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Gundlapalli Mohan Rao And Other v. Gundlapalli Satyanarayana And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jul 30, 1970
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from multiple appeals and cross-objections originating from O.S. No. 26 of 1956 (and related suits). The principal parties are the plaintiff and three defendants: the 1st defendant (father of the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3), the 2nd defendant (a son supporting the plaintiff's case), and the 3rd defendant (a daughter claiming the whole suit properties). The decree of the trial court partitioned certain schedule properties (A and B schedules) into six parts, awarding 1/6th each to the plaintiff and defendants 1 & 2 and 3/6th to the 3rd defendant, with certain adjustments for previously sold items.

Appeals include: Appeal No. 430 of 1965 (by the 1st defendant), Appeal No. 188 of 1967 (by the plaintiff against parts of the same decree), Transferred Appeal No. 254 of 1966 (by legal representatives of the 1st defendant), and cross-objections by the 3rd defendant. The Court examines the sufficiency of any ancestral nucleus, whether particular acquisitions were joint-family acquisitions or self-acquired, and whether later conduct impressed any self-acquired property with the character of coparcenary (joint family) property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a sufficient ancestral nucleus that could have formed the basis for acquisition of the properties shown in the A and B Schedules attached to the plaint in O.S. No. 26 of 1956.
  2. If there was a sufficient ancestral nucleus, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in the suit-schedule properties as claimed by him.
  3. Whether, even if there was no sufficient ancestral nucleus, the 1st defendant, by his conduct and actions, impressed the suit properties with the character of joint family (coparcenary) properties so as to entitle the plaintiff to a share.
  4. An incidental question: whether any of the suit properties represent accretions to the estate of the late Voleti Chenchuramaiah (devolved under a will on the 1st defendant's wife) and therefore belong to the 3rd defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

1st Defendant's Arguments (as presented by his legal representatives)

  • No evidence that any ancestral nucleus existed that could have been the basis for acquiring the rice mill (item 1 of B Schedule) or the other schedule properties.
  • The 1st defendant treated the suit properties throughout his life as his separate, self-acquired properties and never threw them into common stock as joint family property.
  • No evidence that, while managing his wife's estate, he used income from that estate to acquire the rice mill or other suit properties.
  • The lower court erred in granting any share to the plaintiff or other defendants on these grounds.

Plaintiff's Arguments (as advanced by his counsel)

  • There was an ancestral nucleus at partition circa 1903 (tracing back to a partition leaving 4,600 varahas in 1892) which the 1st defendant invested into businesses (provision shop, rice and cashewnut trade, partnership in a rice mill), and from whose income the suit properties were acquired.
  • Income-tax returns and assessment orders (Ex. A-8 and Ex. B-89 for 1949–50 and 1950–51) show the 1st defendant assessed as a Hindu undivided family (HUF), indicating he had treated the properties as joint-family assets and is estopped from denying their coparcenary character.

3rd Defendant's Arguments

  • The entire suit properties were acquired from the income of the estate of the 3rd defendant's mother (devolved under Ex. B-141 dated 29-2-1912) which the 1st defendant managed, and therefore those properties belong to the 3rd defendant.
  • The management of the mother's estate by the 1st defendant extended not only until her majority in 1915 but continued until her death in 1948.

2nd Defendant

  • Supported the plaintiff's case and sought partition on the basis he is entitled to a one-third share in the entire suit properties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kankarathanammal v. Loganatha (A.I.R 1965 S.C. 271 at 274) Property belonging exclusively to a female member will often be managed by the family manager; management alone does not affect the ownership of that female's property. Used to reject the argument that the 1st defendant's management of his wife's estate necessarily converted that estate into the 1st defendant's property or that management alone proves appropriation of income for acquisitions.
Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayana All (as cited via Subba Rao, J.) Statements made by persons (e.g., in returns) may be made to serve a purpose or out of ignorance; relation with estates should be considered rather than isolated statements. Referred to when assessing the probative value of the 1st defendant's statements in income-tax returns; Court considered whether such statements were made honestly or for other reasons.
Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand (Privy Council) When a business is assessed to income-tax as joint-family and no satisfactory explanation is offered by the owner, the assessment tends to support the claim that it was a joint-family business. The Court invoked this reasoning to amplify the weight of the repeated income-tax returns showing HUF status and the absence of explanation by the 1st defendant.
Subramania Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1955 2 M.L.J. 405) No formalities are necessary to impress self-acquired property with the character of joint-family property; intention is decisive and may be inferred from unambiguous declarations. Applied to conclude that the 1st defendant's unambiguous declarations (in returns) could evidence a deliberate intention to treat the property as joint-family property.
G. Narayana Raju v. Chamaraju (A.I.R 1969 S.C. 1276) Self-acquired property can become joint property if voluntarily thrown into the joint stock with intention to abandon separate rights; whether this happened is a question of fact. Cited as authority for the principle that the 1st defendant's volitional act (declaration) could have the legal effect of converting the rice mill into joint-family property.
Decision of Hegde, J. in Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1968 (5.5.70) Self-acquired property becomes joint-family property when the owner, by exercise of volition, impresses it with that character. Used to reinforce the Court's conclusion about the legal effect of the 1st defendant's declarations and conduct.
Mallesappa v. Mallappa (Supreme Court decision referenced) When a manager claims an immovable was purchased with his separate funds (not joint-family funds), it is for him to prove clearly and satisfactorily that the purchase money came from his separate funds. Applied to hold that the 1st defendant bore the burden to prove item 1 of the A Schedule was bought from non-joint (separate) funds; failure to discharge that burden led the Court to treat item 1 A as purchased from rice mill income (now joint).
Madan Lal v. Controller of Estate Duty (Rajasthan High Court) A taxpayer's statement of joint-family property made for income-tax advantage may not be evidence of unequivocal intention to waive separate rights. Relied upon by 1st defendant's counsel; Court considered but distinguished it on facts, concluding the 1st defendant offered no explanation and repeatedly declared HUF status.
Govind Narain Mathur v. Smt. Mohini Devi (Rajasthan High Court, cited in Madan Lal) Statements to tax authorities may be made for advantage and not reflect true intention to abandon separate rights. Referenced as part of the line of authority that declarations to tax authorities are not always decisive; Court nonetheless found the factual matrix here supported an affirmative inference of intention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing the main issues in sequence:

