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Madhaorao v. Yeshwant and others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The land known as "Waghmare Bada" was acquired for public purposes. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed total compensation at Rs.30,300 for the entire property (which included Inam lands, a building, a well, some hutments and trees). The appellant, Madhaorao, did not accept the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for determination of compensation by the Court.
The Land Acquisition Officer referred to the Court under section 18(1) with respect to the dispute as to compensation and also referred the dispute regarding apportionment between Madhaorao, Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. Balkrishnarao predeceased the proceedings and his interest was represented by legal representatives Yeshwant and Lilabai. Ramchandrarao, brother of the appellant, had not applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for a reference; he appeared later and was permitted by the Additional District Judge to be joined as a party. That joinder was challenged by Madhaorao in a revision before the High Court, which dismissed the revision and left the matter to be considered by the Additional District Judge.
Before the Additional District Judge the reference was heard; the Additional District Judge fixed compensation at Rs.2,28,643 and apportioned shares among various claimants (one-third shares to the branches of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao, the remaining one-third split between Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao; and Rs.7,450 for the building divided equally between Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao). Madhaorao appealed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act challenging principally the legality of the apportionment (not the quantum or area acquired). The present opinion is the court's disposal of that appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether persons who did not apply to the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18 (such as Ramchandrarao and Siremal) may be joined and permitted to press claims to apportionment in a reference before the Court (i.e., whether the Court could entertain fresh claims not referred by the Collector under section 30).
- Whether legal representatives of a deceased claimant (Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao) who did not themselves apply under section 18 are precluded from claiming apportionment of compensation, or whether the Collector could refer apportionment under section 30 and thus their claims were maintainable.
- Whether the apportionment awarded by the Additional District Judge in respect of Inam lands was legally tenable in light of the nature of Inam lands (impartible, devolving by primogeniture under the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State) and the rights (if any) of other joint-family members or heirs to a share of compensation.
- Whether, if other claimants' participation was permitted, their claim to a share of compensation should be limited to the amount originally awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer (Rs.30,300) rather than the enhanced amount awarded by the Additional District Judge (Rs.2,28,643).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Madhaorao) Arguments
- Ramchandrarao was precluded from laying any claim to the compensation because he had not applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for a reference under section 18; he could not be permitted to be joined for the first time before the Additional District Judge.
- The legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao are also precluded from raising any claim to apportionment because they failed to apply to the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18; having not done so, they waived their right to object to apportionment.
- In the alternative, even if other claimants' claims were tenable, their recoverable share should be limited to the compensation originally awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer (i.e., they could not claim apportionment in the enhanced compensation determined by the Additional District Judge).
Respondents' (Claimants opposing the appellant) Arguments
- The legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao contended that the Inam lands were ancestral and, despite impartibility and primogeniture, the coparceners (family members) had interests such that they were entitled to a share of the compensation once the land was acquired and its special incidents no longer continued to bind the compensation.
- They relied on several authorities and High Court decisions (discussed in the opinion) to support that, upon change of tenure or governmental action, the interdiction as to impartibility could be removed and coparceners could claim a share.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. G. H. Grant v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 | Explains interaction of sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act: section 18 requires application to Collector within prescribed time to refer apportionment; section 30 allows Collector to refer apportionment suo motu and contains no time limit. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the Collector was competent to refer apportionment under section 30 and that persons who did not apply under section 18 could, in appropriate circumstances, raise disputes under section 30. |
| Prematha Nath v. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 P C 64 | Affirms that jurisdiction of Courts under the Land Acquisition Act is special and strictly limited to objections taken to the Collector's award. | The court used this to support the proposition that the Court's special jurisdiction under sections 18–21 cannot be expanded to entertain fresh claims not falling within the reference made by the Collector. |
