section 10(4)), cannot thereafter be counted along with later prejudicial acts for issuing another detention order under Section 3 in terms of Section 13(2).
- The State therefore urged that Praseetha be overruled insofar as it is inconsistent with that position.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala, [ILR 2009 (4) Ker. 896] | The Division Bench's ratio was understood to hold that occurrences counted for a detention order which was revoked on the advice of the Advisory Board cannot thereafter be reckoned for a subsequent detention order. | The Full Bench examined and found that the ratio in Praseetha was erroneous to the extent it was contrary to the Full Bench's interpretation of the Act; Praseetha was overruled insofar as it conflicted with the Court's conclusion that earlier prejudicial activities may be counted with subsequent activities for a fresh detention order under Section 13(2). |
| Decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court based on the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFE-POSAA) (as referred to in Praseetha) | Referred to in Praseetha; invoked in earlier reasoning considered by the Division Bench. | The Full Bench held it was unnecessary to rely on those Supreme Court decisions because the provisions of COFE-POSAA are not in pari materia with the Kerala Act; therefore those decisions were not applied in reaching the Full Bench's conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench's analysis proceeded by close textual and functional examination of the Act's provisions governing the Advisory Board and the revocation/issuance of detention orders:
- The Court outlined Section 10(4): where the Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause for detention, the Government is obliged to revoke the detention order and release the person forthwith. This revocation provision is compulsory in the circumstances specified.
- The Court examined the Board's statutory jurisdiction (Sections 8–10) and concluded it is limited. The Board's role is to opine only on the sufficiency of cause for the particular detention order placed before it; its jurisdiction is confined to the facts and grounds relied upon for that specific order.
- The Court rejected the view that the Board's consideration operates to "purge" or "diffuse" the prejudicial nature of the alleged acts counted in the earlier detention order. In other words, the Board's finding with respect to sufficiency of cause for that particular order does not qualitatively erase or negate the earlier prejudicial activities for all future purposes.
- The Full Bench adopted the concept of a "live-link": if subsequent conduct by the same person results in prejudicial activity under the Act, those subsequent activities create and maintain a live-link with earlier prejudicial activities. When earlier acts are followed by subsequent prejudicial acts, the combined string of activities may be considered together to justify a fresh detention order.
- The Court held that Section 13(2) expressly provides that revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not be a bar to the issuance of another detention order under Section 3 if the person continues to fall within the statutory definitions and the situations in clauses (i)–(iii) of Section 13(2) occur. Thus, the statutory scheme contemplates that earlier prejudicial acts may be considered for a new order when combined with later acts.
- The Court clarified that revocation under Section 10(4) (on the Board's advice) and revocation under Section 13(1) are, qualitatively, of no distinction insofar as their impact on whether earlier prejudicial activities can be counted for a subsequent order: both forms of revocation do not prevent those earlier acts from being reckoned when later prejudicial acts occur.
- While recognizing that the statutory power of revocation must be exercised with constitutional and statutory balance (fairness to the detenu and consideration of public interest), the Full Bench nevertheless concluded that the statutory text and scheme support counting earlier prejudicial acts in combination with subsequent ones to issue another detention order under Section 3 read with Section 13(2).
- Finally, the Court observed that reliance on precedents under COFE-POSAA (invoked in Praseetha) was unnecessary because COFE-POSAA's provisions are not in pari materia with the Kerala Act; therefore those Supreme Court decisions were not treated as controlling for the issues before the Full Bench.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Full Bench answered the reference by holding that the revocation of a detention order under the Act on the basis of the Advisory Board's advice under Section 10(4) does not strip earlier alleged prejudicial acts of their efficacy so as to exclude those acts from being reckoned for the purpose of imposing another detention order under Section 13(2) read with Section 3 of the Act.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The Full Bench declared the ratio in Praseetha erroneous insofar as it was contrary to the Full Bench's conclusion, and overruled Praseetha to that extent.