  1. Ancestral nucleus: The Court examined partitions in the family (pre-1892 partition leaving 4,600 varahas; further partition in 1903) and documentary evidence that the small ancestral properties were sold by 2-11-1908 (Exs. B-145 and B-146) to discharge family debts. There was no evidence that any ancestral funds remained available in 1914 when the rice mill (item 1 of B Schedule) was acquired. The Court therefore concluded there was no sufficient ancestral nucleus to found the acquisition of the rice mill.
  2. Acquisition from wife's estate: The Court evaluated whether income from the estate bequeathed to the 1st defendant's wife (Ex. B-141 dated 29-2-1912) funded the purchases. It noted: - The 1st defendant managed that estate until the wife's majority in 1915; beyond that date the 1st defendant asserted he handed over management and did not use its income. - The 3rd defendant did not give evidence herself and relied on pleadings and the plaintiff's testimony (the plaintiff was born in 1919 and lacked personal knowledge of management in 1914). - Documentary and cross-examination evidence supported the 1st defendant's account that he borrowed (Rs. 9,800 plus assumed liabilities) to purchase the rice mill for Rs. 14,400 and there was no contradictory evidence. The Court therefore found no satisfactory evidence that the wife's estate income funded the rice mill purchase.
  3. Whether self-acquired property was impressed into joint stock: The Court then considered if, at any later date, the 1st defendant by declaration or conduct had impressed the rice mill and any subsequent acquisitions with joint-family character. It focused on two income-tax assessment orders (Exs. A-8 and B-89 for 1949–50 and 1950–51) in which the 1st defendant filed as a Hindu undivided family with two major sons. The Court noted: - The repeated HUF declarations were not isolated: the 1st defendant filed income-tax returns from 1924 onwards and declared HUF status in at least two later assessment years. - The 1st defendant offered no credible explanation for those declarations when confronted; he did not claim ignorance or that the declarations were made for tax advantage. - Authorities (Pearey Lal, Subramania Iyer, G. Narayana Raju and others) establish that a voluntary and unequivocal declaration or conduct may evidence intention to abandon separate rights and impress a self-acquired property with joint-family character. - On the facts, the Court concluded that the 1st defendant, by his declarations and conduct, abandoned his separate rights in the rice mill (item 1 of B Schedule) and impressed it with the character of coparcenary (joint family) property.
  4. Consequences for other items: The Court held that item 1 of A Schedule (purchased in 1953) could fairly be presumed to have been acquired partly from income of the rice mill (which by then had become joint). Applying Mallesappa v. Mallappa, the Court noted the onus lay upon the 1st defendant to show item 1 A was bought from separate funds; he failed to discharge that burden. Therefore item 1 A was held to be joint family property. Other schedule items acquired prior to the tax-year declarations remained self-acquired; there was no evidence that the 1st defendant had abandoned his rights in them.
  5. Alienations: The Court set aside the plaintiff's alienation of item 12 of the B schedule to the 8th defendant (Ex. B-6 dated 17-10-1961) because that item remained self-acquired and was not part of the joint family property. The alienation by the 1st defendant under Ex. B-143 (15-2-1956) of part of item 1 A will be treated as affecting the 1st defendant's own share (i.e., the portion sold will be allotted to his share).
  6. Relief granted: The Court modified the trial decree — limiting partition to item 1 of the A schedule and item 1 of the B schedule into three equal shares (plaintiff, 1st defendant, and 2nd defendant each entitled to 1/3); set aside the trial court's 3/6th allotment to the 3rd defendant; allowed appeals in part or to the extent indicated; dismissed cross-objections seeking broader relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court modified the decree of the lower court and held that only item 1 of the A Schedule (purchased 1953) and item 1 of the B Schedule (the rice mill) are joint-family properties, each to be partitioned into three equal shares (1/3 each to the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant).