| Smt. Indumati Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani, AIR 1942 Cal. 53 | Supports view that parties could not be added to a reference to agitate claims not referred under section 30; joining permitted only where scope of reference is not altered (e.g., to adduce evidence on market value). | The court relied on this case to show authorities holding that Order 1 Rule 10 CPC can be used to add parties only where no new claim is set up and the scope is not enlarged. |
| Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram, I R 1958 A P 226 | Same view as above—parties could not be added to agitate new claims unless the dispute was referred under section 30. | Used as supporting authority for the limitation on adding parties to raise new disputes not referred under the Act. |
| Mt. Bakalbaso Kher v. Brijendra Singh, AIR 1967 Pat. 243 | Relied on section 53 of the Act to hold that Civil Procedure Code (including Order 1 Rule 10) applied and could be availed of to add new parties before the Court. | The court considered this decision but expressed disagreement with its approach: it held that the special procedure in the Act cannot be bypassed by recourse to CPC provisions to admit new claims not before the Collector. |
| Purushottam Kibe v. Anant Kibe, F.A. No. 91 of 1962 (decided 2-5-1969) | Discusses distinctive characteristics of Inam lands and examines whether Inam lands become joint-family/partible on change of tenure; rejects the contention that such change alone confers a share on joint-family members. | The court relied on the principles and reasoning in this case to conclude that Inam lands retain distinctive characteristics and that the Inamdar alone became Bhumiswami under the Land Revenue Code; coparceners did not acquire enforceable interest by mere change of tenure. |
| Harichand v. Shivchand, F.A. No. 36 of 1961 (decided 23-11-1965) | Held that if Jagirdari is ancestral, after abolition of Jagirs it may become family property and juniors could claim share in the Jagirdari house post-abolition. | The court discussed this authority but distinguished it as inapplicable to the present facts (Inam lands governed by special manual and primogeniture — rights of juniors were not analogous to the Harichand facts). |
| Hirondibai v. Goverdhan, 1959 M P L J Note 127 (S. A. No. 432 of 1952 dated 24-12-1957) | Interpreted succession rules (e.g., survivorship) under a particular statutory scheme, holding that theka lands could result in survivorship rights among co-sharers. | The court noted this decision and distinguished it from Inam lands, explaining the differing statutory schemes and absence of survivorship rights for brothers where primogeniture governs. |
| Thakur Bhagwansingh v. Darbarasingh, 24 NLR 170 | Authority cited in discussion of succession and survivorship in certain feudal-tenure contexts. | Cited as part of background jurisprudence but the court found such authorities inapplicable to the distinctive regime of Inam lands under the Manual. |
| Sukhambai v. Ramsaran Doma Sao and others, 1951 NLJ 453 | Another authority on Thekedari/tenure and rights of co-sharers referenced in the court's survey of prior law. | Noted by the court but distinguished from the present context of Inam lands. |
| Maniram Maksudan v. Ramdayal Maksudan (Maniram Maksudan v. Eamdayan Maksudan — cited in text) | Deals with Thekedari lands and partibility where a ban against partition was removed; used to illustrate differing factual contexts. | The court cited it to show that Thekedari cases are not analogous to Inam lands and therefore offer limited support to respondents' contentions. |
| Smt. Pilanoni Janakram v. Anandsingh, 1960 MPLJ 9627 | Referenced in distinguishing cases about tenancy/occupancy rights and family arrangements affecting joint-family shares. | Distinguished by the court; used in the court's comparison and rejection of analogies offered by respondents. |
| Tikaram v. Amolabai, 1961 M P L J 997 | Cited in discussion of Thekedar/thekedari distinctions and family arrangements. | The court distinguished this authority from the Inam-land regime and found it inapplicable to grant coparcenary shares in Inam compensation. |
| Malhairao and others v. Shivajirao and others, F. A. No. 32 of 1959 (decided 27-9-1963) | Discussed rights in Khudkasht land after abolition of Jagirs; rejects sweeping reversion of earlier generations' joint-family rights upon abolition. | The court adopted the observations in this case to reject the argument that, on acquisition/extinction of Inam tenure, previously non-existent rights in prior generations revive for present claimants. |
| Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna, AIR 1970 SC 1795 | Supreme Court decision rejecting the proposition that loss of impartibility converts an estate into partible joint-family property entitling coparceners to shares. | The court cited this Supreme Court authority to support its conclusion that the respondents' argument (that compensation becomes partible among coparceners when the property loses impartibility) was untenable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court applied the Act's text, its earlier decisions and relevant precedents to address (a) whether certain claimants could be added and press claims in the reference proceedings, and (b) whether the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao had any entitlement to apportionment of the compensation for the Inam lands.
On procedural competence to refer and join parties:
- The court first explained the statutory distinction between section 18 (which requires a person interested, who has not accepted the award, to apply to the Collector within the time prescribed to obtain a reference) and section 30 (which authorises the Collector to refer disputes as to apportionment or persons entitled to compensation even after compensation is settled under section 11, and contains no prescribed time-limit).
- Relying on Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar, the court held that the Collector was competent to refer apportionment under section 30 suo motu; thus legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao could be validly before the Court because the Collector had found a dispute as to apportionment and referred it under section 30.
