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Vishal Yadav v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court
Jul 25, 2003
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Umeshwar Pandey, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is an accused in murder case Crime No. 192 of 2002 (Police Station Kavi Nagar, District Ghaziabad) who filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the appointment of respondent No. 4 (Sri S.K. Saxena) as Special Public Prosecutor under section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to conduct the trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiyala House Courts, New Delhi.

The Sessions trial was transferred by the Apex Court from the Court of Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad to the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiyala House Courts, New Delhi. After transfer, respondent No.1 appointed respondent No.4 as Special Public Prosecutor (whereas earlier the job had been assigned to a Public Prosecutor at Ghaziabad). The petitioner challenged that appointment on several grounds and sought quashing of the appointment and a mandamus to prevent respondent No.4 from appearing as Special Public Prosecutor in the trial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointment of respondent No.4 as Special Public Prosecutor was valid under section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given the requirement that the appointee "has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years."
  2. Whether the deeming provision in sub-section (9) of section 24 (which deems service as Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor, etc., to be practice as an advocate for the purposes of sub-sections (7) and (8)) is applicable to respondent No.4 and whether it can be used to count his service with the Central Bureau of Investigation as qualifying experience.
  3. Whether sub-section (9) of section 24 is in conflict with the Advocates Act or Article 14 of the Constitution, and thus liable to be declared ultra vires.
  4. Whether respondent No.4 was disqualified by age under the U.P. Legal Remembrancer Manual (Para 7.08 of Chapter VII) which prescribes an age ceiling of 62 years for appointment as State counsel.
  5. Whether the appointment was made arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations (including the allegation that respondent No.4 solicited appointment by writing to the Secretary, Chief Minister), and whether the remuneration fixed for respondent No.4 was excessive and unreasonable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Respondent No.4 did not possess the requisite qualification under sub-section (8) of section 24 (i.e., he was not in practice as an advocate for ten years); his enrolment with the Bar Council was only in 1994 after he laid down his office as Legal Advisor with the CBI.
  • The period during which respondent No.4 worked as Legal Advisor/Public Prosecutor in the CBI could not be counted as practice even by resort to the deeming clause in sub-section (9) of section 24.
  • Respondent No.4 was in full-time employment with the CBI and therefore could not be deemed a practising advocate within the meaning of sub-section (8).
  • The appointment contravened the U.P. Legal Remembrancer Manual (Para 7.08, Chapter VII) which disqualifies State counsel who have attained 62 years of age; respondent No.4's date of birth (23.11.1936) placed him above that age.
  • The appointment violated the Advocates Act and Article 14 of the Constitution and was made arbitrarily or on extraneous consideration (including an allegation that respondent No.4 solicited appointment by writing to the Chief Minister's Secretary).
  • The remuneration fixed for respondent No.4 was exorbitant and unreasonable.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Sub-section (9) of section 24 should be interpreted to allow periods of service as Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor, or other prosecuting officers to be deemed as periods of practice as an advocate for the limited purpose of appointment under sub-section (8); it does not alter the statutory meaning of "Advocate" under the Advocates Act.
  • The enabling deeming clause of sub-section (9) is not violative of the Advocates Act or Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Impliedly, previous appointments and notifications (including post-1978 appointments) show practical acceptance of the deeming provision by governments when making such appointments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India Elaboration of the expression "judicial officer" in Article 217(2)(a) with reference to the meaning of "judicial service" under Article 236(b). The court held that the principle in Kumar Padma Prasad concerning the meaning of "judicial officer" was not applicable to the present context of the meaning of "Advocate" under sub-section (8) of section 24 because sub-section (9) contains a specific deeming provision for purposes of appointment as Special Public Prosecutor.
Satish Kumar Sharma v. The Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh (JT 2001 1 SC 236) Addressed the availability of the exception in paragraph 2 of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975, and held that a full-time salaried employee governed by service rules could not claim the exception; enrolment as an Advocate could be terminated. The court distinguished this case: Satish Kumar Sharma dealt with entitlement to practice and retention of enrolment for a full-time salaried employee, whereas the present dispute concerns the limited deeming provision in sub-section (9) for appointment as Special Public Prosecutor; hence the principle in Satish Kumar Sharma was held not to attract the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying sub-sections (8) and (9) of section 24 of the Code as the relevant statutory provisions governing appointment of Special Public Prosecutors. It reproduced both sub-sections: sub-section (8) requires that the Central or State Government may appoint a person who "has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years" as Special Public Prosecutor; sub-section (9) contains a deeming provision that service as a pleader or as a Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor/other prosecuting officer shall be deemed to be practice as an advocate for the purposes of subsections (7) and (8).