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The trial court's finding that multiple schedule items were joint-family property and the allotment of 3/6th to the 3rd defendant was set aside; cross-objections by the 3rd defendant were dismissed.
  • Item 1 of the B Schedule (rice mill) was held to have been impressed with the character of joint-family property by the 1st defendant's declarations and conduct; the income from that mill was held to have enabled the purchase of item 1 of the A Schedule, which therefore also became joint-family property.
  • Other schedule items acquired prior to the tax-year declarations remain self-acquired by the 1st defendant; they were not impressed into the joint stock by his subsequent conduct.
  • The plaintiff's alienation of item 12 B to the 8th defendant was set aside because that item was not joint-family property; similarly, part alienations out of item 1 A by the 1st defendant will be adjusted against his share.
  • Appeals: Appeal No. 430 of 1965 (1st defendant) was allowed to the limited extent stated; Appeal No. 188 of 1967 (plaintiff) was allowed in part; Transferred Appeal No. 254 of 1966 was allowed and the impugned alienation set aside.
  • No broader precedent beyond application of the cited authorities was announced; the Court repeatedly emphasized the fact-sensitive nature of when a self-acquired property becomes joint-family property and relied on established principles (intention, conduct, and burden of proof) in reaching its conclusion.
  • Costs: The parties were directed to bear their own costs. Court-fee due to Government was ordered to be paid by the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant, and the legal representatives of the 1st defendant in proportion to the shares decreed by the Court.
Show all summary ...

Obul Reddi, J.:— The 1st defendant has preferred appeal No. 430 of 1965 against the judgment and decree in O.S 26 of 1956 and the plaintiff has preferred Appeal 188 of 67 against the same decree to the extent his claim has been disallowed by the trial court. Tr. Appeal No. 254 of 1966 is preferred by the legal representatives of the 1st defendant in O.S No. 26 of 1956, who happened to be the plaintiff in O.S No. 111 of 1962. The 3rd defendant has preferred cross objections in Appeal Nos. 430 of 1965 and 182 of 1967 arising out of O.S No. 26 of 1956.

2. The main questions to be answered in these appeals are (1) whether there was sufficient ancestral nucleus which formed the basis for the acquisition of the properties shown in A to D Schedules attached to the plaint in O.S No. 26 of 1956; (2) if there was sufficient ancestral nucleus whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in the suit schedule properties as claimed by him; and (3) whether, even if there was no sufficient ancestral nucleus which could have formed the basis for the acquisition of the properties shown in A to D schedules, the 1st defendant, by his conduct and action, impressed the suit properties with the character of joint family properties so as to entitle the plaintiff to a share in the suit properties. Another question that arises incidentally is whether all or any of the suit properties represent the accretions to the estate of late Voleti Chenchuramaiah, which devolved, under a will, on the wife of the 1st defendant and the mother of the 3rd defendant, who has now laid claims to all the suit properties.

3. The facts necessary for the disposal of the questions involved are these: The 1st defendant is the father of the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3. The 3rd defendant is the sister of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. It is the case of the plaintiff that there was sufficient ancestral nuclcus at the time of the partition of the properties between his father, the 1st defendant and his brothers in or about the year 1903 and that, with that nucleus, he opened a provision shop, carried on business in rice and cashewnuts and later joined as a partner in partnership with others in a rice mill business and that, from the income realised from the rice mill and other ventures, he acquired the plaint schedule properties. It was also alternatively pleaded by the plaintiff that his father was managing the properties, which devolved upon his mother under a will executed by her father and that, with the income realised from these properties and also from the properties belonging to the joint family, he acquired the suit schedule properties and that in either case, he is entitled to a one-third share in the entire properties set out in the schedules, as the will executed by Chenchuramaiah provides for devolution of all his assets on the children of his daughter, Kamakshamma, i.e the mother of the plaintiff, after his death.

4. The 2nd defendant supported the case of the plaintiff and asked for partition of the properties on the basis that he is also entitled to a one-third share in the entire suit properties. The defence of the 3rd defendant is that she is entitled to the entire suit properties, as all the acquisitions now shown as plaint schedule properties were acquired with the income derived by her father from the management of the properties which devolved upon her mother under a will, Ex. B-141 dated 29-2-1912 and she is entitled to all the suit properties as her mother, Kamakshamma, died in the year 1948.

