- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Dr. A. Indira Narayanan v. Government Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a medical practitioner who worked at the Murari Hospital (a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act). In June 1988 the wife of the third respondent, Smt. Indira, was admitted to that hospital in labour. On 17.6.1988 the petitioner applied forceps and the child was delivered at 9:50 p.m.; the child's left eye was then found to be "lying outside." The petitioner dressed the eye and informed the child's mother-in-law; he sought retention of a paediatrician but the child's relations took the child on 18.6.1988 to the Children’s Hospital, Egmore, Madras.
On 13.6.1991 the third respondent sent a notice alleging negligence by the petitioner, stating that the child had been operated at the Children’s Hospital and that after three years the child could not speak or walk; a sum of "rs. L,10,000" was demanded. The petitioner replied on 3.7.1991 denying negligence. The third respondent subsequently filed complaint O.P. No. 50 of 1992 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras, claiming damages for the alleged injury. When summons were issued in that O.P., the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking prohibition of the second respondent (the State Commission) from proceeding with the complaint.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (second respondent) has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint against a medical practitioner/hospital under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — specifically whether services rendered by a doctor fall within the Act's definition of "service."
- Whether "professional service" rendered by a doctor amounts to a "contract of personal service" and is therefore excluded from the definition of "service" in the Act.
- Whether the third respondent qualifies as a "consumer" under the Act for the purpose of filing the complaint.
- Whether the complaint is barred by limitation, given the time lapse between the alleged incident (June 1988) and the notice/complaint (1991/1992).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The third respondent is not a "consumer" as defined by the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
- The complaint (O.P. No. 50 of 1992) was filed more than three years after the alleged negligence, and is therefore time-barred.
- "Professional service" is a "personal service" and is excluded from the purview of the Act; the Act excludes services rendered free of charge or under a contract of personal service.
- The Act does not define "personal service," but its ordinary meaning excludes medical profession; sec.16 does not require appointment of medical experts on the State Commission.
- There is no privity of contract between the petitioner and the third respondent; the third respondent did not directly avail services from the petitioner.
- There was no deficiency in service or negligence by the petitioner; to hold a doctor liable there must be misconduct or negligent nature (relying on the decision cited as S. Mittal v. State of U.P.).
Third Respondent's Arguments
- The State Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint; the definitions of "consumer" and "service" in the Act, read together, bring medical services within the scope of "service."
- In the event of any deficiency in the performance of services rendered by a doctor, the aggrieved party can seek remedies under the Act by filing a complaint before the appropriate consumer forum (relying on M/s. Cosmopolitan Hospital v. Smt. Vasantha P. Nair).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S. Mittal v. State of u. R, I.R. 1989 s. C. 1570: (1989) 3 s. C. C. 112 | Relied on by petitioner’s counsel to contend that to hold a doctor liable there must be misconduct or negligent nature; implied position that medical profession may not fall within the Act's definition of "service." | The court considered the reliance but did not accept the petitioner's overarching contention that medical services are excluded from the Act; the court held that services rendered by a doctor fall within the definition of "service" and therefore the State Commission has jurisdiction. |
| M/s. Cosmopolitan Hospital v. Smt. Vasantha P. Nair, (1992) 1 C.P.R. 820 | Relied on by the third respondent to support the proposition that deficiency in medical services can be adjudicated under the Consumer Protection Act before consumer fora. | The court accepted the view that in the event of deficiency in medical services the aggrieved party can invoke remedies under the Act before the consumer forum; this authority supported the conclusion on jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a textual and purposive construction of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It extracted and considered the definitions of "consumer" (sec. 2(d)) and "service" (clause 2(o) / references in the opinion), and other relevant provisions such as the definition of "deficiency" (sec. 2(g)), the establishment of consumer redressal agencies (sec. 9), the manner of filing a complaint (sec. 12) and the procedure on receipt of a complaint (sec. 13).
Key analytical steps:
- The court noted that "service" is defined as "service of any description which is made available to potential users" and that the Act expressly excludes only services "rendered free of charge" or "under a contract of personal service."
- On a combined reading of the definitions of "consumer" and "service," the court found that the language of the Act is broad and that services rendered by a doctor fall within the expression "service." The court emphasized that the definition uses the phrase "service of any description."
- The court rejected the petitioner's submission that professional medical services are to be treated as a "personal service" excluded from the Act. The court characterized medical services as "professional" and "sophisticated high class professional service" and concluded it would be incorrect to categorise such services as the narrow concept of "personal service" exempted by the statute.
- The court applied principles of statutory construction (citing authorities on construction, including Graies on statute law and a quoted passage from Lord Goddard) to stress that where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its ordinary meaning and effect; thus the plain language of the Act supports including medical services within "service."
- The court therefore concluded that activities of providing medical assistance for payment by hospitals and members of the medical profession fall within the scope of "service" under the Act and that, consequently, in the event of any deficiency in such services, the aggrieved party may seek remedies under the Act before the appropriate consumer forum.
- The court observed procedural facts that no counter-affidavits were filed for respondents 1 and 2, whereas the third respondent filed a detailed counter‑affidavit denying the petitioner's contentions about jurisdiction.