- However, Ramchandrarao's claim was first made before the Additional District Judge and he had not applied under section 18 nor was he a person as to whom the Collector had referred a dispute under section 30. The court reiterated the special and limited jurisdiction of the Court under the Act (citing Prematha Nath) and concluded that the Court hearing a reference cannot entertain fresh claims or add parties to determine their title to compensation unless the Collector has referred the dispute under section 30 or the claim arose within the reference as made.
- The court rejected the proposition that Order 1 Rule 10 CPC could be used to add parties so as to bring into the reference new claims not before the Collector, noting that section 53 CPC cannot be used to bypass the special procedure laid down by the Act (and distinguishing the authority in Mt. Bakalbaso Kher v. Brijendra Singh).
- Consequently, the court held that Ramchandrarao could not be added as a party before the Additional District Judge for determining his title to compensation and that his remedy was a civil suit (or, where appropriate, other remedies outside the Act).
- The court applied the same reasoning to Siremal (a later intervenor at appellate stage) and rejected his application to be joined because his claim was a new dispute not before the Collector or the reference court and could not be entertained in appeal under section 54, which is no broader in scope than the powers of the Court hearing the reference.
On entitlement to compensation for Inam lands:
- The court examined the nature of Inam lands: recorded Madhaorao as Inamdar; Inam land was impartible and devolved according to the rule of primogeniture and the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State applied (including section 134 which applied Jagir rules to Inams).
- The court reviewed previous High Court decisions (including Purushottam Kibe and others) and concluded that the distinctive characteristics of Inam lands persist: the Inamdar becomes Bhumiswami under the Land Revenue Code, and no conferral occurs giving joint-family members enforceable shares merely by a change in tenure or by abolition of Jagirs unless specific provisions create such rights.
- Because the Inam lands were impartible and devolved by primogeniture, once Madhaorao succeeded as Inamdar the corpus vested absolutely in him for his lifetime and would devolve on his eldest son; brothers (such as Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao) did not acquire survivorship rights in the presence of lineal male descendants. The Manual provided limited rights of maintenance to widows, minors and brothers subject to orders, but there was no evidence of any maintenance order in favour of the respondents.
- On that basis the court found that the respondents (legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao) had no vested interest in the Inam lands at the time of acquisition and therefore could claim no share in the compensation paid for such lands. The court rejected the respondents' argument that the compensation, once the special incidents of impartibility no longer applied, would be partible among coparceners; it cited Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna (AIR 1970 SC 1795) as authority rejecting that view.
On the Additional District Judge's apportionment:
- The Additional District Judge had fixed overall compensation at Rs.2,28,643 and apportioned one-third shares of the Inam lands' compensation to the legal representatives of Gopalrao and to the branch of Balkrishnarao, with the remaining third split between Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao; a sum of Rs.7,450 for the building was directed to be split between Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao.
- The Additional District Judge concluded that Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao had no interest in the building (their interests in the house were extinguished by purchase by the Court of Wards). The primary contested issue remaining was apportionment of compensation for Inam lands.
- Applying the statutory scheme and precedents, the court concluded the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao could not claim any share in compensation for the Inam lands; similarly Ramchandrarao's claim could not be considered in the reference proceedings; Siremal's later intervention was also rejected as a new dispute not before the Collector.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court's dispositive rulings are:
- Appeal allowed. The appeal of Madhaorao is allowed.
- The order of the Additional District Judge is set aside so far as the apportionment of the share to the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao is concerned.
- The claim of Ramchandrarao is set aside (i.e., cannot be considered in the reference proceedings).
- The application of Siremal for consideration of his claim as to apportionment is rejected (the court could not consider that new dispute at the appellate stage).
- The appeal is allowed with costs; counsel's fee is determined at Rs.250, if certified.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The apportionment in favour of the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao (in respect of Inam lands) is vacated; Ramchandrarao's claim in the reference is dismissed; Madhaorao's appeal is successful and he is awarded costs and counsel's fee as directed.
- Broader legal implications: The court followed existing precedent and applied the statutory scheme (sections 18 and 30) and decisions (including Dr. G. H. Grant and Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna) to confirm that persons who did not apply under section 18 cannot compel the Court to determine fresh claims in a reference unless the Collector had referred the dispute under section 30; the distinctive legal position of Inam lands (impartibility and primogeniture under the Manual for Jagirdars) precludes coparceners or collateral relatives from claiming a share of compensation in absence of recognized rights under the governing rules. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond these applications of statute and precedent; the decision operates to resolve the parties' rights in this matter (and does not purport to create a new precedent beyond application of the cited authorities).