The court noted the legislative history: prior to the 1978 amendment (Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1978), sub-section (6) of section 24 limited appointments to advocates who had been in practice for ten years. The 1978 amendment inserted the deeming clause (now sub-section (9)) so that periods of service in prosecutorial roles could be treated as practice for purposes of appointment under sub-section (8).

On constitutionality and statutory conflict: the court held that the deeming provision in sub-section (9) does not conflict with the Advocates Act or Article 14 of the Constitution. The legislative purpose of sub-section (9) was to take advantage of the special prosecutorial experience of persons who served as Public Prosecutors or Legal Advisors, enabling governments to appoint them as Special Public Prosecutors in appropriate cases. The deeming clause was described as limited in scope—it does not change the general statutory definition of "Advocate," nor does it permit a serving Public Prosecutor or Legal Advisor to practice in courts in violation of service rules. Its purpose is confined to qualifying such persons for appointment under sub-section (8).

The court distinguished the precedents relied upon by the petitioner: Kumar Padma Prasad (which interpreted "judicial officer") was said not to assist because the present question concerns an express deeming clause in the CrPC and not the statutory meaning of "Advocate" drawn from the Advocates Act; Satish Kumar Sharma was distinguished because it dealt with entitlement to practice and retention of enrolment for a full-time salaried employee under the Bar Council Rules, whereas the present case concerns a limited deeming provision enabling appointment as Special Public Prosecutor.

On the facts, the court observed that respondent No.4 had a long experience as Legal Advisor/Public Prosecutor in the CBI and subsequently, after laying down that office, had enrolled and actively practised as an advocate (enrolment noted in 1994). The court also relied on multiple post-1978 notifications/appointments (annexures) showing respondent No.4 had been appointed on several occasions as Special Public Prosecutor by Central and Delhi administrations pursuant to the same provisions; these demonstrated the practical application of sub-section (9).

Regarding the allegation of arbitrariness and the mode of appointment: the court recorded that the appointment followed an endorsement/direction of the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister on respondent No.4's letter of 23.10.2002 and that the record did not show prior scrutiny by the Law Department. The court criticized that practice as unusual and suggested that the Government should not adopt a method of appointment that ignores relevant norms, but it did not quash the appointment on that ground.

On remuneration, the court reviewed the draft notification and the letter of respondent No.4 which set out fee heads: one-time fee Rs.25,000; per-day fee plus clerical and junior attendant fees totaling Rs.14,300; conferencing fee Rs.2,200 per conference; plus travel and daily allowances. The court characterized the daily expenditure (over Rs.16,000 besides the one-time fee) as "quite exorbitant" and exercised its supervisory discretion to reduce the per-day charges (see orders below).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed and the appointment/notification dated 26.11.2002 appointing respondent No.4 as Special Public Prosecutor was not quashed.

Implications and immediate consequences stated by the court:

  • The court held that sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code is not ultra vires the Advocates Act or Article 14 of the Constitution and may be used, for the limited purpose provided, to deem service as prosecuting officer to be practice as an advocate for appointment as Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (8).
  • The appointment of respondent No.4 (who had extensive prosecutorial experience and later practised as an advocate) could not be successfully challenged on grounds of non-eligibility or arbitrariness; hence his appointment stands.
  • As to remuneration, the court directed that the Government (respondent No.1) reduce the per-day appearance charge (including clerical charges and fees of a junior) payable to respondent No.4 by Rs.8,000 from the total daily expenditure previously fixed (which the court found to be in excess of Rs.16,000 per day). If respondent No.4 refuses the reduced terms, respondent No.1 is at liberty to engage other suitable counsel to prosecute the trial.
  • The court expressed disapproval of the appointment procedure by endorsement without appropriate Law Department scrutiny and suggested that the Government should not follow such a practice in future, though it did not annul the appointment on that basis.

