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Joseph v. Philip Joseph .

Kerala High Court
Aug 22, 2000
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a complaint filed by the petitioner before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palai, alleging that the respondent committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by issuing a cheque that was dishonoured. The cheque for Rs. 25,000/- was drawn on the Kozhuvanal Branch of South Indian Bank Limited but was returned unpaid due to the account being closed. The Magistrate convicted the respondent and sentenced him to imprisonment and a fine. The respondent appealed to the Sessions Judge, Kottayam, who acquitted him by setting aside the conviction and sentence. The complainant has now filed this appeal challenging the acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a drawer of a cheque is liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act if the cheque is issued after the bank account has been closed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The dishonour of a cheque due to the account being closed should be treated as insufficient funds under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The Sessions Judge erred in not applying the decision in Japahari v. Priya (1993 (2) KLT 141) correctly and should have relied on Thomas Varghese v. Jerome (1992 (1) KLT 812).
  • Even if the account was closed before issuance, the drawer should be penalized under Section 138 as per the Supreme Court decision in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. (1999 (2) KLT S.N 39).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent supported the Sessions Judge’s acquittal and argued there was no ground for interference with the order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Japahari v. Priya, 1993 (2) KLT 141 A cheque must be drawn on a subsisting account; issuance without an account does not attract Section 138 liability. The Court relied on this decision to hold that issuance of cheque after account closure is not offence under Section 138.
Thomas Varghese v. Jerome, 1992 (1) KLT 812 Issuance of cheque before account closure but dishonoured after closure attracts Section 138. The Court distinguished this case as not applicable since the account was closed long before cheque issuance.
NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., 1999 (2) KLT S.N 39 Dishonour of cheque with endorsement "account closed" is covered under Section 138 as insufficient funds. The Court held this precedent inapplicable because in the present case the account was closed prior to cheque issuance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the facts that the accused’s bank account was closed on 5.8.1987 and the cheque was issued on 9.11.1990. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires a subsisting bank account at the time of cheque issuance or presentation for the offence to be made out. The Court noted that if a cheque is issued before account closure but dishonoured after, Section 138 applies, but not where the account was closed long before cheque issuance. The Court relied on Japahari v. Priya to emphasize that a cheque cannot be issued without an existing account. It found that the accused’s act of issuing a cheque without an account was not punishable under Section 138 but could amount to cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. because in that case the account was closed after cheque issuance, unlike the present case. The Court found no infirmity in the Sessions Judge’s acquittal.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court’s decision directly affects the parties by upholding the acquittal of the respondent, confirming that issuance of a cheque after the bank account has been closed does not attract liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. No new precedent has been established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

N. Krishnan Nair, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.6.1994 of the Sessions Judge, Kottayam in Crl. Appeal No. 190/92. The case arose on a complaint filed by the petitioner herein before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palai, against the respondent herein, alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. After the trial, the learned Magistrate found the respondent (accused) guilty of the offence and convicted him. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate, the respondent herein preferred an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Kottayam. The Sessions Judge, Kottayam allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent and acquitted him. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the complainant has come up with this appeal.

2. The substance of the allegations in the complaint filed before the Magistrate is as follows:—

The accused in discharge Of an amount of Rs. 25,000/- which he borrowed from the complainant, issued Ex. P1 cheque in favour of the complainant drawn on the Kozhuvanal Branch of the South Indian Bank Limited. When the complainant presented the cheque for encashment through the Palai Branch of the State Bank of Travancore, it was returned unpaid with the endorsement “account stands closed”. Thereupon the complainant issued a notice to the accused, calling upon him to pay the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. Since the accused was not prepared to comply with the notice, proceedings were initiated against him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. When the accused appeared before the Court, the particulars of the offence were read over and explained to him.