5. The main defence in this case is put forth by the 1st defendant, the father of the plaintiff. According to him, none of the items shown in the plaint schedules belonged to the joint family of himself and his sons or formed part of the acretions to the estate of late Voleti Chenchuramaiah, the father of his wife, and that they are all his self-acquired properties in which neither the plaintiff nor defendants 2 and 3 have any manner of right or claim. It is his case that he was a minor when his father died in the year 1892; that, in the year 1903, there was a partition between himself and his brothers; that he was then a minor; and that, at the time of the partition, he did not get any sizable share so as to constitute the ancestral nucleus from which he could have acquired the suit properties. It is his case that, in order to eke out his livelihood and maintain his wife, whom he married in 1906, he had to first join as a clerk on a monthly salary of Rs. 10/- and later became a petty trader selling rice and doing business in cashewnuts; that he was taken only as a working partner in the first instance in a rice mill business; that later with his own exertions, he purchased the rice mill in question, item 1 of the B schedule; and that it is from out of the income realised from the rice mill that he acquired the suit properties. It is also his case that, apart from the rice mill business, he had some commission agency business. In short, his defence is that there was no ancestral nucleus which would have formed the basis for the acquisition of any of the properties now shown in the plaint schedules. He also denied the claim of his daughter, the 3rd defendant, that during the period he was in management of the estate of his wife, he utilised the income derived from the estate for purchasing the rice mill in 1914 or thereafter for any of the subsequent acquisitions shown in the plaint schedules.

6. The Principal Subordinate Judge, on the main issues arising out of the pleadings, held that the 1st defendant partly out of the ancestral nucleus and partly out of the income from the estate of late Voleti Chenchuramiah, must have purchased the rice mill and other properties, although it is not possible to ascertain as to what extent the estate of Chenchuramiah contributed and to what extent the ancestral nucleus contributed for the purchase of the suit properties. It is in that view that the learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree for partition of A and B schedule moveable and immoveable properties into six shares giving 1/6th share each to the plaintiff and defendants 1 & 2 and the remaining 3/6th share to the 3rd defendant. The decree also provided for allotment of item 1 of the plaint A schedule sold under Ex. B-143 dt. 15-2-1956 to the 4th defendant to be allotted to the share of the 1st defendant and item 12 of the B Schedule sold by the plaintiff under Ex. B-6 dt. 17-10-1961 to be allotted to the share of the plaintiff in the division to be effected.

7. Mr. Poorniah, the learned Counsel appearing for the legal representatives of the 1st defendant, who have preferred Appeal No. 430 of 1965, contended that there is no evidence worth the name to suggest that there was any ancestral nucleus which could have formed the basis for the acquisition either for the purchase of item 1 of the B schedule the rice mill, or the other properties involved in the suit; that, throughout his life-time, the 1st defendant treated the suit properties as his separate and self acquired properties; and that he had never thrown any one or all of the suit properties into the common stock so as to impress the properties with the character of coparcenary property; and as such, the Court below erred in granting a decree to the extent it did in favour of the plaintiff or the other defendants. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that there is also no evidence to show that, during the time he was in management of his wife's properties, the 1st defendant utilised the income derived from the estate of his wife for acquisition of either the rice mill, item 1 of the B schedule or other properties and as such the lower court erred in granting a decree to the extent of 3/6th share in favour of the 3rd defendant.

8. Mr. Subba Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff appeallant in Appeal No. 188 of 1967, contended that, in the partition of 1892 between Ramaiah, the father of the 1st defendant, and his brothers, 4,600 varahas were divided among the brothers; that the amount that fell to the share of the 1st defendant's father came to be divided in the partition of 1903 between the 1st defendant and his brothers; that, with the aid of that amount and other moveables, the 1st defendant invested in the business which he was carrying on in partnership with others; and that, therefore, there was sufficient joint family nucleus which formed the basis for the acquisition of the suit properties. It is further argued by Mr. Subba Reddy that the declarations made by the 1st defendant in the income tax returns submitted by him for the years 1949–50 and 1950–51 as evidenced by Ex. A-8 dt. 28-2-50 and Ex. B-89 dt. 31-7-50 would show that he has treated the properties as belonging to the joint family which consisted of himself and his sons and that it is not now open to him to contend that the properties are not impressed with the character of coparcenary properties so as to disentitle his sons from seeking partition of the suit properties.

9. Mr. Jagannatha Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd defendant, relying upon the averments in the plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff and the averments in the written statement of the 2nd defendant, contended that the estate of the 3rd defendant's mother was under the management of the 1st defendant not only till her mother attained majority in the year 1915, but till she died in 1948 and it is with the income derived from that estate that the suit properties were acquired by the 1st defendant and that the court below, having regard to the facts, should have dismissed the suit.

