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Dharam Singh v. Karnail Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (original plaintiff) had obtained a decree from the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kharar on 25-9-1997 declaring him owner of the suit property by extinguishment of the defendants’ equity of redemption and restraining the defendants from transferring the property. The defendants’ first appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Ropar on 25-10-1999. The defendants then filed Second Appeal No. 285 of 2000 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed that second appeal, set aside the concurrent findings of the two lower courts and dismissed the suit. The present civil appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in allowing a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 without first formulating a substantial question of law as required by sub-sections (3)–(5) of that provision.
- Whether the proviso to Section 100(5) CPC permits the High Court to decide a second appeal in the absence of any prior formulation of a substantial question of law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The High Court allowed the second appeal without formulating any substantial question of law, contrary to the mandatory language of Section 100 CPC.
- Because the statutory pre-condition was unmet, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
- Additional grounds on the merits were raised, but they were not discussed in detail in the opinion.
Respondents' Arguments
- The memorandum of appeal before the High Court already disclosed substantial questions of law; the High Court therefore acted within its powers in deciding the appeal.
- Even if no question had been formally framed, the proviso to Section 100(5) CPC permits the High Court to decide the appeal on “any other substantial question of law.”
- The High Court, having examined the entire record, rightly concluded that the suit should be dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 | High Court must formulate a substantial question of law before interfering in second appeal. | Cited to affirm that reversing a first appellate decree without such formulation is impermissible. |
| Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 | Section 100 CPC confines second-appeal jurisdiction to substantial questions of law; factual re-appraisal is barred. | Used to underline the limited jurisdiction of the High Court. |
| Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430 | Reiterates mandatory nature of framing substantial questions of law. | Referenced as consistent authority. |
| Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359 | Explains procedural steps in Section 100: stating, formulating and hearing on substantial questions of law. | Quoted to stress statutory sequence that was ignored by the High Court. |
| Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005) 7 SCC 667 | Further reiteration of Section 100 requirements. | Cited as additional supporting precedent. |
| Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair (2005) 12 SCC 588 | Same principle on necessity of substantial questions of law. | Referenced for consistency. |
| Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat (2006) 6 SCC 271 | Continues the line of authority on Section 100 compliance. | Cited to reinforce the legal standard. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted a textual analysis of Section 100 CPC, reproducing its key sub-sections. The Court observed that the High Court’s judgment contained no formulation of a substantial question of law, nor any indication that the appeal was heard on such a question. Citing multiple precedents, the Court reiterated that:
- Sub-section (3) requires the memorandum of appeal to state the substantial question of law.
- Sub-section (4) obliges the High Court, when satisfied that such question exists, to formulate it.
- Sub-section (5) mandates that the appeal be heard only on the questions so formulated.
The Supreme Court clarified that the proviso to sub-section (5) operates only after at least one substantial question of law has been formulated; it cannot cure the complete absence of any formulated question. Because the High Court bypassed these statutory steps, its judgment was held to be legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and remitted Second Appeal No. 285 of 2000 to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with Section 100 CPC. The appeal was allowed on these terms, with no order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reinforces the mandatory procedural framework of Section 100 CPC. High Courts must (1) ascertain the existence of a substantial question of law, (2) formally frame that question, and (3) confine the hearing to it. Failure to comply will result in the appellate decree being set aside. The ruling does not establish a new substantive precedent but reiterates and consolidates existing jurisprudence on second-appeal procedure.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the second appeal filed in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”).
3. The second appeal was filed by the respondents before the High Court questioning correctness of the judgment and decree dated 25-10-1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ropar. The learned Additional District Judge had dismissed the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 25-9-1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kharar, vide which the suit of the present appellant, who was the defendant in the suit was decreed.
4. The suit was filed for a declaration to the effect that the plaintiff had become owner of the suit property by way of extinguishment of equity of redemption qua the rights of the defendants and further with consequential relief of restraining the defendants from transferring the suit property in favour of anybody, as detailed in the head note of the plaint. The respondents contested the suit and filed written statements. Four issues were framed and evidence was laid. After considering the evidence brought on record, the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kharar, vide judgment and decree dated 25-9-1997 decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, appeal was filed before the first appellate court, which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by judgment and decree dated 25-10-1999.
5. As noted above, the defendants filed the second appeal. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and the suit was dismissed. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the second appeal was dismissed without formulating any question of law, which is a mandatory requirement of Section 100 CPC. Several other points on the merits of the case were also urged.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that on considering the memorandum of appeal and the grounds indicated therein, the High Court had allowed the second appeal and, therefore, there was nothing wrong. It is stated that after considering the materials on record, the High Court had recorded its findings that the suit deserves to be dismissed.
7. It is further submitted that though no substantial question of law was formulated before the second appeal was adjudicated, yet that is permissible, because the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code permits the High Court to decide a second appeal on a different substantial question of law subject to recording of reasons.
8. Section 100 of the Code deals with “second appeal”. The provision reads as follows:
“100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
9. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.
10. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 this Court in para 10 has stated thus:
“10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so.”
11. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.”
The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430.
12. In Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359 it was observed thus:
“6. In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100.”
13. The position was highlighted by this Court in Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005) 7 SCC 667, Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair (2005) 12 SCC 588 and in Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat (2006) 6 SCC 271.
14. The plea about the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 instead of supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes against them. The proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression “on any other substantial question of law” clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question.
15. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside, we remit the matter to the High Court so far as it relates to Second Appeal No. 285 of 2000 for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
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