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V. Satyanarayana v. Sandeep Enterprises
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Majage, J.) — Reference under Section 9, Karnataka High Court Act
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (complainant) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before XII Additional C.M.M., Bangalore City, alleging that the petitioner/accused had issued multiple cheques in connection with a loan of Rs. 1,95,000/- (13 cheques of Rs. 15,000/- each) and had executed a promissory note dated 21.1.1997. Five cheques (Exs. P4–P8) were presented and dishonoured (bank memos Exs. P9 & P10). Legal notice dated 25.8.1997 (Ex. P11) was served; payment was not made. Complaint was registered as C.C. No. 357/1998 and the petitioner/accused was convicted under Section 255(2) Cr.P.C., sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (in default six months S.I.) and to pay compensation of Rs. 75,000/-. The petitioner appealed (Crl. A. No. 503/2000) and the appeal was dismissed on 24.12.2001. The petitioner then filed the present revision petition under Section 401 read with Section 397 Cr.P.C., challenging the Magistrate's and Sessions Court's orders.
A Single Judge (MSRJ) referred the revision petition to the Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act for clarification of the legal position arising from the decision in G. Premdas v. Venkataram (2001 1 KCCR 437) (rendered by one of the present bench members), because learned counsel for the petitioner relied on that decision to contend that non-marking of the complaint as an exhibit is fatal to the complainant's case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act forms part of the court record and can be looked into and considered without being marked as an exhibit.
- Whether a complaint under Section 138 must be marked as an exhibit (as held in G. Premdas v. Venkataram) and whether mere non-marking of the complaint is fatal to the complainant's case.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Appellant / Accused)
- Relying on G. Premdas (supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that because the complaint was not marked as an exhibit, non-marking is fatal to the complainant's case and the accused is entitled to acquittal.
- On merits, the petitioner contended that the complainant admitted in evidence that he was a money lender without a licence, so any debt or liability was not enforceable; reliance was placed on Section 11 of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act to argue that an unlicensed money lender cannot obtain a decree/enforcement.
Respondent's / Other Counsel's Arguments
- The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant (and other counsel) adopted the position that a complaint presented under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is part of the court record and need not be marked as an exhibit to be considered.
Amicus Curiae's Submissions
- Sri S. G. Bhagavan (Amicus Curiae) submitted that a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., presented before the Magistrate and signed by the complainant, forms part of the court record and can be looked into and considered without being marked as an exhibit.
- He distinguished documents "relied on by a party" (which must be exhibited) from the complaint which, being presented to and filed in court, is part of the record and akin to plaint/pleadings in civil proceedings (given the admixture of civil and criminal elements in Section 138 NI Act prosecutions).
- He relied on the definitions and provisions in Cr.P.C. (Section 2(d) and Section 200) and on Supreme Court decisions regarding admissions in pleadings/complaints being substantive evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in the Present Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| G. Premdas v. Venkataram, 2001 1 KCCR 437 | Held that the complainant is required to get the complaint marked as an exhibit; non-marking may deprive the accused of the opportunity to confront the complainant with contents and therefore can be fatal (as applied in Section 138 NI Act cases). | The Court considered these observations and concluded that this view is incorrect. The present Court held that the complaint need not be marked as an exhibit and that mere non-marking is not fatal; therefore G. Premdas is held to be "no more good law." |
| Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarakanath Prasad, 1974 1 SCC 78 | Principle that an admission made in a pleading/complaint is substantive evidence proprio vigore and, if clearly and unequivocally made, is strong evidence against the party who made it (though not conclusive). | The Court relied on this principle to hold that an admission in a complaint is substantive evidence and can be used whether or not the complaint is marked as an exhibit. |
| Tiru John v. The Returning Officer, 1977 3 SCC 540 | Supports the principle that admissions in pleadings/official documents carry evidentiary value as substantive evidence. | The Court relied on this authority alongside Bishwanath Prasad to reinforce that complaints can furnish substantive evidence without formal marking as exhibits. |
| M.N. Radhamma v. M.N. Venkatanarayanappa, ILR 1979 KAR 2138 | Interprets "money lender" under the Karnataka Money Lenders Act to require carrying on money lending as a business/profession with a profit motive; a stray loan or isolated transaction does not suffice. | The Court applied this reasoning to reject the petitioner's contention that the complainant was a money lender for purposes of invoking Section 11 of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act; there was no evidence of carrying on money lending as a business. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two connected strands of analysis: (A) whether a complaint under Section 138 NI Act must be marked as an exhibit to be considered; and (B) the merits point raised about the complainant being an unlicensed money lender.
