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Krishena Kumar v. Comptroller And Auditor General of India And Another

Delhi High Court
Jan 28, 1966
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Opinion by S.K. Kapur, J. (28 January 1966)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an Assistant Audit Officer in the Northern Railway, challenged an order dated 28 August 1965 signed by the Assistant Comptroller and Auditor General directing his transfer and posting as an Assistant Accounts Officer in the office of the Accountant General, Bihar, Ranchi.

The petition originally contained allegations that the transfer was motivated by mala fides. The petitioner subsequently applied (Civil Miscellaneous No. 5250-D of 1965) on 13 December 1965 for permission to drop the mala fides point; that application was allowed by the court on 14 December 1965, and the court did not consider facts relevant to the mala fides allegations further.

The petition proceeded on other grounds (statutory/regulatory and procedural challenges to the transfer). After hearing arguments and considering affidavits and authorities, the court dismissed the petition and made no order as to costs. The judgment was delivered on 28 January 1966.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders (as it stood before the 1961 amendment) prevented the petitioner from being transferred outside his "circle" and thus conferred a justiciable right against such transfer.
  2. Whether the 1961 amendment to regulation 124 applied to the petitioner and, if so, whether the amended regulation permitted the transfer.
  3. Whether regulation 124 (in either edition) is statutory or otherwise confers a justiciable right enforceable by the petitioner.
  4. Whether fundamental service rules (specifically Fundamental Rules including Rules 2, 11, 14B and 15 and F.R.15) empowered the Government to transfer the petitioner notwithstanding regulation 124.
  5. Whether the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General was competent to pass the transfer order or whether that power was reserved to the Comptroller and Auditor General (in particular, the scope and effect of paragraph 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders and Rule 28 under section 96-d(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915).
  6. Whether the asserted transfer would result in detriment to the petitioner (financial loss, loss of concessions such as first-class railway pass and saloon use, loss of Provident Fund benefits) and whether conditions of service were being impermissibly altered to his detriment.
  7. Whether the petitioner's lien on his present post was being terminated by the transfer (with related reliance on Rule 14B and Article 311 raised by the petitioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. I. M. Lall)

  • Regulation 124 (as in force before the 1961 amendment) confined railway audit officers to transfer within their circle; therefore the petitioner could not lawfully be transferred outside the circle.
  • The 1961 amendment could not be relied upon to permit the transfer because the pre-amendment regulation governed the petitioner’s conditions of service.
  • Regulation 124 and related materials derive authority from section 96-d(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915 (as amended in 1919), and therefore create enforceable conditions.
  • Reliance on several departmental instruments (Railway Audit Code 1931, Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders 1938, Railway Audit Manual editions) to show localization and circle-based liability for service.
  • The Deputy Auditor General was not competent to pass the transfer order; power to transfer rests with the Auditor General under Rule 28 framed under section 96-d(1).
  • The transfer will cause financial loss, loss of concessions (first-class railway pass, saloon), and may affect Provident Fund benefits; hence it is detrimental and alters conditions of service.
  • The petitioner’s lien on his present post is being terminated by the transfer.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. S. N. Shanker)

  • Regulation 124 and other similar regulations in the Manual of Standing Orders are not statutory; they do not create justiciable rights enforceable in court.
  • Fundamental Rules (notably Rules 2, 11, 14B and 15) vest sufficient power in the Government to transfer servants; Rule 11 indicates the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government.
  • The 1961 amendment to regulation 124 permits transfers; in any event the Fundamental Rules permit the transfer on a temporary basis.
  • The transfer in this case is temporary, the petitioner's lien is not being terminated, and he is being posted to an exactly equivalent post entitled to draw the same grade pay.
  • The Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General is competent to issue the order under paragraph 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders; the Auditor General’s powers (including those in Rule 28) can be exercised through the Deputy to the extent indicated.
  • The alleged losses (concessions, Provident Fund) are either not affected by a temporary transfer or are discretionary and not claimable as of right; respondents assert no detriment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.V.G. Iyengar v. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 Mysore 37 Establishes that a statutory regulation may validly be made even if it prejudicially affects an employee. The court relied on this authority to note that even if regulation 124 were treated as statutory, such a regulation could be competently made and would not automatically invalidate the transfer merely because it affected the employee adversely.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in logical steps, applying the materials and arguments presented:

