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State Of Adhra Pradesh v. Union Of India (Ministry Of Defence), Visakhapatnam

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jun 19, 1996
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, the Union of India acting through the Military Engineer Services (referred to as "M.E.S"), entered into a contract with a building contractor under which M.E.S supplied cement and steel to the contractor and the cost of those supplies was to be deducted from amounts payable to the contractor. For the assessment year 1985-1986 the Commercial Tax Officer (assessing authority) sought particulars of supplies made by M.E.S to the contractor. M.E.S did not furnish those particulars; the assessing authority estimated the net turnover at Rs. 12,50,00,000 and assessed it to sales tax.

M.E.S appealed to the Appellate Authority (Deputy Commissioner (CT), Kakinada), arguing, inter alia, that Article 285(1) of the Constitution exempted the Union from taxation, that M.E.S was not a "dealer" within the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (the "Act"), and that it had not been given reasonable opportunity. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on July 31, 1992 but remanded the matter for verification of actual turnover. M.E.S further appealed to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal which, on September 21, 1995, held that M.E.S was not a dealer under the A.P. General Sales Tax Act and allowed the appeal.

The State filed this Tax Revision Case under Section 22(1) of the Act challenging the Tribunal's order. The High Court (opinion authored by Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.) considered the statutory definitions, constitutional provisions (notably Article 285(1)), and multiple precedents, and concluded that the Tribunal's order was unsustainable. The court set aside the Tribunal's order and allowed the Tax Revision Case; the T.R.C. was allowed without costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Government (M.E.S) falls within the definition of "dealer" under Section 2(e) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (including the effect of Explanation III).
  2. Whether Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India exempts the Central Government (M.E.S) from liability to sales tax imposed under the State Act.
  3. Whether the supply of cement and steel by M.E.S to the contractor for construction of buildings entrusted to the contractor amounts to a "sale" (i.e., whether property in the goods passed to the contractor so as to make the turnover taxable).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State) / Learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes

  • Submitted that the Central Government as well as the State Government fall within the meaning of "dealer" in Section 2(e) of the Act read with Explanation III.
  • Contended that Article 285 of the Constitution does not exempt the Government from payment of tax and therefore M.E.S was rightly assessed to sales tax.
  • On the merits, argued that M.E.S admittedly supplied cement and steel to the contractor for the purpose of construction entrusted to the contractor; therefore the turnover for the supply of goods to the contractor is liable to be assessed to sales tax.

Respondent (M.E.S) / Mr. Dhilleswara Rao (counsel for respondent)

  • Pleaded before the appellate authority that by virtue of Article 285(1) no tax can be collected from the Union Government.
  • Contended that M.E.S is not a "dealer" within the meaning of the Act because it is not carrying on business.
  • Argued that the Union of India is not a "person" for the purpose of the definition relied upon, and that Explanation-III should not treat the Union as a dealer.
  • Maintained that the goods (cement and steel) were supplied for M.E.S's own use in construction and therefore property in the goods did not pass to the contractor — so the transaction did not amount to "sale".
  • Also contended that no reasonable opportunity was given to M.E.S in the assessment process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re, Sea Customs Act (1878) (Special Bench) AIR 1963 SC 1760 Distinction between excise duties (taxable event: manufacture; nature: indirect) and sales tax (taxable event: act of sale); that excise and sales tax, though both related to goods, are different imposts and are not taxes directly on goods. The court relied on this distinction to frame the analysis of Articles 285 and 289, supporting the position that sales tax is not necessarily a "tax directly on property" and therefore may fall outside the scope of exemptions contemplated by Article 285(1).
W.P. No. 17664 of 1989 (Full Bench of the High Court), dated March 18, 1996 Holding that Articles 285 and 289 are intended to exempt property of the Union/States from taxes directly on property or income, and do not extend to taxes which only indirectly affect income or property. The court adopted the Full Bench's reasoning to conclude that Articles 285 and 289 concern direct taxes on property and thus that sales tax (an impost concerned with the act of sale) is not exempt under Article 285(1) on the basis of that Article alone.
Union of India v. State of Punjab, AIR 1990 Punjab & Haryana 183 Case where the Railway Department challenged imposition of road tax; single judge held Article 285(1) bars the imposition of the tax (a direct tax on property in that factual matrix). The court observed that this decision concerned a direct tax on the property of the Union and therefore does not advance the petitioner's case in the present matter where the question is whether sales tax (characterised differently) is covered by Article 285(1).
Union of India v. Purna Municipal Council, (1992) 1 SCC 100 : AIR 1992 SC 1597 Supreme Court held that Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act is saved under Article 285(1), dealing with taxation of railways by local authorities — a case of direct tax on railways/property. The court noted this was a case of direct taxation of railway property and concluded that it does not support the petitioner's contention that Article 285(1) exempts the Union from indirect taxes such as sales tax; thus the precedent does not help the petitioner.
N.M. Goel and Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Rajnandgaon, AIR 1972 SC 368 Held that where PWD (government) supplied materials (iron, steel, cement) to a contractor under conditions (including clause preserving title but allowing consumption/inspection and price deduction) the use/consumption of materials in execution of works effected passing of property — the supply amounted to sale. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to reject the respondent's contention that supply of goods by M.E.S to the contractor did not amount to sale because the goods were for Government's own use; the precedent indicates property passed on use/consumption and thus the turnover was taxable.
Division Bench, T.R.C. No. 256 of 1990 (this Court), dated February 6, 1996 Held that supply of steel, cement and A.C. sheets for construction of the assessee's own building by the assessee-company to the contractor amounts to "sale" and the turnover was taxable. The court treated this Division Bench decision as directly supporting its conclusion that supplies by M.E.S to its contractor amounted to sale and were taxable; the Tribunal's contrary finding was set aside in light of this reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following logical steps, each tied closely to statutory text and precedents cited in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of "dealer" under Section 2(e) of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act:

    The court extracted the statutory definition of "dealer" and Explanation III. It noted that the definition covers persons who carry on buying, selling, supplying or distribution of goods or who execute works contracts involving supply or use of material. Explanation III explicitly deems the Central Government or the State Government to be "dealer" where they buy, sell, supply or distribute goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration "whether or not in the course of business."

    The court rejected the respondent's contention that the Union cannot be a "person" for these purposes, and observed legislative history: prior to July 1, 1985, the words "Central Government and the State Government" were part of the definition; by Act 18 of 1985 (effective 1-7-1985) Explanation III was added, maintaining that the Central/State Governments would be deemed dealers. On that statutory basis the court concluded that the Central Government is a "dealer" within Section 2(e).

  2. Interpretation of "sale" under Section 2(n) and Explanation VIII:

    The court quoted Section 2(n) and Explanation VIII, which states that every transfer of property in goods by the Central Government or the State Government for cash, deferred payment or any other valuable consideration shall be deemed to be a "sale" for the purposes of the Act. The court indicated that even though Explanation VIII was inserted with effect from August 1, 1986, that insertion did not defeat the assessment for 1985-86 because, in the court's view, profit motive was not a necessary element to invoke the concept of "business" (with reference to principles under the Central Sales Tax Act as well).

    On this basis the court held that transfers by the Central Government in the factual circumstances would amount to "sale".

  3. Constitutional submission under Article 285(1):

    The court examined Article 285(1) which exempts "the property of the Union" from "all taxes imposed by a State" subject to Parliamentary law. The central legal question was whether sales tax falls within "all taxes" in Article 285(1).

    Relying on the Special Bench decision in the Sea Customs Act matter (AIR 1963 SC 1760) and the Full Bench decision in W.P. No. 17664 of 1989, the court accepted the distinction between taxes that are direct taxes on property/income and taxes that are not. The Full Bench was interpreted to mean Articles 285 and 289 were intended to protect property of the Union/State only from direct taxes on property or income and not from taxes which only indirectly affect property or income.

    Considering other authorities cited by the respondent (including Union of India v. State of Punjab and Union of India v. Purna Municipal Council), the court concluded those decisions related to direct taxation of property (e.g., road tax, railway taxation) and therefore did not advance the respondent's argument that Article 285(1) exempts the Union from sales tax. Summing up, the court held that levying of sales tax on the turnover of M.E.S would not be exempt under Article 285(1).

  4. Whether the supply amounted to "sale" (passage of property):

    The court addressed the submission that the materials supplied by M.E.S remained its property for its own use and therefore no sale took place. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in N.M. Goel & Co. and the Division Bench decision of this Court (T.R.C. No. 256 of 1990), both of which held that supplies of materials by a government department to a contractor that are used or consumed in the execution of works do result in passing of property and amount to sale for the purposes of sales tax assessment.

