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Dr. A.K Sabhapathy v. State Of Kerala And Others

Kerala High Court
Oct 14, 1982
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Khalid, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was referred to this Court because the question of law was deemed important with significant consequences for the medical profession. The petitioner is a representative of the Indian Medical Association (Kerala Branch) and approached the Court in that capacity. The respondents include the State of Kerala (1st respondent), the Union of India (2nd respondent), the Bihar D.M.S. Holders' Association of Kerala (3rd respondent), an individual Bihar D.M.S. holder (4th respondent), and others impleaded as interested parties (5th–7th respondents).

Relevant administrative actions and events:

  • Ext. P-1 (8 April 1975) — Registrar of Kerala University informed that Bihar D.M.S. holders could be treated on a par with the integrated D.A.M. of Kerala University for continuing in the profession only.
  • Ext. P-2 (4 May 1977) — Government notification permitting D.A.M. holders in Kerala to practice allopathic medicine, issued under the first proviso to Section 38 of the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners' Act, 1953 (T.C. Act).
  • Ext. P-3 (28 September 1978) — Government order stating Bihar D.M.S. would be held on par with integrated D.A.M. of Kerala University for continuing in the profession only; a request for a notification akin to Ext. P-2 for Bihar D.M.S. holders was rejected by the Government (the order and the rejection are part of the administrative history).
  • O.P. No. 3661 of 1979 — Filed by respondents 3 and 4 against an order of the Kerala University Registrar (Exhibit P-5); this O.P. was disposed of by this Court in Ext. P-7 with a direction to the State to re-consider the representations and pass appropriate orders.
  • Ext. P-8 (13 April 1981) — Following the Court's directions, the State issued a notification under the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C. Act exempting Bihar D.M.S. holders from operation of that Act.

The present original petition challenges the constitutionality of the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C. Act and seeks to quash Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-8.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first proviso to Section 38 of the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners' Act, 1953 (T.C. Act) is constitutionally valid.
  2. Whether Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-8 (government notifications/orders exempting certain diploma/qualification holders from the operation of Section 38) are void for repugnancy with Section 15 (and in particular Section 15(2)(b)) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (the Central Act), and therefore invalid under Article 254 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the first proviso to Section 38 confers arbitrary power in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution (i.e., whether it lacks guidelines/safeguards and is therefore void for arbitrariness).
  4. Whether Bihar D.M.S. holders (a diploma from Bihar) can be permitted to practice allopathic medicine in Kerala notwithstanding the schedules to the Central Act which principally include allopathic qualifications.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The subject of medical practice falls under Entry 26 of List II (State List) and the Central Act (Indian Medical Council Act, 1956) enacted by Parliament governs the field; Section 15 of the Central Act limits enrolment/practice to qualifications listed in its Schedules.
  • Bihar D.M.S. is not included in the schedules of the Central Act; hence D.M.S. holders cannot practice allopathy and any state action (Ext. P-8) exempting them from Section 38 of the T.C. Act conflicts with Section 15 of the Central Act.
  • Where there is inconsistency between state and central laws Article 254 requires the state law to yield; the first proviso to Section 38 insofar as repugnant to Section 15 of the Central Act cannot stand.
  • The first proviso to Section 38 lacks guidelines and is arbitrary, violating Article 14; Exts. P-2 and P-3 are also invalid for being in conflict with the Central Act.

Respondents' Arguments (State and proponents of Exts. P-2/P-3/P-8)

  • The State was bound to reconsider the request pursuant to this Court's earlier judgment (Ext. P-7) and, after consideration and consultation with Kerala University and the Director of Indigenous Systems of Medicine, issued Ext. P-3 and later Ext. P-8 to recognize Bihar D.M.S. holders for practice.
  • The Government examined the Bihar D.M.S. course content (including allopathic subjects) and concluded it was just to recognize Bihar D.M.S. holders similarly to D.A.M. holders (who had been permitted to practice allopathy by Ext. P-2).
  • The exemption under the proviso is limited to practice of the profession (not other fields) and was exercised cautiously; the proviso does not confer arbitrary power in violation of Article 14.
  • The petitioner's belated challenge to Ext. P-2 (issued in 1977) should not be entertained; absent discrimination between Bihar D.M.S. holders and D.A.M. holders, the State's position is defensible.

