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Jawahar Lal v. Thakur Radha Gopalji Maharaj
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Sri Thakur Radha Gopalji Maharaj, through his manager Madan Lal, brought a suit to recover Rs. 900 (comprising Rs. 720 principal and Rs. 180 interest) arising from an alleged permanent endowment of Rs. 12 per month for the expenses of an idol. The endowment originated from a document dated 18 March 1893 executed by one Janki Prasad, who had purchased property purportedly yielding that income. Janki Prasad and his son Radha Ballabh died; Radha Ballabh had instructed his son Jawahar Lal to continue payments, which Jawahar Lal did for a time and then stopped. The suit, filed on 13 September 1933, sought recovery for a five-year period.
The defence asserted that the property was ancestral within a joint Hindu family and that Janki Prasad lacked power to make a testamentary disposition of joint family property or to create a permanent provision without creating a charge; it was also pleaded that recovery beyond three years was barred by limitation.
Procedurally: the learned Munsif found the family to be joint and the will invalid and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court dismissed the suit on a technical ground relating to framing under the will. This Court (single Judge) on 27 April 1937 remanded the case for trial according to law. On remand the Additional Civil Judge passed a modified decree in favour of the plaintiff, holding that part of the instrument amounted to a transfer in presenti and allowing recovery for three years only; the plaintiff and defendant both appealed (the defendant by way of second appeal, the plaintiff by cross-objection).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to sue through Madan Lal (the manager).
- Whether Janki Prasad was competent to make a valid waqf (or permanent dedication) of the property in favour of the plaintiff.
- Whether the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff is void for want of consideration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The property in dispute formed part of a joint Hindu family (co-parcenary) and was ancestral; therefore the document was a testamentary disposition beyond the powers of Janki Prasad and invalid.
- It was beyond Janki Prasad's competence to make a provision of Rs. 12 per month "for all time" without creating a charge upon the property.
- The suit was not maintainable for recovery beyond three years (limitation plea).
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff was properly suing through Madan Lal, who was in charge of the idol (de facto manager), and thus entitled to institute the suit on the idol's behalf.
- The deed dated 18 March 1893 effected the dedication: at least part of it (the portion yielding Rs. 5 per month) was an inter vivos transfer (transfer in presenti) and entitled the plaintiff to recover for the claimed period.
- On limitation the plaintiff's counsel relied on Article 116 of the Limitation Act to claim recovery for the entire five-year period.
- The respondent's counsel also advanced a submission that the transaction could be supported by the consent of the sons (post facto or subsequent consent).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (1933) 60 I.A. 124 | Person in actual possession of a math is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property appertaining to it, not for personal benefit but for the benefit of the math. | The Court relied on this authority (and the later All. High Court case) to uphold that the suit could be brought through Madan Lal as de facto manager in charge of the idol. |
| Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti (1935) I.L.R. 57 All. 159 | Followed the principle that a person in actual possession/management can sue on behalf of a religious institution. | Followed as supporting authority for the manager's locus standi; cited together with Ram Charan Das and noted in subsequent appellate authority. |
| Gopal Datt v. Babu Ram [1936] A.L.J. 515 | Affirms that a suit can be brought in the name of the idol by a person who is a de facto manager of the temple. | The Court quoted this observation to support the conclusion that Madan Lal could institute the suit on behalf of the idol. |
| Sardar Singh v. Kunj Bihari Lal (1922) I.L.R. 44 All. 503 | Person with restricted rights in a joint Hindu family can make a gift for charitable/pious purposes if the gifted portion bears a very small proportion to the entire estate (example was a Hindu widow). | Applied as authority that the principle of permissible small inter vivos gifts for pious purposes can apply to managers or fathers, i.e., limited alienation inter vivos is permissible. |
| Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ram Chandra Dada Naik (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 48 | Holds that a father or manager of a joint Hindu family cannot make a testamentary disposition (devise) of joint family property; the coparcener's power of alienation is founded on partition and dies with him. | The Court relied on this foundational principle to distinguish inter vivos gifts (permissible within limits) from testamentary dispositions (not permissible), and to hold that the portion relating to Rs. 7 per month was a testamentary disposition and invalid. |
| Gangi Reddi v. Tammi Reddi (1927) 54 I.A. 136 | Followed the rule that fathers/managers cannot make testamentary dispositions of joint family property. | Cited as subsequent authority following the principle in Lakshman Dada Naik; used to reinforce the Court's application of that principle to the Rs. 7 portion. |
| Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh (1913) I.L.R. 35 All. 337 | Where an arrangement between father and sons was to take effect immediately (in presenti) though its operation might be postponed to a future date; the arrangement operated in presenti. | The Court distinguished this case from the present facts because there the arrangement clearly operated in presenti; in the present deed the Rs. 7 portion did not speak in presenti and so Brijraj Singh was not applicable to validate that portion. |
| Lalta Prasat v. Sri Mahadeoji (1920) I.L.R. 42 All. 461 | Addressed whether subsequent or contractual consent could validate a testamentary-type disposition; addressed interpretation of Privy Council reasoning about contractual conditions and effect on partition/possession. | The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that subsequent consent of sons does not validate a testamentary disposition of joint family property; it helped settle that post facto consent would not validate the Rs. 7 portion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying factual findings to established legal principles found in precedent:
- Standing to sue: The Court accepted the finding that Madan Lal was in charge of the idol. Relying on prior authorities (Ram Charan Das, Mahadeo Prasad Singh and Gopal Datt), it held that a de facto manager may sue in the name of the idol for the benefit of the religious institution; accordingly the suit was properly instituted through Madan Lal.
- Nature of property and validity of the instrument: The Court accepted the lower court's finding that the property was ancestral and the family was a joint (co-parcenary) family; consequently the document's validity turned on whether it effected an inter vivos gift (transfer in presenti) or a testamentary disposition.
-
Textual construction of the document: The Court analysed the translation of the 18 March 1893 deed and identified two distinct parts:
- The portion relating to Rs. 5 per month — expressed in terms that the testator "has already arranged" and had purchased property and effected mutation in favour of Sri Thakurji Maharaj. The Court interpreted this language as indicating a completed transfer in presenti (inter vivos), with delivery/mutation effected.
- The portion relating to Rs. 7 per month — expressed in future-oriented terms (a portion "will be set apart" and mutation "will be effected" and, if not effected, Radha Ballabh shall get it recorded). The Court found that here the testator contemplated action but did not effect mutation or delivery himself; he left it to his son to act. This language, the Court held, spoke of a future or testamentary disposition rather than an inter vivos transfer.
- Application of substantive legal principle: The Court applied the established rule (as stated in Lakshman Dada Naik and followed in later authorities) that a father or managing member of a joint Hindu family cannot make a testamentary disposition of joint family property because the coparcener's right of alienation is founded on partition, and that right dies with him. The Court therefore held that the Rs. 7 portion, being testamentary in character, was invalid.
- On consent and validation: The respondent's contention that subsequent consent of the sons validated the transaction was considered. The Court examined Brijraj Singh (where the arrangement operated in presenti) and Lalta Prasat (Full Bench), and held that subsequent/post facto consent cannot validate a testamentary disposition where there is nothing for the will to operate upon; thus the sons' later consent did not validate the Rs. 7 portion.
- Limitation and quantum: The Court agreed with the lower court that the claim for more than three years was barred. It rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Article 116 of the Limitation Act because the case did not fall within that provision (which deals with compensation for breach of a registered written contract). Consequently the Court limited recovery to the period properly recoverable relating to the Rs. 5 per month portion.
