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Chandeshwar Yadav v. Radha Devi
Factual and Procedural Background
On 24 August 1971, Defendant No. 1 agreed to sell a house and land to the plaintiffs and allegedly received the full consideration. A sale deed was executed on 30 September 1971 but was not ultimately registered because Defendant No. 1 failed to appear before the Sub-Registrar. On 6 October 1972, Defendant No. 1 executed a registered sale deed for the same property in favour of Defendant No. 2 (the present appellant).
The plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Commissioner against the failure to register; it was dismissed. On 22 August 1974, they instituted a suit for specific performance. The trial court found the plaintiffs ready and willing, deemed the subsequent sale to Defendant No. 2 fraudulent, yet dismissed the suit as time-barred. The first appellate court reversed, holding the suit within limitation and decreeing specific performance.
In second appeal, the High Court remanded the case to the first appellate court to determine (a) whether Defendant No. 2 was a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice and (b) whether the 13-month delay defeated equitable relief. After remand, notice of hearing was served on counsel who had earlier appeared for the defendants; when he later stopped appearing, the appellate court proceeded ex parte, allowed additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, and again decreed the suit.
Defendant No. 2’s attempts to set aside the ex parte decree via Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and subsequent appeals, including a Letters Patent Appeal, were dismissed. The present appeal challenges those dismissals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendants had adequate notice of the remanded first appeal, so that the ex-parte decree should stand.
- Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation because it was not filed within 30 days of the Sub-Registrar’s refusal, as contemplated by Section 77 of the Registration Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- No notice of the remanded appeal was served on the defendants, rendering the ex-parte decree void.
- The suit was time-barred since Section 77 of the Registration Act requires initiation within 30 days from the Registrar’s refusal to register the sale deed.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Notice Issue: The order sheet demonstrated that notice of the remanded appeal was duly served upon the counsel who previously represented the defendants and who appeared at least once thereafter. The counsel never denied his authority or lack of vakalatnama. Consequently, the court concluded that the defendants had sufficient notice; the appellate court rightly proceeded in their absence.
Limitation Issue under Section 77: The court treated Section 77 of the Registration Act as conferring an option upon the vendee—either to sue under that section within 30 days of refusal or to file an ordinary suit for specific performance within the general period of limitation. Because the plaintiffs elected the latter route and instituted the suit within the prescribed limitation for specific performance, the bar of Section 77 did not apply.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The dismissal leaves intact the decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment reiterates that Section 77 of the Registration Act is optional and does not curtail the usual limitation period for suits seeking specific performance. No broader precedent or new legal principle was established beyond this clarification.
(1) Defendant No. 1, on 24.8.1971, entered into an agreement with plaintiffs-respondents for sale of a house as well as of land. It is alleged that defendant No. 1 received the entire consideration amount and a sale deed was also executed on 30.9.1971 and was presented before the Sub-Registrar for registration. It is alleged that defendant No. 1 did not turn up for registration. On 6.10.1972, defendant No. 1 executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 (appellant herein) in respect of the property covered by the agreement for sale dated 24.8.1971. Since defendant No. 1 did turn up for registration of the sale deed, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Commissioner but the same was rejected. On 22.8.1974, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale of the property. In the said suit, various issues were framed and one of the issues was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court found that the consideration amount has already been paid and the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The trial Court also found that defendant No. 2 (appellant herein) was not a bona fide purchaser of the property as the sale deed was bogus, fraudulent and without consideration. However, the trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation and therefore, suit was dismissed. Plaintiffs, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the first appellate Court. The first appellate court found that the suit brought by the plaintiffs was within limitation and, therefore, the appeal was allowed and the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale was decreed. Aggrieved defendant-appellant preferred second appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and remanded the appeal to the first appellate Court for recording finding on two questions (1) whether defendant No. 2 was a bona fide purchaser with notice for consideration and (2) whether the delay in filing the suit after a lapse of more than 13 months was such which disentitled the plaintiffs for grant of an equitable relief of specific performance. It appears that after the remand, the notice of hearing of the appeal was served on counsel for the defendant-appellant, who was his earlier counsel for the appellant. It also appears that the said counsel appeared once or twice before the first appellate Court. On 5.12.1984, an application was moved by the plaintiffs under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for taking additional evidence. Since the defendant-appellant did not appear in the appeal, the said evidence was allowed to be taken on record. Subsequently, the appeal was heard on merits and was allowed. Defendant No. 2, thereafter, filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 for setting aside ex-parte judgment. The said application was rejected. The defendant filed two sets of appeals, one against the order rejecting the application for recalling the ex-parte order and second against the ex-parte judgment passed by the first appellate Court. The High Court dismissed the second appeal as well as Miscellaneous appeal. Defendants, thereafter, preferred Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 17.12.1989. The Letters Patent Bench dismissed the miscellaneous appeal as well as second appeal as it was held not maintainable. Against the aforesaid decision, the defendant- appellant has filed the present appeal. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised two arguments. The first argument is that the defendants who were respondents in the first appellate Court had no notice of the appeal and, therefore, the ex-parte order passed by the appellate Court deserved to be set aside. The second argument is that the suit having not been filed within 30 days from the date of the refusal by the Registrar, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by time under Section 77 of the Registration Act. So far as the first argument is concerned, the Order Sheet of the appellate Court shows that the notice of the appeal was served upon the counsel for the defendant-appellant, who once or twice appeared in the appeal. Subsequently, he did not appear. The counsel for the defendant-appellant never stated before the first appellate Court that he has either no Vakalatnama or no authority on behalf of the defendants. We, therefore, find that the defendant-appellant had sufficient notice of hearing of the appeal and the first appellate court was justified in proceeding to decide the appeal in absence of the defendant-appellant. So far as the second question is concerned, assuming when the Registrar declined to register the sale deed presented by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were under no obligation to bring suit within thirty days of such refusal as contemplated under Section 77 of the Registration Act. Section 77 of the Registration Act gives option to a vendee either to file suit under Section 77 of the Act or bring a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of the property. In the present case the plaintiff has chosen to bring the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale of the property within the period of limitation. In such a situation the plaintiff's suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation, having not filed within thirty days of refusal by the Registrar to register the sale deed as contemplated under Section 77 of the Registration Act. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________
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