Respondents 3 and 4 / Other respondents (supporting the State)

  • They endorse the Government's decision and the explanations in the State's counter-affidavit concerning consultation, study of course content, and policy considerations such as unemployment among medical personnel.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 898) The principles under Article 254 regarding repugnancy between Central and State laws: presumption in favour of constitutionality; conditions for repugnancy (clear and direct inconsistency, absolute irreconcilability, impossibility of compliance with both); role of Article 254(2) (presidential assent) and doctrine of pith and substance. The Court adopted the guidelines from this Supreme Court decision to analyse whether the T.C. Act (State law) and the Indian Medical Council Act (Central law) were repugnant. Applying those criteria, the Court found any repugnancy was not absolutely irreconcilable and therefore did not strike down the State proviso or the notification issued under it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages and adhered to the materials and arguments presented in the record:

  1. Challenge to Ext. P-2: The Court first disposed of the petitioner's attack on Ext. P-2 (notification dated 4-5-1977). It held the challenge to Ext. P-2 was time-barred (belated) and that no person who would be affected by invalidation of Ext. P-2 was before the Court. As a result, on grounds of delay and absence of the proper affected parties, the Court declined to quash Ext. P-2 under Article 226.
  2. Statutory definitions and scope: The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. It noted definitions: "medicine" (Section 2(f)) as modern scientific medicine (including surgery and obstetrics), "recognised medical qualification" (Section 2(h)) as those in the schedules, and "State Medical Register" (Section 2(k)). It emphasized that Section 15(1) provides that qualifications in the Schedules suffice for enrolment on State Medical Registers, and Section 15(2)(b) precludes anyone not enrolled on a State Medical Register from practicing medicine in a State.
  3. Character of the Central Act: The Court examined parliamentary debates (Lok Sabha debates) and concluded that the Indian Medical Council Act predominantly concerns allopathic (modern scientific) medicine; although there were arguments to include other systems, the Act as enacted addresses allopathic medicine.
  4. Repugnancy analysis (Article 254): The Court relied on the Supreme Court's guidance in M. Karunanidhi to frame the tests for repugnancy. It noted the presumption in favour of constitutionality and that repugnancy requires (i) clear and direct inconsistency, (ii) absolute irreconcilability, and (iii) impossibility of obeying one without disobeying the other. Absent these conditions, the Courts favour co-existence of State and Central legislation.
  5. Examination of Section 38 of the T.C. Act and its first proviso: Section 38 generally prevents persons not registered under the Act from practising the specified systems. The first proviso allows the Government, by notification, to exempt any person/class/area from Section 38. The petitioner contended the proviso was arbitrary (lack of guidelines). The Court found that the power vested in the Government, coupled with the actual exercise documented in the counter-affidavit (consultation, study of course content, etc.), did not demonstrate an arbitrary conferment of power; the Court was unwilling to strike down the proviso on Article 14 grounds.
  6. Interaction between State power to exempt and Central registration requirements: The Court observed that neither the Central Act nor the T.C. Act forbids a person from being enrolled on two State registers (i.e., in more than one system) if they meet requisite qualifications. It cited Section 47 of the T.C. Act which expressly contemplates that the Government may, by notification, direct that possession of a qualification not entered in the schedule may entitle a person to registration if the Government is satisfied as to the course of study and requisite knowledge and skill.
  7. Conclusion on repugnancy and validity of notification: Applying the Karunanidhi principles, the Court concluded that while there is some repugnancy between the Central Act and the T.C. Act, it is not of a kind that is absolutely irreconcilable. The Court therefore refused to declare the first proviso to Section 38 unconstitutional and upheld Ext. P-8 as validly issued under that proviso. However, the Court emphasized a safeguard: respondents 3 to 7 can practice allopathic medicine only if and when they get themselves enrolled in the State Register for the said medicine.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

O.P. fails and is dismissed.

Direct effects and immediate consequences:

  • The Court declined to quash Ext. P-2 (the 1977 notification permitting D.A.M. holders in Kerala to practice allopathic medicine) because the challenge was belated and no directly affected person was before the Court.
  • The Court held that the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C. Act is not unconstitutional on the grounds argued (neither arbitrary under Article 14 nor repugnant to the Central Act to the extent of being absolutely irreconcilable), and it did not invalidate Ext. P-8 (the notification exempting Bihar D.M.S. holders issued under that proviso).
  • The Court qualified the practical effect: respondents permitted by notification to practice allopathic medicine must obtain enrolment in the State Medical Register for the allopathic system in order to satisfy Section 15(2) of the Central Act — i.e., the permission to practice is to be exercised in conjunction with appropriate registration procedures.

