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Kamla Devi v. Balbir Singh
1. Two questions have been referred to the Full Bench for its opinion. These are:
(1)Whether an appeal under clause 12 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a Single Judge, passed by him in first appeal against a decree or order of subordinate court will be competent without the case being declared to be a fit one - for appeal by the Single Judge."
(2) Whether the view taken by this Court in Saiya Jyoti Vs. Maj. K. D. Jyoti, Letters Patent Appeal No : 3 of 1975 decided on 14-3-1979 is correct ?
The facts leading to the reference hive been set out in detail in the order of reference. A. Decree u/s 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was parsed against the appellant by District Judge, Jamma. Appeal taken from it was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge of Ibis Court. The appellant then filed an appeal under Cl, 12 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. An objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that the learned Single Judge not having declared the case to be a fit one for appeal in terms of Cl. 12 the appeal was not maintainable. Reliance was placed upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Satya Jyoti Vs. Maj. R. D. Jyoti, Letters Patent Appeal No. 3 of 1978 decided on 14-3-1979 which prima facie supported the aforesaid objection. The Division Bench, being of the opinion, that no declaration in terms of J2 was necessary where a Single Judge of the High Court had decided first appeal, has posed the aforesaid questions to be answered by a larger bench
2. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent (Jammu and Kashmir which is the subject of all polemics in the case, reads as under: -" 12. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court Judicature from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the excise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court consistently with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by accord subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one fur appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or successor and be heard by Our Board of Judicial Advisors for report to Us, '' 3 . On a careful reading of this clause the following conclusions can be easily drawn :-
(1) Appeal shall lie from every judgment of one Judge of the High Court, or of one Judge of any Division Court, if.
(a) the same is not pasted by him in appeal against a decree or order of a Court subject to superintendence of the High Court, passed by it in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction : and
(b) the same is not passed in the civil original jurisdiction of the High Court.
(2) An appeal shall also lie from a judgment at one judge of the High Court, or of one judge of any Division Court, passed by him in appeal against a decree or order of a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court passed by it in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, provided the Judge declares that the case is a fit one for a further appeal to a larger bench, but not otherwise.
(3) No appeal shall lie against any sentence passed by a Judge of the High Court, or by a Judge of a Division Court, nor shall an appeal lie against an order passed by him in exercise of the powers of superintendence of the High Court. It is not necessary to state herein the fourth conclusion in regard to appeals to the Board of Judicial Advisors, as the Board has since ceased to exist. It is thus manifest that under Ci. 12 a party can, as of a right go in appeal against a judgment of a Single Judge, where the same has been passed by him while hearing an appeal from a decree or order passed by a lower court in its original jurisdiction, unless a second appeal against such a decree or order is specifically barred under any other law (Union of India Vs. Mohindera Supply Co. AIR 1962 SC 256), No declaration, by the Single Judge that the case is a fill one for further appeal is required in such case. It would be required only where the Single Judge has passed a judgment while hearing an appeal from an appellate decree or order of a lower court. In other words, such a declaration would be a sine qua non for an appeal under Cl. 12 only where the Single Judge has decided a second appeal. As a corollary, it would also follow, that in no ease shall an appeal lie under Cl. 12, where a Single Judge has decided a first appeal from a judgment or order, not passed as a Court, by an officer or tribunal under the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The clause speaks of decrees or orders passed by Court alone, which are subject to the superintendence of the High Court and of no others.
4 Apart from the plain language of Cl. 12, there is ample authority for the proposition that no declaration under Ci. 12 ii needed when an appeal is to be preferred against a judgment passed by n Single Judge of the High Court while hearing a first appeal. In Lapli Parshad Vs. Karnal Distillery Co, AIR 1963 SC 1279 their Lordship while interpreting Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent t Punjab) which is almost a facsimile of Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent (Jammu and Kashmir), held as under :-
"Clause 10 of the Patent of the Lahore High (which continues to apply to the Punjab High Court provides, in so far as it is material and we do further ordain that aft appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature from the judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree of order-made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court; abject to the superintendence of the said High Court and that notwithstanding anything herein before provided au appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of OB Judge of the said High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal,
Manifestly the clause confers an unqualified right of appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a single Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction. Similarly there is a right of appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge hearing a civil appeal where the judgment is not in an appeal from an appellate decree. But against the judgment of a single Judge exercising powers in appeal from an appellate decree, an appeal under the Letters Patent only lies if the Judge declares that the case is a fit one for appeal and not otherwise.