A. Formal status of the complaint and evidentiary effect:
- The Court observed that a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is presented before the Magistrate and is part of the court record; this differs from an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. which is normally lodged with police.
- Recognising the hybrid civil-criminal character of NI Act proceedings, the Court treated a complaint for an offence under Section 138 as akin to a plaint or pleadings in civil proceedings. Consequently, admissions in the complaint are substantive evidence.
- The Court relied on precedent (Bishwanath Prasad and Tiru John) to the effect that admissions in pleadings/complaints are substantive evidence and need not be formally proved by marking the pleading as an exhibit; the opposite party need not invite the attention of the complainant to such admissions for them to have evidentiary value.
- From this, the Court concluded that because the complaint is part of the record, it can be looked into and considered without being marked as an exhibit; it is not a document "relied on" in the sense that would demand exhibition under the Evidence Act.
- The Court expressly disagreed with the reasoning in G. Premdas that non-marking is fatal because it prevents confrontation: the Court held that non-marking does not cause such prejudice and therefore non-marking is not a technical error fatal to the complainant's case.
B. Merits — allegation that the complainant was an unlicensed money lender:
- The petitioner argued that the complainant admitted being a money lender without licence and that under Section 11 of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act, an unlicensed money lender cannot enforce debts through the courts.
- The Court inspected the evidence and found nothing to show that the complainant advanced the loan in the course of a business of money lending. The complainant denied that the transaction was in the course of his money lending business; the petitioner (examined as D.W.1) did not assert that the cheques related to a money-lending business.
- Relying on M.N. Radhamma, the Court reiterated that to be a "money lender" under the Act there must be a course of dealings carried on with a profit motive — i.e., money lending as a profession. A stray instance of lending money does not suffice.
- The Court noted that even if interest were agreed (as the promissory note might suggest), the promissory note was not the basis of the complaint, it was executed after the cheques, and it was described as security. Thus, the pronote and those arguments did not establish that the complainant was a licensed/unlicensed money lender for purposes of Section 11.
- Therefore, Section 11 of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act did not apply and the contention based on the complainant's admitted status did not assist the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's answer to the reference question is stated as:
“The complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act forms part of the record and hence, the same is not required to be marked as exhibit and further mere not marking of the complaint would not be fatal to the complainant's case.”
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The Court held that the earlier decision in G. Premdas v. Venkataram is "no more good law" to the extent it required marking the complaint as an exhibit and treated non-marking as fatal.
- On the merits of the petition, the revision petition was rejected; the conviction and orders under the trial and Sessions Court were not set aside by this Court.
- A subsequent application by the petitioner under Section 389 Cr.P.C. to suspend sentence was rejected because the Court found that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
- Administrative direction: the Court directed the office to send copies of this judgment to all subordinate courts concerned with matters under Section 138 NI Act, since some courts were following the now-disapproved view in G. Premdas.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what is stated therein.
Judges: S.R.B.M., J. & S.B.M., J. — Date of Judgment: 16.9.2004
Majage, J.:—
This revision Petition is referred under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act by a learned Single Judge (MSRJ) seeking clarification as to the judgment rendered in the case of G. Premdas v. Venkataram . 2001 1 KCCR 437. incidentally rendered by one of us (SRBMJ) and the following question is framed to answer the reference:
“Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act forms part of the record? Or, Whether the same has to be marked as an exhibit as held in the said judgment and whether mere non-marking of the complaint is fatal?”
2. The facts and reason for reference are that:
The respondent — complainant filed a complaint against the petitioner/accused before the Court on XII Additional C.M.M at Bangalore City for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act alleging that in connection with loan of Rs. 1,95,000/- availed by him on 14.1.1997, the petitioner/accused had issued 13 cheques, each for a sum of Rs. 15,000/- besides executing pronote dated 21.1.1997 When five cheques at Exs. P4 to 8 were presented for encashment, they were dishonoured as per the bank memos at Exs. P. 9 and 10 as funds not arranged and hence the respondent/complainant got issued legal notice dated 25.8.1997 as per Ex. P. 11, which was served on the petitioner/accused. But, in spite of that, he did not pay the amount due under the said cheques. Consequently, the respondent/complainant filed complaint before the learned Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act, which was registered as C.C No. 357/1998 and ultimately ended in the conviction of the petitioner/accused under Section 255(2) of Cr. P.C, by which he had been sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo S.I for six months, besides to pay compensation of Rs. 75,000/- to the respondent/complainant.