The opinion does not set aside the legislative deeming provision nor create a new constitutional precedent invalidating subsection (9); instead it affirms the validity and limited application of subsection (9) and applies that provision to uphold the impugned appointment while moderating the remuneration awarded.

Show all summary ...

Umeshwar Pandey, J.:— The petitioner an accused of murder case crime No. 192 of 2002, Police Station Kavi Nagar district Ghaziabad, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor, under section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the ‘Code’) to conduct the trial of the aforesaid case before the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiyala House Court, New Delhi.

2. It is stated that by an order, the Apex Court on the petition of the complainant of the case directed transfer of the Sessions Trial from the Court of Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Patiyala House Courts, New Delhi. The respondent No. 1, while had assigned the job of prosecuting the trial earlier to one Public Prosecutor at Ghaziabad, it later on appointed the respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct and prosecute the case when it was transferred from Ghaziabad to the Courts at New Delhi. The petitioner has taken several grounds for challenging tine appointment of respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor and stated that the respondent No. 4 wrote a letter to the Secretary, Chief Minister for soliciting his appointment; that the appointment of respondent No. 4 is not in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code as he lacked qualifications of the practice at Bar as an Advocate for a period of ten years and that his appointment was in contravention to the rules and regulations contained in Chapter VII of the U.P Legal Remembrancer Manual Para-7.08 of Chapter VII of the aforesaid Manual provides that no one would be eligible for appointment as State counsel after attaining the age of 62 years and the date of birth of respondent No. 4 being 23.11.1936 had already attained the aforesaid maximum age of 62 years long before his present appointment under challenge. It is though provided under sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code yet no serving officer would be deemed to be in practice as an Advocate. It would be violative to the Advocates Acts as well as Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the enabling sub-section (9) as aforesaid could not be attracted in the case of present appointment of respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 had been in full time employment of the Central Bureau for Investigation as Legal Advisor/Public Prosecutor and he could not be deemed to be a practising Advocate within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code the petitioner has thus, contended that the aforesaid appointment of respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the case against the petitioner on behalf of the State of U.P is wholly arbitrary and has been made on extraneous consideration. It being illegal and against the provisions of section 24(8) of the Code, should be quashed and a mandamus commanding the respondents should be issued by the Court that respondent No. 4 be not treated as Special Public Prosecutor to appear and conduct the aforesaid criminal case before the Additional Sessions judge, Sri S.N Dhingra at Patiyala House Courts, New Delhi.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner while arguing the matter before us, has in the first place challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor in the said murder case on the ground that he does not possess requisite qualifications for such appointment under sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code. He is not an Advocate having experience of ten years practice as is enrolment as such with the Bar Council, Delhi was done only in the year 1994 when he laid his office of legal advisor with C.B.I on his retirement Learned Counsel has also emphasized that the period during which the respondent No. 4 worked as Legal Advisor/Public prosecutor in the C.B.I, could not be counted even with the help of deeming clause of sub-section (9) to be a period spent in practice as an Advocate. The enabling clause of sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code would not legally be available in the matter of respondent No. 4.

4. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents while replying to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner in the aforesaid context has tried to make the provisions of sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code threadbare and has stressed that this enabling clause does not go to alter the meaning/definition of word ‘Advocate’ as has been projected in the Advocates Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further emphasised that this sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code is also not violative to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

5. sub-sections (8) and (9) of section 24 of the Code are the relevant provisions for the purposes of appointing a person as Special Public Prosecutor by the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. The provisions of the aforesaid two sub-sections (8) and (9) of section 24 of the Code are reproduced below:—

“(8) The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor.

(9) For the purposes of sub-section (7) and sub-section (8), the period during which a person has been in practice as a pleader, or has rendered (whether before or after the commencement of this Code) service as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer, by whatever name called, shall be deemed to be the period during which such person has been in practice as an advocate.”

