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Pokarmal Radhakishan v. Mustt. Radha Devi Agarwalla
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation originates from Title Suit No. 44 of 1967, in which the plaintiffs (opposite parties) sought eviction of the defendant (the present revision petitioner) from certain premises on the ground of bona fide requirement for residential-cum-business use for plaintiff No.2 (who was a minor when the suit was filed). The defendant contested the suit and denied the bona fide requirement, alleging alternatively that the suit was a device to effect an unlawful rent enhancement from Rs. 160 to Rs. 250 per month.
Procedurally, the dispute reached this Court in 1973 as a second appeal. On application of the plaintiffs and by reference to an earlier decision (L.P.A. No. 11 of 1976), the second appeal was converted into a revision petition by order dated 21.4.1980 and renumbered as Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980. This Court remanded the case to the learned appellate court with directions (including setting a date for appearance). The appellate court disposed of the appeal by judgment and decree dated 6.6.1984, deciding issue No. 6 ("Whether the suit rooms are bona fide required by the plaintiffs?") in favour of the plaintiffs, thereby affirming the Munsiff's judgment and decree. The defendant then filed the present revision petition challenging the appellate court's finding on issue No. 6.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit rooms are bona fide required by the plaintiffs (issue No. 6 of the suit).
- In the context of a revision petition, whether the High Court should or may interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below (including whether subsequent events occurring during the pendency of proceedings ought to be taken into account).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Petitioner (defendant) — Mr. N.M. Lahiri
- The evidence regarding bona fide requirement is meagre and not sufficient to prove issue No. 6 as required by law.
- Reliance on this Court's decision in Manas Kamal Bhowal v. Satyandra Ch. Gupta: if there is absence of bona fide requirement in evidence or plaintiff fails to prove genuine need, the Court lacks jurisdiction to pass an eviction decree under section 5(1) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act.
- The appellate court's conclusions are wrong because there is no clear and cogent evidence about particulars showing genuine need; the burden of proof lies on the plaintiffs.
- The plaint lacks full and sufficient particulars as to who will manage the proposed shop (plaintiff No.1 being described as "pardanashin"); no person was examined to show management arrangements.
- Reliance on the Supreme Court decision Mst. Boga Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan to challenge the plaintiffs' case.
- Submitted that plaintiffs failed to bring to the trial court's notice that plaintiff No.2 had become major, and that the need that existed when suit was filed has since changed so there is no existing need now.
Respondents / Plaintiffs — Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee
- The bona fide requirement pleaded was for plaintiff No.2 (a minor at suit filing) to have premises for future business; plaintiff No.2 has since become major and can now conduct the business himself — this subsequent event may be considered by the Court.
- Reliance on Pasupulati Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders and Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina to support the proposition that courts should have regard to facts arising after lis if they have a fundamental impact on relief and may mould relief accordingly.
- Emphasised that in revision this Court has limited jurisdiction and should not reappreciate evidence or reassess facts unless a jurisdictional error appears; the existence or non-existence of bona fide requirement is essentially a factual finding.
- Pointed out that the change in status (plaintiff No.2 attaining majority) had been brought to this Court's notice earlier in Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980 by affidavit under Order 151 CPC and was recorded by this Court when disposing that revision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf ((1976) 1 SCC 128 : AIR 1975 SC 1758) | Illustration that rent control law is a source of lengthy litigation; used to contextualise the long pending nature of such disputes. | Referenced to illustrate that this suit, originating in 1967 and long pending, is an example of protracted litigation under rent control laws. |
| Manas Kamal Bhowal v. Satyandra Ch. Gupta ((1982) 1 GLR 653) | Held that if there is absence of bona fide requirement in evidence or plaintiff could not prove genuine need, the Court lacks jurisdiction to pass eviction under section 5(1) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act; decision on bona fide requirement must be conclusive on evidence. | Relied upon by petitioner to argue insufficiency of proof; Court acknowledged the principle and applied it as the legal standard for assessing the plaintiffs' burden of proof on bona fide requirement. |
| Pasupulati Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders ((1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409) | Proposition that facts arising after lis which fundamentally affect relief should be brought to tribunal's notice and considered; equity may permit procedural flexibility to promote substantial justice. | Invoked by respondents to support consideration of subsequent events (e.g., plaintiff No.2 attaining majority) when deciding relief. |
