- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Parsottambhai Maganb... v. State Of Gujarat Thr...
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Gujarat acquired the respondents’ land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Collector declared his award under Section 11 on 17 January 1982. The landowners (claimants) did not attend the pronouncement of the award and, according to the record, were never served with notice under Section 12(2). They first learnt of the award when compensation was paid in July 1988; within three months—on 22 September 1988—they filed an application requesting a reference to the civil court under Section 18.
The Reference Court (Assistant Judge, Sabarkantha District) held on 21 April 1999 that the application was within time because limitation began from the claimants’ date of knowledge (July 1988). The State appealed. On 7 November 2000 the Gujarat High Court, in a batch of appeals (First Appeals Nos. 7957–7969 of 1999), reversed that finding, holding that the reference application—filed more than six months after the award date—was barred by limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b). The claimants obtained special-leave and appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the absence of the claimants’ presence at the pronouncement of the award and without service of notice under Section 12(2), the six-month limitation period in the proviso to Section 18(2)(b) runs from the date of the award or from the date on which the claimants actually or constructively gained knowledge of the award.
- Consequently, whether the reference application filed on 22 September 1988 was time-barred.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (Claimants)
- The High Court erred in computing limitation from 17 January 1982 because:
- They were not present when the award was made.
- No notice under Section 12(2) was served upon them.
- They acquired knowledge of the award only when compensation was paid in July 1988; filing the reference on 22 September 1988 was therefore within the permissible six-month period.
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer to contend that “the date of the award” in Section 18(2)(b) means the date of communication/knowledge when the claimant was absent and not served with notice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, (1962) 1 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500 | Limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b) commences from the date the claimant obtains actual or constructive knowledge of the award when he was not present and no notice under Section 12(2) was served. | The Supreme Court applied this precedent to hold that the six-month period began in July 1988 (date of knowledge), making the 22 September 1988 application timely. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra that “the date of the award” for limitation purposes entails communication of the award to the claimant. Key steps in its reasoning:
- The High Court itself found that the claimants were neither present at the pronouncement nor served with Section 12(2) notice; therefore, Section 18(2)(a) and the first limb of Section 18(2)(b) were inapplicable.
- In such circumstances, fairness and natural justice require that limitation begin only when the award is communicated or becomes known to the claimant, as recognised in Raja Harish Chandra.
- The High Court failed to apply this settled principle, notwithstanding that the State did not challenge the claimants’ assertion of first knowledge in July 1988.
- Since the application for reference was filed within six months of that knowledge, the Reference Court’s finding of timeliness was correct and should not have been disturbed.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed; High Court’s finding of limitation set aside. The matter is remitted to the Gujarat High Court for adjudication of the appeals on their merits.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that, where claimants are absent at the pronouncement of the award and receive no notice under Section 12(2), the six-month limitation under Section 18(2)(b) begins from the date they acquire knowledge of the award. While the ruling follows existing Supreme Court precedent and sets no new legal standard, it underscores the necessity for Collectorates to serve notices promptly and for courts to compute limitation in harmony with principles of natural justice.
B.P Singh, J.— These appeals by special leave are directed against the common judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 7-11-2000 in First Appeals Nos. 7957 to 7969 of 1999 whereby the High Court held that the application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by limitation.
2. The facts of the case are few and undisputed. Pursuant to the acquisition proceeding taken under the Land Acquisition Act, an award was declared under Section 11 of the Act on 17-1-1982. The respondents filed an application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act on 22-9-1988. The High Court held that since the application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act was filed beyond the period of six months from the date of declaration of the award; the same was barred by limitation. Hence, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the State of Gujarat and quashed the judgment and awards passed by the Reference Court in land references cases referred to it for adjudication.
3. The High Court considered the case in the light of the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It, firstly, held that the claimants were not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section 18(2)(a) was not attracted. It, then, held that the State had not been able to establish that a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was issued and served upon the claimants. Thus, the first part of Section 18(2)(b) was also not attracted. It, therefore, held that the limitation prescribed under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b) applied in the case and held that the application under Section 18 ought to have been filed within six months from the date of the declaration of the award. Since the application for reference was made beyond the period of six months from the date of declaration of the award, the same was barred by time.
4. Counsel for the appellant claimants urged that the High Court clearly erred in law in holding the reference application to be barred by time inasmuch as the appellants were not present when the award was made nor were they served with notices under Section 12(2) of the Act. In fact the appellants had no knowledge of the date of declaration of the award till July 1988 when compensation was paid to them. It was only then that they came to know that the award had been declared on 17-1-1982.
5. The learned Assistant Judge, Sabarkantha District at Himmatnagar by his judgment and order of 21-4-1999 recorded a finding that the application under Section 18 of the Act made on 22-9-1988 was not barred by limitation. This finding is based on the fact that the claimants had been paid compensation in July 1988 and the application under Section 18 was made on 22-9-1988. There was no evidence to prove that notice under Section 12(2) was even served on the appellants. In these circumstances, he held that the application under Section 18 of the Act was within time. In sum and substance, the Assistant Judge computed the period of limitation from the date of knowledge of the award in July 1988.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer (1962) 1 SCR 676, AIR 1961 SC 1500 and submitted that since the appellants were not present when the award was made, and no notice was given to them under Section 12(2) of the Act, the application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act must be held to be within time if it is filed within six months of the date of knowledge of the declaration of the award. In our view, the submission is sound and must be accepted. This Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (1962) 1 SCR 676, AIR 1961 SC 1500 was dealing with a case in which an award was declared under the Act on 25-3-1951. No notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was given to the claimants. It was only on 12-1-1953 that the claimants came to know about the declaration of the award whereafter they filed an application claiming a reference under Section 18 of the Act on 24-2-1953. The High Court of Allahabad held that the case fell under the latter part of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application made by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming a reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the date of the award in question, it was beyond time. This view of the High Court was overruled by this Court and in doing so the Court made the following pertinent observations: (SCR pp. 682-84)
“Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words ‘the date of the award’ occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.
There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words ‘from the date of the Collector's award’ used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”
7. This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the declaration of the award either actual or constructive. This principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant was not present or represented when the award was made, or where no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him. It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Coming to the facts of the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July 1988. They had admittedly no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. They had therefore filed the application under Section 18 of the Act on 22-9-1988 well within the period of limitation. The Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra (1962) 1 SCR 676, AIR 1961 SC 1500. Moreover, we find from the grounds of appeal filed before the High Court that the assertion of the claimants that they came to know of the declaration of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July 1988, has not even been challenged.
8. We are, therefore, of the view that these appeals must be allowed. We, accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the finding of the High Court that the application for reference under Section 18 of the Act was barred by limitation. However, since the appeals have not been disposed of on merit, we remit the matter to the High Court for disposal of the appeals on merit in accordance with law.
Alert