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Gajara Vishnu Gosavi v. Prakash Nanasaheb Kamble And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Sep 16, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed Civil Suit No. 6 of 1987 seeking a declaration of ownership and confirmation of possession over the western half of City Survey No. 83, together with an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering and, if necessary, recovery of possession of the remaining portion. Her title derived from a chain of conveyances beginning with Krishna Kamble, whose sole heir — his granddaughter Housabai — first sold the property to Anjirabai Guruling Kamble (13-1-1976). After Anjirabai’s death, her husband Guruling became owner and later conveyed the property to the appellant by registered sale deed dated 4-7-1984.

The respondents contested, asserting (i) non-joinder of necessary party (Housabai), (ii) absence of partition, and (iii) invalidity of the sale deed. The trial court, after framing issues and taking evidence, held that no partition had occurred; therefore, only undivided interests were transferable and the appellant’s possession was not lawful. The suit was dismissed on 19-12-1991. The first appellate court (Regular Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1992, decided 13-8-1999) and the Bombay High Court (Second Appeal No. 183 of 2000, decided 21-3-2000) affirmed the dismissal. The present Supreme Court appeals challenge those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a vendee of an undivided share in joint property can lawfully obtain and retain exclusive possession without a partition by metes and bounds.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent factual findings that no partition had taken place and the appellant’s possession was therefore unlawful.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • She is a bona fide purchaser for value through a registered sale deed chain and therefore the lawful owner of the western half of the suit property.
  • Her vendor (Anjirabai) had been put in possession by the original heir, and that possession lawfully passed to her.
  • The courts below erred in refusing declaratory and injunctive relief despite documentary evidence and depositions supporting her title and possession.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The suit is defective for non-joinder of a necessary party, namely, Housabai.
  • No partition of City Survey No. 83 ever occurred; hence Housabai had no specific demarcated share to convey.
  • The sale deed relied upon by the appellant is invalid with respect to conferring exclusive possession, rendering her occupation a trespass.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh (1990) 3 SCC 517; AIR 1990 SC 854 A vendee of a co-sharer’s separable share may maintain specific performance; partition is not a legal obstacle because the vendee can seek partition. Reinforced that transfer of an undivided share is permissible but does not automatically confer exclusive possession; partition must follow.
Ramdas v. Sitabai (2009) 7 SCC 444; JT (2009) 8 SC 224 A purchaser of a coparcener’s undivided interest gains only the right to sue for partition, not immediate possession. Relied upon to underscore that the appellant could at best sue for partition; possession without partition is impermissible.
M.V.S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 Purchaser of undivided coparcenary interest cannot obtain possession prior to partition. Cited within Ramdas v. Sitabai and accepted as governing law.
Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh, AIR 1953 SC 487 Same principle: transferee of undivided share gets only a right to partition. Cited within Ramdas v. Sitabai and followed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that all three lower courts had concurrently found that no partition of City Survey No. 83 had ever been effected. Reviewing the record, the Court found no perversity in those findings.

Examining the legal position, the Court surveyed precedent establishing that while an undivided share of joint property may be transferred, the transferee gains merely a right to seek partition, not immediate exclusive possession. It relied on Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh to show that partition is a prerequisite for demarcated possession, and on Ramdas v. Sitabai (along with the earlier decisions in Manikayala Rao and Sidheshwar Mukherjee) to affirm that a purchaser of a coparcener’s undivided interest must institute a partition suit for allotment of share.

The Court further observed that agricultural holdings statutes may restrict fragmentation below prescribed extents, reinforcing the need for formal partition.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that, because partition had not occurred, the appellant’s claim to exclusive possession was untenable. Her remedy, if any, lay in seeking partition rather than declaratory or injunctive relief for exclusive possession. Consequently, there was no legal ground to disturb the concurrent decisions below.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed.

The dismissal affirms the concurrent findings that a transferee of an undivided share cannot assert exclusive possession absent partition. The immediate consequence is that the appellant remains only a co-owner without exclusive rights, and any further relief would require a separate partition action. The decision restates existing principles without creating new precedent.

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Order

1. These appeals have been filed against the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated 21-3-2000 by which Second Appeal No. 183 of 2000 filed by the appellant has been dismissed and judgments and orders of the trial court as well as the first appellate court have been affirmed.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the appellant filed Civil Suit No. 6 of 1987 seeking declaration that she was the owner of the western half part of the suit property i.e City Survey No. 83 and in actual physical possession thereof and further for restraining the respondent-defendants to cause any obstruction to her possession over the said property and also for possession of the other part of the property. The said relief was claimed on the basis that the entire CTS No. 83 was originally owned by Krishna Kamble and Maruti Kamble. Both brothers had been living separately and were using their respective half parts in the suit premises. Krishna Kamble was in possession of the eastern half part of the said property. Krishna Kamble died leaving only one son, Shripati who died leaving only heir i.e daughter Housabai. Maruti had two sons, namely, Genu and Dadu. Dadu died issueless. Genu had three sons, namely, Ganapati, Nana and Shankar. Ganapati died issueless. Shri Prakash Nanasaheb Kamble, Defendant 1 is the son of Nana and Defendant 2 Manik Shankar Kamble is the son of Shankar.