4. He pleaded not guilty. Thereupon, the complainant gave evidence as PW1 and examined the Manager of the Kozhuvanal Branch of South Indian Bank as PW 2. Exts. Pl to P8 were also marked. No defence evidence was adduced. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence, the learned Magistrate found the accused guilty of the offence, convicted him and sentenced him as stated earlier. Page: 135The appeal filed before the Sessions Judge was allowed and the accused was acquitted.

5. The order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge is seriously challenged in this appeal.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly contended that the learned Sessions Judge should have found that the dishonour of cheque by a bank on the ground that account is closed would be covered by the phrase “the amount of money standing to the credit of the accused is insufficient to honour the cheque.” According to the learned counsel, the decision reported in Japahari v. Priya, 1993 (2) KLT 141 is not correctly decided and the lower Court should have relied on the decision reported in Thomas Varghese v. Jerome, 1992 (1) KLT 812. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and urged that there is no ground for interference.

7. The important question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a drawer of cheque is liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, if the cheque is issued after closing the account. In this case, admittedly, the account which the accused had with the bank was closed on 5.8.1987 and the cheque was issued in 1990. If we examine Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it could be seen that in order to invite the penalty as provided for in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, for the drawer of the cheque, there must have been a subsisting account with the bank, either on the date on which the cheque was issued or on the date which the cheque was bearing or at the time when the cheque was presented for ???ncashment. No doubt, if the drawer of the cheque issues a cheque in favour of another and thereafter closes the account before the cheque reaching the bank, then-the act of the drawer of the cheque would come within the purview of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; [See the decision reported in Thomas Varghese v. Jerome, 1992 (1) KLT 812]. But, when the account was closed long back and the cheque was issued much later and there was no case for the payee of the cheque or the complainant that the cheque was really dated prior to the closing of the account, then the dishonour of the cheque on the basis that the account was closed long back in not an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In this connection, it is relevant to note the following observations' of this Court in Japahari v. Priva, 1993 (2) KLT 141:

“A cheque cannot be issued de hors an account maintained by its drawer with the banker. Section 6 of the Act says that a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker. When the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid because of the amount of money standing to the credit of “that account” is insufficient to honour the cheque, it is open to the holder of the cheque to make demand for payment as indicated in clause (b) of the proviso. The words “that account” in the section denote to the account in respect of which the cheque was drawn. No doubt if any person manages to issue a cheque without an account with the hank concerned its consequences would not snowball into the offence described under Section 138 of the Act. Such acts may amount to other offences. For the offence under Section 138 of the Act there must have been an account-maintained by the drawer at the time the cheque was drawn.”

8. In this case, the evidence of PW 2 and Ext. P8 would show that the account was closed on 5.8.1987 and the cheque issued only on 9.11.1990 No doubt, the act of the accused by having issued a cheque when he was not maintaining any account with the bank and fraudulently representing to the complainant that there was funds to the credit of his account with the bank and on the basis of this representation, the complainant was deprived of his money, the act done by the appellant would come within the purview of Section 420 of the I.P.C It is also relevant to note that Ex. P1 cheque leaf was not bearing any ledger folio account number and as observed by the Page: 136lower Court this would create doubt whether Ex. P1 was issued on the account covered by Ext. P8.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly contended that even if the account was closed before the issuance of the cheque, drawer of the cheque would be subjected to the penalty as provided under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., 1999 (2) KLT S.N 39. No doubt, in the decision referred to by the learned counsel, it has been held that when the cheque is returned by a bank with an endorsement “account closed”, it would (the?) amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque as envisaged in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was also observed by the Supreme Court in that case that the expression “the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque” is a genus of which the expression “that account being closed” is specie. But, the said decision is not applicable to facts of this case. In that case, the account was closed after issuing the cheque. But, in this case as noticed earlier, the account was closed long prior to the issuance of the cheque. The decision reported in Thomas Varghese v. Jerome, 1992 (1) KLT 812 also would not help the appellant in this case. Since long prior to the drawal of the cheque in question, the accused had closed the account with the bank. I see no infirmity in the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the accused in this case has not committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This appeal is groundless and is liable to be dismissed.

10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.