  1. Withdrawal of mala fides: The court first noted the petitioner had withdrawn the mala fides allegation by an application allowed on 14 December 1965; thus the court did not consider facts raised only in support of that allegation.
  2. Textual comparison of regulation 124: The court set out regulation 124 before and after the 1961 amendment to determine whether the pre-amendment localization rule applied and to identify whether the amended regulation permitted transfer outside the circle.
  3. Character of regulation 124: The court concluded that regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders (and the corresponding clause in the Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, 1938 edition) is not a statutory regulation conferring a justiciable right on the petitioner. This conclusion was grounded in the respondents' submission and the court's reading of the regulatory scheme.
  4. Primacy of Fundamental Rules: The court held that the Fundamental Rules (including Rules 2, 11, 14B and 15 and F.R.15) confer sufficient power on the authorities to transfer the petitioner on a temporary basis. In short, even if regulation 124 placed localization limitations, the Fundamental Rules supply the administrative power to effect transfers, particularly temporary ones.
  5. Conditions of service and alteration to detriment: The petitioner argued that the pre-amendment regulation formed a condition of service and could not be altered to his detriment. The court found the respondents' evidence persuasive that there was no detriment: the transfer was to an "exactly equivalent post" and the petitioner would continue to enjoy the same terms and conditions (grade pay, etc.). Because the respondents asserted no detriment and the record did not satisfy the court that detriment existed, the petitioner’s contention failed.
  6. Competence to make the order (delegation/entrustment issue): The court examined paragraph 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, which describes the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General's role and authority to deputise for the Comptroller & Auditor General, subject to general control. The court concluded that the Deputy was validly entrusted with authority to issue orders in departmental administration and that such entrustment effectively meant the acts remained those of the Auditor General (i.e., not an unlawful delegation). The court observed that where the superior retains effective control, acts of a deputy may be regarded in substance as the acts of the superior. The court cited legal principles (including an extract from Halsbury's Laws of England) to support upholding such entrustment.
  7. Rule 28 and Rule 28(ii): The petitioner relied on Rule 28 (exercise of disciplinary and administrative powers by the Auditor General) to argue exclusivity of power. The court rejected the contention that Rule 28(ii) limited entrustment of transfer powers to the Auditor General himself. It found that paragraph 3 of the Manual provided machinery for the Deputy to discharge the business entrusted to him and that such acts were subject to the Auditor General's general control.
  8. Financial loss, concessions and Article 311: The court addressed the petitioner's claim of financial loss and loss of concessions. The respondents maintained the transfer was temporary, the lien continued, provident fund benefits would continue, and concessions (railway pass and saloon) were discretionary and not claimable as of right. The court found the material on record did not satisfy it that the petitioner was being transferred to an inferior post or suffering detriment; such factual disputes were unsuitable for resolution in a writ petition. Consequently, the Article 311 argument (which depends on a punitive removal/disciplinary action) failed.
  9. Lien contention: The petitioner contended his lien was being terminated. The respondents stated (in reply) that the lien was not being terminated and relied on Rule 14B. Given the respondents' clear statement that the lien was preserved, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the controversy further.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The petition challenging the transfer was dismissed by the court and the petition was ordered dismissed with no order as to costs.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The transfer order dated 28 August 1965 was effectively upheld by the dismissal of the petition (the court found no justiciable right in regulation 124 and sufficient power under the Fundamental Rules and departmental entrustment).
  • The court accepted the respondents' position that the transfer was temporary, to an equivalent post, and that the petitioner's lien was not being terminated. The court therefore did not find material evidence of detriment that would invalidate the transfer.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or wide-reaching precedent; it rests on statutory/regulatory interpretation and application of established principles regarding departmental entrustment of powers and the primacy of Fundamental Rules in matters of transfer. The court noted existing authority (S.V.G. Iyengar) indicating that a statutory regulation can be competently made even if prejudicial to an employee, but the judgment did not announce a new legal doctrine beyond its application to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is confined to matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or holdings beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

S.K. Kapur. J.:-

(28th January, 1966)-The petitioner, an Assistant Audit Officer in Northern Railway, has challenged the order dated 28.8.1965 signed by the Assistant Comptroller and Auditor General directing that the petitioner be transferred and posted as an Assistant Accounts Officer in the office of the Accountant General, Bihar, Ranchi. Various allegations had been made in the petition to the effect that the transfer order was a result of malice, but on 13.12.1965 the petitioner made an application being civil miscellaneous No. 5250-D of 1965 asking for permission to drop the point regarding mala fides. This application was allowed by me by my order dated 14.12.1965 and it is, therefore, not necessary to advert to any fact relevant to the said allegations.