Some other authorities laying down the same rules are Ramji Singh Vs Mst. Chhulghhana Kuer, AIR 1958 Patna 655 (Full Bench) Smt. Dassi Vs Dhani Ram, AIR 1969 Punjab & Haryana 25, Ambujani Vs: T. S. Remaswamy AIR 1973 Delhi 46. Not a single decision taking a contrary view was cited before us. 5. An argument was, however, made that in view of the provisions of Sec. 60 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution Act, 1996, hereinafter the Constitution Act. dealing with appeals, which have been specifically saved u/s 102 of the Constitution, an appeal from an appellate decree of a single Judge who passed the decree declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but not otherwise, no matter whether the decree against which an appeal is to be filed, has a been passed by the Single Judge on first or on second appeal. Section 60 reads as under -
"60. Procedure in appeals. (I) Except as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force and subject to any rules made in this behalf, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature may be exercised by a single Judge of the Court or by a bench of two or more Judges of the Court. (2.) Except as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force an appeal from any original decree or from any order against which an appeal is permitted by any law for the time being in force passed or made by a single Judge of the High Court shall lie to a bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court.
(3.) Unless such an appeal is prohibited by any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal from an appellate decree made by a Single Judge of the High Court shall lie to a bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court, where the Judge who passed the decree declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.
Taken all by itself, this section no doubt supports]the contention that in all cases where an appeal ii to be taken from an appellate decree of a single Judge his declaration that the case is a fit one for appeal, would be a condition precedent for its maintainability This is what unmistakably flows form sub-see. f3) This section has however, to be read along with some other provisions in order to arrive at a right conclusion. The first to be noticed is section 102 of the constitution which reads :-
"102. Saving of existing jurisdiction of the High Court :- Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the jurisdiction of and the law administered la the High Court and the respective power of the Judges thereof justice in the relation to the administration of Justice in Court, including any power to make rules if the Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof, sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution "
It starts with the expression" subject to the provisions of this Constitution and the provisions of any law for the time being in force . . . ''Obviously therefore, provisions of section 60 would apply, unless there is anything to the contrary, contained either in the Constitution itself, or in any other law for the time being in force. Existing law in Cl. (b) of Section 2. of the Constitution has been defined to mean. "any law Ordinance, order, by-law, rule, notification or regulation passed, made or issued before the commencement of this Constitution by the Legislature or other competent authority or person having power to pass, makes or issue such law Ordinance, Order, bye-law, rule, notification or regulation'1 . All such laws, subject to its other provisions, have been saved by the Constitution, , u/s 157. Admitedly, there is nothing in the Constitution contray to sub-section (3) of section 60 of the Constitution Act. The question which, therefore, falls for determination is as to whether or not there is anything to the contrary contained in any other existing law. At this stage, the other provision to be noticed is Sec, 5 of the Constitution Act, This section reads as under:
" 5. Notwithstanding anything contained in this or any other Act, all powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in relation to the State and its government are hereby declared to be and to have always been inherent in and possessed and retained by His Highness and nothing cotanained in this or any other Act, shall affect or be deemed to have affected the right and prerogative of His Highness to Make laws and issue proclamations orders and ordinances by virtue of his inherant authority. the section, before its repeal by the J & k constitution (amendment) act (No: XVIII, 2008, re-affirmed the existence of the plenary power of His Highness to make law. or to issue orders, executive or judicial, in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which were deemed to be inherent in him by virtue of his being the Rujer of the State. This section on its plain terms, had ove-riding effect not only over the other laws, but also over the other provisions of the constitution act itself This is distinctly borne out from its opening words "Not with standing anything contained in this or any other Act.........". The truism that His Highness was the fountain head of all the legislative and executive powers in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, has been acknowledged in judicial decisions as well, la Anehal Singh, Vs. Government, AIR 1951 Jammu and Kashmir 1, the Court while interpreting Sec. 3 of Regulation il) (i) of 1991, which is substantially the sams as Sec. 5 of the Constitution Act, observed as follows ;
"At the outset it is necessary to, determine the question whether the service of the applt. was at the pleasure of His Highness personally or was it at the pleasure of His Highness Govt. His Highness is undoubtedly the source of all legislative, executive and Governmental authority in the State. In legal theory, he personifies the State and constitutes its Govt."
To the same effect are the observations made in a Bench decision of this Court reported as State of J & K. Vt. O. S. Broca. A. R. 1978 J & K 64.
7. The Constitution Act came into force on September 1, 1939. i) he Letters Patent were granted in favour of the High Court of jammu & Kashmir, by the His Highness on August 28. 1943 i.e. nearly 4 years there after. Ci. 12. of the Letters Patent brought two significant changes in Section 60 of the Constitution Act, in that, it enlarged the right of appeal in two ways, In the first place it extended the right not only t» decrees passed by him; but also to all judgments passed by a Single Judge, which under sub-section (3) of section 60 was restricted to decrees only.