    Accordingly, the court rejected the contention that the supply did not amount to sale and concluded that the turnover from such supplies was taxable.

  5. Conclusion based on the above:

    Applying the statutory definitions (Sections 2(e) and 2(n) with the relevant Explanations), and the precedents addressing the characterization of sales tax and the passing of property in works-contract situations, the court concluded that (a) the Central Government is a "dealer" within the Act; (b) Article 285(1) does not exempt M.E.S from liability to sales tax in respect of such supplies; and (c) the supply of cement and steel to the contractor amounted to sale and therefore constituted taxable turnover. Consequently, the Tribunal's contrary conclusion was set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the Tax Revision Case (T.R.C.) is allowed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The Tribunal's finding that M.E.S is not a "dealer" under the A.P. General Sales Tax Act is reversed; the Central Government (M.E.S) is to be treated as a "dealer" where it supplies materials as in the present case.
  • The supplies of cement and steel by M.E.S to the contractor for execution of construction work are treated as "sale" (property passing on use/consumption) and the turnover arising from those supplies is liable to be assessed to sales tax pursuant to the Act.
  • The T.R.C. is allowed without costs in the circumstances of the case.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying and following existing statutory text and precedents; it confines its decision to the interpretation and application of Section 2(e), Section 2(n) (and their Explanations), and to the established case law distinguishing direct taxes on property from indirect taxes. In the text of the opinion the court did not state that it was announcing any novel principle beyond those conclusions; the effect articulated is the reversal of the Tribunal's order and confirming taxability in the factual circumstances described.

Show all summary ...

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.:— This Tax Revision Case is filed under Section 22(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short ‘the Act’) by the State.

2. The respondent-Union of India, hereinafter referred to as “M.E.S”, entered into a contract for construction of buildings with a Building Contractor. It appears, the terms of the contract provide that for the purpose of the construction, cement and steel will be supplied by M.E.S to the Contractor and the price thereof will be deducted from the amount payable to the Contractor for the work done by him. For the assessment year 1985-1986 the Commercial Tax Officer, assessing authority, called for the particulars of the supplies of goods made by M.E.S to the Contractor. The M.E.S, however, did not furnish the particulars, so the Assessing Authority estimated the net turnover at Rs. 12,50,00,000/- and assessed it to sales tax. Aggrieved by the assessment orders passed by the assessing authority, M.E.S filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority-Deputy commissioner (CT), Kakinada. It was pleaded before the appellate authority that in view of the provisions of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India, no tax can be collected from the Union Government; further M.E.S is not a dealer within the meaning of the Act, as it is not carrying on business, therefore, no sales tax can be levied on it. It was also pleaded that no reasonable opportunity was given to M.E.S The above said pleas were not accepted by the appellate authority and the appeal was dismissed on July 31, 1992; the matter was remanded to the assessing authority to verify the actual turnover and assess the tax according to law. Aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, M.E.S filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that M.E.S could not be said to be a dealer under the A.P General Sales Tax Act; the Tribunal thus allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the appellate authority, on 21-9-1995. It is the validity of that order of the Tribunal that is the subject matter of this Tax Revision Case before us. The learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes submits that the Central Government as well as the State Government fall within the meaning of ‘dealer’ in Section 2(e) of the Act read with Explanation III, therefore the Tribunal has erred in holding that the Central Government is not a dealer. He contends that Article 285 of the Constitution of India does not exempt the Government from payment of tax, therefore the M.E.S was rightly assessed to sales tax. With regard to the merits of the case, it is submitted that under the contract, admittedly, M.E.S has supplied cement and steel to the Contractor for use in the construction of the building which was entrusted to the Contractor, therefore, the turn over for the supply of goods to the Contractor is liable to be assessed to sales tax.

3. We shall take up the first contention of the learned Government Pleader.

4. Section 2(e) of the Act, insofar as it is relevant for our purpose, reads as under:

“‘Dealer’ means any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distribution of goods (or delivering goods on hire purchase or on any system of payment by instalments or carries on or executes any works contract involving supply or use of material) directly or otherwise, whether for cash or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, and includes-

(i) to (iv) xx xx xx xx

Explanation-I&II xx xx xx xx

Explanation-III:— The Central Government or the State Government which, whether or not in the course of business, buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods, directly or otherwise, for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration shall be deemed to be dealer for the purposes of this Act.”