- Disposition on appeal and cross-objection: The Court allowed the defendant's appeal to the extent of modifying the decree; it decreed the plaintiff's claim for three years on the basis of Rs. 5 per month and fixed the monetary award at Rs. 200 with pendente lite and future interest at 3% per annum. The cross-objection by the plaintiff (seeking the full five-year recovery) was dismissed with costs.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Appeal allowed; decree modified.
Direct holding and relief:
- The Court held that the deed contained two distinct dispositions: the part creating Rs. 5 per month constituted an inter vivos transfer (valid) while the part creating Rs. 7 per month amounted to a testamentary disposition (invalid as to joint family property).
- The claim in respect of the Rs. 7 per month portion was dismissed.
- The plaintiff's claim was allowed for three years in respect of the Rs. 5 per month portion. The parties agreed that this amounted to Rs. 200; the Court decreed Rs. 200 with pendente lite and future interest at 3% per annum.
- The parties were directed to pay and receive costs in proportion to failure and success. The plaintiff's cross-objection for the full five-year claim was dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is a modified decree in favour of the plaintiff limited to the valid inter vivos transfer portion (Rs. 5 per month for three years; monetary decree Rs. 200 plus interest).
- The Court applied existing principles about inter vivos gifts versus testamentary dispositions in joint Hindu family contexts; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities.
Sinha, J.:— This is a defendant's appeal and arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 900, Rs. 720 principal and Rs. 180-interest.
One Janki Prasad had four sons, Radha Ballabh, Kanhaiya Lal, Keshab Deo and Jagan Prasad, and a daughter, Mst. Bibi Sukkho. Radha Ballabh's son is the appellant before us. The plaintiff, Sri Thakur Radha Gopalji Maharaj, brought the above suit through the manager, Madan Lal. The story with which the plaintiff came to court was briefly this:
Janki Prasad had, on the 18th of March, 1893, executed a will whereby he dedicated permanently a sum of Rs. 12 per month for the expenses of an idol. He has himself purchased the property yielding the above amount. He died and so did his sort Radha Ballabh soon after. The story further goes on to say that Radha Ballabh, before his death, directed his son, Jawahar Lal, to continue making payments in accordance with the terms of the will. This Jawahar Lal did for sometime, but later on he stopped the payments. The suit was brought on the 13th of September, 1933. It might be mentioned that the sum claimed was for a period of five years.
The defence, in the main, was that the family was a joint Hindu family, the property was ancestral property, the transaction in question amounted to a testamentary disposition beyond the powers of Janki Prasad and the suit was, therefore, not maintainable. It was also pleaded that it was beyond the competence of Janki Prasad to make any provision for the payment of Rs. 12 per month for all time in future without creating a charge upon the property. It was lastly pleaded that the suit was at any rate not maintainable for a period of more than three years.
The learned Munsif found that the family was a joint Hindu family, the property was ancestral property and the will was in consequence invalid. He arrived at some other findings, with which it is not necessary to deal at this stage, and finally dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the lower appellate court dismissed the suit on a technical plea that it had not been framed in accordance with the will.
This decree was challenged in second appeal in this Court. A learned Judge of this Court held that the plaintiff should not have been non-suited on such a technical point when all the incidents of the case were present before the court. The learned Judge; therefore, by his order, dated the 27th of April, 1937, remanded the case for trial according to law. The learned Additional Civil Judge of Muttra has on remand passed a modified decree in favour of the plaintiff. He has held that on a true interpretation of the document the transfer amounted not merely to a transfer in futuro but a transfer in presenti. He held further that the claim for more than three years was barred by limitation. He, therefore, in this view of the case, passed a decree for Rs. 457-14-0 with pendente lite and future interest at Rs. 3 per cent per annum.
Both parties are dissatisfied with this decree. The defendant has preferred the above, second, appeal whereas the plaintiff has filed a cross-objection.
There were a number of issues framed in the case; the principal were:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to sue through Madan Lal?