| Mottulal v. Radha Lal ((1974) 2 SCC 365 : AIR 1974 SC 1596) | Interpretation that the word "required" means need (not mere desire); landlord must show genuine requirement to start/continue business; clarifies "bona fide required". | Applied in construing clause (c) of section 5(1) of the Assam Act: "bona fide required" denotes genuine, pressing and honest need rather than mere desire. |
| Mst. Boga Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan ((1979) 1 SCC 273 : AIR 1979 SC 272) | Interpretation of "reasonable requirement" and "own occupation" in the context of the J&K Act; held that "own occupation" need not be narrowly interpreted as personal physical possession by landlord. | Relied on by the petitioner; the Court discussed this authority but distinguished the Assam Act's wider wording (section 5(1)(c) also covers persons for whose benefit the house is held). |
| Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina ((1985) 1 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 207) | Reiterates that courts must have regard to events as they present when hearing the proceeding and mould relief in light of those events. | Relied upon by respondents to argue that the Court may consider the fact that plaintiff No.2 attained majority and shape relief accordingly; Court accepted that subsequent events could be relevant. |
| Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ((1981) 3 SCC 103 : AIR 1981 SC 1711) | When eviction is sought for personal requirement, the need must be shown to exist at the date of appellate decree or when a higher court deals with the matter; subsequent events that nonsuit the landlord must be examined and may be pleaded by the tenant. | Applied to support the proposition that courts (including appellate courts) must examine subsequent events affecting the landlord's requirement and mould relief; supports tenant's right to point out changed circumstances before decree becomes final. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court structured its analysis around section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act (as substituted in 1972) and the meaning of the phrase "bona fide required". The Court emphasised that section 5 places fetters on a landlord's right to evict and that a decree for recovery of possession cannot be made unless the conditions of section 5 are satisfied.
The Court discussed the legal meaning of "bona fide required" (drawing on Mottulal v. Radha Lal): "bona fide" denotes genuine and honest intention; "required" signifies need rather than mere desire. The landlord bears the burden of showing a genuine requirement.
Turning to the evidence, the Court noted that the learned appellate court had quoted relevant portions of the plaintiffs' evidence, in particular plaintiff No.1's testimony that the suit house "belongs to Pradip Kumar Agarwalla" (the minor) and that "the house is required by me ... in order to open a shop in the name of Pradip Kumar" to make provision for his future. The Court also set out paragraph 5 of the plaint, which pleaded the bona fide requirement for residential purposes and for starting a separate and independent business for plaintiff No.2.
The Court addressed the petitioner's contentions in turn: it accepted that pleadings alone are not evidence and that the plaintiff must support plaint averments with cogent and reliable evidence; however, the Court found that plaintiff No.1's oral testimony sufficiently corroborated the plaint's assertions and established genuine need. The Court acknowledged the petitioner's point about lack of particulars as to shop management (given plaintiff No.1's described seclusion), but found the evidence adequate because the stated purpose was to provide for the minor's future business and independence on attaining majority.
The Court also examined whether subsequent events — specifically, plaintiff No.2's attainment of majority — should affect the court's view. It observed that this fact had been brought to the Court's notice previously (in Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980 by affidavit) and relied on precedents (Pasupulati, Variety Emporium, Hasmat Rai) to conclude that courts may and should consider subsequent events if they fundamentally affect the relief sought. The Court therefore treated the subsequent event as a proper matter for consideration but found that there had been no change of circumstances that would defeat the plaintiffs' need.
The Court reiterated the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction: the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the courts below except in cases of grave jurisdictional error. Having reviewed the evidence quoted by the appellate court and the plaint, and after applying the tests drawn from the cited authorities, the Court concluded that the concurrent findings on bona fide requirement were convincing and supported by cogent evidence.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the revision petition. The core ruling is stated as: petition is dismissed.
Implications:
- The impugned judgment and decree of the learned appellate court (dated 6.6.1984), which decided issue No. 6 in favour of the plaintiffs and affirmed the Munsiff's decree in Title Suit No. 44 of 1967, stand affirmed.
- The plaintiffs were held to have discharged the burden of proving bona fide requirement of the suit premises; the Court found no jurisdictional defect warranting interference in revision.
- The parties were directed to bear their own costs in this Court, and the case records were ordered to be sent down to the Court below.
- No new legal principle or precedent was stated to be laid down by this opinion; the decision operates to confirm the courts below on the facts and law as applied in this case.