6. The provisions of sub-section (9) aforesaid were not available in the Code prior to the Cr. P.C (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Act No. 45 of 1978), which became applicable with effect from 18.12.1978 In the pre-amendment period sub-section (6) of section 24 of the Code dealt with such appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor. The said sub-section (6) of the Code was as below:—

“(6) The Central Government or the State Government may appointment, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, an Advocate who has been in practice for not less than ten years, as a Special Public Prosecutor.”

7. From the above, we find that prior to 1978 amendment the Central Government or the State Government, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, could appoint a person as Special Public Prosecutor only if he has been in practice for not less than ten years as an Advocate. Such appointment of a person having rendered service as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor or as an Assistant Public Prosecutor or other prosecuting officers etc. was not possible. By virtue of 1978 amendment this enabling clause of sub-section (9) was added and the expedience of the persons having been in service as Public Prosecutor etc. was deemed to be an experience of practice as an Advocate. This sub-section however, does not appear to have come in conflict with the provisions of the Advocates Act. It is only with a view of taking benefit of the experience of a person serving as Public Prosecutor etc. for a long drawn period of time, this amendment was introduced and the appointment of such person as Special Public Prosecutor has been facilitated. It is not to the effect to altogether change the definition of Advocate as appearing in the Advocates Act. The Public Prosecutor or Legal Advisor working on full time basis with any department or corporation of the Government does have special experience in the prosecution branch and if by virtue of adding sub-section (9) aforesaid to the Code, the benefit of such experience was sought to be taken by the Legislature for prosecuting a special case or group of cases by such persons, the said amendment or addition in the Code could not be taken to have come in conflict either with the provisions of the Advocates Act or with Article 14 of the. Constitution of India. This deeming clause of sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code also does not confer a serving Public Prosecutor/Legal Advisor etc. a liberty to practice in Courts as an Advocate. The meaning given to the functions of a Public Prosecutor in sub-section (9) as an Advocate, is confined only for the purposes of appointment of such person as Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code. It has absolutely no other significance as to occasion a conflict between this sub-section (9) and the provisions of the Advocates Act or Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

8. Before 1978 amendment, the emphasis under sub-section (6) of section 24 of the Code was on the candidate being an Advocate in practice and not in practice as a Government servant. The underlying object in enacting the provisions of sub-section (6) was that only an Advocate of ten years standing and experience at the Bar should be chosen for appointment as a Special Public Prosecutor. It could not then be attributed to the Legislature that, when it implied the language ‘an Advocate who has been in practice for not less than ten years’; it intended that even a full time employee of the Government governed by service rules would also be eligible or would satisfy the requirement of sub-section (6) of section 24 of the Code. This intent/view of Legislature however, on further consideration by it was not found tenable thus, only the amended section 24 of the Code has come into existence. After such amendment, the earlier view/intent of the Legislature was given a gobye. The period of service of a person as a Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor, Assistant Public Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer by whatever name called, has been deemed to be the period during which such person has been in practice as an Advocate. This deeming provision added to the Code being not in any manner in conflict with the provisions of Advocates Act and Article 14 of the Constitution of India, cannot be said to be violative of those provisions. sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code thus, is not liable to be declared ultra vires.

9. The petitioner's learned Counsel to support his submission, in the aforesaid context has cited the case law of Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India,1 and the case of Satish Kumar Sharma v. The Bar Council of Himanchal Pradesh . JT 2001 1 SC 236..

10. In Kumar Padma Prasad's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has elaborated upon the expression “judicial officer” as used in Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution of India and has given its meaning with the help of the expression “judicial service” as defined under Article 236(b) of the Constitution of India. But in the present context while deriving meaning of the word “Advocate” used in sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code, we have not to go and borrow the expression and its meaning as defined in section 2(a) of the Advocates Act, because the expression finds a deeming provision under sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code for the purposes of enabling a person having experience of service as Public Prosecutor etc. for being appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by the Government under sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code. Therefore, the principle of law, which is available in the aforesaid case of Kumar Padma Prasad (supra) is of no application in the present facts situation of the case. In Satish Kumar Sharma's case also the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the availability of the benefit of the exception contained in para 2 of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 has held that a person getting fixed salary under the employment of a corporation governed by service rules could not get the benefit of the said exception and his enrolment as an Advocate with the Bar Council is liable for termination. In this case the very enrolment with the Bar Council and entitlement of a full time salaried employee to practice as an Advocate before the Court was under challenge. Under these circumstances, the person under full time employment with a corporation seeking benefit of the exception of Rule 49 aforesaid has been refused that benefit by the Apex Court. It was not in the nature of such a dispute as we are having in the present case. The facts situation of the present case thus, do not attract application of principle of law laid down in Satish Kumar Sharma's case (supra).