10. It is now necessary, in the first instance, to see if there was any joint family nucleus at the time when the first acquisition viz., the rice mill item 1 of the B schedule was made by the 1st defendant in 1914. It is not in dispute that between Kamaiah, the father of the 1st defendant, and his brothers, there was a partition sometime prior to 1892 and that the property available for partition was worth only 4,600 varahas. Ramaiah, it may be noticed, died in 1892 survived by his sons, 1st defendant, Narasimhulu Setty, Ramanujam, Sriramulu, Nammalwar and two daughters, Mangathayamma and Rangamma. The 1st defendant and his brothers again partitioned in 1903 and there is no evidence to show as to the exact amount that fell to the share of each of the brothers. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the family, either at the time of the earlier partition in 1892 or later at the time, of the partition in 1903, was possessed of any lands or other immovable property. All that Ramiah left behind to his sons was a small plot of land purchased by him under Ex. A-2 dt. 8-9-1890 for Rs. 275/-. This site was purchased for the purpose of putting up a house and it is in evidence that Ramaiah himself laid the foundation for this house during his lifetime. But, unfortunately this property on the strength of which his sons subsequently borrowed moneys and put up a building had to be sold to redeem the debt incurred for the construction of the house. Exs. B-145 and B-146 show that, on 2-11-1908, the 1st defendant and his brothers sold the shops, sites and the house constructed by them in the site purchased by their father for discharging the debt due to the Voleti family by the 1st defendant's family. Therefore, Exs. B-145 and B-146 make it clear that; by 2-11-1908, whatever little ancestral property was left behind by Ramaiah, the father of the 1st defendant, was sold to discharge the debts incurred by the sons of Ramiah. There is no evidence at all to show that any portion or part of the ‘varahas’ that originally fell to the share of Ramaiah, the father of the 1st defendant, at the partition prior to 1892 still remained intact or were available to enable the 1st defendant to invest in the businesses which he was carrying on in partnership with othersr or in his own name so as to form the basis for the acquisition of the suit properties. It is significant to remember that the plaintiff was born in 1919 and there is absolutely no evidence either oral or documentary, to show that, in 1914 when his father acquired the rice mill, there was any ancestral nucleus worth the name. Therefore, we are unable to agree with Mr. Subba Reddy that there was sufficient ancestral nucleus which could have formed the basis for the acquisition of the rice mill, item 1 of the B Schedule.

11. This takes us to the next question whether the properties acquired by the 1st defendant were due to his own exertions or due to the reason that he was in management of the properties of his wife, which were bequeathed to her under a will. Ex. B-141 dt. 29-2-1912 by her father, Voleti Chenchuramaiah. The 1st defendant was married to Kamakshamma the daughter of Chenchuramaiah, in 1906. She was born on 17th September 1897 and became a major by September 1915. Admittedly, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the 1st defendant was in management of his wife's properties after his marriage till she became a major. While Mr. Jagannatha Rao contends that the 1st defendant was in management of his wife's properties till his wife died in 1948, Mr. Poornaiah, points out that apart from the 1st defendant, there were two other executors; that the 1st defendant and the other executors relinquished that management when the 3rd defendant's mother became a major in 1915; and that, thereafter, the 1st defendant, barring giving some advice to his wife regarding the management of the properties, had taken no part in the management of her estate. It is also the case of Mr. Poornaiah that, at no time either during the period when the 1st defendant was in the management of the properties or subsequently thereafter, he had utilised any portion or part of the income derived from the estate of his wife for any of the acquisitions and as such, the 3rd defendant has no right to claim a share in the properties. The 1st defendant himself, it may be stated, asserted in his evidence that he handed over the estate of his wife, soon after she became a major and that he had nothing to do with that estate thereafter and that he had not utilised any part of the income during the period he was in management of the properties. The 3rd defendant has not chosen to examine herself to substantiate the allegation made by her that the suit properties were the accretions to the estate of her mother, which devolved upon her. She has chosen to rely upon the averments in the plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff rested his case in the main on the ancestral nucleus forming the basis for the acquisitions and it is only alternatively that he claimed a share in his mother's properties contending that the income from his mother's properties was also utilised for the purpose of acquiring the suit properties by his father. The plaintiff's version cannot be relied upon, for he would have no personal knowledge of the management by his father, the 1st defendant, till his mother attained majority, as he was born subsequently in 1919. Even if it is to be said that the 1st defendant was helping his wife in the management of her estate, it will not follow that he was appropriating that income and that the suit properties are the result of those appropriations.

12. Ordinarily, in Hindu families, the property belonging exclusively to a female member would also be normally managed by the manager of the family. Even if it is true that the 3rd defendant's mother did not take part in the management of property, it would not materially affect the rights or interests of the 1st defendant's wife, as indisputably, the property belonged to her. The Supreme Court in Kankarathanammal v. Loganatha . A.I.R 1965 S.C 271 at 274. has observed:

“It is true that the actual management of the property was done by the appellant's father; but that would inevitably be so having regard to the fact that in ordinary Hindu families, the property belonging exclusively to a female member would also be normally managed by the Manager of the family; so that the fact that appellant's mother did not take actual part in the management of the property would not materially affect the appellant's case that the property belonged to her mother”.