5. From the perusal of the definition of ‘dealer’, extracted above, it is clear that any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods or delivering goods on hire purchase or on any system of payment by instalments or carries on or executes any works contract involving supply or use of material directly or otherwise, whether for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration falls within the meaning of the Act. The definition includes various categories of persons including local authority and society within the meaning and the ambit of the definition of ‘dealer’. So far as the Central Government or the State Government is concerned, Explanation III to the definition of ‘dealer’ puts the matter beyond the pale of controversy as it says that if the Central Government or the State Government buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration whether or not in the course of business, shall be deemed to be ‘dealer’ for the purposes of the APGST Act.

6. Mr. Dhilleswara Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent, vehemently contends that inasmuch as the Union of India is not a person, M.E.S cannot be treated as a dealer. This contention of the learned counsel completely ignores the existence of Explanation-III, referred to above. We may note here that the words “Central Government and the State Government” formed part of the definition of ‘dealer’ prior to July 1, 1985 but they were deleted from clause (i) and Explanation III was added by Act 18 of 1985 with effect from July 1, 1985. Thus it is clear that even before 1-7-1985 ‘the Central Government’ and ‘the State Government’ were within the inclusive definition of expression ‘dealer’ with effect from that date by virtue of Explanation-Ill ‘the Central Government’ and ‘the State Government’ continue to be ‘dealer’ for purposes of the Act.

7. It will be apt to refer to the definition of the expression ‘sale’ as contained in Section 2(n) of the Act and Explanation VIII thereto, insofar as they are relevant for our purpose.

“2(n) ‘Sale’ with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means every transfer of the property in goods (whether as such goods or in any other form in pursuance of a contract or otherwise) by one person to another in the course of trade or business, for cash, or for deferred payment, or for any other valuable consideration or in the supply of distribution of goods by a society (including a co-operative society), club, firm or association to its members, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation or pledge of or a charge on goods.

Explanation I to VII:— xx xx xx xx

Explanation-VIII:— Every transfer of property in goods by the Central Government or the State Government for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, whether or not in the course of business, shall be deemed to be a ‘sale’ for the purpose of this Act.”

8. From a plain reading of clause (n) and Explanation VIII it becomes explicit that every transfer of property in goods by the Central Government or the State Government, whether or not in the course of business, either for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration would amount to “sale” for the purpose of the Act.

9. The submission that Explanation VIII was inserted with effect from August 1, 1986 and assessment relates to 1985-1986, would make no difference because even before the insertion of the explanation, profit motive was not relevant for the purpose of business under the Central Sales Tax Act. From the above discussion, it follows that the Central Government is a “dealer” within the meaning of the expression in Section 2(e) of the Act.

10. It is then contended by Mr. Dhilleswara Rao that even if M.E.S is a dealer, Article 285(1) of the Constitution exempts the Central Government from payment of tax.

11. Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:—

“285. Exemption of property of the Union from State Taxation:—

(1) The property of the Union shall, save insofar as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State.

(2) xx xx xx xxx.”

12. It is true that by virtue of this Article, the property of the Union is exempted from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State and that this exemption is subject to the law that might be made by the Parliament. Admittedly, there is no law made by the Parliament governing the said provision. The question then arises, whether the sales tax would fall within the concept of “all taxes” in Article 285(1).

13. In In Re, Sea Customs Act (1878) (1) AIR 1963 SC 1760 the Special Bench of the Supreme Court while explaining the nature of excise duty in the context of Section 20(2)(1) of the Customs Act, observed in para 25 as follows:

“…This will show that the taxable event in the case of duties of excise is the manufacture of goods and the duty is not directly on the goods but on the manufacture thereof. We may in this connection contrast sales tax which is also imposed with reference to goods sold, where the taxable event is the act of sale. Therefore, though both excise duty and sales tax are levied with reference to goods, the two are very different imposts; in one case the imposition is on the act of manufacture or production while in the other it is on the act of sale. In neither case therefore can it be said that the excise duty or sales tax is a tax directly on the goods for in that event they will really become the same tax. It would thus appear that duties of excise partake of the nature of indirect taxes as known to standard works on economics and are to be distinguished from direct taxes like taxes on property and income.”