Broader implications discussed by the Court: The Court expressed concern about the attraction of practitioners of indigenous systems to allopathy and urged governmental encouragement and protection of indigenous systems, but the ultimate legal disposition rested on the reasons set out above.

Show all summary ...

Khalid, J.:— This original petition comes before us on a reference by a learned Judge of this Court, since the question of law involved is important and the impact of the decision on it on the medical profession would be serious.

2. The petitioner is a member of the Kerala Branch of the Indian Medical Association, the Convener of the I.M.A Action Committee for Kerala and the Chairman of the Action Committee for Bihar DMS issue. It is in this representative capacity that he has approached this Court.

3. The first respondent is the State of Kerala and the 2nd respondent, the Union of India. The 3rd respondent represents the Bihar D.M.S holders' Association of Kerala and the 4th respondent is a Bihar D.M.S Holder, awarded by the Bihar State Board of Homoeopathic Medicine. Respondents 5, 6 and 7 got themselves impleaded since they were vitally interested in the outcome of the original petition.

4. By Ext. P-1 dated 8th April, 1975 the Registrar of the Kerala University was informed that the Bihar D.M.S holders could be treated on a par with the integrated D.A.M of Kerala University for continuing in the profession only. The D.A.M holders in Kerala, who are diploma holders in the integrated medicine from the Government Ayurveda College, Trivandrum, had requested for practising Allopathic course of treatment and Government issued a notification dated 4th May, 1977 Ext. P-2 by which the Government granted the request made by the Association. This was issued by virtue of the proviso to Section 38 of the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners' Act, 1953 (Act IX of 1953) for short, the T.C Act. By Ext. P-2, the D.A.M holders in Kerala were permitted to practice in Allopathic medicine. The State Government passed an order dated 28-9-1978, evidenced by Exhibit P-3, wherein it was stated that the D.M.S awarded by the Government of Bihar will be held to be on par with the integrated D.A.M of the Kerala University for continuing in the profession only. Thereafter the 3rd respondent approached the Government with a request for a notification similar to Ext. P-2 in respect of Bihar D.M.S holders also. This request was rejected by the Government order dated 28-9-1978. The request was repeated and the Government struck to the stand by rejecting the request again by Ext. P-4 dated 20-9-1978. The matter was taken up with the Kerala University also. The stand of the University was that the D.M.S of Bihar University had not been recognised as equivalent to Diploma course of Kerala University for purposes of higher course of studies. Thereafter respondents 3 and 4 filed O.P No. 3661 of 1979 before this Court evidenced by Ext. P-6, impugning the order of the Kerala University Registrar (Exhibit P-5). That O.P was disposed of by this Court by Ext. P-7 judgment with a direction to the first respondent to re-consider the question raised by the petitioner in their two representations and to pass appropriate orders. The State Government pursuant to the directions by this Court issued a Notification, Ext. P-8, dated 13-4-1981 in exercise of the powers contained in the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C Act, exempting Bihar D.M.S holders from the provisions of that Act. The present O.P is filed to strike down the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C Act as unconstitutional and to quash Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-8 orders.

5. The grounds urged in support of the contention of the petitioner are as follows. The medical practice and other professions are covered by Entry 26 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, for short the Central Act, passed by Parliament covers this field. Section 15 of the said Act refers to the right of persons possessing qualifications in the Schedules to that Act to be enrolled in a State Medical Register. Persons who are entitled to practice modern medicine and surgery have to be enrolled in a State Medical Register. The schedules in that Act do not take in Bihar D.M.S Diploma and therefore D.M.S holders are not entitled to practice allopathy. The provisions of the T.C Act can be implemented only subject to the provisions of the Central Act. Ext. P-8 notification issued under the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C Act offends Section 15 of the Central Act. The inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and by the State Legislature is a matter directly covered by Article 254 of the Constitution of India. When there is inconsistency, the State law should yield place to the central enactment to the extent of repugnancy. The first proviso to S. 38 of the T.C Act, in so far as it is repugnant to Section 15 of the Central Act cannot therefore stand. In the absence of previous assent of the President, the first proviso to S. 38 of the Act and Ext. P-8 notification issued under it cannot have validity and cannot be enforced. The first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C Act does not contain any guidelines for its exercise. The proviso is thus arbitrary in nature and hence violative of the provisions in Article 14 of the Constitution. Exts. P-2 and P-3 are bad for the reason that they also offend the provisions contained in the Central Act.

6. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent, it is stated that the Government was under an obligation for a de novo consideration of the request made by the 3rd respondent since this Court by Ext. P-7 judgment had directed it to do so. The Government felt that it was only just that the D.M.S holders of Bihar should also be recognised since the D.A.M of Kerala University was recognised by it. Since the D.A.M holders of the Kerala University were permitted to practice modern medicine, the Government did not see any reason why the D.M.S holders of Bihar should not also be permitted to practice modern medicine and exempt them from the operation of Section 38 of the T.C Act. Ext. P-3 order was passed by the Government after mature consideration and in consultation with the University of Kerala and the Director of Indigenous Systems of Medicine. The Government paid due consideration to the allopathic subjects taught for the Bihar D.M.S course. The exemption is limited to the practice of profession alone and it is not extended to other fields. The first proviso to Section 38 does not confer any arbitrary power on the Government and it has been exercised only with due care and caution. It is further reiterated in the counter-affidavit that in taking the decision with regard to holders of Bihar D.M.S Diploma, the Government has been guided by the contents of the course undergone by them in matters like unemployment among medical personnel etc. raised in the writ petition. Ext. P-2 notification was issued in 1977. The belated challenge of the petitioner against Ext. P-2 should not be entertained. If that be so, there is no reason why Bihar D.M.S holders should be discriminated against the D.A.M holders of Kerala.

7. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents 3 and 4, the stand taken by the Government has been endorsed. To the same effect is the averment contained in the counter-affidavit filed by the 5th respondent.

8. We will first dispose of the challenge by the petitioner against Ext. P-2. Ext. P-2 came into force on 4-5-1977. This writ petition is presented on 25th June, 1981. The challenge against Ext. P-2 cannot be accepted not only for the reason that the challenge is belated but for the additional and more important reason that no one who will be affected by the invalidation of Ext. p-2 is before this Court. By Ext. P-2, the D.A.M holders of Kerala were exempted by the Government from practising allopathic medicine. In the absence of any such person on the party array, it is neither permissible nor lawful for this Court to adjudicate upon this question in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We, therefore, decline the relief to quash Ext. p-2 made by the petitioner in this Original Petition.

9. What then remains is the challenge against Exts. P-3 and P-8. In this connection, it is necessary to understand the scope of the relevant provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the T.C Act. Section 2(f) defines “medicine” as modern scientific medicine in all branches and includes surgery and obstetrics but does not include veterenary medicine and surgery. Section 2(h) defines “recognised medical qualification” as any of the medical qualifications included in the schedules. Section 2(k) defines “State Medical Register” as a register maintained under any law for the time being in force in any State regulating the registration of practitioners of medicine. This original petition and the contentions raised therein have to be disposed of primarily with reference to Section 15 of the Central Act. Section 15(1) of the Central Act reads:

“15. Right of persons possessing qualifications in the Schedules to be enrolled—Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act the medical qualifications included in the Schedules shall be sufficient qualification for enrolment on any State Medical Register.”

Section 15(2)(b) is also relevant, which is extracted:

“(2) Save as provided in Section 25, no person other than a medical practitioner enrolled on a State Medical Register….

(b) shall practice medicine in any State.

10. At the outset, we may state that the schedule to the Act does not contain any of the qualifications in homoeopathy, Ayurveda, Unani or Siddha systems. In other words, the schedule to the Act concerns itself mainly with allopathic medicine. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Act concerns itself only with modern scientific medicine which is the other name for allopathic medicine. It has nothing to do either with homoeopathic or other indigenous systems of medicine. Since respondents 3 to 7 were not enrolled as practitioners in allopathic medicine in the State Medical Register, they cannot under Section 15(2) be allowed to practice allopathic medicine in Kerala. The exemption granted by Ext. P-8 notification is thus directly in conflict with the mandate contained in Section 15(2)(b) of the Central Act.

11. The Government Pleader and the counsel for respondents 3 to 7 put forward a forceful fight to meet this contention saying that the definition of medicine in Section 2(f) of the Central Act would take in both homoeopathy and indigenous systems of medicine, for, it would be devaluing those systems to exclude them from the expression ‘modem scientific medicine’. With this contention, they plead that if any one of them has been enrolled in the State Medical Register, they satisfy the conditions laid down in Section 15(2)(b) which stipulates only enrolment in a State Medical Register to practice medicine.