What effect, if at all it had on sub-section (2), it is not necessary to discuss herein, as sub-section (2), deals with decrees and orders passed by a Single Judge on original side with which we arc not presently concerned. It is only pertinent to point out that the expression 'judgment" occurring in Cl. 12 is of much wider amplitude as compared td the expression "decree" Almost all the High Courts in the country have accepted the well known meaning assigned to the expression "Judgment" by the High Court of Calcutta Vs. Oriented Gas Co, (1872 8 Beng. L. R. 433 ), according to which, "judgment" ''means" a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory the difference between them being, that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." Ah order holding a document inadmissible in evidence, or rejecting the prayer of a person to be brought on record as legal representative of a party dying during the pendency of an appeal for example, is no doubt a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 12, even though such an order is not a decree. On the other hand, every order dismissing an appeal on merits it a judgment within the meaning of the said clause. Viewed thus, every decree is a Judgment, though every judgment may not be a decree. Pari rationes, no order passed by a Judge of the High Court in his criminal appellate or revisional jurisdiction, is appeasable under Cl. 12, because It is not a judgment deciding any right or liability within the meaning of this clause (Muniiwami Vs. Rajaratanam AIR 1922 Mad. 495). The other change which clause 12 brought in sub-section (3) was that an appeal against a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court could be held as of right, when the same was passed by him in an appeal against a decree or order of a Court subordinate to the High Court passed by it in its original jurisdiction, which under sub-section (3) could not be filed without his leave. To this extent therefore, provisions of Cl, 12 are contrary to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 60 within the meaning of section 102 of the constitution. There can be no manner of doubt that the Letters Patent Jammu & Kashmir) are law for the time being in force" within the meaning of Section 102' for they clearly fall within the definition of the expression "existing law" given in CI, (b) of Sec. 2 of the Constitution on and have been saved under Section 157. My answer to the question No. i : would be, therefore, in the affirmative.
The order passed in Satya Jyoti'i case (supra) is no doubt brief and does not deal exhaustively with the point at issue, It merely says :
"We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel has not been able to convince us that right of appeal is available to him under Letters Patent. Nor cm invokes section 96 of c p c. to his ad as that section cannot be said to be applicable to the said case. There is nothing in the High Court rules which could indicate that any right of appeal is available to the applicant in the present case. The appeal is dismissed in limine."
If this order is interpreted to lay down the rule, that even in a case which a single Judge of Chi High court has decided on first appeal, a declaration by him that the case would be a condition precedent for the maintainability of an appeal under Cl. 12, then with due respects to the learned Judges who constituted the Bench, the law Laid dawn in this aforesaid judgment, in my opinnion, does not appear to be correct and my answer to the second question, in the premises, will be in the negative. Since the present appeal is clearly maintainable, the record of the case will be sent back to the Division Bench for its decision on other points.
Sd/-
1, K. Kotwal. J.
Per Dr. Anand 3 :
9. I have gone through the lucid judgment prepared by my learned brother Kotwal J. I entirely agree with the law expressed by his Lordship that no declaration under clause 12 of the Letters Patent is needed where an appeal is to be preferred against a judgment passed by a single judge of the High Court, in a first appeal from a decree or order and (hat the judgment in Satya Jyoti's case does not lay down the correct law. Support for these views is also available from the High court rules, 1975. rule 47 reads thus.
"An appeal under the Letters patent from the judgment of a Judge sitting alone passed in a cause, not being an appeal from an appellate decree or order, shall be posted before a bench of two judges for preliminary hearing" Rule 49 reads thus :
"An application for a certificate under clause 12 of the Letters Statement in the case of the judgment of a Single Judge deciding a second appeal shall be made orally before him immediately after the judgment is deliveries. No subsequent application for the purpose shall be entertained unless for special reason shown by an application supported by an affidavit the judge is satisfied that circumstance existed rendering the immed-ate application impossible".
From a plain reading of Rule 49 (Supra), it is obvious that a declaration by a Single Judge to the affect that the case is a fit one for further appeal is required only where the Single Jude has passed a judgment in a second appeal i.e. while hearing an appeal from an appellate decree or order of a subordinate court.
10 Rule 47 provides that when an appeal is preferred under the Letters Patent, from a judgment of a single judge passed in a c use. other than an appeal from an [appellate decree or order, no declaration of fitness is required from the single judge. However such appeal has to be posted, before the Bench of judges for preliminary hearing. The expression "in a cause" In Rule 47 would also include a first appeal heard by a single judge of the court.
Thus, the answer to the first question referred to the full Bench for its opinion would be in the affirmative while the answer to the second question be in the negative.
Sd/-
Dr. A. S, Anand, J.
Per Acting C. J.
