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Panneerselvam v. State Of Tamil Nadu .
Factual and Procedural Background
Five police personnel (A-1 to A-5) attached to Ammapet Police Station were tried in Sessions Case No. 65 of 1994 for the death of one Arunbharathi @ Jynarab (“the deceased”), who died of burn injuries sustained on 14-12-1992. The Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, by judgment dated 13-05-1997 convicted all five for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and imposed life sentences, along with ancillary convictions under Sections 348 and 201 IPC for some of the accused.
On appeal under Section 374 CrPC, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court acquitted A-2 and A-3 but upheld the convictions of A-1 and A-5 (the present appellants). The appellants then approached the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment that disposes of their criminal appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in treating the dying declaration recorded by the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW-14) as trustworthy while discarding earlier statements made by the deceased to three doctors (PWs 3, 4 and 6).
- Whether the convictions of A-1 and A-5 could be sustained solely on the basis of the RDO’s dying declaration in light of principles governing multiple and possibly conflicting dying declarations.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The deceased repeatedly told PWs 3, 4 and 6 (doctors) that he had poured petrol on himself and set himself on fire; these were the first statements in point of time and were made voluntarily in the presence of his relatives, including PW 1.
- The High Court wrongly presumed that the presence of a police constable rendered those statements involuntary, ignoring testimony that many relatives were also present.
- The High Court mis-read the RDO’s dying declaration: the deceased actually stated he did not know who set him on fire, yet the High Court treated it as implicating either A-1 or A-5.
Respondent State's Arguments
- The dying declaration before the RDO was reliable and entitled to paramount weight; statements before doctors were tainted because police officials were present when they were made.
- Given the solemnity of a dying declaration, the absence of cross-examination does not dilute its evidentiary value when found voluntary and truthful.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 | Collected principles on evaluation of dying declarations. | Framework used to test reliability of multiple dying declarations. |
| Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 | Dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration. | Reiterated that corroboration is not a legal mandate but a prudential rule. |
| State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552 | Conviction can rest solely on a true and voluntary dying declaration. | Cited to confirm that corroboration is unnecessary once confidence is inspired. |
| Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211 | Same principle as above. | Supports reliance on single trustworthy declaration. |
| K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 | Court must guard against tutoring, prompting, imagination. | Applied to test whether the RDO statement was free from influence. |
| Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264 | Suspicious dying declaration requires corroboration. | Underpins Court’s scepticism of the RDO statement. |
| Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25 | Dying declaration by unconscious person is inadmissible. | Referenced in passing while listing principles; not determinative here. |
| Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654 | Infirm dying declaration cannot be basis for conviction. | Supports rejection of the RDO statement for inconsistencies. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455 | Lack of details does not by itself vitiate a dying declaration. | Cited while examining brevity of doctors’ statements. |
| Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769 | Short dying declaration can itself guarantee truth. | Bolstered acceptance of concise statements to doctors. |
| Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152 | Eyewitness testimony on deceased’s fitness can override medical opinion. | Relied upon where PW 1 confirmed deceased’s alertness. |
| State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390 | If prosecution story diverges from dying declaration, declaration cannot be acted upon. | Used to highlight contradiction between prosecution theory and doctors’ statements. |
| Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 | Where multiple dying declarations exist, the earliest has primacy unless all are trustworthy. | Key basis for preferring statements to PWs 3, 4 and 6 over the later RDO declaration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court stressed that although dying declarations are admissible without oath or cross-examination, courts must rigorously scrutinise their voluntariness and authenticity. Applying the precedential tests:
- Chronology and spontaneity: The declarations to PWs 3, 4 and 6 were the first in point of time, made immediately after the incident, and consistently stated that the deceased had self-immolated.
- Presence of relatives: PW 1 confirmed that multiple family members were present during those statements, reducing the likelihood of police influence despite the presence of a constable.
- Misreading by High Court: The Court found that the RDO’s dying declaration, properly construed, contained no attribution of acts to A-1 or A-5; it actually recorded that the deceased did not know who set him on fire.
- Consistency test: Because the later RDO statement conflicted with the earlier consistent declarations, the Court applied the principle that suspicious or contradictory dying declarations should not be relied upon without corroboration.
- Resultant evidentiary vacuum: With the RDO declaration discarded and the doctors’ statements favouring self-immolation, the prosecution failed to establish the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeals are allowed; the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appellants (A-1 and A-5) are acquitted of all charges. They shall be released forthwith unless required in any other case.