That matter was unsuccessfully taken up before the Sessions Court in Crl. A. No. 503/2000 by the petitioner/accused and that appeal came to be dismissed on 24.12.2001 Hence, he approached this Court in the present revision Petition under Section 401 r/w 397 of Cr. P.C, challenging the order passed by the learned Magistrate and also the order passed by the Sessions Court.
When the revision petition was taken up for consideration, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision in the case of G. Premdas (supra) contended that as even in this case, the complaint is not marked by the complainant and as such non marking of the complaint as exhibit is fatal to the complainant's case as such he is entitled for acquittal.
The learned Singe Judge (MSRJ) was not inclined to subscribe to the view expressed and law declared in G. Premdas's case and as such the present reference.
3. As the question raised is of general importance, we had requested Sri S.G Bhagavan, learned Advocate to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.
4. We have also heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused and also the learned Counsel for the respondent/complainant.
5. It was submitted by Sri S.G Bhagavan, Advocate — learned Amicus Curiae that the complaint presented before Court under Section 200 of Cr. P.C, is a part of Court record, which could be looked into and considered even without being marked as exhibit since it is not a document to say that it could not be looked into or considered without being marked as exhibit. According to him, only a document, relied on by a party, cannot be considered or looked into unless it is marked as exhibit, but the same cannot be said with regard to complaint filed in the Court. This is because, according to him, the complaint will be presented by the complainant in person in the Court before the learned Magistrate under his signature and as such, it is a part of the Court record though, of course, on the basis of such complaint, criminal law will be set into motion. In this connection, he invited our attention to the definition of the word “complaint” given in Section 2(d) of Cr. P.C, besides Section 200 of Cr. P.C, which deals with complaint filed at first instance before the Court. Other learned Counsel appearing for the parties also submitted the same.
6. Perused the records.
7. In the case of G. Premdas (supra), it was observed that the complainant is required to get the complaint marked as exhibit and, if it is not marked as exhibit, the accused may lose a chance to confront the complainant with contents thereof and as such, in cases like the present one (arising out of Section 138 of N.I Act), it is essential that the complaint should be not only got marked (under the Evidence Act), but its contents to be spoken by its author complainant, which will give an opportunity to him of corroboration and, at the same time, opportunity to the accused to elicit contradictions, and this is possible only when such complaint is produced and got marked in the evidence of the complaint. It was also observed that the complaint is not a substantive piece of evidence but can be used for corroborating or contradicting the complaint, though the proceedings under the N.I Act are practically admixture of civil and criminal nature and the complaint forms the basis for the Court to take action and sets the criminal law into motion and is an important document like first information under Section 154 of Cr. P.C These observations made in G. Premdas case are before us for consideration and clarification.
8. As rightly submitted by the Amicus Curiae, a complaint for offence under Section 138 of N.I Act is always presented in the Court before learned Magistrates, unlike first information lodged/covered by Section 154 of Cr. P.C, which is normally lodged before police. Of course, it is true, as observed in the case of G. Premdas (supra), that complaint is the basic document, which sets the criminal law into motion and it is also an important document like first information under Section 154 of Cr. P.C and proceedings under the N.I Act are practically admixture of civil and criminal in nature.
9. Though complaint filed for offence under Section 138 of N.I Act is akin to first information covered by Section 154 of Cr. P.C unlike FIR, which is not substantive piece of evidence, complaint is a substantive piece of evidence which can be used for corroborating or contradicting the complaint, whether it is marked as exhibit or not. This is because, complaint presented under Section 200 of Cr. P.C is akin to plaint or pleadings in civil proceedings since proceedings under N.I Act are practically admixture of civil and criminal in nature. As submitted by learned Amicus Curiae placing reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarakanath Prasad . 1974 1 SCC 78 and Tiru John v. The Returning Officer . 1977 3 SCC 540, any admission made in the complaint is substantive evidence proprio vigore and an admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it though not conclusive and for this purpose, the opposite party need not invite the attention of the complainant, who made admission in the complaint.
10. Strictly speaking the complaint is not a document relied on by complainant in support of his case and as such, to rely on or use it, it need not be marked as exhibit since, being part of the record, it could be looked into and considered by the Court even though not marked as exhibit.