13. It is not enough if the 3rd defendant alleges that the incom from her mother's property was appropriated or utilised by her father in acquiring the suit properties; but she must also adduce positive evidence to establish that the income derived from the estate of her mother was utilised for the purpose of acquiring the suit properties. In this regard, there is absolutely no evidence, either oral or documentary and she has not even chosen to get into the witness-box to assert or hold on to her allegation in the written statement.

14. Mr. Jagannatha Rao sought to rely upon certain circumstances to show that the 1st defendant could not have acquired the rice mill, item I of the B schedule, without the income from his wife's estate. He relies upon the fact that, by the date of Exs. B 145 and B-146 i.e 2-11-1908, the 1st defendant had lost all his properties and that he could have maintained himself and his family only with the help of the income derived from the properties of his wife. It is true that, after his marriage in 1906, he came to be the manager of the properties of his wife till 1915 and it is also true that it is during this period that he became a partner in the rice mill business and later purchased the rice mill in the year 1914. The evidence of the 1st defendant would show that he originally joined as a working partner in the rice mill and that it is only when he suffered losses that mill was sold under an award Ex-B 10 dated 31-8-1915, given by the arbitrators and that, for purchasing the rice mill, he borrowed Rs. 9,800/- from Voleti Venkatarangam Setty and from Reddis and merchants. There is absolutely nothing in the cross-examination of the 1st defendant to suggest the he had not purchased the rice mill with the moneys borrowed by him from Voleti Venkatarangam Setti and others as asserted by him. The cross-examination of this witness by the 3rd defendant or the plaintiff does not at all touch this aspect of the 1st defendant's case and in fact it is not their case that the 1st defendant had not purchased the rice mill after the award, Ex-B, 10 by borrowing moneys from the local creditors. The rice mill was purchased for Rs. 14,400 and this amount includes the debt of Rs. 4,600 which he was directed to discharge under the award plus the amount of Rs. 9,800/- borrowed by him. Therefore, the consideration for the purchase of the rice mill has been explained by him and there is no evidence contra. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Subba Reddy or with Mr. Jagannatha Rao that either the ancestral nucleus of the joint family or the income from the estate of Kamakshamma formed the basis for the purchase of the rice mill, item I of the B-Schedule. The lower Court, therefore, was in error in holding that the suit properties were acquired by the 1st defendant partly from out of the income appropriated from the estate of Kamakshamma and partly with the aid of the ancestral nuclous of the joint family.

15. The next question to be considered is whether the 1st defendant, at any time subsequently, either by his declaration or other acts, impressed the suit properties with the character of joint family properties. Mr. Subba Reddy placed great reliance on Exs. A-8 and B-89 to press his point that the suit properties are impressed with the characer of coparcenery property by reason of the declarations made therein. Exs-A-8 and B-89 ape the assessment orders passed on the returns submitted by the 1st defendant for the assessment years 1949–50 and 1950–51. It is manifest from what is contained in those two assessment orders that till the assessment year 1948–49, the returns were filed by the 1st defendant as an individual, but in these two assessment years, the returns were filed showing the status of the family as Hindu undivided family with two major sons, who constituted the joint family. Mr. Poornaiah, however, sought to rely upon the orders for the purpose of showing that the assessing authority did not accept the statement or declaration of the 1st defendant and assessed the 1st defendant treating him as an individual. It is also his case that a statement made by an assessee for purposes of income-tax returns cannot be taken as unequivocal declaration of his intention to impress the property viz., the rice mill, with the character of a joint family property more so when the declaration was not accepted by the assessing authority. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel sought to rely upon the observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayana All that the learned Judge stated is that it sometimes happens that persons make statements which served their purpose or proceed upon ignorance of the true position; and it is not their statements but their relation with the estates, which should be taken into consideration in determining the issue.

16. It is Significant to bear in mind that the statement made by the 1st defendant is not an isolated one or made for any one single year. The statement that his was a Hindu undivided family was repeated by him when he submitted the returns for the next year also. Ever since the 1st defendant became a major, he was carrying on business in rice and cashewnuts and started a rice mill and submitted the income tax returns as evidenced by the several returns filed by him from 1924 onwards. It is not a case where the declaration made by the 1st defendant was upon ignorance of true position or with the sole object of evading payment of higher income tax, for he had paid the income-tax showing the status of the assessee as an individual from 1924 till 1948. If it is a question of gaining some benefit or advantage for himself, he would have certainly resorted to the method of making an untrue declaration much earlier than 1918. Further, no explanation has been offered by him as to why he had to make such a declaration not once, but in two years, if he did not really intend to impress the property viz., the rice mill business, with the character of joint family or coparcenary property.

17. In Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand the Privy council, dealing with a case of similar kind where a son claimed partition in the business started by his father and in view of the absence of the explanation by the father as to why the business was assessed in income tax as a joint Hindu family business, observed:

“Among these there is nothing equal in importance to the respondent's testimony in his examination in chief that the cycle business was assessed to income tax as a joint Hindu family business, and that the assessment notices were in the appellant's possession. He was not cross-examined on these statements and he was not contradicted. All that the appellant said about them is that the business had been assessed for twenty years and that he had not been keeping the notices received from the income tax department. The necessary conclusion is that the business was assessed as a joint family business. That may not be conclusive in favour of the respondent, because there might be an advantage to the appellant, though he was the true owner of the business, in having it assessed to income tax as a joint family concern. But as no explanation has been offered by the appellant, the fact that the assessment was made on the joint family goes far to establish the respondent case”.

