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Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust And Others v. A.G Syed Mohideen And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents filed OS No. 13 of 2006 before the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore, invoking Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). They sought, inter alia, a direction that the second appellant reimburse all sums spent after 20-6-2005 in violation of a supplementary trust deed and an order to convene a trust meeting for approval of the trust’s income and expenditure.
Appellants 2-4 submitted a memo contending, on the strength of the Madras High Court decision in P.S. Subramanian v. K.L. Lakshmanan (2007 5 MLJ 921), that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and that the suit should be transferred to the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. On 1-8-2007 the District Judge rejected the memo, holding he had jurisdiction because the suit was valued at Rs 10 lakhs.
The appellants’ revision before the Madras High Court was dismissed on 25-4-2008. They then approached the Supreme Court by way of special-leave appeal, the sole question being whether District Courts in Tamil Nadu possess jurisdiction to try suits under Section 92 CPC despite State Government Notification G.O.Ms. No. 727 dated 8-3-1960 empowering Subordinate Judges’ Courts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the State Government’s 8-3-1960 notification issued under Section 92(1) CPC, District Courts in Tamil Nadu cease to have jurisdiction over suits concerning public charitable or religious trusts filed under Section 92 of the Code.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Prior to 8-3-1960, District Courts (the “principal civil court of original jurisdiction”) had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 92.
- The 1960 notification, by empowering Courts of Subordinate Judges, substituted those courts in place of District Courts; consequently, District Courts no longer possess jurisdiction.
- The word “or” in Section 92 (“in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government”) should be read as substitutive, not alternative, as held in P.S. Subramanian.
Respondents' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.S. Subramanian v. K.L. Lakshmanan (2007 5 MLJ 921) | Interpreted “or” in Section 92 CPC as substitutive, implying exclusive jurisdiction of courts notified by the State Government. | Expressly disapproved; Supreme Court held the interpretation incorrect. |
| Annamalai Chettiar v. Solaiyappa Chettiar, AIR 1935 Mad 983 | Recognised concurrent jurisdiction of District Courts and other courts empowered by State notification under Section 92. | Relied on to reaffirm concurrent jurisdiction. |
| Dakor Temple Committee v. Shankerlal, AIR 1944 Bom 300 | Same principle of concurrent jurisdiction under analogous circumstances. | Cited approvingly. |
| R. Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal, AIR 1962 Mad 450 | Supported the view that both courts share jurisdiction when so empowered. | Cited approvingly. |
| Pazhukkamattom Devaswom v. Lakshmikutty Amma, 1980 KLT 645 | Further authority for concurrent jurisdiction. | Cited approvingly. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began with the canon that statutory text should be read in its plain, ordinary sense unless such reading yields ambiguity or absurdity. Section 92 states that a suit may be instituted “in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered … by the State Government.” The Court found the language clear and unambiguous: “or” denotes an alternative, conferring a choice of forums, not a substitution.
The legislature’s object was twofold: (1) depart from the general rule in Section 15 CPC that suits be filed in the lowest competent court by enabling District Courts to handle trust disputes; and (2) alleviate workload by allowing State Governments to authorise additional courts. Reading “or” as substitutive would nullify this scheme and produce anomalies—e.g., no forum would exist for Section 92 suits valued below Rs 1 lakh if Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act were applied.
Section 92 is a self-contained jurisdictional provision. Consequently, pecuniary limits in Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act and venue provisions in Sections 15-20 CPC do not control suits under Section 92. District Courts and courts empowered by State notification therefore possess concurrent jurisdiction, irrespective of the suit value.
The Court criticised the single-judge decision in P.S. Subramanian for overlooking earlier Madras and other High Court judgments consistently recognising concurrent jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Principal District Judge, Cuddalore, is to proceed with the suit expeditiously.
Implications: The decision clarifies that, in Tamil Nadu and by parity of reasoning elsewhere, District Courts retain jurisdiction over suits filed under Section 92 CPC even after the State empowers subordinate courts. Section 92 suits may thus be initiated either in the District Court or in a court specified by State notification, irrespective of pecuniary limits. The ruling overrules the contrary view expressed in P.S. Subramanian but does not establish a new legal doctrine; it reaffirms established jurisprudence on concurrent jurisdiction.
R.V Raveendran, J.— Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and respondents. We have also heard the learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and the Registrar General of the Madras High Court to whom notices had been issued in regard to the interpretation of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short) with reference to the State Government Notification GOMs No. 727 dated 8-3-1960.
2. The respondents instituted a suit (OS No. 13 of 2006) on the file of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against the appellants under Section 92 of the Code, seeking a direction to the second appellant to repay all the amounts spent by him after 20-6-2005 contrary to the terms of the supplementary deed of trust, and also to convene the trust meeting for approval of the income and expenditure and other consequential reliefs. Appellants 2 to 4 herein filed a memo before the District Court stating that having regard to the decision of the Madras High Court in P.S Subramanian v. K.L Lakshmanan (2007) 5 MLJ 921 the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit under Section 92 of the Code and therefore the suit may be transferred to the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. The learned District Judge rejected the said memo by order dated 1-8-2007 holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs 10 lakhs.
3. The revision filed by the appellants, challenging the said order of the District Court, was dismissed by the Madras High Court by the impugned order dated 25-4-2008. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a District Court in the State of Tamil Nadu, does not have jurisdiction to try a suit under Section 92 of the Code.
4. Section 92 relates to public charities. It enables a suit being filed in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, “in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate”.
