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Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Ch. Seshamma executed two registered settlement deeds on 1 December 1958 in favour of her daughters, Hymavathy and Vimalavathy. Vimalavathy—whose husband is the present appellant—died on 4 May 1970. On 21 August 1970 Seshamma purported to revoke the settlement deed (Ex. B-1) in favour of Vimalavathy and executed a Will (Ex. A-1) bequeathing the same property to her other daughter, Hymavathy. Seshamma died on 26 January 1976.
Hymavathy instituted O.S. No. 35 of 1973 before the Subordinate Judge, Tenali, seeking declaration of title on the strength of Ex. A-1. The trial court, after examining DWs 1-3, held Ex. B-1 to be a settlement deed that had already divested Seshamma of ownership, rendering Ex. A-1 invalid; it therefore dismissed the suit. A learned Single Judge of the High Court affirmed that dismissal on 13 December 1988. However, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 124 of 1989, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the lower courts and decreed the suit in favour of Hymavathy by judgment dated 11 July 1995. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was filed by special leave against that Division Bench decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the document dated 1 December 1958 (Ex. B-1) operates as a settlement deed creating an immediate interest in favour of the donee, or whether it is testamentary in nature and therefore revocable as a Will.
- If Ex. B-1 is a valid settlement deed, whether Seshamma could subsequently revoke it and transfer the same property to Hymavathy under Will Ex. A-1.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments (Hymavathy)
- The nomenclature “settlement deed” is not conclusive; what matters are the recitals as a whole and the settlor’s intention.
- Because the right to enjoy and alienate the property was postponed until after Seshamma’s death, the document should be construed as a Will, which could be revoked in favour of the respondent through Ex. A-1.
Appellant’s Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that the decisive test is whether the instrument confers an interest in praesenti. Examining both the operative clauses and the property schedule, the Court found:
- Seshamma expressly “delivered” the deed to her daughter and stated that the property “is settled” on her.
- The document created a present transfer of ownership, subject only to Seshamma retaining a life interest; full enjoyment and powers of alienation were deferred until her death.
- Such a structure—divesting the settlor of title while reserving a life estate—is characteristic of a settlement deed, not a Will.
- Once Seshamma had divested herself of ownership in 1958, she possessed no title to bequeath by Will in 1970. Consequently, Ex. A-1 was a nullity.
- The Division Bench erred by overlooking the schedule and failing to consider the deed as a whole; the trial court and the Single Judge had correctly interpreted Ex. B-1.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; decree of the trial court restored; no costs.
As a result, ownership of the disputed properties remains with the estate of the late Vimalavathy (represented by the appellant). The decision reinforces the principle that an instrument transferring present interest, even with a reserved life estate, constitutes a settlement deed and cannot be treated as a revocable Will. The ruling is confined to the parties and does not purport to set a new precedent beyond applying settled law to the facts.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard the counsel on both sides. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated 11-7-1995 of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court made in LPA No. 124 of 1989. The undisputed facts are that Ch. Seshamma had two daughters, namely, Hymavathy and Vimalavathy. She had bequeathed her properties to her daughters by two settlement deeds executed and registered on 1-12-1958. The appellant is the husband of Vimalavathy, who died on 4-5-1970. On 21-8-1970, Seshamma had revoked the settlement deed Ex. B-1 and executed Will Ex. A-1 giving the properties gifted in favour of Vimalavathy to her daughter Hymavathy. Seshamma died on 26-1-1976. Smt Hymavathy filed OS No. 35 of 1973 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Tenali. The trial Judge relying on the evidence of DWs 1-3, had held that Ex. B-1 is a settlement deed and that, therefore, the Will Ex. A-1 is not valid in law. Accordingly, he dismissed the suit. The learned Single Judge by judgment and decree dated 13-12-1988 confirmed the decree of the trial court. The Division Bench, as stated earlier, in the impugned judgment decreed the suit as claimed by Hymavathy. Thus this appeal by special leave.
3. The only question is the interpretation of the deed Ex. B-1. It is true, as rightly contended by Smt K. Amareshwari, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, that the nomenclature of the document is not conclusive. The recitals in the document as a whole and the intention of the executant and acknowledgement thereof by the parties are conclusive. The Court has to find whether the document confers any interest in the property in praesenti so as to take effect intra vivos and whether an irrevocable interest thereby, is created in favour of the recipient under the document, or whether the executant intended to transfer the interest in the property only on the demise of the settlor. Those could be gathered from the recitals in the document as a whole. The settlement deed reads as under:
“I am 78 years' old by now. Since I am suffering from Nanju disease and breathlessness and asthma, I feel that it would be difficult for me to live long. You happened to be my daughter. Out of great love and affection I have for you, I, having felt strong desire got this settlement deed executed in your favour this day, settling the properties mentioned in the schedule hereunder i.e, the property I had purchased on 21-11-1935 from Sharadappa, wife of Damarla Anajaiah and Vejella Veeraiah and others which is my self-acquired property, and the land devolved upon me out of the property of my husband under a decree passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and which has been in my absolute rights and enjoyment, to belong to you after my death to be enjoyed by you with absolute rights. Therefore, taking possession of the schedule land after my death you may enjoy the same freely and happily till the sun and moon endure together with trees, water, stones, treasures and treasure troves with all the rights with absolute powers of disposition by way of gift, mortgage, exchange, sale etc., from your son to grandson and so on by paying the taxes of the municipality, Government etc., from then onwards. I, heirs of my successors shall never raise any dispute against you, your heirs or successors in this behalf. Having assured you and made you to believe that the schedule-mentioned properties have not been alienated and have not been subjected to any attachments of courts, securities etc., and are free from all encumbrances and which are in my absolute right and enjoyment, this deed of settlement is got executed and ‘delivered to you’.”
4. The Division Bench on its reading of the said document has construed it to be a Will. Unfortunately, it did not read the recital in the Schedule to the settlement deed. The boundaries of the properties settled (details of which are not material; hence omitted) through this settlement deed through which the rights were created in his favour.
5. The said recital clearly would indicate that the settlement deed executed on that date is to take effect on that day. She created rights thereunder intended to take effect from that date, the extent of the lands mentioned in the Schedule with the boundaries mentioned thereunder. A combined reading of the recitals in the document and also the Schedule would clearly indicate that on the date when the document was executed she had created right, title and interest in the property in favour of her second daughter but only on her demise she was to acquire absolute right to enjoyment, alienation etc. In other words, she had created in herself a life interest in the property and vested the remainder in favour of her second daughter. It is settled law that the executant while divesting herself of the title to the property could create a life estate for her enjoyment and the property would devolve on the settlee with absolute rights on the settlor's demise. A reading of the documents together with the Schedule would give an indication that she had created right and interest in praesenti in favour of her daughter Vimalavathy in respect of the properties mentioned in the Schedule with a life estate for her enjoyment during her lifetime. Thus, it could be construed rightly as a settlement deed but not as a Will. Having divested herself of the right and title thereunder, she had, thereafter, no right to bequeath the same property in favour of her daughter Hymavathy. The trial court and the learned Single Judge rightly negatived the claim. The Division Bench was not, therefore, correct in law in interfering with the decree of the trial court.
6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree of the trial court stands confirmed. No costs.
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