Implications: The decision restores the primacy of the earliest, voluntary dying declaration when multiple inconsistent versions exist and underscores that mere police presence does not automatically taint a statement if independent witnesses are present. The ruling applies settled principles rather than creating new precedent.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— These two appeals have their matrix in a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court disposing of three criminal appeals preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”), against the judgment of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur in Sessions Case No. 65 of 1994 dated 13-5-1997. Five persons had faced trial for alleged commission of murder of one Arunbharathi @Jynarab (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”). They were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). So far as A-1, A-2 and A-5 are concerned, each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. A-1, A-2 and A-5 were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 348 IPC and sentenced to one year's RI each. A-1 was charged for commission of the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year's RI and A-2 and A-5 were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC and each was sentenced to undergo RI for life.
2. A-1 was Head Constable, while A-2 was a constable, A-3 was a writer, and A-4 was a Pere constable. All of them were attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty on 14-12-1992 and 15-12-1992. A-5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil.
3. After the case was committed to the Court of Session charges were framed; since the accused persons pleaded innocence they were put to trial. In order to substantiate the charges 14 witnesses were examined. On consideration of the material on record the trial court recorded the conviction and imposed sentences as aforesaid.
4. The stand of the appellant before the High Court was that the deceased had put himself on fire and in fact, all the accused persons immediately quenched the fire and had taken him to Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where PW 3 doctor was available. The deceased made a voluntary statement to PW 3 wherein he categorically stated that he had poured petrol on himself and set himself on fire. Thereafter the deceased with the burn injuries was taken to Medical College Hospital where also he made a similar statement to PW 4 the doctor. Subsequently, another doctor PW 6 examined him where also he made a similar statement. Therefore, it was submitted that the trial court was not justified in convicting them relying on the purported dying declaration alleged to have been given by the deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW 14) on 16-12-1992 i.e four days prior to his death. The same was nothing but a tutored one. The High Court held that the so-called statements made before the doctors cannot be accepted in view of the dying declaration recorded by PW 14 the RDO. The High Court did not attach any importance to the statements purportedly given before PWs 3, 4 and 6 and also relied on the dying declaration purportedly made by the deceased before PW 14. The High Court found that the allegations against A-2 and A-3 were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and they were entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, the appeals filed by these accused persons were allowed and those filed by the appellants in these two appeals were dismissed.
5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions that because the statements of the deceased to PWs 3, 4 and 6 were made in the presence of a constable, therefore, they were not voluntary. On the contrary at the time when the statements were made, the relatives of the deceased were present is evident from the evidence of PW 1 who took the deceased to the hospital. He had categorically admitted that he was accompanied by several persons when the deceased was taken to and was at the hospital. PW 1 and others were there with him. PW 1 has categorically admitted that this was the situation in Ammapet Hospital and Thanjavur Medical College Hospital. He has categorically stated that several persons were present at the hospital. It was, therefore, submitted that the voluntary statement made right from the beginning should not have been lightly brushed aside. It is also pointed out that the High Court came to an erroneous conclusion by misreading the dying declaration purported to be made before the RDO that it was either A-1 or A-5 (the present appellants) who had poured petrol and set him on fire.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent State submitted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the dying declaration made before the RDO. According to him the fact that police officials were present when the statements were made by the deceased before the doctors made the position clear that the deceased was not speaking the truth.
7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.
9. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474, AIR 1992 SC 1817:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104, (1976) 2 SCR 764)
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552, AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211, AIR 1983 SC 164.)
(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, AIR 1976 SC 1994.)
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P 1981 Supp SCC 25, AIR 1982 SC 1021)
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, AIR 1981 SC 617.)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769, AIR 1979 SC 1505.)
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P 1988 Supp SCC 152, AIR 1988 SC 912)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390, AIR 1989 SC 1519.)
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, they have to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, AIR 1982 SC 839.)
10. We find that the High Court has erroneously discarded the statements made by PWs 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, even though one police official was present when the statement was made to PWs 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW 1 who had taken him to the hospital were present also. Additionally, the High Court has misconstrued the dying declaration. The deceased had categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him on fire. The High Court observed, as if, the deceased had said that either A-1 or A-5 did so. The conclusions have been arrived at by misreading the evidence. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellant in each case is acquitted of the charges. The appellants be released from custody forthwith unless required in any other case. The appeals are allowed.
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