18. When confronted with the orders of the Income-tax Officer, no explanation was offered by the 1st defendant as to why he made those declarations. It was not even stated by him that he made the declarations upon ignorance of true position of law or for the reason that he wanted to evade payment of higher income tax. He tried to explain away by saying that he might not have made that statement and that he did not remember if he had described himself as the ‘kartha’ of the joint family, which consisted of himself and his two sons, the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant who were entitled to claim partition.

19. In this connection, we may notice with advantage the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Subramania Iyer v. Commissioner of Incom tax, Madras . 1955 2 M.L.J 405.. In this case, the question referred to the Bench under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act was: “In the absence of any other evidence, is the recital in the partnership deed of the 20th April, 1947, in respect of the General Commercial Distributors enough for drawing the inference that the moneys invested by the assessee in the business carried on by him, came out of funds belonging to the undivided family consisting of the assessee and his minor son”, and it was answered by the learned judges in these words:

“There was nothing to prevent the assessee from impressing upon any self acquired property belonging to him the character of joint family property. No formalities are necessary in order to bring this about and the only question is one of intention on the part of the owner of the separate property to abandon his separate rights and invest it with the character of joint family property. The declaration in to partnership deed is unambiguous in its terms and is to the effect that the assessee was entering into the partnership as the manager of the undivided family of the assessee and his minor son”.

20. If, as now contended by Mr. Poornaiah, the 1st defendant had no intention of abandoning his rights in the self acquired propty, item 1 of the B Schedule viz., the rice mill, there was absolutely no need for him to make a declaration in the manner he did in the income tax returns. The fact that the Income-tax officer did not accept his statement is absolutely of no consequence, because it is the conduct of the 1st defendant that matters and so long as he, out of his own volition, declared-impressing the self acquired property belonging to him with the character of coparcenary property, no other formality is required. The fact that he made a feebly attempt to deny fifteen years later, that too in his evidence unable to find any other answers makes us believe that he abandoned his separate rights in the rice mill, the income from which was being assessed to tax. When once the self acquired property is impressed with the character of coparcenary property, it ceases to be a separate or self acquired property. He cannot undo what has been once done namely impressing the self-acquired property with the character of coparcenary property.

21. Mr. Poornaiah, however, sought to place reliance upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Madan Lal v. Controller of Estate Duty to show in the absence of sufficient circumstances to indicate that the 1st defendant had abandoned his separate claim to the property and had begun to treat it as a joint family property, no inference can be drawn from the declarations made by him in the income-tax returns. On the facts of that case, the learned Judges, following the earlier decision of the same court in Govind Narain Mathur v. Smt. Mohini Devi held that a statement in connection with the assessment of income-tax that certain property was the joint family property may be made for the purpose of getting some advantage under the law relating to income-tax and that it could not be evidence of any unequivocal intention on the part of the assessee to waive his interest in the self acquired property.

22. Each case has to be judged having regard to the facts and surrounding circumstances of that case. Whether the 1st defendant intended to abandon his rights and make an unequivocal declaration has to be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. It is not the case of the 1st defendant that he made the declarations with a view to gain any advantage or for the reason that he was ignorant of the true position of law. Nothing prevented him from putting forth such a defence. Therefore, it is manifest from his own conduct and in the absence of any explanation that it was a statement, deliberately made out of his own volition abandoning or giving up his interests in the self acquired property, item 1 of the B Schedule, and impressing it with the character of joint family property.

23. We may usefully refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in G. Narayana Raju v. Chamaraju . A.I.R 1969 S.C 1276. The Learned Judges, dealing with the question of abandment of separate claims in a self acquired property, observed:—

“It is a well-established doctrine of Hindu Law that property which was originally self-acquired may become joint property if it has been voluntarily thrown by the coparcener into the joint stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upto it. But the question whether the coparcener has done so or not is entirely a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case. It must be established that there was a clear intention on the part of the coparcener to waive his separate rights and such an intention will not be inferred from acts which may have been done from kindness or affection.”

24. There is another decision which requires to be referred to in this connection. In Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1968 decided on 5.5.70 Hegde, J., dealing with the question as to when the self-acquired property gets impressed with the character of coparcenary property, observed:

“It becomes joint family properly because the coparcener, who owned it up till then as his separate property, has by the exercise of his volition, impressed it with the character of joint family or coparcenary property, to be held by him thereafter along with other members of the joint family”.