1. The defendant is the revision petitioner who has been untiringly fighting out an eviction suit since 1967 when the opposite parties as plaintiffs brought the Title Suit No. 44 of 1967 against the petitioner seeking for eviction from the premises in question. The dispute between the parties entered the premises of this Court in the year 1973 in the shape of a second appeal wherein the plaintiffs were the appellants. However, on the application of the plaintiffs and in view of the decision of this Court in L.P.A No. 11 of 1976, the second appeal was converted to a revision petition by the order dated 21.4.80 and was renumbered as Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980. This Court while deciding the said revision petition, remanded the case back to the appellate Court below with the following direction:
“The learned appellate Court below will dispose of the case on considering the evidence what are available on record. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate court are set aside. While remanding the case, I direct that the parties should appear before the appellate Court on 21.11.83…
2. The learned appellate Court accordingly disposed of the appeal by the impugned judgment and decree dated 6.6.84 and dismissed the appeal of the present petitioner (defendants) by deciding the issue No. 6 in favour of the plaintiffs-respondent. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff in favour of the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 44 of 1967 stood affirmed. Therefore, the defendant has again approached this Court by this r???vision petition for relief. The legal dispute in this revision petition as raised by the petitioner centres round the issue No. 6, which runs as follows:
“Whether the suit rooms are bona fide required by the plaintiffs?”
3. After remand, the appellate court expressed the concurrent view with that of trial Court holding that the suit rooms are bona fide required by the plaintiffs.
4. This is a long pending matter and the entire dispute of the parties centres round the only one legal issue since 1967: Whether the plaintiffs could prove that they require the suit premises bona fide? In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf , as reported in (1976) 1 SCC 128 : AIR 1975 SC 1758, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the rent control law has been a rich source of lengthy litigation in the country and the present case is also an illustrative one which originated in the year 1967 and has not come to an end till now.
5. In nut-shell, the facts of this litigation may be narrated as follows: The opposite parties, who were plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 44 of 1967 in the Court of Munsiff at Sibsagar, sought for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises mainly on the ground of bona fide requirement for the plaintiffs' use and occupation for their residential-cum-business purposes. The main plea of the plaintiffs that the plaintiff No. 2, a minor son of plaintiff No. 1, got the suit premises after partition between their family members and the plaintiffs require the suit premises for separate and independent businses for the use and benefit of the minor plaintiff No. 2. This requirement and use is necessary to make both present and future provision for plaintiff No. 2 and to give him a footing to stand upon when he would become major. The plaintiffs pleaded that on being requested, the defendant failed to vacate the premises and that gave a cause of action for the plaintiff's to institute the suit. The suit was contested tooth and nail by the defendant. In the written statement the defendant also denied the contentions made by the plaintiffs. The defendant also denied the plea of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs. The defendant further averred that the plaintiffs illegally wanted to raise the rent from Rs. 160/- to Rs. 250/- per month and the defendant having refused to comply with the proposal made by the plaintiff No. 1 regarding enhancement of rent, the suit was filed to evict the defendant. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to an many as seven issues, out of which issue No. 6 was the focal point for contest between the parties.
6. Mr. N.M Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner, while criticising the impugned judgment and decree of the learned appellate court below has urged before me that the evidence as regards bona fide requirement being meagre in substance, the learned appellate Court ought to have held that the plaintiffs could not prove issue No. 6 as required to be proved under the law and as such the impugned judgment and the consequent decree are liable to be set side. In the above context, Mr. Lahiri has drawn my attention to a decision of this Court rendered in Manas Kamal Bhowal v. Satyandra Ch. Gupta, as reported (1982) 1 GLR 653, In Manas Kamal (supra) this Court held that if the Court finds absence of any bona fide requirement in evidence or that the plaintiff could not prove the genuine need, the Court cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction under the provisions of section 5(1) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. It was also held that the decision on the issue of bona fide requirement must be conclusive on the basis of the evidence on record. If the plaintiff failed to prove the genuine need in respect of the suit premises, and if the provision of section 5(1)(c) is not satisfied by the evidence on record, the Court cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant. The next submission of Mr. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the conclusions reached by the learned appellate Court below on the basis of the evidence on record appears to be wrong inasmuch as there is no clear and cogent evidence on record about particulars for any genuine need. The burden of proof, no doubt, lies on the plaintiff to prove bona fide reqirement. Now the main consideration is as regards the finding of the learned appellate Court below in the light of the evidence on record as to whether the plaintiffs could prove bona fide requirement to get a decree for eviction of the defendant.