2. Whether Janki Prasad was competent to make a valid waqf of the property in the plaintiff's favour?
3. Whether the agreement relied upon, by the plaintiff is void for want of consideration?”
For the purposes of this second appeal these are the only material issues. The plea with regard to the maintainability of the suit through Madan Lal must fail. It is true that there were a number of trustees but they appointed Madan Lal a manager through whom this suit has been instituted. It was held in Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (1933) 60 I.A 124 that a person in actual possession of the math is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property appertaining to it, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the math. This case was followed in the later case of Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti (1935) I.L.R 57 All. 159. Both these cases were considered in a judgment of this Court reported in Gopal Datt v. Babu Ram [1936] A.L.J 515. Their Lordships have made the following observation: “A suit can be brought in the name of the idol by a person who is a de facto manager of the temple.” On the finding that Madan Page: 180Lal is in charge of the idol the suit was rightly brought through him.
The learned Civil Judge has found that the property in dispute belonged to the co-parcenary. He has further found that the family was a joint family. The transfer in favour of Sri Thakurji Maharaj will, therefore, stand only if it amounts to a gift in presenti. If on the other hand, it amounts to a mere testamentary disposition, the legal consequences will be different.
We now come to the most important question in this case—whether the clause in favour of the Thakur ji in the deed of the 18th of March, 1893, amounts to a gift in presenti or a mere testamentary disposition. The learned Munsif held that it amounted to a will. The learned Civil Judge has, on appeal, come to a different conclusion, although the judgment itself makes it clear that he was not absolutely free from doubt. Paragraph 12 deals with the relevant portion. The learned counsel, for the appellant has furnished us with an official, translation of the will. The paragraph in question reads thus:
“I have fixed Rs. 12 a month permanently for the expenses of Rag Bhog of Sri Thakur Radha Gopalji installed in the temple at Qasba Raya. I have already arranged for Rs. 5 a month out of this amount, by purchasing property in mauza Raja Garhi, a hamlet of mauza Khanwal, pargana Mat, and getting mutation of names with respect to the same effected in favour of Sri Thakurji Maharaj aforesaid. As regards the remaining Rs. 7 a month, it is necessary to make some arrangement. I have made this arrangement that out of the zamindari property in mauza Raja Garhi, a hamlet of Khanwal, pargana Mat, which I have purchased, a portion yielding an income of Rs. 7 a month will be set apart for Sri Thakurji Maharaj and mutation of names with respect to the same will be effected in his favour. In case of mutation of names not being effected, my first son, Radha Ballabh, whom the said property has been allotted, shall get it recorded in the name of Sri Thakurji Maharaj and shall get mutation of names effected in his favour.”
The difference between the two portions, the one dealing with Rs. 5 a month and the other with Rs. 7 a month is marked. When dealing with the former, the expression used is “I have already arranged for Rs. 5 a month…. by purchasing property in mauza…. and getting mutation of names with respect to the same effected in favour of Sri Thakurji Maharaj aforesaid.” These indicate a completed transfer in the sense that the delivery of possession was made in favour of Sri Takurji. Coming now Page: 181to the portion respecting Rs. 7 a month, the language does not indicate a transfer in presenti. It merely says:
“I have made this arrangement that out of the zamindari property … I have purchased … a portion … will be set apart for” Sri Thakurji Maharaj and mutation of names with respect to the same will be effected in his favour. In case of mutation not being effected my first son… shall get it recorded in the name of Sri Thakurji and shall get mutation of names effected in his favour.”
The concluding portion of the quotation makes it abundantly clear that with regard to Rs. 7 the testator himself, although he was clear and definite in his mind about the arrangement, never took the necessary steps of mutation or delivery of possession. He, in the event of himself not taking the necessary steps, left the matter in the hands of his son, Radha Ballabh. There can be no manner of doubt that the testator's treatment of the two portions was different. With regard to Rs. 5 he had already done something; with regard to Rs. 7 he contemplated doing something. The transfer with regard to the former amounted to a transfer in presenti; with the regard to the latter it amounted to a testamentary disposition.
