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Prakash Chand Sharma v. Vimlesh (Smt) .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife married on 24 February 1978. After cohabiting for roughly fifteen months, marital discord led to their separation. In 1981 the husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act on three grounds: (1) desertion, (2) cruelty and (3) unsoundness of mind.
The trial court granted a decree of divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty while rejecting unsoundness of mind. On appeal, the first appellate court affirmed the decree, but solely on the ground of cruelty. The wife filed a second appeal, and the High Court reversed the decree, holding that cruelty was not proved. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment.
Pending the litigation, the husband remarried on 21 November 1988—after the first appellate decree but while the wife’s second appeal was pending—and a child was born of the second marriage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the wife’s conduct amounted to “cruelty” within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act so as to justify a decree of divorce.
- Whether, despite the absence of proven cruelty, the marriage could be dissolved on the theory of irretrievable breakdown in light of the husband’s subsequent remarriage and the existence of a child.
- Whether the husband, having contracted a second marriage while the second appeal was pending, could claim any equitable relief in view of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The marriage has become irretrievably broken down; the parties have effectively separated and cannot be reconciled.
- The husband has remarried and has a child from the second marriage; therefore, maintaining the first marriage would serve no purpose and the Court should grant a divorce to regularise the existing situation.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court independently reviewed the factual findings of all three lower courts, paying particular attention to two letters relied upon by the trial and first appellate courts. Those letters—one written by the wife to her uncle after initiation of divorce proceedings and the other, undated, addressed to the husband—expressed the wife’s remorse, desire for reconciliation, and self-blame for the marital discord.
The High Court had held, and the present Court agreed, that the letters did not corroborate the husband’s allegation that the wife denied him marital relations. Instead, their tenor suggested that she desired settlement and lamented the separation. The Court accepted the High Court’s assessment that an Indian wife’s tendency to blame herself cannot, without more, be treated as evidence of cruelty.
Regarding irretrievable breakdown, the Court declined to dissolve the marriage merely because the husband had remarried. Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act permits remarriage only after the time for appealing a divorce decree has expired or any appeal has been dismissed. Here, the wife’s second appeal was pending, albeit filed three days late but nevertheless admitted. Consequently, the husband’s second marriage was in disregard of Section 15, and he could not profit from his own wrong.
The Court also noted its unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation: the wife expressed willingness to resume cohabitation notwithstanding the husband’s second marriage, but the husband refused.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The interim order dated 20 August 1992 stands vacated. The appellant must pay costs of Rs 3,000 and clear any arrears of maintenance within two months. All interlocutory applications and the contempt petition are disposed of.
Implications: The decision reinstates the High Court’s refusal to dissolve the marriage, underscores strict adherence to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and signals that a party who violates that provision cannot invoke the doctrine of irretrievable breakdown to secure a divorce. No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing statutory provisions.
Order
1. The appellant is the husband. He married the respondent on 24-2-1978. For about 15 months they lived together and thereafter differences arose necessitating a separation. The husband then filed a divorce petition in 1981 seeking dissolution of the marriage on three counts, namely (1) desertion, (2) cruelty and (3) unsoundness of mind. The trial court granted decree for divorce on the first two counts rejecting the third count. The First Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decree on the first count only, namely, cruelty, rejecting the second count of desertion. In second appeal the High Court reversed the decree holding that the husband had failed to prove cruelty. It is against this order of the High Court that the present appeal is preferred.
2. We may also mention that after the First Appellate Court affirmed the decree of divorce on 29-8-1988 and after the second appeal was preferred by the wife, the husband married again on 21-11-1988 and has a child through this marriage. This is a feature which was highlighted before us in the course of the hearing.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the line of reasoning adopted by the courts below in reaching the conclusion one way or the other. We have seen the emphasis of the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court while upholding the contention that the wife was guilty of cruelty towards her husband. We find that the First Appellate Court besides relying on the statement of the husband that the wife did not permit him to cohabit and have sexual relationship, a fact which is denied by the wife in her deposition, placed reliance on two letters 101-A and 102-A, both written by the wife, one to the husband and the other to her uncle. In the letter of 1-8-1981 written to her uncle after the institution of the divorce proceedings, she has poured out her agony and has implored her uncle to visit her immediately to settle the dispute with the husband. She says that her condition is very pathetic as everyone is sick of her and she feels she has made her husband miserable. The second letter is undated and is addressed to her husband. She laments the separation and shows her disappointment at not having heard from him. She speaks of her faith in religion and tries to blame herself for the unhappiness in the family. From these two letters the First Appellate Court concluded that the allegation of the husband that she did not permit sexual relationship was established and that constituted mental cruelty. The High Court, however, reproduced both the letters and after evaluating the evidence of the contesting parties came to the conclusion that it was not possible to hold from these two letters that they corroborated the version of the husband. The High Court was of the view that the tenor of the two letters indicated that the wife left the marital home because of the atmosphere prevailing there at the relevant point of time which made it impossible for her to live there. If she had left on her own she would not have lamented the separation nor would she have desired a settlement. Emphasis was laid on the fact that she tried to blame herself but it is typical of an Indian wife to take the blame on herself. That does not mean that the factual situation was as alleged by the husband. The High Court, therefore, was right in the evaluation of the evidence. The High Court was justified in taking the view that it was wholly unwarranted to reach a conclusion that the wife was guilty of causing mental cruelty, on such skeleton material. We, therefore, do not see any merit in this appeal.
4. However, Mr Pramod Swarup, the learned counsel for the appellant-husband, vehemently submitted that having regard to the fact that both the parties have drifted from married life the marriage must be taken as irretrievably broken, more so because the husband has remarried and has a child through the second marriage and, therefore, this Court should grant a divorce. We do not think that in the facts and circumstances of the case such a view can be taken. From the very beginning the wife has been saying that she is ready and willing to live with the husband. It is the husband who is denying her access. If the husband remarried in hot haste after the institution of the second appeal which was delayed by only three days, we cannot see how that fact can come to his rescue. That is clearly opposed to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act which in terms states that when a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce and there is no right of appeal against the decree or where there is such a right, the time for filing an appeal has expired or an appeal has been presented and has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to remarry. In the instant case no doubt the second appeal was delayed by three days but the fact is that it was instituted and was pending on the date of the second marriage. Therefore, the husband acted in disregard of Section 15 and cannot get the benefit of his own wrong.
5. Before we part, we may state that we made an endeavour to bring about a settlement between the parties. The wife expressed her willingness to go and live with the husband notwithstanding the presence of the other woman but the husband was not in a position to agree presumably because he has changed his position by remarriage. Be that as it may, a reconciliation was not possible.
6. For the above reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. The interim order passed on 20-8-1992 will stand vacated from today. The appellant will pay the cost of this appeal quantified at Rs 3000 and arrears of maintenance till today, if not paid, will be paid within two months. The IAs and contempt petition also stand disposed of.
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