Disposition: Appeal allowed; apportionments to legal representatives set aside; claim of Ramchandrarao rejected; costs awarded; counsel fee Rs.250 if certified.
Dube J.-
This appeal preferred under section 54 of the land acquisition act by Madhaorao is against the award of Third Additional District Judge, Indore, in a reference under the land acquisition act (hereinafter referred to as the act). The appeal is mainly directed against the legality of the apportionment of the compensation and does not concern itself with the quantum of compensation or the extent of area acquired.
2. The property known as "Waghmare Bada" was acquired for a public purpose. The Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation at Rs.30,300 for the entire property which included Inam lands, a building, a well, some hutments and trees. We are here only concerned with a dispute as to apportionment of the compensation in respect of the Inam lands and the building. Madhaorao, appellant did not accept the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and applied to him to make a reference under section 18 of the Act for determination of the compensation by the Court. The •Land Acquisition Officer while referring to the Court under section 18 (1) of the Act as regards the dispute as to compensation, also referred the dispute with regard to apportionment of the compensation between Madhaorao, Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. As Balkrishnarao died, his interest was represented by his legal representatives, Yeshwant and Lilabai. It may be stated that neither Balkrishnarao nor Gopalrao had separately applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for a reference to be made as regards either the apportionment of the compensation or adequacy of the amount fixed. Ramchandrarao, who is brother of the present appellant Madhaorao, neither participated in the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer nor made any application for a reference to be made to a civil Court for apportionment of the compensation. The following genealogical tree will explain the relationship of the claimants with Madhaorao.
@ At Table……………….
Anantrao Waphmare
Baburao Balkrishnarao Gop 1 1 ilrao
Madhaorao (appellant eldest son) Kamchandrarao Yeshwant (respondent (respondent No. 4) No. 1) Lilabai (respondent No. 2)
i NarsinRhrao [respondent No. 3 (1)] i 1 Shakuntalabai Hemlatabai [respondent [respondent No 3 (2)] No. 3 (3)]
3. All the claimant-respondents including Ramchandrarao appeared before the Additional District Judge and disputed the quantum of compensation and claimed apportionment. Though the name of Balkrishnarao appears in the order of the Land Acquisition Officer, there is no mention of Ram-chandrarao's name as a claimant for apportionment. The Additional District Judge, Indore, permitted Ramchandrarao to be joined as a party to the proceedings. Madhaorao appellant had challenged the legality of this order before the High Court in a revision. The High Court dismissed the revision holding that Madhaorao would have the right to come up in appeal against the tenability of the claim of Ramchandrarao and that it was not proper to adjudicate upon the rights of Ramchandrarao in the revision as they were being considered by the Additional District Judge. The High Court, therefore, left the matter open and it is now contended by Madhaorao that Ramchandrarao is precluded from laying any claims to the compensation because he had not applied to the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the dispute to Court under section 18 of the Act. He could not be permitted to be joined as a party before the Additional District Judge in reference for the first time.
4. The appellant Madhaorao has also disputed the tenability of the claim to apportionment by the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. He has contended that they are also precluded from raising any claim as to apportionment of the compensation before the Additional District Judge as they had not applied to the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the dispute to a civil Court under section 18 of the Act. Having failed to do so, the claimants would be deemed to have waived their right to object to the apportionment. It was also contended in the alternative that the other claimants not having objected to the quantum of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, even if their claim was tenable, it would have to be limited to the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and they could not claim apportionment in the enhanced compensation granted by the Additional District Judge.
5. In view of section 30 of the Act, no criticism could be validly made against the maintainability of the claim of the legal representatives of Bal-krishnarao and Gopalrao. The Act itself envisages that the Collector could refer a dispute under section 30 as regards title to compensation and apportionment even though the claimants neglected to make a reference under section 18 of the Act. The scheme of section 18 and section 30 of' the act came for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Grant v. The State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237, wherein it was observed:
"There are two provisions, sections 18 (1) and 30, which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. By sub-section (1) of section 18 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by sub-section (2) of that section of a person interested who had not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under section 11, any dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under sub-section (2) of section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under section 18 (2) to refer the matter to the Court But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference under section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have devolved upon him since the award. Whereas under section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-section (2), clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under section 30. Again under section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector is under section 30 not enjoined to make a reference: he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment, or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award."