- Finally, the court noted that objections relating to limitation and other factual matters remain open for the petitioner to raise before the consumer forum itself; those matters were not decided in the writ petition context.
Holding and Implications
WRIT PETITION DISMISSED
Holding (core ruling): The court held that the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the third respondent because the services rendered by a medical practitioner/hospital fall within the definition of "service" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986; "professional service" is not to be treated as a "contract of personal service" excluded from the Act.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The writ petition seeking prohibition of the State Commission from proceeding with O.P. No. 50 of 1992 was dismissed; the State Commission may proceed with the complaint.
- The petitioner remains free to raise objections regarding limitation and other factual aspects before the consumer forum; the court did not decide those factual/limitation issues in this writ proceeding.
- No costs were awarded (the court specifically ordered "No costs").
Broader implications: The opinion explicitly interprets the Act to include paid medical/hospital services within the term "service" and authorizes consumer fora to adjudicate alleged deficiencies in such services. The opinion itself does not comment further on setting or not setting a broader precedent beyond its application to the present petition.
The prayer in this writ petition is as follows:
.. To issue a writ at prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ, prohibiting the state consumer disputes redressal commission, madras the second respondent herein from proceeding with the complaint given by the third respondent herein in o. P. No. 50 of 1992 taken on its file and pass.
2. The petitioner, who is a medical practitioner has come before this court with this writ petition, when the second respondent filed o. P. No. 50 of 1992 before the state consumer disputes redressal commission. During june, 1988, it seems that the wife of the third respondent smt. Indira was admitted in the murari hospital with labour pain. The murari hospital , where the petitioner was working was run by a society registered under the tamil nadu societies registration act. Since the wife the third respondent did not deliver till late in the evening (on 17. 6. 1988) , the petitioner thought of applying forceps and the child was delivered at 9. 50 p. M. by use forceps. It was then found out that the child had its left eye lying outside. It seems that the petitioner immediately dressed the eye and informed the third respondent � s mother in law, that subsequently, the petitioner wanted to have the paediatrician retained with the hospital to examine the child, but the third respondent � s relations who arrived on 18. 6. 1988 were in a hurry to take the child to the children � s hospital, egmore, madras, that the third respondent through his counsel sent a notice dated 13. 6. 1991 alleging that the injury to the child was due to the negligence of the petitioner and that the child had been operated at the children � s hospital, egmore, madras and that the child could not speak or walk after three years and as such a sum of rs. L,10,000 was demanded. It is further seen that the petitioner has sent a reply on 3. 7. 1991 to the said notice denying the allegations of negligence and wrong handling, that in view of the above situation, the third respondent had filed a complaint in o. P. No. 50 of 1992 against the petitioner before the state consumer disputes redressal commission, madras, claiming a sum of rs. L,10,000 as damages for the alleged injury caused to his child in murari hospital, at the time of delivery and that when the summons was issued in that o. P. No. 50 of 1992 to the petitioner, the petitioner has come to this court with the aforesaid relief.
3. It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the above writ petition that the third respondent is not the � consumer � as defined by the consumer protection act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the act) , that the said complaint (o. P. No. 50 of 1992) , has been filed more than three years after the date of alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner, that � professional service � is a � personal service � and is exempted from the purview of the act, that the act does not define the words � personal service � , that its meaning has got to be gathered as ordinarily understood, that sec. 16 of the act provides for composition of the state commission, that sec. 16 of the act does not provide for appointment of persons qualified in medicine, or experts in the medical practice, that the services rendered by a medical practitioner are of a personal nature and are excluded from the purview of the act, that therefore the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, that there is no privity of contract between the petitioner and the third respondent, that the third respondent did not avail of any services from the petitioner, that therefore the complaint before the second respondent is not maintainable in law, that the above complaint (o. P. No. 50 of 1992) has been filed after more than 3 1/2 years from the date of the alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner, that there is no deficiency in the service rendered by the petitioner, that the professional work done by the petitioner is not coming within the purview of the definition of � service � under the act and that the medical experts has not been included under sec. 16 of the act for any adjudication by the consumer forum.
4. Though no counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, the third respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit, wherein it is stated that there is no substance in the contention raised by the petitioner that the second respondent commission has no jurisdiction to deal with the disputes.
5. Mr. Krishnappan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner draws my attention to the objects and reasons for passing of the act. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also invites my attention to the definitions of the terms � consumer � and � service � made under scc. 2 (d) and (o) of the act respectively. Under sec. 2 (d) the term � consumer � is defined as follows:
Consumer means any person who -
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the services for consideration paid or promised,or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person;
The term � service � is defined under clause 2 (o) of the act which reads as follows:
(o) service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing supply of electrical or other energy, board of lodging or both, entertainment, amusement or the purveying a news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service.
According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, by no stretch of imagination, the service of a doctor comes under the definition of services � in the act and the medical profession is not included in the service. Relying in the decision reported in a. S. Mittal v. State of u. R, a. I. R. 1989 s. C. 1570: (1989) 3 s. C. C. 112, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that to hold that a doctor is liable for the damages there must be a misconduct of a negligent nature. According to the learned counsel, the profession of doctors will not come under the definition (ie) service rendered by the doctors as per the definition given under sec. 2 (l) (c) of the act and as such the second respondent will have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the third respondent.