7. Mr. J.P Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has pleaded before me that the bona fide requirement as stated in the plaint was for the plaintiff No. 2, who was a minor at the time of filing the suit and that too for keeping the provision for his business in future. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel that by this time the plaintiff No. 2 has become major and is capable of conducting the business by himself alone. Therefore, this subsequent event may also be considered by the Court. My attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pasupulati Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, ((1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409). It was observed by their Lordships as follows:
“If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances.”
8. It has been further pleaded by Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, that this being a revision application, this Court has limited jurisdiction and shall not enter into the facts either for the purpose of fresh assessment or for reappreciation of the evidence. The findings as to the existence or non-existence of any bona fide requirement or genuine need is a pure finding of fact and in exercising a revisional jurisdiction this Court shall not interfere with those findings if no jurisdictional error arises in the record.
9. The contour of power of High Court under section 115 C.P.C to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact is no longer res-integra. In catena of cases their Lordships of the Supreme Court issued mandate that the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts and to remove the defects of facts mainly on the basis of evidence Howsoever gross that may be, if it does not touch the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the case itself. The High Court has limited power in the field of its revisional jurisdiction and except in cases of grave jurisdictional error, the High Court shall not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below if no miscarriage of justice and grave injury is caused to the party. The core question to be decided in this revision petition is “whether the plaintiffs could prove the bona fide requirement”. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to set out hereinbelow the material provisions of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1966 as substituted by the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, for short ‘the Act’:
“5. (1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house:—
(c) where the house is bona fide required by the land lord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the land lord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court, or …. ….”
10. The provisions, of the Act puts fetters on the right of the landlord to evict his tenant from the premises occupied by him with a view to protect the interest of the tenant. The landlord cannot evict a tenant by virtue of a decree if any of the conditions of section 5 is not satisfied. The crucial words in clause (c) of section 5(1) are “bona fide required”. The word “bona fide” connot???s genuine need and honest intention. The words “bona fide required”, therefore, connotes that the landlord genuinely, pressingly and honestly needs the premises in question for his use. On the word “required” the Supreme Court observed that the word “required” signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be element of need and the landlord must show, the burden being upon him that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. (See Mottulal v. Radha Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 : AIR 1974 SC 1596).
11. Let me now apply the test to the f???ts of the pre sent case. The learned appellate Court in the impugned judgment has referred few portions of the evidence on record. The learned appellate Court did consider the evidence of the plain tiffs on Issue No. 6 and quoted the following relevant evidence in this connection:
The plaintiff No. 1 stated in her evidence:
“The suit house in the instant case belongs to Pradip Kumar Agarwalla. He is aged 7 (seven) years now. I maintain the properties falling in the share of Pradip ….”
“The house is required by me. It is being required in order to open a shop in the name of Pradip Kumar, The shop is necessary to be started in order to make provision for the future of Pradip Kumar. ….”
12. Mr. N.M Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner has streneously urged before me that no particular averments are made in the plaint as regards requirement of the suit premises. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, the plaintiffs state:
“5. The house in suit is bone fide required by the plaintifft both for residential purpose and starting a separate and independent business for the use and benefit of the minor plaintiff No. 2. This has become necessary because as an incident of partition amongst the family members of the plaintiffs and by virtue of a gift of the house in suit, amongst others, the house in suit is the only place for the plaintiff No. 2 where he can be separately, conveniently and independently maintained by starting and carrying on an independent business on his account at Sibsagar Town. This requirement and use are also necessary to make both present and future provision for the minor plaintiff No. 2 and to give him a footing to stand upon when he will become an adult.”