- Revocation of a detention order under Section 10(4) (on the Board's advice) is qualitatively no different from revocation under Section 13(1) regarding the legal effect on earlier prejudicial acts: neither form of revocation prevents earlier acts from being counted with later acts to justify a fresh detention order under Section 13(2).
- The Full Bench found no ground to interfere with the impugned detention orders in the matters before it: the writ petitions challenging those detention orders were dismissed.
- The decision establishes the legal position (for purposes of this Act and these references) that earlier prejudicial acts can be aggregated with later prejudicial acts to sustain a subsequent detention order; the Court expressly limited reliance on COFE-POSAA-based Supreme Court decisions because they were considered not in pari materia with the Kerala Act.
Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.:— The issues for consideration in these references to the Full Bench relate to some of the provisions regarding preventive detention under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, for short, the “Act”. The second among the captioned matters is referred and tagged along, in view of the order of reference in the former.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties in both the matters, including the State Government's counsel. The reasoned order of reference is made doubting the correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala, [ILR 2009 (4) Ker. 896]. The short issue for consideration is as to whether the alleged occurrences taken into consideration while passing an order of detention, which was revoked by the Government under Section 10(4) of the Act on the advice of the Advisory Board, could be counted along with the later prejudicial acts, for issuance of another detention order under Section 3 of the Act in terms of Section 13(2) thereof.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WP (Crl.) No. 248 of 2014 argued that Praseetha was decided correctly and hence it does not call for variation on reconsideration. Per contra, the learned State Government's counsel supported the views expressed in the order of reference and argued that the ratio of Praseetha is wrong to the extent it holds that the occurrences which were counted for the purpose of the earlier detention order, which was revoked on the advice of the Board cannot thereafter be counted along with other prejudicial acts which are alleged to have been committed after the revocation. He, therefore, pleaded that the ratio in Praseetha is to be overruled.
4. Sub-section 4 of Section 10 of the Act enjoins that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of a person concerned, the Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith.
5. Sub-section 1 of Section 13 of the Act provides for revocation or modification of detention order by the State Government. Section 13(2) provides, among other things, that the revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not be a bar for the issuance of another detention order under Section 3 of the Act, if the person concerned continues to be a person falling within the definition of ‘known rowdy’ or ‘known goonda’ as defined in the Act, and if any of the situations enumerated in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of that sub-section occurs.
6. To resolve the controversies raised in these matters, particularly as to the effect of the Board's recommendations, in the first instance, it is profitable to examine the jurisdiction of the Board constituted in terms of Section 8 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act provides that in every case where a detention order has been made under the Act, the Government shall place the matter for consideration of the Board in accordance with the prescriptions of that provision. Section 10 lays down the procedure of the Board and further action. Sub-section 4 of that section provides, among other things, that where the Board has reported that, in its opinion, there is no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Government shall revoke the detention order and shall cause the person to be released forthwith. The domain of consideration by the Board in terms of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act is such that, the only question for decision and advice by it is as regards the particular detention order which went to it for opinion. The Board's authority was to opine whether the order of detention before it then, was founded on sufficient cause; on the basis of the cases which were made the foundation of that particular order of detention. The statutory jurisdiction of the Board in that regard is confined to consideration of the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause, as regards that particular detention order which went for the opinion of the Board. It will be too farfetched; nay, impermissible; to say that the consideration by the Board at that stage is something that could be treated as one amounting to diffusing the prejudicial nature of the alleged criminal acts reckoned to pass the detention order which was before the Board for such statutory scrutiny.
7. When subsequent conduct of the same person results in prejudicial activity or activities reckonable in terms of the Act, that will trigger and maintain a live-link with the earlier prejudicial Page: 509activities, though such earlier prejudicial activities, by themselves, would not have weighed as sufficient enough to sustain the earlier detention order. The advice of the Board in relation to an earlier detention order is only as regards the sufficiency of the cause as to that detention order, on the basis of those prejudicial activities which were reckoned to pass that particular detention order. Such advice of the Board does not purge the efficacy of those prejudicial activities or their vigor as to criminality, to exclude them from being counted when the person concerned involves in prejudicial activities subsequent to the revocation of that detention order. When those earlier prejudicial activities are followed by subsequent prejudicial activity or activities, all of them ought to be taken as a string of potent activities which will sustain with continuity of live-link for the purpose of another order of detention. If the competent authority enters satisfaction as to the requirement to issue another detention order, taking into consideration all or any of the earlier prejudicial activities along with the subsequent prejudicial activities, there is no illegality in that. That is undoubtedly within terms of the Act.
