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Babu Ram v. State Of M.P .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 29, 2002
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Factual and Procedural Background

Bhagwan Devi, wife of Ram Kumar and daughter-in-law of the appellant Babu Ram, was found charred to death on 27-2-1988 in the house where she lived with her husband. The appellant had been visiting the couple for three days prior to the incident. After investigation, police filed a charge-sheet against the appellant and his son under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and, in the alternative, under Section 306 read with Section 498-A IPC.

The trial court acquitted both accused of murder (Section 302) and destruction of evidence (Section 201), but convicted them of abetment of suicide (Section 306) and cruelty (Section 498-A), sentencing each to three years’ rigorous imprisonment on both counts, to run concurrently.

Both accused appealed (Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1990), while the State filed a separate appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1990) against their acquittal on the murder and evidence-tampering charges. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh acquitted Ram Kumar entirely on the basis of alibi but, as to Babu Ram, allowed the State’s appeal, convicting him under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively, to run concurrently.

The present opinion is the Supreme Court’s decision on Babu Ram’s further appeal against the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Babu Ram strangulated and burnt Bhagwan Devi, thereby committing murder punishable under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the prosecution proved that Babu Ram caused disappearance of evidence to screen himself from legal punishment, attracting liability under Section 201 IPC.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence, particularly the medical testimony regarding alleged ligature marks and the theory that the appellant was the last person present at the scene.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Dr. Fayaj Hussan (PW 1) testified that death was due to burn injuries, not strangulation; his comments on ligature marks were speculative and inconclusive.
  • No independent, acceptable evidence proved strangulation; conviction based on mere probabilities is impermissible.
  • The prosecution’s “last-seen” theory was weak because the room was bolted from inside and no witness saw the appellant exit through the window as hypothesised.

State’s Arguments

  • Circumstantial evidence demonstrated that death resulted from both strangulation and burning.
  • The appellant was last seen in the residence, supporting an inference that he alone could have committed the crime.
  • Motive existed: ill-will over insufficient dowry provided by the deceased.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court carefully examined the medical evidence and the chain of circumstances relied upon by the High Court.

  • Medical testimony: PW 1 noted transverse ligature marks on the neck but conceded multiple possibilities: partial strangulation before or after burning, or no strangulation at all. The Court found the doctor’s opinion uncertain and inadequate to establish strangulation beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Absence of corroborative signs: Had strangulation occurred during burning, the assailant would likely have sustained burns; no such injuries on the appellant were alleged.
  • Lack of disturbance: Neighbours heard no shrieks during the alleged strangulation or burning, weakening the prosecution’s scenario.
  • “Last-seen” circumstance: The prosecution claimed the appellant exited through a window and bolted it from outside, yet spot inspection by the Sessions Judge showed this would be extremely difficult and no witness confirmed seeing the appellant use the window.
  • Motive: Evidence indicated the appellant and his son were satisfied with the dowry—a gold ring and a government job for Ram Kumar—thus undermining the alleged dowry motive.

Collectively, these deficiencies created reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that reliance on unproven hypotheses and uncertain medical opinion rendered the High Court’s conviction unsafe.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE.

The Supreme Court acquitted Babu Ram of all charges. His bail bonds stand discharged. The decision affects only the parties to the case and does not establish a new legal precedent, resting instead on an appraisal of evidence unique to the record.

Show all summary ...

N. Santosh Hegde, J.— The deceased Bhagwan Devi was married to one Ram Kumar, son of the appellant herein. It is stated by the prosecution that on 27-2-1988, the said Bhagwan Devi was found charred to death in the house where she was living with her husband, and at that time, the appellant was visiting them for about 3 days prior to the ghastly incident. After investigations, the police filed a charge-sheet against the appellant and his son under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and alternative charges were also framed under Section 306 read with Section 498-A IPC. Almost all material witnesses examined by the prosecution had turned hostile and the trial court after considering the material on record came to the conclusion that the charges under Sections 201 and 302 were not proved against the said Ram Kumar and the appellant and, therefore, acquitted them of the said charges. However, both the accused, namely, Ram Kumar and the appellant were found guilty of the charges under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC and were sentenced to undergo RI for 3 years under each count and both the sentences were made to run concurrently.

2. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence imposed on them, the appellant and his son Ram Kumar preferred Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1990 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and being aggrieved by the acquittal of the accused persons of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1990 before the said High Court. The High Court tried both the appeals together and came to the conclusion that so far as Ram Kumar is concerned, his innocence is proved by the alibi set up by him and acquitted him of all the charges, whereas it partly allowed the State's appeal to the extent of the appeal filed against the appellant herein and found the appellant guilty of offences chargeable under Sections 201 and 302 IPC for having caused the murder of Bhagwan Devi and for having caused the disappearance of evidence for screening himself from the said offence and, consequently, sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for life under Section 302 IPC and further RI for 7 years for the offence held proved against him under Section 201 IPC, with a direction that both the sentences will run concurrently.