25. In this case, the facts narrated by us are sufficient to establish that there is an unequivocal declaration on the part of the 1st defendant giving up or abandoning his interests in the self-acquired property and throwing it in the common stock, thus impressing it with the character of coparcenary property and when once that is done, it ceases to be the separate or self acquired property and acquires the character of joint family properly. We have no hesitation in holding that whatever rights he had in item 1 of the B Schedule till the date he made declarations in the returns filed for the assessment years 1949–50 and 50–51, he surrendered those rights in that separate or self acquired property and impressed it, by exercises of his own volition, with the character of joint family property and the character of the property does not change thereafter even if he chooses to repudiate the same. As already stated by us, item 1 of the B Schedule is the joint family property in which the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant are each entitled to one third share.

26. There is one more item which requires to be considered i.e, item 1 of the A Schedule, which was purchased by the 1st defendant under Ex. B-35 dt. 30.11.1953 subsequent to the declaration made by him in the income-tax returns that the rice mill belonged to the joint family. The rice mill, as has been stated by the 1st defendant in his evidence, was leased out for a net rental of Rs. 4, 200/- and the income, according to Mr. Subba Reddi, derived from the rice mill by the date of the purchase of item 1 of the A schedule, the consideration of which was Rs. 8,000/- was sufficient to raise a presumption that item 1 of the A schedule is also joint family property having been purchased from out of its income. In this connection, Mr. Subba Reddi relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mallesappa v. Mallappa to contend that, where a manager claims that any immoveable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund; and that the onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners.

27. Mr. Poornaiah, however, sought to rely upon the fact that, apart from the rice mill, item 1 of the B Schedule, the 1st defendant was possessed of about 18 acres of land, the income from which would have been sufficient to purchase item 1 of the A schedule and that, apart from that, there is no plea that the consideration for the purchase of item 1 of the A schedule proceeded from the income derived from the rice mill and that the 1st defendant also has not been questioned regarding the purchase of this item. It is true that there is no plea nor the 1st defendant questioned as to the source of consideration for purchasing item 1 of the A Schedule; but, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mallesappa v. Mallappa it is for the 1st defendant to show that item I of the A Schedule was purchased with the income from the lands and that no part of the income realised from the rice mill went towards the purchase of that item. Thus burden, which rests upon the 1st defendant has not been discharged. Therefore, in view of our finding that the rice mill, item 1 of the B schedule, became an item of the joint family property by 1949, we are of the view that the income realised from it was sufficient to enable the 1st defendant to purchase item 1 of the A schedule under Ex. B-35. Therefore, this item is also liable to be partitioned between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2, each being entitled to ⅓rd share in it.

28. So far as the other suit items are concerned, they were purchased long prior to the declarations made in the income-tax returns and, therefore, there is no evidence to show that the 1st defendant ever abandoned his rights in the remaining items of the self-acquired property so as to impress them with the character of coparcenary property. So far as the alienation by the plaintiff of item 12 of the B schedule to the 8th defendant under Ex. B-6 dated 17-10-61 is concerned, we have no hesitation in setting aside the finding of the lower court. This item of property was not an item of the joint family property, as the 1st defendant had never abandoned his rights to this item of property.

29. So far as the alienation made by the 1st defendant under Ex. B-143 dated 15-2-1956 to the 4th defendant is concerned, it will not bind the plaintiff for the reasons that the land to the 4th defendant is from out of item 1 of the A schedule, which the 1st defendant purchased under Ex. B-35, The part of the item sold by the 1st defendant to the 4th defendant will be allotted to the share of the 1st defendant.

30. For the reasons recorded by us, the decree of the court below allotting 3/6th share to the 3rd defendant in the suit properties is set aside and the cross objections in both the appeals (Appeal Nos. 430/65 and 188/67) are dismissed.

31. In the result, the decree of the court below is modified so as to provide only for partition of item 1 of the A schedule and item 1 of the B Schedule into three equal shares and for recovery of possession of one such share by the plaintiff, with the aforesaid modification in the decree, the appeal preferred by the 1st defendant (Appeal No. 430 of 1965) is allowed to the extent indicated above and similarly, the appeal preferred by the plaintiff (Appeal No. 188 of 1967) is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their own costs.

32. So far as the Transferred Appeal 254 of 1966 is concerned, the alienation made by the plaintiff of item 12 of the B schedule to the 8th defendant under Ex. B-6 is set aside, as it is not one of the items of property in which the 1st defendant has abandoned his rights and impressed with the character of joint family property. The alienation made by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit is not binding upon defendants 1 and 2. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and the transferred appeal is allowed.

33. C.M.P No. 2403/69:— We see no grounds to receive the documents as additional evidence. The petition is dismissed.

34. C.M.P No. 2143 of 1967:— Delay condoned. Petition allowed.

35. C.M.P No. 7620/67:— Amendment allowed, Petition ordered accordingly.

36. On being mentioned:— The Court fee due to Government shall be paid by the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant, and the legal representatives of the 1st defendant in proportion to the shares decreed by this court.

37. Orders accordingly.