14. In a recent judgment of the Full Bench of our High Court, in W.P No. 17664 of 1989, dated March 18, 1996, the question, whether the sales tax can be levied on the turn over relating to sale of seized property by the Collector, Central Excise and Customs, was considered. It was, inter alia, contended that levying of tax is within the teeth of Article 285. Speaking for the Full Bench, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice observed, after referring to the judgment in In Re, Sea Customs Act (1878) (1) supra, as follows:

“….We are, therefore, of opinion reading Article 289 and its complementary Article 285 together that the intention of the Constitution-makers was that Article 285 would exempt all property of the Union from all taxes on property levied by a State or by any authority within the State while Article 289 contemplates that all property of the States would be exempt from all taxes on property which may be leviable by the Union. Both the Articles, in our opinion, are concerned with taxes directly either on income or on property and not with taxes which may indirectly affect income or property. The contention therefore on behalf of the Union that these two Articles should be read in the restricted sense of exempting the property or income of a State in one case and the property of the Union in the other from taxes directly either on property or on income, as the case may be, is correct.”

15. From the above discussion, it emerges that taxes referred to in Articles 285 and 289 of the Constitution are ‘all taxes’ directly on property.

16. Mr. Dhilleswar Rao has, however, relied upon the judgment in Union of India v. State of Punjab (2) AIR 1990 Punjab & Haryana 183 to contend that the MES is exempt from sales tax under the State Sales Tax Act. In that case the Union of India through Railway Department questioned the imposition of road tax under Punjab Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1924. The learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the provisions of Article 285(1) of the Constitution clearly bars the imposition of the tax. It was also observed that the provisions of clause (2) of Article 285 of the Constitution were not applicable. That is a case where the property of the Union was subjected to direct tax and as pointed out above, exemption contemplated under Article 285(1) of the Constitution, is confined to direct taxes only. Therefore, that judgment does not advance the case of the petitioner.

17. The learned counsel next relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Purna Municipal Council (3) (1992) 1 SCC 100 : AIR 1992 SC 1597. In that case Union of India claimed exemption from service charges on the vehicles of the Railways for the period from 1954 to 1960. The Bombay High Court did not accept the defence of the Union of India that no tax could be levied in view of the provisions of Article 285 and Section 135 of the Railways Act. Reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court held that Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act gets saved under Article 285(1) of the Constitution but not under clause (2) of Article 285 of the Constitution. Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act provides taxation of railways by local authorities. That was the case of direct tax on Railways and not the case of any indirect imposition of tax. We have already pointed out that exemption as contemplated under Article 285(1) is in regard to direct taxes but not indirect taxes. Therefore, the above judgment of the Supreme Court would not help the petitioner.

18. For the above reasons, we hold that levying of sales tax on the turn over of MES would not be exempt under Article 285(1) of the Constitution.

19. Lastly it is submitted that supply of goods by M.E.S to the contractor does not amount to sale because M.E.S has supplied the goods for the purpose of its own use but not for the use of the contractor. In other words, what is contended is that the supply of cement and iron was made to the contractor for being utilised in the construction work of M.E.S so the property in the goods did not pass to the contractor. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.M Goel and Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Rajnandgaon (4) AIR 1972 SC 368 we need not elaborately discuss the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as the point is covered and so the contention is liable to be rejected. In that case P.W.D supplied iron, steel and cement to the contractor for use in the construction work which was entrusted to the contractor by P.W.D Clause 10 of the agreement provided that all the material so supplied to the contractor shall remain the absolute property of Government and shall not be removed on any account from the site of the work and shall be at all times open to inspection by the Engineer-in-charge. The. price of the iron and steel so supplied to the contractor was to be deducted from the final bill for the works done by the Contractor as per the terms of the agreement. On considering the said clause, the Supreme Court held that read in the proper light that clause indicated that by use or consumption of materials in the work of construction, there was passing of the property in the goods to the assessee from the P.W.D

20. A Division Bench of this court of which one of us (Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.) was a member in T.R.C No. 256 of 1990, dated February 6, 1996 held that supply of steel, cement and A.C sheets for construction of its own building by the assessee-company to the contractor amounts to “sale” of those goods and the turnover was liable to be taxed. From the above discussion, it follows that the order of the Tribunal has to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside.

21. The T.R.C is allowed but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.