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C. Elumalai And Others v. A.G.L Irudayaraj And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners initiated contempt proceedings alleging violation of this Court’s order dated 19-3-2007 in SLP (C) No. 19924 of 2006. That order had (i) directed the High Court seized of CS No. 597 of 2006 to “make an effort” to dispose of the suit within six months of receiving the order and (ii) restrained the parties from creating any third-party rights during the pendency of the suit. The petitioners contend that, despite these directions, third-party rights were in fact created. Respondent 1 (Contemnor 1) filed several affidavits—each containing an “unconditional apology”—whereas Respondent 2 (Contemnor 2) filed none.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Respondents 1 and 2 wilfully and deliberately violated the Supreme Court’s order dated 19-3-2007 by creating third-party rights.
- Whether the “unconditional” apologies tendered by Respondent 1 should be accepted so as to purge the alleged contempt.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments
- The respondents have consciously and wilfully violated the Supreme Court’s order prohibiting creation of third-party rights.
- The successive “unconditional apologies” are a tactical ploy aimed at shielding the contemnors after the violations had already occurred.
- Continued post-apology conduct demonstrates ongoing disregard of the Court’s mandate.
Respondent 1’s Arguments
- There was never any intention to flout the Court’s order; Respondent 1 is a “victim of circumstances.”
- The unconditional apology offered should be accepted as evidence of genuine contrition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 | Apology must be genuine; “slap—say sorry—and forget” approach rejected. | Used to scrutinise the sincerity of Respondent 1’s repeated apologies and to emphasise that apology is not a shield against contempt. |
| T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot (2006) 5 SCC 1 | Scope of contempt jurisdiction under Article 129; necessity of punishing wilful disobedience. | Provided overarching framework for assessing wilful violation and the need to uphold the dignity of courts. |
| Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha (2003) 11 SCC 1 | Definition of “wilful disobedience”—requires intent to disregard the law. | Court applied this definition to conclude the respondents acted with deliberate intent. |
| Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 569 | Contempt lies only on clear case of wilful disobedience, but negligence can suffice. | Cited to underline the high threshold that was nonetheless met in the present case. |
| Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd. [1974] AC 273 | Public policy in punishing contempt to preserve administration of justice. | Reinforced the need for deterrent measures to prevent orders being “disregarded with impunity.” |
| Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh (2002) 4 SCC 21 | Clear, unambiguous orders must be obeyed; misunderstanding is no defence. | Supported the finding that the 19-3-2007 order admitted of no alternative interpretation. |
| All Bengal Excise Licensees’ Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh (2007) 11 SCC 374 | Wilful and deliberate violation of interim orders amounts to contempt. | Parallel drawn to highlight the gravity of violating an injunction-like restraint. |
| Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai (2008) 14 SCC 561 | Re-affirmation of the principles governing contempt and apology. | Cited as additional authority underscoring the limited value of belated apologies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Bench examined the affidavits and the chronology of events following the order of 19-3-2007. Drawing upon precedent, it held that:
- The creation of third-party rights was in direct contravention of a clear and unambiguous order; the contemnors’ conduct satisfied the test of “wilful disobedience.”
- The apologies tendered by Respondent 1 were not spontaneous or made “at the earliest opportunity” but only after violations were evident; hence, under principles in L.D. Jaikwal and allied cases, they lacked the requisite penitent character.
- Article 129 of the Constitution empowers—and obliges—the Supreme Court to punish acts undermining its authority; deterrence is essential to maintain the “majesty of law.”
Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that exemplary monetary sanctions were appropriate, coupled with incarceration in default, to vindicate its authority and deter future violations.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Each contemnor is directed to pay exemplary costs of Rs 2,00,000 to the Registry of the High Court within eight weeks, failing which they shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Any third-party rights created after the order dated 19-3-2007 are declared null and void.
Implications: The decision reinforces that apologies, when perceived as tactical or insincere, will not absolve contemnors. It underscores the Supreme Court’s readiness to impose financial penalties—and imprisonment if necessary—to secure compliance with its orders. The ruling primarily affects the parties inter se and does not purport to establish new substantive precedent, but it affirms and operationalises existing contempt jurisprudence on wilful disobedience and the limited efficacy of belated apologies.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Alleging violation of the order passed by this Court, the present contempt petition has been filed.