The Collector, having determined the compensation for the land, found a dispute as regards apportionment; he was, therefore, competent to refer the matter suo motu under section 30 of the Act as regards apportionment between Madhaorao and the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao.
6. The question that arises for consideration is whether the claim entertained by the learned Additional District Judge as far as Ramchandrarao is concerned is also tenable. It has already been pointed out that Ramchandrarao made his claim for the first time before the Additional District Judge. Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 confer a special jurisdiction upon the Court and it arises out of an application made to the Land Acquisition Officer by any person interested who has not accepted the award. There can be no reference except at the instance of such a person interested under section 18 unless it be a reference of a dispute under section 30 of the Act. Dealing with the special jurisdiction of the Court under the Act in Prematha Nath v. Secretary of State AIR 1930 P C 64, it was observed by the Privy Council thus:
"Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of the section. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award and is confined to a consideration of that objection."
If a party has not chosen to apply to the Collector for a reference under section 1.8 and if the Collector has not referred the matter under section 30 of the Act, then the Court hearing the reference would be powerless to entertain any fresh claim and add him as a party to the proceedings. It was, therefore, necessary to refer the question of title to compensation claimed by Ram-chandrarao Waghmare and Siremal. They did not seek the assistance of the Collector in that regard. For making a reference under section 30 of the Act, the powers of the Collector are also not fettered by any limitation. Bui what they now seek to do is to be made parties in the reference proceedings and claim title to the compensation as against Madhaorao. If it was only desired to support the reference made by Madhaorao, there could be some justification in making them parties to the proceedings. For, in that case, they would be permitted to adduce evidence as regards the value of the land. Now, Ram-chandrarao could not be added as a party by Additional District Judge for determining his title to the compensation as this dispute was not referred to him under section 30 of the Act.
7. The decisions in Smt. Indumati Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani AIR 1942 Cal. 53, and Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram A I R 1958 A P 226, support the view that the parties could not be added to agitate their claim before the Court if the same was not referred under section 30 of the Act. It was pointed out in the Calcutta case that a party could be permitted to be added in a reference if the scope of the reference is not in any way altered; as for instance, when a trustee of a Wakf property applied to be added as a party to the proceedings with a view to support the claim of Wakf, he was permitted to be joined as a party after taking recourse to the provisions of order 1, rule 10 of the code of civil procedure and this was only for the purpose of permitting him to adduce the evidence as to the market value of the property acquired. No new claim was enquired into and the scope of enquiry was not enlarged. The provisions of order 1, rule 10 could be availed of to the limited extent bearing in mind that the parties were not setting up a new claim.
8. In Mt. Bakalbaso Kher v. Brijendra Singh AIR 1967 Pat. 243, reliance was placed on section 53 of the Act which provides that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code applied to all the proceedings before the Court under the Act except and so far as they are not inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. It was therefore, held that provisions of order 1, rule 10 could be availed of to add new parties before the Court. With great respect to the views expressed in that case, we are inclined to hold that section 53 of the Act in itself lays down that the provisions of (civil Procedure Code would apply except and so far as they may not be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. Now, when the Act itself lays down a special procedure for making a reference, this could not be by-passed by taking recourse to any provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The special procedure laid down under the Act for raising disputes before Courts under section 18 and for setting title to compensation and apportionment under section 30 would prevail and if as pointed out no such dispute was before the Court, it would not be permissible to add new parties raising new disputes. We would agree with the view taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta in the aforesaid cases. In this view of the matter, the claim of Ramchandrarao could not be considered by the Additional District Judge and his remedy, if any, was by a civil suit.
9. We may also advert to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar (supra). It was observed in para 18 as under:-
"The scheme of the land acquisition act is that all disputes about the quantum of compensation must be decided by resort to the procedure prescribed by the Act: it is also intended that the disputes about the rights of owners to compensation being ancillary to the principal dispute should be decided by the Court to which power is entrusted. Jurisdiction of the Court in this behalf ia not restricted to cases of apportionment, but extends to adjudication of disputes as to the persons who are entitled to receive compensation, and there is nothing in section 30 which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award, devolved."