5. Section 2(4) of the Code is extracted below, while defining the term “district”, in effect defines the term “District Court”:
“2. (4) ‘district’ means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a ‘District Court’), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court;”
6. Section 9 of the Code provides that the courts shall (subject to the provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Sections 15 to 19 of the Code deal with place of suing. Section 15 requires every suit to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it.
7. Section 6 of the Code deals with pecuniary jurisdiction and provides as follows:
“6. Pecuniary jurisdiction.—Save insofar as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction.”
8. Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 (for short “the Civil Courts Act”) empowers the State Government to fix, and from time to time vary, the local limits of the jurisdiction of any District Court or Subordinate Judge's Court under that Act. Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act (as amended by Amendment Act 1 of 2004), deals with the jurisdiction of the District Judge and the Subordinate Judge is extracted below:
“12. Jurisdiction of District Judge or Subordinate Judge in original suits.—The jurisdiction of a District Judge extends, subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds five lakh rupees. The jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge extends, subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure to all like original suits and proceedings of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds one lakh rupees but does not exceed five lakh rupees.”
9. By a Notification dated 8-3-1960 issued in exercise of power under Section 92(1) of the Code, in supersession of the Judicial Department Notification No. 719 dated 17-10-1910, the Governor of Madras invested all courts of the Subordinate Judges in the State of Madras with jurisdiction under the Code in respect of suits relating to trusts created for public purposes of a charitable and religious nature.
10. The appellants submit that on a true interpretation of Section 92 of the Code, the District Court as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district had jurisdiction to try suits relating to public trusts till 8-3-1960, having regard to the provisions of Section 92 of the Code; and that once the State Government issued a notification in exercise of power under Section 92 empowering courts of the Subordinate Judges to entertain suits under Section 92, the District Court ceased to have jurisdiction to try suits under the said section. In support of their contention, they strongly relied upon the decision of a learned Single Judge in P.S Subramanian (2007) 5 MLJ 921 wherein it was held that the word “or” occurring between the words “may institute a suit in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction” and “in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government” in Section 92 of the Code, should have to be read as substitutive and not as disjunctive or alternative.
11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be.
12. Section 92 provides that a suit under that section can be instituted “in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government”. (emphasis supplied) When it is read in a normal manner, it means that the suits under Section 92 should be filed in the District Court or in the subordinate court. When the language is clear and unambiguous and when there is no need to apply the tools of interpretation, there is no need to interpret the word “or”, nor any need to read it as a substitutive word, instead of its plain and simple meaning denoting an “alternative”.
13. Assuming that there was any need for applying the principles of interpretation, let us next consider whether the word “or” was used in Section 92 of the Code in a substitutive sense. It is clear from Section 92 of the Code that the legislature did not want to go by the general rule contained in Section 15 of the Code that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating to public trusts. The intention of the lawmakers was that such suits should be tried by the District Court. At the same time, the lawmakers contemplated that if there was heavy workload on the District Court, the State Government should be enabled to empower any other court (within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject-matter is situate), also to entertain such suits. Therefore, the word “or” is used in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice.
14. The provisions of Section 92 do not give room for interpreting the word “or” as a substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when the Government notified any other court, such notified court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District Court. If the intention was to substitute the court empowered by the State Government in place of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, instead of the words “may institute a suit in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government”, the following words would have been used in the section:
“may institute a suit in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, or when any other court is empowered in that behalf by the State Government, then in such court empowered by the State Government,”
“may institute a suit in the court notified by the State Government”.
15. The provisions of Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act specifying the pecuniary limits of District Courts and subordinate courts, is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the express provisions of Section 92 specifying the courts which will have jurisdiction to entertain suits under that section, neither the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act will apply to such suits. Section 92 is a self-contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to suits under that section does not depend upon the value of the subject-matter of the suit. Therefore, insofar as the suits under Section 92 are concerned, the District Courts and subordinate courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits.
16. We find that the learned District Judge had held that he had jurisdiction because the value of the subject-matter was Rs 10 lakhs, apparently keeping in view, Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act. We make it clear that the pecuniary limits mentioned in Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not apply to suits under Section 92 of the Code. In fact, if Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the jurisdiction of courts with reference to suits under Section 92 of the Code, it will then lead to the following anomalous position: the District Court will have jurisdiction if the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs 5 lakhs. The subordinate court will have jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs 1 lakh but does not exceed to Rs 5 lakhs. That would mean that a suit under Section 92 of the Code, where the subject-matter does not exceed Rs 1 lakh, cannot be filed in any court as Section 92 confers jurisdiction only on District Courts and subordinate courts. This obviously was not intended. Be that as it may.
17. We do not therefore approve the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in P.S Subramanian (2007) 5 MLJ 921 which ignores the earlier decisions of that Court and decisions of the other High Courts which have consistently taken the view that where jurisdiction is also conferred on any other court by the State Government by a notification (under Section 92 of the Code or under any similar provision), then that court and the District Court will have concurrent jurisdiction. We may in this behalf refer to the decisions in Annamalai Chettiar v. Solaiyappa Chettiar AIR 1935 Mad 983, Dakor Temple Committee v. Shankerlal AIR 1944 Bom 300, R. Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal AIR 1962 Mad 450 and Pazhukkamattom Devaswom v. Lakshmikutty Amma 1980 KLT 645.
18. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. The learned District Judge will proceed to decide the suit expeditiously.
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