12. This question was debated at the bar at some length. This necessitated further investigation into this aspect of the case with reference to the parliamentary debates when this Act was on the anvil. The learned counsel for the petitioner made available to us the Lok Sabha debates. We have gone through the debates fairly in detail. We find on a close study of the debates that the Indian Medical Council Act concerns itself only with the allopathic medicine and the modern scientific medicine that is contemplated by it is the allopathic medicine. Though the debate contained very valuable and useful speeches, trying to place other systems of medicines also on equal footing as the allopathic medicine, the ultimate result that emerges from the discussion is what we have indicated above. But this observation of ours cannot dispose of this petition. We will have still to examine how far the plea of repugnancy and the attempt of the petitioner to defeat the rights of respondents 3 to 7 could be sustained.

13. The question of repugnancy came up for discussion at the hands of the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. We do not think it necessary to refer to all of them but would rest content by referring to the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 898). In that decision, Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the constitution Bench observed as follows at page 902 thus:

“It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Art. 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in list I, i.e, the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e, the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circumstances:—

1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.

2. Where, however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on any Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Art. 254.

3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the Entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act, it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.

4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Art. 254.

So far as the present State Act is concerned, we are called upon to consider the various shades of the constitutional validity of the same under Art. 254(2) of the Constitution.”

The discussion is summed up by the learned Judge in para 24 of the judgment, which reads:

“It is well settled that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing the Act to prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima facie, there does not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied—

1. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act.

2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.

3. That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.”

The guideline afforded by the Supreme Court to consider the question of repugnancy and to resolve the said question is seen above. Unless there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Acts, the Courts will always lean in favour of a co-existence between the two Acts. The same is the position when an apparent inconsistency is not one which is absolutely irreconcilable and the third condition laid down is that the inconsistency between the two Acts should be of such a nature that compliance with one would be impossible without disobeying the other.

14. With these guidelines we will consider the provisions of the T.C Act vis-a-vis the Central Act. It cannot be disputed that the T.C Act and the Central Act cover the same field and are legislations on item 26 of List in of the Seventh Schedule. Sec. 2(g) of the T.C Act defines ‘practitioner’ as any person ordinarily engaged in the practice of modem medicine or homoeopathic medicine or indigenous medicine, as the case may be; Section 2(k) defines “register” as a register of practitioners maintained under the Act, and S. 2(1) defines “registered practitioner” as a practitioner whose name is for the time being entered in a register. Section 23 of the T.C Act deals with eligibility for registration; Section 24 about registration fee and S. 27 about application for registration. Section 28 deals with removal from the registers by Council and S. 30 about Annual List of practitioners. Section 38 occurring in Part III bears the caption “Medical Practitioners Generally” and stipulates that no person other than those registered under the Act shall practice. The first proviso to it is important and therefore we read S. 38 with the first proviso;

“38. No person other than (i) a registered practitioner or (ii) a practitioner whose name is entered in the List of Practitioners published under S. 30 or (iii) a practitioner whose name is entered in the list mentioned in Section 25 shall practice or hold himself out, whether directly or by implication, as practising modem medicine, homoeopathic medicine, or ayurvedic medicine, siddha medicine or unani tibbi medicine and no person who is not a registered practitioner of any such medicine shall practise any other medicine unless he is also a registered practitioner of that medicine.”

“Provided that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, direct that this section shall not apply to any person or class of persons or to any specified area in the State where none of the three classes of practitioners mentioned above carries on medical practice.”

This section thus prevents a homoeopathic practitioner to practice allopathic medicine unless he is also a registered practitioner of that medicine. This embargo is whittled down by the first proviso. This proviso gives the Government power by issuance of a Notification in the Gazette, to exempt class or classes of persons from the rigour contained in Sec. 38. The attack against this proviso is that it is arbitrary. We will consider this attack. It is contended that this proviso does not contain any built-in safeguards or guidelines for its exercise. It may appear to be so. But we cannot ignore the fact that the authority who is to exercise power under this proviso is the Government. We will have to assume, as is usually done in such cases, that this power will be exercised by the Government only with extreme caution and care. The counter-affidavit filed by the Government contains sufficient averments that it was after deep study or the course of study of the Bihar D.M.S holders and after consultation with the concerned authorities that the Notification was issued. We do not find in the proviso a conferment of an arbitrary power on the Government. The fact that the power vests in the Government is itself a sufficient safeguard. The attack on the proviso on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Art. 14 cannot be sustained.