The facts have been stated in detail in the judgment proposed to be delivered by Kotwal J. I need not repeat them. The point that really arises for determination is whether an appeal lies to the High Court from the judgment of a single judge bearing a civil appeal in respect of a decree or order of a subordinate court without the case being declared to bea fit for appeal by such judge. The presently existing jurisdiction of the High Court is regulated by section 102 of the constitution of jammu and Kashmir, (shortly the 'State Constitution') Section 102 reads, :
"Saving of existing Jurisdiction of the High Court. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the jurisdiction of the law administered in the High Court and the respective powers of the Judges there of in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sitting of the Courtraen and of members there-of sitting alone or in Division Courts shall be the same as immediately b fore commencement of this Constitution.
12, This section saves the jurisdiction conferred on this court by the jammu and kashmir constitution act of 1996 which was in force immediately before the commencement of the State constitution. Act, 1996 (short) the M996 Act') provided as under :
"(I) Except as other vise provided by any enactment for the time being in force and subject to any rules made this behalf the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature may be exercised by a single Judge of the Court or by a bench of two or more Judges of the Court.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by any enactment for time being in force, an appeal from any original decree or from any order against which an appeal permitted by any law for the time being in force passed or made by a single judge of the High Court shall lie to a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court.
(3) Unless such an appeal is prohibited by any enactment for the time being in force- an appeal from an appellate decree made by a single Judge of the High Court shall lie to a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court where the judge who passed the decree declares that the case it a fit one for appeal."
13. On a plain reading of this section it follows that unless such an appeal is barred by any law for the time being in force, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench from the judgment of a single Judge hearing a civil appeal in respect of a decree or order of a subordinate court if the judgment amounts to a decree and the judge who has passed the judgment declares that the case it fit one for appeal. Needless to add that the word 'decree' has been defined to section 2 (2) of the code of civil procedure and it is in sense that this word has been used here.
14. The 1996 Act came into force on 2nd of September, 1939. Thereafter, on 28-8-1943, the then ruler granted Letters Patent to the High Court. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent reads :
''And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of power of superintendence of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, consistently with the pro visions of the Civil Procedure Code, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares the case is a fit one for appeal but that the right of appeal from other judgments of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us Our Heris or successors arid be heard by our Board of Judicial Advisors for report to us."
15. This clause undoubtedly confers an unqualified right of appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a single Judge hearing a civil appeal in respect of a decree or order of a Subordinate court. Accordingly, in the matter of appeal from the judgment of a single Judges hearing a civil appeal in respect of a decree or order of a Subordinate Court, the provisions of Letters Patent are directly in conflict with the provisions of section 60 of the 1996 act. The question is: which of the two provisions should prevail in the matter?
16. It has been contended that the then rulex possessed plenary powers of legislation in respect of the State and the powers were so wide in amplitude that be could make a provision contrary to the provisions of 1996 act and that clause 12 was one of such provision. For this, reliance has been placed upon section 5 of the '996 act. section 5 reads ;
"5. Not with standing anything contained in the or any other Act, all powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in relation to the State and its government are hereby declared to be and to have always been inherent in and possessed and retained by His Highness and nothing contained in this or any other Act, shall affect or be deemed to have affected the right and prerogative of His Highness to make laws and issue proclamations, orders and ordinances by virtue of his inherent authority''
17. There can be hardly any doubt that this section saved the inherent powers of the then ruler as a source of legislative, executive and governmental authority in the State. His powers of legislation were wide enough to enable him to make provisions contrary to 1996 Act. The provisions so made could take effect over the provisions of 1996 Act. But it does not mean that by an executive enactment the then ruler could amend or override the provisions of 199j Act. The question that necessarily arises is whether the Letters Patent is an executive enactment ? It the answer DC that it is a legislative enactment, then, there can be no doubt that the provisions of clause ' 2 would override t & e provisions of section 60 of the 1996 act. On the other hand, if it is held that the Letters Patent is an executive enactment, then, the provisions of section 12 shall have to be read subject to the provisions of section 60 of 1996 Act.
.18. In Venkatarmaiya's Law Lexicon (2nd Edition) the meaning of Letters Patent is given as "Letters by which the king makes his grants, whether of lands, honors, franchises or anything else" In wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edition) it is given as "Writings of the sovereign, sealed with the Great Seal of England whereby a person or public company is enabled to do acts or enjoy privileges Accordingly.
ORDER OF THE COURT
20. In accordance with the judgment of the majority, question No. 1 is replied in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative,
Sd/-Mufti Baha-ud-Oin Farooqi.
Acting C. J
Jaintu ; Sd/- Dr. A. S. Anand, J.
November It, 1980 Sc/- I. K. Kotwal. J.
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