2. Relying on regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, as corrected up to 1.3.1952, the petitioner says that he cannot be transferred outside “the circle.” According to the petitioner, the effect of the impugned order is that he is being transferred from the post of the Assistant Audit Officer in the Northern Railway to another department as Assistant Accounts Officer in the Office of the Accountant General, Bihar. Regulation 124 was amended on 1.4.1961 and it is not in dispute that under the amended regulation the petitioner could he transferred. It is, however, said that the amended regulation cannot be resorted to for the reasons, which shall be discussed hereafter. It is pertinent to quote regulation 124 before and after the amendment of 1961-

(Before Amendment)

“Assistant Accounts Officers employed in the Post and Telegraphs Audit and Accounts are liable for service anywhere in India. Those employed in the Railway Audit Offices are liable to transfer within the circle to which they belong, while those employed in the organisation of the Accountant General, Food, Rehabilitation and Supply, are liable to transfer from the Headquarters office or the branch offices to any of the offices in the organisation. Transfer among other Assistant Accounts Officers are not ordinarily made but may be made when considered necessary on terms to be prescribed by the Comptroller and Auditor General in each individual case.”

(After Amendment)

“Assistant Accounts Officers of the Posts and Telegraph Audit Department and the Assistant Audit Officers of the Defence, Commercial and Supply Audit Departments are liable for service anywhere in India. Transfers of other Assistant Accounts/Audit Officers are not ordinarily made. They are, however, liable like all other Central Government servants, to be transferred from one office to another, subject to the provisions of F. R. 15. The Comptroller and Auditor General transfers such persons to any other office within the Indian Audit and Accounts Department or to any office under the Central Government on such terms and conditions as may be determined by him in each case.”

Reference is then made to the indian railway code, 1960 edition. appendix i, clause 13, to show that the Audit Department was under the control of Auditor General, but not the Accounts department. This has been referred to in support of the contention that the petitioner is being transferred from one department to another. On an objection taken by the respondents that regulation 124 is not a statutory regulation and no right can be founded thereon, Mr. I. M. Lall, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has relied on section 96-d of the government of india act, 1915, as amended in 1919 sub-section (1) whereof provides that “An Auditor-General shall be appointed by Secretary of State in Council and shall hold office during his Majesty's pleasure. The Secretary of State in Council shall, by rules, make provision for his pay, powers, duties and conditions of employment, or for the discharge of his duties in the case of a temporary vacancy or absence from duty.” My attention has also been invited in this behalf to (1) Railway Audit Code (1931), paragraph 6, showing the various circles into which the railway branch of the Audit Department is divided. In the preface to the said Audit Code, it is recited, “It derives its authority from the rules framed under section 96-d (1) of the Government of India Act; (2) Auditor General's Manual of Standing” Orders, 1938 edition, clause 124, saying,--” “......Those employed in the Railway Audit offices are liable for transfer within the circle to which they belong. Transfers among others Assistant Accountants Officers are not ordinarily made but may be made when considered necessary on terms to be prescribed by the Auditor General in each individual case”; (3) Railway Audit Manual, second edition, clause 67, reading, inter alia,-“The Subordinate Railway Audit Service has been reorganised on a localised system with effect from the 1st July, 1935. For this purpose and the Railway Audit Department has been split up into three distinct and self-contained circles of Railway Audit offices. These are the Northern the Eastern and the Southern circles. The Northern circle comprises the offices of the Chief Auditor, Eastern Punjab Railway, the Chief Auditor, Railway Clearing Accounts, the Chief Auditor, Oudh and Tirhut Railway......... Members of the Subordinate Railway Audit Service are localized in one of these circles and are liable for service in any Railway Audit Office within the circle to which they are localised and also in the office of the Director of Railway Audit. Similarly, Subordinate Railway Audit Service passed clerks are localised in the circles in which they hold liens......”; and (4) Railway Audit Mannual, 1943 edition, appendix 8, clause 2.

3. Mr. S. N. Shanker, the learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the form of regulation 124 in the Audit General's Manual of Standing Orders as well as other regulations contained therein, show that these regulations are not statutory and consequently no right can be founded thereon, and that under the fundamental rules 2, 11, 14b and 15, the Government has an absolute right to transfer, Rule 11 provides-Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided, the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays him, and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority without claim for additional remuneration, whether the services required of him are such......” Rule

14B provides for the power of the Governor-General in Council to transfer to another permanent post in the same cadre the lien of a Government servant, who is not performing the duties of the post to which the lieo relates, even if that lien his been suspended. This power is subject to the provisions of Rule 15. Rule 15 may be quoted with advantage:-

“F. R. 15 (a) The Governor General in Council may transfer a Government servant from one post to another provided that except-

(1) on account of inefficiency or misbehaviour, or

(2) on his written request,

a Government servant shall not be transferred substantively to. or, except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in, a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien, or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under Rule 14.