It is clear from the majority decision that the remedy for setting a dispute as to the title to compensation was provided under the Act by taking recourse to section 18 or under section 30. If the Collector refused to refer the matter under section 30, the matter could be agitated in a suit or could be challenged under proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
10 Similarly, the application by Siremal who has raised entirely a new dispute by intervening at the appellate stage cannot be entertained. Siremal, who applied to be joined as a party before the High Court, claims compensation in respect of 73 ft. by 65 ft. land. This entirely new dispute was neither before the Land Acquisition Officer nor before the Additional District Judge. The scope of appeal from a decision of a reference under sections 18 and 30 of the land acquisition act is limited just as the scope of reference itself is limited. The powers of the High Court under section 54 are in no way greater than the powers of the Court hearing the reference and if the reference could only be confined to matters specifically referred to it, the scope could not be enlarged in appeal. In the referring order by the Land Acquisition Officer, he indicated that there was a dispute regarding apportionment of the compensation between Madhaorao, Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. He also indicated that these were the persons interested in the land. The order of the Additional District Judge and that of the High Court in appeal, therefore, could not go beyond what was referred by the Land Acquisition Officer. We are of ihe opinion that for the reasons already discussed, provisions of order 1, rule 10 of the civil procedure code would not be of any assistance to Siremal for making a claim before us at this stage. We, therefore, reject the application of Siremal for consideration of his claim as to apportionment.
11. The contention of the appellant that the claim of the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao should be restricted to the compensation awarded by the Collector is without any force. When the matter as regards quantum of compensation was at large before the Court, the apportionment would undoubtedly be of the compensation finally determined as the dispute referred to by the Collector under section 30 was for apportionment after the determination.
12. We may now advert to the order of the Additional District Judge, Indore. He fixed the compensation of the entire property at Rs.2,28,643. He apportioned this amount of compensation in four shares. Out of the share of the compensation for Inam lands, one-third share amounting to Rs.73,731 was apportioned to the legal representatives of Gopalrao. Similarly, another one-third share amounting to Rs.73,731 was apportioned to the branch of Balkrishnarao. The remaining one-third was divided equally between Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao. Madhaorao and Ramchandrarao were further given a sum of Rs.7,450 as compensation for the building to be divided equally between them. The learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao had no interest in the building as their interest was purchased by Madhaorao. Therefore, even if there were any rights in the house, by virtue of its being ancestral, such rights were extinguished by purchase of all interests by Aladhaorao. This position is not disputed and we are left with the question of compensation in respect of the Inam lands.
13. It is an admitted position that Madhaorao was recorded as the Inamdar of the land acquired. It is also not disputed that the Inam land was impartible and its devolution was according to the rule of primogeniture. The Inam lands in absence of any special terms were to be governed by the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State. The Inarn lands for all purposes were treated in the same manner as Jagirs and all rules applicable to the Jagirs applied to Inam lands. By virtue of section 134 of the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State, all rules and regulations laid down in the Manual and applicable to the Jagirs were, in absence of any standing rules or circular, applicable to Inams. By sections of the Manual for Jagirdars of Holkar State, 1928, the Jagir was to descend in the order of primogeniture i.e. to the eldest male member in the line of the last holder. By sections 14 and 15 of the Manual, widows, minors and brothers were entitled to maintenance.
14. The learned Additional District Judge came to a conclusion that the claimants and the appellant formed a joint family. The property acquired was ancestral and that no partition had taken place. For coming to this conclusion the learned Additional District Judge relied on the findings in an earlier suit Sundarhai v. Lt. Col. Gopalpuri Gusai and 4 others Civil Suit No.21 of 1927 decided on 26-11-1929, for redemption of mortgage in which Madhaorao, Baikrishnarao and Gopalrao were parties. It was held there that the three constituted a joint Hindu family and no partition had taken place in the family. There is no evidence of partition after the decision of this mortgage suit. Again in the same mortgage suit it was found by the Court that Balkrishnarao could mortgage his interest in the property and a preliminary decree for sale was passed only as against the rights and interest of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. Madhaorao was a minor at that time and the management of the estate was done by Court of Wards. Again when the house was being sold in execution of the aforesaid decree, the interests of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao were purchased by the Court of Wards. Though the finding in the mortgage suit may not be resjudicata, there is no escape from the conclusion that the property was ancestral and the house at least was found to be a joint family property. As already indicated, the coparcenery interest in the house, of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao stood extinguished by the purchase of their interest by the Court of Wards. The position, therefore, boils down to this that the property acquired was ancestral and Madhaorao succeeded to it being the eldest male member of the last Inam holder. The house was undoubtedly held jointly but the interest of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao was purchased by Madhaorao. The bulk of compensation is in lieu of Inam lands. The question that arises is whether the legal heirs of BaJkrishnarao and Gopalrao had any vested interest in the Inam lands to entitle them to apportionment of the compensation. There is no doubt that if the acquisition had not taken place the land would have continued to be enjoyed by Madhaorao like his self-acquired property. The income derived from such land also became his self-acquired property. As long as Madhaorao was alive, the corpus of Inam land vested absolutely in him and after his death, it would have devolved on his eldest son.