It is settled law that a person with restricted rights in a joint Hindu family can make a gift for charitable purposes, if the portion gifted bears a very small proportion to the entire estate, vide Sardar Singh v. Kunj Bihari Lal (1922) I.L.R 44 All. 503. This was the case of a Hindu widow but the principle will apply also to the manager or the father. A will stands on a different footing. It was held by their Lordships, of the judicial Committee so far back as the year 1880 in Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ram Chandra Dada Naik (1881) I.L.R 5 Bom. 48 (62) that it is not permissible to the father or manager of a joint Hindu family to make a testamentary disposition with respect to the joint family property. In the words of their Lordships:
“Its reasons for making this distinction between a gift and a devise are, that the coparcener's power of alienation is founded on his right to a partition; that right dies with him; and, that, the title of his co-sharers by survivorship vesting in them at the moment of his death, there remains nothing upon which the will can operate.”
This case was followed in Gangi Reddi v. Tammi Reddi (1927) 54 I.A 136. In his ninth edition of the Hindu Law, Mulla at page 245 has, summed up the position thus: “A Hindu father or other managing member has power to make a gift within reasonable limits of Page: 182ancestral immovable property for ‘pious purposes.’ Bui the alienation must be by an act inter vivos, and not by will.”
Mr. Chatterji, the learned counsel for the respondent has, however, tried to support the transaction on the ground of consent. The finding of the learned Judge on this question is in these terms: “These facts clearly show subsequent, if not previous consent.” He has taken, his stand principally on the case of Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh (1913) I.L.R 35 All. 337, but that was a case where their Lordships made it abundantly clear that the arrangement which had been entered into between the father and the sons was to take effect immediately, that is on the date that it was arrived at. The arrangement there was, therefore, to operate in presenti and its operation was postponed to any future date.
It has, in the alternative, been contended by the learned counsel that even a post facto consent is enough to validate the transaction. If it is true, as was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Lakshman Dada, that “there remains nothing upon which the will can operate” there remained nothing which could be validated by consent, and the consent, either of Radha Ballabh or of Jawahir Lal, was of no avail. The dispute has been set at rest by a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Lalta Prasat v. Sri Mahadeoji (1920) I.L.R 42 All. 461. The Privy Council case on which the learned counsel took his stand; itself makes this point clear. The passage in the will made by the father on which reliance was placed run in these terms: “If I at any time come back from pilgrimages and find mismanagement or character of any one bad, then I shall have power to cancel this will, which shall be enforced from the date of its execution.” Their Lordships were of the opinion—
“That the highest effect that can be given to such words is that this evidences a contractual condition which the sons accepted in order to obtain the partition which gave them immediate possession of the property, and viewed thus, the contractual acceptance of a power of forfeiture in case of bad behaviour would not, in their Lordships' opinion, be sufficient to prevent the partition operating in presenti.”
The true test is from what date does the document speak? The deed in question speaks with regard to Rs. 5 from the date of its execution but it speaks from some date in future with regard to Rs. 7. We are, therefore, of opinion that the subsequent consent Page: 183of the son of Radha Ballabh would not validate the transaction.
The claim, therefore, with regard to Rs. 7 must fail.
The learned counsel for the respondent has sought to press his cross-objection. He claims that he is entitled to a decree for the entire period of five years. Before the learned Civil Judge the plaintiff's counsel relied upon article 116 of the Limitation Act. That article speaks of a compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered. The present is not a case of that character. Nothing has been shown to us to induce us to disagree with the learned Civil Judge on this question.
No further point was raised before us. We, therefore, allow the appeal, modify the decree of the court below by decreeing the plaintiff's claim for three years on the basis of Rs. 5 a month.
The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs. 200. We, therefore, decree the claim for a sum of Rs. 200 with pendente lite and future interest at three per cent per annum. The parties will pay and receive costs in proportion to failure and success. The cross-objection is dismissed with costs.
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