(b) Nothing contained in clause (a) of this rule or in clause (13) of rule 9 shall operate to prevent the retransfer of a Government servant to the post on which he would hold a lien, had it not been suspended in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of rule 14.”

Mr. Shankar has stated at the bar that the transfer of the petitioner is on a temporary basis and his lien is not being terminated. It is also said on behalf of the respondents that Divisional Audit is not a rank at all. The petitioner is a Class II officer and he is transferred to an exactly equivalent post. According to the respondents the transfer is from one wing of the Audit Department to another wing of the same Department, and in the order of transfer darted the 28th August, 1965, it is in terms stated: “In the post to which you have been transferred, you will be entitled to draw the grade pay admissible to you from time to time in the office of the Chief Auditor, Northern Railway.” Having carefully considered the argument on this point at the bar, I am of the opinion that regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders is not a statutory regulation conferring any justiciable right on the petitioner and the same is the position wife respect to regulation 124 of the Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, 1938 edition. The Fundamental Rules referred to above confer sufficient power on the concerned authorities to transfer the petitioner on temporary basis particularly when, as discussed hereafter, the petitioner is going to enjoy the same terms and conditions as enjoyed by him in the present post.

4. This brings me to the second contention of Mr. I. M. Lall, that even if the various regulations mentioned herein above do not confer a justiciable right on the petitioner, they are conditions of service and, consequently, cannot be altered to his detriment. This requires me recur for a moment to the contention the petitioner that the unamended regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Standing Orders govern the case of petitioner. It is said that that was regulation applicable to the petitioner when he was in service and that become the condition of his service, not susceptible to any alteration resulting in detriment to the petitioner. The respondent swear to the effect that there has been no detriment to the petitioner. I will advert to this aspect again a little later, but suffice it here to say that I am convinced about the respondents' plea. The contention of the petitioner, therefore, cannot prevail. This renders it unnecessary to decide the contention raised by Mr. Shankar that regulation 124 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, as amended in 1961, confers a right on the respondents to transfer the petitioner, and even if this regulation is taken to be a statutory regulation, then. as held in S.V.G. Iyengar v. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 Mysore 37, such a regulation can be competently made, though pre-judicially affecting an employee.

Mr. Lall then contends that the Deputy Auditor General was not competent to pass the order of transfer. He has relied on paragraph 7 of the reply-affidavit wherein it is said: “The order of transfer in the instant case was passed by the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of India who is competent to do so in accordance with para 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, a copy of which is enclosed as Annexure R. 6.” The said paragraphs reads as follows :-

“The Comptroller and Auditor General has a Deputy who functions, in general, as Chief of Staff, and, except in the case of reports on accounts submitted to Parliament and State Legislatures, has authority to deputise for the Comptroller & Auditor General in any matter and to any extent as may be mutually determined from time to time between the Comptroller & Auditor General and himself. The Deputy Comptroller & Auditor General is, in particular responsible for the efficient working of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and, subject to the Comptroller and Auditor General's general control, issues orders from the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General.”

Reliance has been placed on para 47 of Railway Audit Manual, Third Edition (1960), which provides:-

“The Subordinate Railway Audit Service has been decentralised and localised on individual Railways with effect from the 1st May, 1956. The general control over the members of Subordinate Railway Accounts Service in the matter of leave, transfers officiating appointments and promotions rests with the Chief Auditor of each Railway subject to the restrictions imposed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Members of the Subordinate Railway Accounts Service are localised on the Railway only or to the Railway to which they have opted at the time of the above localisation and are liable for service in any Railway Audit office within that Railway and also in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Similarly, Subordinate Railway Accounts Service passed clerks are localised on the Railway on which they hold liens. Transfers of Subordinate Railway Accounts service men or Subordinate Railway Accounts Service passed Clerks from one Railway to another are not ordinarily admissible.”

Reference is then invited to the rules issued by the Secretary of State for India in Council framed under section 96-d (1) of the government of india act, 1915 as amended in 1919, and reliance has been placed on Rule 28 thereof. The said rule is as under:-

“28. The Auditor General may:-

(i) in the case of officers of the Indian Audit Department below the rank of Deputy Auditor General, transfer, censure, suspend or degrade any such officer, withhold from his any increment or increments of pay, recover from his pay the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to Government by negligence or breach of orders, promote him to any grade or post in the Indian Audit Department below the rank of Deputy Auditor General or declare him to be permanently unfit for promotion, grant him any leave that may be admissible under rule, and exercise the powers of a local Government under the Government Servants' Conduct Rules.

(ii) in the case of officers of the Indian Audit Department of any grade lower than Class I, delegate to any officer of the Indian Audit Department the power of granting any leave that may be admissible under Rule.”