6. Mr. V. Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent refers to the various provisions of the act, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent contends that if the definition of the term � consumer � is read together with the definition of the term � service � , it cannot be said that the professional work done by a doctor will not come within the purview of the definition of the term � service � as defined in the act. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent relies upon the decision reported in m/s. Cosmopolitan hospital v. Smt. Vasantha p. Nair, (1992) 1 c. P. R. 820 and contends that in the event of any deficiency in the performance of the services rendered by a doctor, the aggrieved party can invoke the remedies provided under the act by filing a complaint before the consumer forum, having jurisdiction.
7. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both parties. It is relevant to extract sec. 2 of the act which gives the clue to the issue:
The consumer protection bill, 1986 seeks to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for the purpose, to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and for matters connected therewith.
(2) it seeks, inter alia to promote and protect the rights of consumers such as -
(a) the right to be protected against marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property;
(b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices;
(c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to an authority of goods at competitive prices;
(d) the right to be heard and to be assured that consumers � interests will receive due consideration at appropriate forums;
(e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and
(f) right to consumer education.
The term deficiency is defined under sec. 2 (g) of the act which reads as follows:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � deficiency � means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in inequality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service �.
Sec. 9 of the act which provides for the establishment of consumer disputes redressal agencies reads as follows:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � there shall be established for the purposes of this act, the following agencies, viz.
(a) a consumer disputes redressal forum to be known as the � district forum � established by the state government with the prior approval of the central government in each district of the state by notification;
(b) a consumer disputes redressal commission to be known as the state commission established by the state government with the prior approval of the central government in the state by notification; and
(c) a national consumer disputes redressal commission established by the central government by notification. � sec. L2 of the act provides for the manner in which a complaint shall be made.
Sec. 12 of the act reads as follows:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � a complaint, in relation to any goods sold or delivered or any service provided, may be filed with a district forum by
(a) the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or such service provided.
(b) any recognised consumer association, whether the consumer to whom the goods sold or delivered or service provided is a member of such association or not; or
(c) the central or the state government �.
Sec. 13 of the act prescribes the procedure on receipt of a complaint. Sec. 13 of the act reads as follows:
(1) the district forum shall, on receipt of a complaint if it relates to any goods.
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � (a) refer a copy of the complaint to the opposite party mentioned in the complaint directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the district forum;
(b) where the opposite party on receipt of a complaint referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the district forum, the district forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute. �
Sec. 24 of the act refers to the finality of orders. Sec. 24 of the act reads as follows:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � every order of a district forum, state commission or the national commission shall if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this act, be final. �
In my view, a combined reading of sub - clauses (1) and (c) of sec. 2 will clearly show that the definition � service � includes the services rendered by a doctor also. The expression � service � has been defined in sec. 2 (l) (c) of the act as meaning � service of any description �. The only two categories of service exempted from the purview of the act under the said definition are � service rendered free of charge � or under a contract of personal service. If the definition of the term � service � is read with the definition of the term � consumer � which occurs in sec. 2 (l) (c) of the act, (extracted above) , i have no hesitation to hold that the services rendered by a doctor is basically professional service and therefore it will be incorrect to call the sophisticated high class professional service as personal service. Further the meaning of the word � hire � is given in the concise oxford dictionary (new vii edn.) in the following terms:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � employ (person) for wages or fee, procure (from person) , grant (out to person) , temporary use of (thing) , for stipulated payment; borrow (money) girl or man, domestic servant, esp. On farm. �
In the graies on statute law (vii edn.) it is seen if meaning is plain, consequences to be disregarded, constitution according to intention is provided as hereunder:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � the cardinal rule for the construction of acts of parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the act themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. � the tribunal that has to construe an act of a legislature, or indeed any other document, has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. And in order to understand these words it is natural to inquire what is the subject matter with respect to which they are used and the object in view. In 1953 lord goddard, c. J. , said: � a certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing statutes. The object of the act has to be considered:
span style='font - family:"arial unicode ms";mso - fareast - font - family: "times new roman"'> � where the language of an act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature �.
Therefore, the contention of mr. Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent that the second respondent has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint preferred by the third respondent, has to be accepted i do not think that the professional service is a personal service and that the same is exempted from the purview of the act i have no hesitation to hold that the activity of providing medical assistance for payment carried on by hospitals and members of the medical profession falls within the scope of the expression � service � as defined in sec. 2 (l) (c) of the act and that in the event of any deficiency in the performance of such service, the aggrieved party can invoke the remedies provided under the act by filing a complaint before the consumer forum having jurisdiction.
8. In view of the above reasoning, i do not think that a writ of prohibition as sought for the petitioner can be issued in this case. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same shall stand dismissed. However, it is open to the petitioner to raise his objections with regard to the limitation and other factual aspects of the case before the consumer forum. No costs.
Alert