15. The respondents contend that the Inam lands were ancestral and though they were subject to the incident of impartiality and primogeniture yet, by reason of these, they did not cease to be ancestral and joint family properties. In any case, it was urged, the incidents of survivorship attached to (he incident of impartibility and primogeniture and to that extent they had interest in the property. It was contended that on the findings in the mortgage suit, the Inam lands were also part of the joint family property and once the Inam land was shorn of its characteristics of impartibility and decidability by rule of primogeniture, all the members of the joint family became entitled to a share in it. By a Governmental action, the Inam land with all its bundle of rights was acquired and the compensation that was paid was not impressed with any of the characteristics of impartibility. The coparceners, therefore, became entitled to a share in the compensation. The contention, however, assumes that the Inam land could be held in coparcener by the respondents. Support is, however, sought for the contention from a number of decisions of this High Court wherein importable estates were treated as joint family properties and by a change of tenure, the interdiction as to impartibility was removed, and the coparceners became entitled to have share in the property. Most of these cases turned on facts peculiar to them and not much support could be gathered from them. Most of these cases were examined in Purushottam Kibe v. Anant Kibe F. A. No. 91 of 1962 decided on 2-5-1969. The discussion in Kibe's case brings out the distinctive characteristics of the Inam lands.
16. In another Division Bench case of this High Court Harichand v. Shivchand F. A. No. 36 of 1961 decided on 23-11-1965", it was observed that if Jagirdari is ancestral property, after abolition of Jagirs it would become family property just like any other items of the ancestral property. The Division Bench in this case relied on Hirondibai v. Goverdhan 1959 M P L J Note 127=S. A. No. 432 of 1952 dated 24-12-1957. In this case, under section 109 of the C. P. and Berar Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1917, succession by survivorship was not interdicted. So, though the Theka was impartible if the Theka was owned jointly by a Hindu family, the co-sharers succeeded by survivorship after the Thekedar's death. This view, it was pointed out, fell in line with previous decisions in Thakur Bhagwansingh v. Darbarasingh 24NLR170, and Sukhambai v. Ramsaran Doma Sao and others 1951 NLJ 453. This view was again adopted by Shrivastava J. in Maniram Mak-sudan v. Ramdayal Maksudan 1959MPLJ829. These cases could hardly be of any assistance for the reason that the Inam land though ancestral would only devolve by applying rule of primogeniture. After the death of Baburao, neither Balkrishnarao nor Gopalrao could succeed by survivorship. Section 3 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Hoikar State regulated the devolution. There was no ptace lor the brothers of Baburao in presence of his son even though the Inams were ancestral property. No sooner Madhaorao became the Inam holder, it is difficult to see what right Balkrishnarao 01 Gopalrao will have in the Tnam lands. Now, Harichand's case deals with the rights of junior members to claim share, in Jagirdari house situated in Jagir village after the abolition of Jagirs. It was held that he could claim such a share Nothing, however, was said in respect of compensation amount payable for the Jagir to the coparceners. This case and most of the cases relied on in Harichand's case came for consideration before this High Court in Purushottam Kibe v. Anant (supra). The Division Bench in that case was dealing with the rights of members of the joint Hindu family in Inam lands. A challenge very similar to the present one was made in that case. It was argued that by passing of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, there was a change in the tenure of the Inam lands and the proper assumed the character of joint family property without the character of impartibility and primogeniture and, therefore, the members of the family became entitled to an interest in it by survivorship. Repelling these contentions, the Division Bench held that there was nothing in the Land Revenue Code which would warrant such an interpretation. The language of section ] 58 of the m. p. land revenue code indicated that the Inam-holder became the Bhumiswami of the land There was no conferral of any right with reference to person who belonged to the joint family of the Inamdar. Therefore, even if the Inam were held as ancestral, the Inamdar alone became the Bhumiswami of the land and there was no obligation to part with his right in favour of any of the members of the joint family. The only right which the other members of the joint family held was aright to put forward their claim as senior member of the family in case of extinction of the line of the Inamdar subject. to its being recognised by the Government. We are in full agreement with the principle laid down in that case and also agree with the reasons given in the judgment distinguishing the reported case, in Smt. Pilanoni Janakram v. Anandsingh 1960 MPLJ 9627, and Tikaram v. Amolabai 1961 M P L J 997. While distinguishing the latter case, it was pointed out that though Thekedari was conferred upon the eldest member of the joint Hindu family and such Thekedari was impartibly yet, that did not mean that Sir and Khudkasht land appurtenant to theka belonged exclusively to the Thekedar. Such land was according to the decision the joint