2. The stand of the petitioners is that by order dated 19-3-2007 SLP (C) No. 19924 of 2006 this Court had directed that the High Court which was considering CS No. 597 of 2006 on the original side shall make an effort to dispose of the suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order. It was also directed that till completion of the suit the parties shall not create any third-party right. It is the case of the petitioners that in clear violation of this Court's order, third-party rights have been created. Several affidavits have been filed by Respondent 1, alleged Contemnor 1. But no response has been filed by Respondent 2, alleged Contemnor 2.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there has been conscious violation of the orders passed by this Court. The unconditional apologies offered at various stages are intended to cover up the violation. Even after filing of the first affidavit containing alleged unconditional apology, the subsequent conduct shows continued violation.
4. Learned counsel for Respondent 1-Contemnor 1 submitted that the factual scenario clearly shows that there was never any intention to flout the orders of this Court. Rather, Respondent 1-Contemnor 1 is a victim of circumstances and therefore the unconditional apology offered should be accepted.
5. “31. Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shorn of penitence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward.
32. Apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence, nor is it intended to operate as universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness. As was noted in L.D Jaikwal v. State of U.P (1984) 3 SCC 405:
We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the ‘slap—say sorry—and forget’ school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying ‘sorry’ does not make the slapper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to ‘say’ sorry—it is another to ‘feel’ sorry.”
The above position was highlighted in T.N Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot (2006) 5 SCC 1
6. “56. The next question is whether for disobedience of the order passed by this Court, the respondent contemnors are liable to punishment. In this connection, we may refer to some of the legal provisions. Article 129 of the Constitution declares this Court (Supreme Court) to be ‘a court of record [having] all the powers of such a court including the powers to punish for contempt of itself’.
57. Clause (c) of Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 enacts that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, the court may, commit the person guilty of disobedience of an order of interim injunction to civil prison and direct his property to be attached and sold. Rule 2-A of Order 39 as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) reads thus:
‘2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.—(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the court granting the injunction or making the order, or any court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the court directs his release.
(2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.’
60. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha (2003) 11 SCC 1 this Court had an occasion to consider the concept of ‘wilful disobedience’ of an order of the Court. It was stated that ‘wilful’ means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. According to the Court, it signifies the act done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. It was observed that the act or omission has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
61. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 569 it was held that for holding a person to have committed contempt, it must be shown that there was wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the court. But it was indicated that even negligence and carelessness may amount to contempt. It was further observed that issuance of notice for contempt of court and power to punish are having far-reaching consequences, and as such, they should be resorted to only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's order is made out. A petitioner who complains (sic of a) breach of court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order and if such allegation is proved, contempt can be said to have been made out, not otherwise. The Court noted that power to punish for contempt is intended to maintain effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice.
62. In the celebrated decision of Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd. 1974 AC 273, (1973) 3 WLR 298, (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL) Lord Diplock stated: (AC p. 308 A)
‘… There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with impunity….’
63. In Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh (2002) 4 SCC 21 this Court held that the Contempt of Courts Act has been introduced in the statute book for securing confidence of people in the administration of justice. If an order passed by a competent court is clear and unambiguous and not capable of more than one interpretation, disobedience or breach of such order would amount to contempt of court. There can be no laxity in such a situation because otherwise the court orders would become the subject of mockery. Misunderstanding or own understanding of the court's order would not be a permissible defence.
64. It was observed that power to punish a person for contempt is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of judiciary but that by itself operates as a string of caution and cannot be used unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that the person has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of the court. The power under the Act must be exercised with utmost care and caution and sparingly in the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of justice-delivery system. Mere disobedience of an order is not enough to hold a person guilty of civil contempt. The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act.
66. In All Bengal Excise Licensees' Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh (2007) 11 SCC 374 this Court considered several cases and observed that wilful and deliberate act of violation of interim order passed by a competent court would amount to contempt of court.
70. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt of court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a court, it is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt.”
(emphasis in original)
The above position was highlighted in Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai (2008) 14 SCC 561, (2008) 10 Scale 349, 60-64, 66 & 70.
7. On consideration of various aspects, we are satisfied that there has been a wilful and deliberate violation of this Court's order. We, therefore, in exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution of India impose exemplary costs of Rs 2,00,000 on each of the contemnors to be deposited to the Registry of the High Court within a period of eight weeks. On deposit being made, the amount shall be transferred to the National Legal Services Authority. In case of non-payment, the contemnors shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months each. Any third-party right created after order dated 19-3-2007 SLP (C) No. 19924 of 2006 is of no consequence and stands set aside.
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