11. In the above view, simply because complaint is not marked as exhibit, the accused will not loose a chance to confront the complaint with its contents. So also, it cannot be said that like FIR, it is not a substantive piece of evidence. This is because, complainant can rely on the averments in the complaint without getting it marked as exhibit since it is a substantive piece of evidence.
12. Hence, in our view, if the complainant does not get the complaint marked as exhibit, there is no infirmity or any technical error committed, because the complaint which is presented to the Court itself, it can be looked into and considered without being marked as exhibit and also could be used for corroborating the case of the complainant or contradicting the complainant, if the accused intends to do so. As such the view expressed in G. Premdas's case that complainant is required to get the complaint marked as exhibit and if it is not marked as exhibit, is fatal to the complainant's case is not a correct view.
13. In view of the above, we answer the question as follows:
“The complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I Act forms part of the record and hence, the same is not required to be marked as exhibit and further mere not marking of the complaint would not be fatal to the complainant's case.”
14. As such, in our view, the judgment in the case of G. Premdas v. Venkataram (supra) is no more good law.
15. This takes us to the merits of the case.
It was vehemently argued for the petitioner/accused that since it is admitted by the respondent/complainant in his evidence that he is a money lender and not having any licence to do money lending business, debt or liability itself was not enforceable under law and as such, the trial Court as well as the Sessions Court committed an error in ignoring said material. In this connection, he referred and relied on Section 11 of the Karnataka Money Lenders Act, according to which, suit filed by a money lender, who has no valid licence in money lending, would not be decreed by a Civil Court.
16. It is true that the complainant — P.W 1 has made the above admission, but there is nothing in his evidence to show that in the course of his business as a money lender, he has lent/advanced the amount to the petitioner/accused. That apart, though examined himself as D.W 1 petitioner/accused has not stated that the cheques in question were in relation to any money lending business i.e, the cheque issued was in the course of money lending business of the respondent/accused. Suggestion made to the complainant — P.W 1, that the transaction was in the course of money lending business, was denied. So, on denied suggestion, it cannot be held that the transaction in question was in the course of money lending business. Hence, Section 11 of the said Act does not come into picture in the present case.
17. Even otherwise, if assumed that the cheques were issued by the petitioner/accused in the course of money lending — business, that itself does not attract the provisions contained in Karnataka Money Lenders Act. This is because, under said Act, money lender means “a person, who carried on the business of money lending” and to say that one is a money lender, he or she must carry on business in money lending in the State and, to record an activity as business, there must be a course of dealings carried with a profit motive. In other words, money lending must be carried on as profession. If the money lending was not with profit motive or, not carried on as a profession, he or she does not become a money lender under the Karnataka Money Lenders Act, as held by this Court in the case of M.N Radhamma v. M.N Venkatanarayanappa . ILR 1979 KAR 2138.. So, a stray instance of lending money does not show carrying on the business of money lending as profession or with profit motive.
18. In the present case, there is no evidence or material on record to say that the respondent/complainant carried/carry on money lending business and consequently he comes within the meaning of the word “money lender” as defined under the Karnataka Money Lenders Act. So, admission or statement of respondent — PW. 1 that he does not possess money lending licence does not come to the aid of the petitioner/accused.
19. Of course, it was vehemently argued for the petitioner/accused that the transaction in question could be said to be with profit motive since interest was agreed in the transaction, as can be said from promote at Ex. P. 2. For this firstly, it may be noted that the complaint was not based on the pronote. Secondly, execution of pronote was subsequent to issuing cheques and it was not on the date of cheques. Thirdly, pronote was executed as security in the transaction of loan in which cheques were issued. Lastly, even if assumed that the transaction was with profit motive, it was a stray transaction as not shown that the respondent/complainant was carrying on such transactions as profession to term him as “money lender” attracting Money Lenders Act. So, said pronote and argument in that regard do not help the accused much to hold the complainant as ‘money lender’ under Karnataka Money Lenders Act. Consequently, none of the grounds urged for the petitioner/accused helps him in any way. No other point has been raised or argued.
In the result, the revision petition is rejected.
S.R.B.M, J & S.B.M, J
16.9.2004
After pronouncement, it is submitted that the subordinate Courts are following in judgment in G. Premdas's case supra, which is held by this Court now as no more good law. Hence, office is directed to send the copies of this judgment to all the Courts concerned dealing with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
After pronouncement of the judgment, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has filed application under Section 389 of Cr. P.C to suspend the sentence as the petitioner intends to challenge the pronouncement and on merits. Since no substantial question of law arises for consideration, the prayer for suspension of sentence is rejected.
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