15. Now about the scope of the proviso. The Central Act does not lay down any qualification for registration. All that Section 15 says is that a person whose name is not seen in the State Register shall not practice medicine. The proviso in question does not in terms say that a person whose name is not on the rolls of the State Register in one system can practice another system. The proviso only exempts practitioners who want to practice one system without being in the concerned list from the operation of Section 38. Neither the Central Act nor the T.C Act contains any provision which prohibits a person who satisfies the authorities that he possesses the requisite qualification to practice two systems from getting enrolled on two State rolls. If that is so, a practitioner can be a registered practitioner in two registers. The Central Act does not place en embargo on a State from recognising qualifications for the purposes of two systems, due regard being given to the course of study and subjects taught, for such qualification. If that is possible, nothing prevents a State Government from permitting a practitioner to be on two rolls. Such a situation appears to be what S. 47 of the T.C Act contemplates. It would be useful to read Sec. 47 of the T.C Act in full:

“47. If it shall appear to the Government, on the report of the appropriate Council or otherwise, that the course of study and examinations prescribed by any of the medical schools or colleges or bodies conferring the qualifications described in the Schedule are not such as to secure the possession by persons obtaining such qualifications of the requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient practice of their profession, or if it shall appear to the Government, on the report of the appropriate Council or otherwise, that the course of study and examinations prescribed by any medical school or college or body conferring a qualification not entered in the schedule are such as to secure the possession of by persons obtaining such qualification of the requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient practice of their profession, it shall be lawful for the Government, from time to time, by notification in the Gazette, to direct that the possession of any qualification entered in the schedule shall not entitle any person to registration under this Act, or to direct that the possession of any qualification not entered in the schedule shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, entitle a person to be so registered, as the case may be, and the schedule shall thereupon be deemed for all purposes to be altered accordingly.”

This section states, among other things, that if the Government is satisfied that the course of study and examinations prescribed by any medical school or college, though not entered in the schedule are such as to secure the possession by persons obtaining such qualifications of the requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient practice of their profession, such persons can be permitted to be registered by the issuance of a notification in the Gazette. The effect of the section, as we see it, is the conferment of power on the Government to permit enrolment of persons who satisfy it of having secured qualifications with requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient practice of their profession, to be enrolled not only in one State Register but in more than one. If respondents 3 to 7 are enrolled both in the homoeopathic register and the allopathic register, a challenge against their practising both the systems will not lie. But they are not enrolled in the State Register for allopathic medicine, What falls for consideration is whether in the absence of their names in the allopathic register the petitioner's claim to quash Exhibit P8 notification should be granted or not.

16. While we see that there is some repugnancy between the Central Act and the T.C Act in our view that repugnancy is not one that is absolutely irreconcilable. If respondents 3 to 7 get themselves enrolled in the State Register for allopathic medicine, they will satisfy S. 15(2) of the Central Act to practice that medicine. In the nature of the contentions raised, we are not therefore inclined to hold either that the first proviso to Sec. 38 is unconstitutional or that the notification Ext. P8 issued thereunder is invalid. The notification is strictly in consonance with the first proviso to Section 38 of the T.C Act. The only safeguard necessary is to observe that respondents 3 to 7 can be permitted to practice allopathic medicine only if and when they get themselves enrolled in the State Register for the said medicine. The first respondent appears to be interested in giving due encouragement both to the Ayurvedic medicine and homoeopathic medicine, as is seen in its counter-affidavit. We are sure that when applications are made by respondents 3 to 7 to be enrolled in the allopathic register, they would be considered in the spirit of the averments contained in the counter-affidavit

17. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the writ petitioner is not entitled to succeed. O.P fails and is dismissed. No costs.

Before parting with this case, we wish to express our concern at the undue attraction that the allopathic system invites at the hands of persons practising homoe and other indigenous systems of medicine and indirectly down-grading their own systems. No system can claim superiority over other systems. Each system has its own peculiarities, efficaciousness and healing powers. Ayurvedic system is ancient. Nature has provided indigenous herbs with power to heal dreadful diseases. It is want of research that has stunted the ayurvedic system. Equally so the Unani and other indigenous systems. Homoeopathy also has its own efficacy. Undue attraction for allopathy that the other systems display may in due course destroy the systems which were in vogue for centuries. We hope and wish that the Government will give due encouragement to the indigenous systems of medicine and not allow them to die out because of negligence and indifference.

Petition dismissed.