11. The respondent No. 4 having a long experience of working as Legal Advisor/Public Prosecutor with Central Bureau of Investigation and after laying down his office actively practicing in the Courts of law as an Advocate, has it been appointed as Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code, there is no scope to challenge his such appointment on the ground of non-eligibility or arbitrariness.

12. Besides the above, the respondent No. 4 through his Supplementary Affidavit, has filed several copies of Notifications in Annexures-B and C which go to show that he on many occasions, by the Central Government and the administration of Union Territory of Delhi, was appointed as Special Public Prosecutor under the aforesaid provisions of sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code as well as under sub-section (I) of section II of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. These Notifications are of post amendment dates of 1978 when sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code had already come into existence. Obviously, these appointments of the respondent No. 4 while he was in service and thereafter have been made by the respective Governments with the aid of the enabling clause of sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code. Therefore, the present appointment of the respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (8) of section 24 of the Code, it has been made with the aid of sub-section (9) of section 24 of the Code, the same does not appear to be arbitrary or illegal. He is having long experience of conducting cases for the prosecution before the Courts in Delhi. His appointment as Special Public Prosecutor by respondent No. 4 in any case does not appear to be illegal or irrational.

13. From the side of the petitioner, an argument in respect of arbitrary fixation of remuneration payable to respondent No. 4 was advanced and it has been contended that the remuneration made permissible to Sri S.K Saxena, is extremely exorbitant and unreasonable. The details of remuneration that have been made admissible to Sri S.K Saxena find place in the draft notification of Greh (Police) Anubhag-3. This notification is part of the record of Law/Home Department of the Government of respondent No. 1. On our having summoned the aforesaid record of the appointment of Sri S.K Saxena, the same has been made available for perusal. The aforesaid notification and the letter of Sri S.K Saxena dated 6.11.2002 show that the remuneration payable to respondent No. 4 has been divided in severed heads. The one time fees is the sum of Rs. 25,000/- whereas per day fees, clerical charges and junior attending Court is Rs. 14,300/-. The conferencing fees for each conference is Rs. 2,200/-. This fees is besides the travel and daily allowance, which has been claimed by Sri Saxena towards his remuneration. It appears that the Government of respondent No. 1 has consented to such demand of fees of Sri Saxena and it has been duly notified. The per day appearance of respondent No. 4 to conduct the trial of the murder case entails an expenditure of about more than Rs. 16,000/- besides the one time fees of Rs. 25,000/-. This definitely appears to be quite exorbitant and we hereby direct that instead of taxing he Government exchequer so unreasonably the respondent No. 1 would reduce per day appearance charge including the clerical charges and the fees of junior of respondent No. 4 in the aforesaid Sessions Trial case by Rs. 8,000/- from the total of the aforesaid daily expenditure of Rs. 16,000/-. In case, the respondent No. 4 expresses his reluctance on agreeing to such term and condition of the reduced remuneration, the respondent No. 1 would be at liberty to engage some other suitable Counsel to prosecute the trial.

14. The record dealing with the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Special Public Prosecutor in the aforesaid murder trial of Nitish Khatara also shows that the appointment of Sri Saxena was made in pursuance of an endorsement/direction of Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister. This endorsement was made on the letter of Sri Saxena dated 23.10.2002 It appears that without making any scrutiny as to the suitability of the person for such appointment through the Law Department, the Government Orders dated 24.10.2002 were taken out. It is unusual and we accordingly suggest that the Government should not adopt such method of appointment by ignoring all the norms.

15. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case that the respondent No. 4 possess due qualification and experience for his such appointment as Special Public Prosecutor in a sensational murder case, we are not inclined to quash his appointment/Notification dated 26.11.2002 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) and the writ petition as such having no merits, is hereby dismissed.