13. In my opinion, the plaintiffs have sufficiently stated in the aforementioned paragraph No. 5 of the plaint about the need of the suit house for their use and occupation. The pleadings cannot be treated as evidence, but the contentions made in the plaint are to be supported by cogent and reliable evidence. The plaintiff is the best person to say about the bona fide requirement of the suit premises. Plaintiff No. 1, the mother of plaintiff No. 2, while deposing had specifically stated about the requirement and from her evidence it is crystal clear that they had a genuine need. Mr. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted before me that there is no full and sufficient particulars in the plaint as to who and how the shop will be managed and nobody has been examined who would be entrusted to manage the shop, the plaintiff No. 1 being a ‘Pardanashin’ lady. But it is seen in evidence that for the interest of the minor (plaintiff No. 2), the plaintiff No. 1 wanted to open a shop in the suit premises in order to provide the plaintiff No. 2 with an independent business when the plaintiff No. 2 would become major. The witness, defendant No. 1, in his evidence could not say if the house was required to open a shop to make provision for Pradip, the plaintiff No. 2. Mr. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on another decision of the Supreme Court (Mst. Boga. Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan) as reported in (1979) 1 SCC 273 : AIR 1979 SC 272. While dealing with the provisions of J. & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (34 of 1966) their Lordships had the occasion to interpret the meaning of ihe words “reasonable requirement” as laid down in section 11(1)(h) of the said Act. In paragraph 18 of the judgment, their Lordships held:
“Having regard, therefore, to the circumstances mentioned above, we are unable to subscribe to the view that the words ‘own occupation’ must be so narrowly interpreted so as to indicate actual physical possession of the landlord personally and nothing short of that. We, therefore, overrule the argument of the respondents on this point.”
14. It was further held by their Lordships “that the whole-object of the Act is to provide for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings etc. and section 21 specifically enumerates the grounds which alone will entitle a land lord to evict his tenant”. Here, in our case, the provisions of the Act are worded differently. In section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Act the bona fide requirement does not only relate to the land lord alone, but also to such person for whose benefit the house is held. It does not stop there. It further provides that if the landlord could show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court, the landlord can get recovery of possession of any house by virtue of a decree. If the Court is satisfied that the landlord has proved bona fide requirement or even on any other satisfactory cause, he can get a decree for eviction of the tenant. In course of argument it is further submitted by Mr. Lahiri that the plaintiff No. 2 (opposite party No. 2) became major, but the plaintiffs failed to bring to the notice of the Court that fact and furthermore the need which existed at the time of filing of the suit has changed its course and as such there is no existing need for the suit premises in question. This point has been sufficiently replied by Mr. J.P Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite party. It is submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee that in the ear lier proceedings in this Court, namely, in Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980, this fact was brought to the notice of the Court by filing an affidavit in support of the application under section 151 of the C.P.C and this Court passed an order while disposing of the Civil Revision No. 84 of 1980, stating inter alia that the plaintiff No. 2 (opposite party No. 2 hereto) has attained majority during the pendency of the second appeal. The next question is to consider as to whether the Court can take into consideration the subsequent events. Reliance has been placed by Mr. J.P Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the opposite party on a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Variety Emporium v. V.R.M Mohd. Ibrahim Naina., as reported in (1985) 1 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 207, where their Lordahips have held:
“No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to event? as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of those events.”
15. In Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 : AIR 1981 SC 1711, their Lordships have held:
“When an action is brought by a landlord for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement, the landlord's need must not only be shown to exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from Court to Court, if subsequent events occur which, if noticed would nonsuit, the landlord, the Court has to examine and evaluate those events and mould the decree accordingly, The tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement of the landlord no more exists by pointing out such subsequent events, to the Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be incorrect to say that as a decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant,. he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. The tenant can be precluded from so contending on when a decree or order for eviction has become final.”
16. The original theme of the plaintiffs' suit for eviction of the defendant was based on section 5(1)(c) of the Act. It was averred in the plaint, supported by evidence, that for the minor son of plaintif No. 1 the suit house was necessary in order to open a shop which would be continued by the plain tiff No. 2 even after his attaining majority. There was no chance of any discontinuance, nor any change of events occurred after the plaintiff No. 2 became major. The concurrent finding of fact of both the Courts below as regards bona fide require ment appears to be convincing based on evidence on record. I, therefore, do not find any material to interfere with those concurrent finding of fact. The plaintiffs could prove with cogent and reliable evidence about their bona fide require ment of the suit premises and in the light of the decisions as alluded above. I am convinced that the plaintiffs have pr???ved their genuine need for the suit premises in question and they had been able to fulfil the conditions by discharging the burden. Therefore, the contentions of Mr. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted on the facts and circumstances of the case. I do not find any material to interfere with the findings of the learned appellate Court below on issue No. 6. This revision petition has no merit.
17. In the result, the petition is dismissed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court. Send down the case records to the Court below.
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