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Rajindra Singh (Dead) Through Lrs. And Others v. Prem Mai And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Smt. Prem Mai and Smt. Sudha Mai instituted Suit No. 487 of 1957 seeking declaration of title and possession over agricultural land against the defendant, Rajindra Singh. The trial court decreed the suit on 21-9-1963.
On 16-4-1964 the first appellate court reversed the decree, holding that Rajindra Singh had been in cultivatory possession prior to commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950; the suit was therefore time-barred under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and the defendant had become a Sirdar.
The plaintiffs’ second appeal (SA No. 215 of 1964) was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court on 10-2-1971, affirming the defendant’s title. During the original suit, a court-appointed Receiver had taken possession, and the plaintiffs purportedly gifted the land to D.A.V. College Trust.
After the second appeal failed, Rajindra Singh sought restitution of possession under Section 144 CPC. The trial court rejected restitution on 13-8-1975; the first appellate court dismissed the appeal on 2-4-1976; the High Court dismissed the second appeal on 6-9-1999. Rajindra Singh (now deceased) and his legal representatives challenged the High Court’s 1999 order before the Supreme Court by special-leave petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the courts below erred in rejecting the appellant’s application for restitution of possession under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the plaintiffs’ decree had been reversed and the defendant’s title affirmed.
- Whether, in light of the affirmed title, the appellant (or his legal representatives) is entitled to immediate possession of the suit land despite subsequent litigations concerning an unexecuted agreement to sell.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the first appellate court’s decision declaring Rajindra Singh a Sirdar and dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit had attained finality after affirmation by the High Court on 10-2-1971. On that basis, the defendant ordinarily became entitled to possession.
The Court found that the lower courts and the High Court, in the restitution proceedings, failed to give effect to this final determination of title. Consequently, their view in refusing restitution was “cannot be sustained.”
Respondent 2 informed the Court of a later, unconsummated agreement to sell the land, and of pending Suit No. 242 of 2002 in which both sides had obtained a status-quo injunction. The Supreme Court expressly declined to adjudicate that controversy, limiting itself to the restitution issue.
Recognising the interim order in Suit No. 242 of 2002, the Court held that any delivery of possession pursuant to the present judgment would remain subject to orders passed in the pending suit.
In closing, the Court expressed strong concern over the five-decade delay, likening the case to “Jarndyce v. Jarndyce” from Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, and urged systemic reforms for expeditious justice.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the impugned judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated 6-9-1999 are set aside.
Practical Effect: The appellant’s legal representatives are, in principle, entitled to possession of the suit land, but actual possession will abide by the status-quo order in pending Suit No. 242 of 2002. No costs were awarded.
Broader Implications: The decision does not create new precedent on substantive property law; however, the Court’s remarks highlight concern over systemic judicial delay and serve as a policy exhortation for speedier disposal of cases.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave has been filed by Rajindra Singh (since deceased), whose legal representatives have been brought on record, against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 16-9-1999 in Execution Second Appeal No. 870 of 1976 whereby the second appeal filed by the appellant-defendant has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that Smt Prem Mai and Sudha Mai filed a suit for declaration and possession of the suit land in the trial court being Suit No. 487 of 1957. The said suit was decreed against the appellant herein on 21-9-1963. Aggrieved against that decree, the appellant-defendant preferred an appeal which was allowed on 16-4-1964 and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was reversed by the first appellate court. The first appellate court was of the view that the appellant-defendant was in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute since before the commencement of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and the suit was barred by time in view of Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, and hence the defendant had become a Sirdar.
3. Aggrieved against that, the respondent herein preferred second appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 10-2-1971 and the judgment passed by the first appellate court was affirmed. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the trial court had appointed a Receiver (one Pitamber Singh) who took possession of the suit land. Also, Prem Mai and Sudha Mai purported to gift the suit land to the D.A.V College Trust. After the suit was dismissed by the first appellate court and the said dismissal was affirmed by the High Court, the question arose about restitution of the land in question to the appellant-defendant under Section 144 CPC. However, by order dated 13-8-1975 the restitution application was rejected. Aggrieved against that order, the matter was taken up in first appeal which was dismissed on 2-4-1976 and then to the High Court in second appeal which was dismissed on 6-9-1999. All the courts having dismissed the restitution proceedings, the appellant is before us by way of the present appeal.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record.
5. From the bare facts it is apparent that the suit against the appellant was dismissed by the first appellate court which held that the appellant is the Sirdar of the land in question, and that judgment has been affirmed by the High Court on 10-2-1971 in SA No. 215 of 1964, which order became final. Hence in the ordinary course the appellant would be entitled to possession of the suit land. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court by its order dated 6-9-1999 and courts below cannot be sustained.
6. However, we have been informed by learned counsel for Respondent 2 that after these proceedings were over, the appellant-defendant had entered into an agreement to sell with Respondent 2 for sale of the suit land. An application for bringing on record these subsequent facts has been filed by Respondent 2. Since that agreement to sell was not acted upon, Respondent 2 has filed a civil suit being Suit No. 242 of 2002 before the Civil Judge, Dehradun for enforcement of the said agreement, and the legal representatives of the appellant have also filed a suit against Respondent 2. In the said proceedings an interim order of status quo has been passed in April 2002 by the trial court. However, this is not the subject-matter before us and we do not wish to express any opinion on this issue. So far as the present case is concerned, we are of the opinion that after the title of Rajindra Singh (since deceased) has been upheld by the High Court on 10-2-1971, he or his legal representatives would ordinarily have been entitled to take possession of the suit land. Therefore, the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the impugned order dated 6-9-1999 cannot be sustained and consequently the same is set aside. However, in view of the subsequent order of status quo passed in Suit No. 242 of 2002 for enforcement of the agreement to sell pending between the parties, we do not wish to express any opinion thereon.
7. Insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and allow this appeal. The appellant would ordinarily have been entitled to possession of the suit land but because of the interim order of status quo passed in Suit No. 242 of 2002, we direct that the possession of the suit land shall be subject to orders passed in those proceedings.
8. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
9. Before parting with this case we would like to express our anguish at the delay in disposal of cases in our law courts. The present case is a typical illustration. A suit filed in 1957 has rolled on for half a century. It reminds one of the case Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Charles Dickens' novel Bleak House which had rolled on for decades, consuming litigants and lawyers alike.
10. We may quote a passage from Bleak House written in Dickens' inimitable style:
“Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendry hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee house in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the court, perennially hopeless.”
Is this not descriptive of the situation prevailing in India today?
11. People in India are simply disgusted with this state of affairs, and are fast losing faith in the judiciary because of the inordinate delay in disposal of cases. We request the authorities concerned to do the needful in the matter urgently to ensure speedy disposal of cases if the people's faith in the judiciary is to remain.
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