3. It is against this judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the appellant Babu Ram is before us. Mr D.B.R Vohra, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended before us that it is clear from the evidence of Dr Fayaj Hussan, PW 1, that the death of the deceased Bhagwan Devi was caused not by strangulation but due to the burn injuries received by her. He also contended that the evidence of the said doctor in regard to the ligature marks found on the neck of the deceased cannot be accepted as a definite conclusion of the said doctor and in the absence of the prosecution producing any acceptable evidence for the purpose of proving strangulation, the High Court could have relied on probabilities alone to convict the appellant on the charge of murder. On behalf of the State, it was contended by Mr Rohit Singh that there was enough circumstantial evidence to drive home the point that the death of Bhagwan Devi was not only caused by the burn injuries she received but also by strangulation and the prosecution has established beyond all reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who was last found in the residence where Bhagwan Devi was found murdered. Therefore, bearing in mind the motive emanating from the ill will harboured by the appellant against the deceased for not having brought sufficient dowry, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the death in question was caused by strangulation and burning and both the acts must have been committed only by the appellant. Hence, the judgment of the High Court was unexceptionable.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. First of all, it should be noticed that PW 1 in his examination-in-chief as also the post-mortem certificate did notice some transversely placed ligature marks on the front side of the neck at the level of thyroid cartilage about 3/4 inch wide. It is the presence of this ligature mark which has made the High Court accept the prosecution case that the death was partly due to strangulation. On a perusal of the evidence of the doctor in detail, it is seen that when the said doctor was questioned by the court in regard to the ligature marks found by him and the effect thereof on the cause of death, this is what the doctor said:

“First there must have been partial strangulation and thereafter she might have been burnt or it may be possible that after the start of burn she might have been strangulated. After burns she might have survived for about an hour and during that period she might have been strangulated.”

A bare perusal of this evidence/statement clearly shows that the doctor was not sure what exactly was the effect of the so-called ligature marks that were found on the body of the deceased. His evidence is rather uncertain in terms since that evidence postulates more than one possible circumstance. It also indicates that the deceased could have been conscious for nearly an hour after she was burnt and also contemplates the deceased being strangulated as she was being burnt. If we analyse these possibilities, it will be extremely difficult to accept the prosecution case that there was strangulation by the appellant for the reason that if the strangulation had taken place during the process of burning then the probabilities are that the accused also would have some signs of burns on his hands, if not the burn injuries itself. But that was not the prosecution case. It is also evident from the said doctor's evidence that there was a possibility that the deceased might have survived for an hour after she was strangulated but the other evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly goes to show that even though there were neighbours in the proximity, nobody ever heard any shrieks from the deceased during her alleged strangulation or burning. Therefore, in our opinion, the evidence of the doctor does not in any manner support the prosecution case to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant had caused the strangulation of the deceased.

5. Coming to the next aspect of the prosecution case that it is the appellant who alone could have caused the burn injuries on the deceased, it is to be noted that the said version of the prosecution case is solely based on the fact that the accused was last found in the house wherefrom the dead body was recovered. Here again, we are unable to accept the finding of the High Court because it is the prosecution case that the body in question was found in a locked room where both the front door and the window of the room were locked/bolted from inside. The prosecution tried to develop a hypothesis that there was a window in the house which had a barrel bolt which bolt could have been closed from inside after a person came out of the window and shook the window in such a manner as to put the bolt in proper position. The learned Sessions Judge who conducted a spot inspection and tried to examine this aspect of the case, has clearly stated that it was extremely difficult to do so and he himself could do it with great difficulty and that too in the third attempt. That apart, the case of the prosecution that the appellant might have come out of the window and then locked it from inside afterwards is again only a hypothesis inasmuch as no witness has ever stated that the appellant was seen coming out of the window. It is true that some witnesses, who have turned hostile, have stated in their examination-in-chief that they saw the appellant coming out of the house but they did not say that he was coming out of the window or at what point of time he came out of the house. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not at all safe to draw any such inference against the innocence of the accused based on the facts which are not at all proved.

6. We are satisfied that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant having been acquitted of the charge under Section 201 read with Section 306 IPC, there being no cross-appeal by the State, we do not think it is necessary for us to go into that aspect of the matter. Even otherwise, so far as the appellant herein is concerned, we find that there is no motive whatsoever why the appellant should have caused the death or abetted the suicide of the deceased because she failed to bring in sufficient dowry. In the background of the prosecution evidence which shows that the appellant and Ram Kumar were satisfied with the gold ring which was given by the father-in-law and the government job which he managed to get for Ram Kumar, therefore, even according to the prosecution case, the appellant's son was not having any grouse against his wife on account of bringing in insufficient dowry. We find it extremely difficult why the appellant who was visiting his son and daughter-in-law and had come only 3 days prior to the incident in question, should go to such an extent of murdering or abetting the suicide of his daughter-in-law for not bringing in sufficient dowry. In our opinion, it is extremely dangerous to rely upon the prosecution evidence to base a conviction against the appellant. In the said view of the matter, this appeal succeeds and the same is allowed accordingly. The conviction and the sentence imposed on the appellant by the High Court as well as the trial court are set aside. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is on bail, if so his bail bonds shall stand discharged.