On the basis of the said Rule 28, it is said that the power of transfer may be exercised by Auditor General and none else and it is only power to granting leave to an officer of any grade lower than Class I that can be delegated, as provided in Rule 28 (ii).

6. Mr. Lal then relies on the Indian Audit and Accounts Department (Administrative Officers, Assistant Accounts Officers and Assistant Audit Officers) Recruitment Rules, 1963, and referring to item 11 in the Schedule thereof, it is said that it is only by promotion that the new vacancy, to which the petitioner has been transferred, could be filled. It is farther said that para 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders, quoted hereinabove, has no applicability to the transfer of the petitioner. Mr. Shankar has relied on Compilation of the Fundamental Rules made by the Secretary of State in Council under section 96-b of the government of india act, and the supplementary rules made by the Governor-General in Council, Volume II, as corrected up to 31st August 1963. Appendix No. 4 thereof is headed: “Delegations made by the Governor-General in Council under Fundamental Rules 4 and 6.” Serial No. 6-A, refers to fundamental Rule 15 and, delegates “power to transfer a Government servant from one post to another” to all needs of departments. Under Appendix 14, the list of Heads of Department is given. The list of such appears with respect to Finance Department starts with item 36. Item 40 reads:

“Chief Auditors and Government Examiners of Railway Accounts.” According to Mr. Lal, the Head of Department being the Chief Auditor, the Deputy Auditor General could still not pass the transfer order while, according to Mr. Shankar, the Head of Department could with respect to such administrative matters delegate the functions and in any case such Head of the Department would have inherent power to do so Mr. Shankar says that in such powers also stand delegated by virtue of para 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual of Standing Orders quoted hereinabove. Having considered the arguments, I am of the opinion that the powers have been validly entrusted of the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General by virtue of said paragraph 3. Matter of such entrustment is a matter of internal arrangement of the Department and power to authorise other officials to exercise such ministerial functions would be implicit in the conferment of power on the Head of Department. In my opinion, sub-rule (11) of rule 28 does not limit the power as contended for by the petitioner. Strictly speaking, such entrustment may not even be termed as delegation. By the said paragraph 3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Manual, only a machinery has been created for discharge by the Deputy of the business entrusted to him, all of whose acts are “subject to the Comptroller and Auditor General's general control.” There is, in law no delegation, because constitutionally all the acts or decisions of the Deputy are those of the Auditor General. The degree of freedom from control with which the delegate is vested is really the decisive factor in determining the validity of delegation. It is a known rule.of law announced in innumerable decisions that where effective powers of control by the delegating authority are extremely significant the Court may uphold the entrustment of power by denying that there has been any delegation at all, on the ground that in substance the authority responsible for passing on the functions to his subordinated continues to address its own mind to the exercise of its powers. I think, the degree of control retained by the Auditor General is close enough for the decisions to be regarded as the Auditor General's own. In every case the Courts must balance the demands of administrative efficiency against the tradition of adherence to the letter of law in matters affecting the rights of private parties. Some matters may be so important that the authority must address himself to them personally. This is, however, a matter in which it can be legitimately said that the Auditor General can act through his deputies, retaining a close control. Reference may be made to Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition Volume I, page 170, paragraph 397.

7. Mr. Lall then says that the transfer will entail financial loss as well as loss of concession of first class railway pass and use of saloon. Mr. Shankar, on the other hand, states that the petitioner gets the same conditions of service as are applicable to him in his present post. According to him, the fear of Mr. Lall that the petitioner will lose the Provident Fund benefit is unfounded, as the Provident Fund would still continue since the transfer is on a temporary basis and the petitioner's lien is not being terminated. In paragraph 7 of the reply-affidavit also, it is said that the petitioner is being transferred to an exactly equivalent post. Mr. Shankar points out by reference to sub-para (3) of paragraph 7 of the reply-affidavit that the concession with respect to railway pass and use of saloon in purely discretionary and not claimable as of right. Having regard to the position taken up by the respondents, I am not satisfied on the materials on this record that the petitioner is not being transferred to an exactly equivalent post. In any case, such controversies cannot be resolved in a writ petition. This contention of the petitioner must, therefore, be repelled. It follows that the argument of the petitioner that article 311 of the constitution is being violated, must also fail.

8. The last contention of Mr. Lall is that his lien on the present post is being terminated. Mr. Shankar replying on rule 14-b of the fundamental rules, says that holding of lien is subject to power of transfer, but that question.should not arise because the petitioner's lien is not being terminated. In view of this statement by Mr. Shankar, It is not necessary to resolve the controversy.

9. In the result, this petition must fail and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.