8. A detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the Government. That power under Section 13(1) of the Act is a statutory one. It is a statutory power; so positioned that it ought to be exercised maintaining the requisite constitutional and statutory balance, bearing in mind the constitutional rights of the person against whom the detention order is issued vis-a-vis the powers to detain and the grounds of detention as are provided for in the Act; without forgetting the object and purpose of the Act. Therefore, the issuance of an order of revocation under Sub-section 1 of Section 13 cannot be made in derogation of the constitutional principles governing the repository of that statutory power; which is nothing short of fairness in action, both in relation to the detenu, as also the public at large; bearing in mind the mischiefs sought to be prevented by such statutory provisions authorising detention orders. Remember; the Act enacted in 2007, stands now with no successful challenge to its constitutional validity.
9. Looking at Sub-section 4 of Section 10, all that can be seen is that the Government have the obligation to revoke a detention order on the advice of the Board on consideration of the grounds of that particular detention order which is compulsorily liable for such scrutiny in terms of Sections 8 to 10 of the Act. That is an obligatory process in terms of the constitutional provisions governing preventing detention.
10. What emerges from the aforesaid discussions is that once an order of detention is revoked either as a measure of obligatory revocation referable to Section 10(4) of the Act or by recourse to revocation under Section 13(1), the resultant revocation is, qualitatively, of no distinction among themselves as regards their impact on the prejudicial activities counted for the purpose of the earlier detention order. This means that notwithstanding whether it is an obligatory revocation under Section 10(4) or a voluntary revocation under Section 13(1), the prejudicial activities which were reckoned for the purpose of an earlier detention order can nevertheless be counted, providing the live-link to issue another order of detention against the same person in the light of sub-section 2 of Section 13; which provision is only to the effect that the revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not be a bar for the issuance of another detention order under Section 3. Therefore, the power to issue the detention order is always under Section 3 and all that sub-section 2 of Section 13 does is to enumerate the situations where another detention order under Section 3 can be issued against the same person who was covered by an earlier detention order.
11. In the aforesaid view of the matter, clearly emanating out of the provisions of the Act themselves, it was not necessary to make reference to the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the basis of the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFE-POSAA), referred to in Praseetha (supra); more particularly because, the provisions of COFE-POSAA are not in pari materia with those of the Act in hand.
12. Having regard to the conclusions arrived at above, we hold that the ratio of Praseetha (supra) is erroneous to the extent it is contrary to what is stated herein. We, therefore, answer the reference in both the cases by declaring that the revocation of an order of detention under the Act on the basis of the advice of the Board under Section 10(4) does not take away the efficacy of the alleged acts counted for the detention order so revoked, to exclude them from being reckoned to impose another detention order as provided under Page: 510Section 13(2) of the Act. The revocation of a detention order by the Government, either on the basis of the advice of the Board or otherwise, makes out no qualitative distinction; and, therefore, the quality of revocation of the detention order under Sub-section 4 of Section 10 is, in no way, different from the quality of revocation under Sub-section 1 of Section 13 of the Act. Praseetha (supra) is hereby overruled to the extent of declaration of law made herein. We have also considered the particular facts of both the cases referred to the Full Bench. We do not see any ground as to lack of due application of mind or any other vitiating factor that could be upheld to interfere with the detention orders impugned in these writ petitions. All grounds raised against the detention orders fail. These writ petitions are liable to be dismissed repelling the plea extended on behalf of the detenus covered by the orders impugned.
13. In the result, answering the reference as above and holding that there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned orders of detention, these writ petitions are dismissed.
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