3. The appellant-plaintiff purchased the property of Krishna Kamble from the legal heir Housabai Sitaram Chavan as she became the owner of the said property after the death of her father Shripati. In fact, said Housabai had sold her share to one Anjirabai Guruling Kamble by a registered sale deed dated 13-1-1976. After the death of the said purchaser Anjirabai, her husband Guruling Kamble became the owner of the said property and from him the appellant-plaintiff had purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 4-7-1984. Thus, she claimed the ownership of the property i.e western half part of the suit property.

4. It is further claimed by the appellant-plaintiff that she had spent a huge amount and raised construction of four rooms after taking the permission of the Nagar Parishad. In the absence of the appellant-plaintiff, Respondents 3 and 4-defendants occupied the suit property at the instigation of Respondents 1 and 2-defendants and in spite of several requests the possession of the said property was not handed over to her. Hence, the suit was filed on 4-7-1984 for the aforesaid reliefs.

5. Respondents 1 and 2-defendants contested the suit on various grounds, inter alia, that Housabai was a necessary party. As she had not been impleaded as respondent-defendant, the suit could not be entertained for want of necessary party. The property had never been partitioned. The sale deed executed by Housabai could not be valid and the same was liable to be dismissed.

6. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed various issues, including whether the appellant-plaintiff was in lawful possession and had valid title over the suit property, and as to whether the respondent-defendants had encroached upon the said property.

7. The parties led evidence and after considering the same, the trial court came to the conclusion that no partition had ever taken place. Therefore, Housabai could not claim any specific share in the property. She could be a co-sharer in common and joint possession. As the partition had never been effected, the question of handing over of the possession either to the present appellant-plaintiff or her vendee could not arise. Therefore, her possession was merely a forcible possession and was not valid and the suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 19-12-1991. The trial court observed that at the most on the basis of the sale deed Anjirabai and thereafter appellant-plaintiff could become the owner in common along with respondent-defendants in respect of the suit property but as there was no partition, the appellant-plaintiff could not be in lawful possession. The said findings of fact had been affirmed by the first appellate court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1992 decided on 13-8-1999, as well as by the High Court vide impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal.

8. Shri Vijay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has raised all the issues which had been raised before the courts below and submitted that as the appellant had been a bona fide purchaser for consideration and had been put in possession by her vendee Anjirabai who had purchased the suit property vide registered sale deed from Housabai, the suit ought to have been decreed and has tried to persuade us by taking us through the pleadings as well as the depositions to allow the appeals.

9. Be that as it may, three courts have recorded the concurrent findings of fact that partition had never been given effect to in respect of the suit property. Therefore, Housabai could transfer her share. But the question does arise as to whether without partition by metes and bounds, she could put her vendee Anjirabai in possession?

10. In Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh (1990) 3 SCC 517, AIR 1990 SC 854 this Court held that where the shares are separable and a party enters into an agreement even for the sale of share belonging to the other co-sharer, a suit for specific performance was maintainable at least for the share of the executor of the agreement, if not for the share of other co-sharers. It was further observed:

“6. As regards the difficulty pointed out by the High Court, namely, that the decree of specific performance cannot be granted since the property will have to be partitioned, we are of the view that this is not a legal difficulty. Whenever a share in the property is sold the vendee has a right to apply for the partition of the property and get the share demarcated.”

11. In a recent judgment in Ramdas v. Sitabai (2009) 7 SCC 444, JT (2009) 8 SC 224 to which one of us (Dr. B.S Chauhan, J.) was a party, placing reliance upon two earlier judgments of this Court in M.V.S Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami AIR 1966 SC 470 and Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh AIR 1953 SC 487 this Court came to the conclusion that a purchaser of a coparcener's undivided interest in the joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he had purchased. He has a right only to sue for partition of the property and ask for allotment of his share in the suit property.

12. There is another aspect of the matter. An agricultural land belonging to the coparceners/co-sharers may be in their joint possession. The sale of undivided share by one co-sharer may be unlawful/illegal as various statutes put an embargo on fragmentation of holdings below the prescribed extent.

13. Thus, in view of the above, the law emerges to the effect that in a given case an undivided share of a coparcener can be a subject-matter of sale/transfer, but possession cannot be handed over to the vendee unless the property is partitioned by metes and bounds, either by the decree of a court in a partition suit, or by settlement among the co-sharers.

14. In the instant case, all the three courts below have recorded the finding of fact that there had been no partition of the suit property. Such concurrent finding does not require interference as there is nothing on record to show that it was perverse, being based on no evidence or contrary to the evidence on record.

15. In view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. Appeals are accordingly dismissed.