family property of the co-sharers of the Thekedar. A family arrangement entered into by the Thekedar with the members of his family could bind him and the position was in no way altered by the abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951 which conferred upon the Thekedar rights of occupancy in respect of Sir and Khudkasht land. The rights of other members of the family under the arrangement continued and the Thekedar was deemed to have acted on behalf of the rest of the members of the family securing occupancy rights. The position obtaining with regard to Inam lands held under a grant is not the same as a Thekedar. In cases of Inam lands, the other members of the family have no interest except of maintenance subject to its determination by the department dealing with the subject of Jagirs and Inams and that too, as already pointed out was confined to widows and minors in the family and brothers of the Inamdar for the time being. It would be helpful to site the observations of the Court in Malhairao and others v. Shivajirao and others F.A. No. 32 of 1959 decided on 27-9-1963. The question in that case was regarding the rights in respect of Khudkasht land in a Jagir village after coming into force of the M. P. Abolition of Jagirs Act. It was observed thus:-
"The plaintiff's argument seems to be that the moment Jagirs were abolished, and the lands became puce tenancy, they also became joint family property. If by this is meant that they became joint family property of Shivajirao and his SODS, there is something to be said in support of the conttntion. But the argument is that the position reverts to two generations backwards as if Shivajirao's grand-father Krishnarao had got these lands as joint family property. Fantastic as this argument is, support is sought from some reported cases which are not really analogous. For example, in Maniram Maksudan v. Eamdayan Maksudan, the Court was dealing with some 'Thekedari' lands which were joint family property from the very beginning. There was a ban against partition and when it was removed the Court held that they became partible. It was difficult to see what analogy there lies with these lands which at no earlier time were partible."
We wholly agree with the view, as in the present case also we do not see how the interest which was wholly absent in the Inam lands which had lapsed when succession opened after the death of Baburao could resuscitate when the Inam lands themselves were extinguished. The Inam lands constituted a special kind of grant and unless expressly provided in the grant, the other members of the family at no time had any right as against the Inamdar except as already pointed out of maintenance to a very limited extent. Therefore, there was no which Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao could claim in the Inam land. There could be no right which they could assert in the compensation for such land.
17. The position that emerges out is that the respondents had no interest in the Inam land by birth and had no right to partition having regard to the impartible nature of the land. There is no evidence of any right of maintenance in their favour. The Manual for Jagirdars of Holkar State provided for maintenance to brothers of the Inam holder and widows and minors. But this right was subject to a proper order by the Jagir Commsissioner and there is no order providing for maintenance to any one. The Inam land could not be held in coparcener as joint family properly. The respondents had no present interest in the impartible estate. The Inarn land though an ancestral joint family property yet in the hands of Inamdar was clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. For the purpose of devolution of property it was governed by section 3 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Holkar State and even if it is held that the Inam land devolved on Madhaorao as joint family property the only right which a member of the joint family property acquired by birth was. to take the property by survivorship in the order indicated in section 3 irrespective of the fact that the member succeeding was joint or separate. What is important is that no member acquired any interest in the property itself. Even the right to take property by survivorship in the case of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao who are uncles would be too remote in presence of lineal male descendants like sons and brothers of the Inam holders. If at the time of acquisition, the respondents had no interest in the Inam land they could claim no share in the compensation. The argument that when the property lost its character of impartibility it became partible amongst the members of the joint family was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna AIR 1970 SC 1795, and would not be tenable in the instant case.
18. We are, therefore, of the view that the legal representatives of Bal-krishnarao and Gopalrao could claim no share in the compensation of the Inam land or the house. We have already indicated that we cannot consider the claim of Ramchandrarao in this appeal. We cannot also consider the claim of Siremal who sought intervention before the High Court.
19. In the result, we allow the appeal of Madhaorao and set aside the order of the Additional District Judge as far as apportionment of the share to the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao, is concerned. We also set aside the claim of Ramchandrarao. The appeal is thus allowed with costs. We, however, determine the counsel's fee at Rs.250, if certified.
Appeal allowed.
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