- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Vasudeo Kulkarni v. Surya Kant Bhatt And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a lawyer of approximately 25 years’ standing in Indore, had been engaged by one Dinubhai (a senior partner in a dissolved firm of chartered accountants) to conduct litigation arising out of a money-recovery suit and two related appeals. A statement of account dated 9 February 1965 (Ex. P-1) prepared by the appellant showed two entries—Rs 210 and Rs 110—described as “paper book charges.”
The complainant, who was the appellant’s junior and also Dinubhai’s son, alleged that no such sums were ever deposited on the stated dates and, almost three years later, filed a criminal complaint on 8 December 1967 accusing the appellant of offences under Sections 409, 468 and 474 IPC. Ultimately only a charge under Section 409 IPC (criminal breach of trust) concerning the two items was framed.
The trial Magistrate acquitted the appellant, treating the dispute as essentially civil and noting unexplained delay, lack of corroboration, and the pendency of alternative civil proceedings. On appeal by the complainant, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed the acquittal, convicted the appellant under Section 409 IPC, and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 250. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was filed by special leave against that judgment of conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant, entrusted with money by his client, committed criminal breach of trust under Section 409 IPC in respect of the amounts of Rs 210 and Rs 110 recorded as “paper book charges.”
- Whether, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s findings when the evidence consisted essentially of the solitary testimony of the complainant and the appellant’s explanatory statement.
Arguments of the Parties
Complainant/First Respondent
- Maintained that no deposits corresponding to Rs 210 or Rs 110 were made on the dates shown, demonstrating misappropriation by the appellant.
- Relied on testimony of a High Court clerk indicating that the only paper-book expense actually deposited was Rs 26.50 on 18 March 1965.
Appellant
- Contended that the figures “210” and “110” were mere typing errors for Rs 21 and Rs 10 respectively.
- Claimed that the aggregate difference of Rs 300 had already been adjusted towards his professional fees in another matter (Kothari Book Depot case) with the complainant’s knowledge and receipt.
- Highlighted the three-year delay in filing the criminal complaint and the ongoing civil accounting between himself and Dinubhai.
State (Respondent in Supreme Court)
- Through counsel Mr Panjwani, declined to support the High Court’s conviction during the hearing before the Supreme Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court underscored that the prosecution rested solely on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony; neither the client (Dinubhai) nor any other witness substantiated allegations of dishonesty. The Court noted that:
- The trial court’s acquittal was based on cogent grounds—unexplained delay, existence of civil remedies, and the appellant’s plausible explanation.
- A lawyer’s notice dated 16 May 1967 from Dinubhai merely demanded a monetary balance and threatened civil action or bar-council proceedings, but did not allege criminal intent—suggesting the dispute was perceived as civil, not criminal.
- In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only when the lower court’s view is perverse or wholly unsustainable; the High Court failed to demonstrate such compelling reasons.
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discarding the trial court’s appreciation of evidence and in drawing an inference of dishonest misappropriation merely from accounting inaccuracies.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE; APPELLANT DISCHARGED FROM BAIL BOND.
Immediate effect: the appellant’s criminal liability is extinguished and the High Court’s order is vacated. Broader implications: the judgment reiterates the limited scope of appellate interference with acquittals, especially where evidence is meagre and civil remedies are available; however, it sets no new legal precedent beyond applying established principles to the facts at hand.
P.K Goswami, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh convicting the appellant under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentencing him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs 250, in default further rigorous imprisonment for three months, in appeal against acquittal at the instance of the complainant (first respondent herein).
2. The appellant is a senior lawyer of 25 years' standing in Indore and the complainant was acting as his junior. The complainant's father, Dinubhai. was the senior partner of a firm of Chartered Accountants, Dinubhai & Co., with its registered office in Bombay and a branch office in Indore. The Indore office was looked after by the second partner, M.C Mehta. It appears that the firm was dissolved on July 5, 1960, when Mehta ceased to be a partner and Dinubhai appointed the appellant as counsel and attorney for filing suits and for recovering dues from various parties. Dinubhai filed a suit, being Suit No. 13 of 1962, for recovery of Rs 12,500 in the Court of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Indore, impleading M.C Mehta and one Chandulal Shah as defendants in that suit. Although the suit was decreed, it appears there were two cross appeals against the decree in the High Court, one by Dinubhai and the other by Chandulal Shah. The appellant was appearing for Dinubhai in both the appeals. He received some amounts in advance from Dinubhai and submitted a statement of account of Shri Dinubhai (Ex. P-1) dated February 9, 1965, wherein two items, namely, Rs 210 and Rs 110 were mentioned as being towards “paper book charges” respectively on April 21, 1964 and September 22, 1964. The entry on September 22, 1964 shows that the amount of Rs 110 is one of several items mentioned therein as expenses incurred in the appeal filed by Chandulal Shah against Dinubhai. So far as the items mentioned in Ex. P-1 on April 21, 1964 including the last item of Rs 210, there is no mention whether the expenditure was actually incurred on that date.
3. The complainant was not pulling on well with his father for some reason or other and also parted company with his senior, the appellant. He filed a complaint against the appellant on December 8, 1967, making allegations under Sections 409, 468 and 474 IPC. Ultimately the appellant was charged under Section 409 IPC with regard to the amounts of Rs 210 and Rs 110 which were mentioned in the statement of account (Ex. P-1) received by the complainant on February 10, 1965. The complainant examined himself and a clerk of the High Court to prove that no paper book charges were deposited on the dates mentioned in the accounts. On the other hand a sum of Rs 26.50 was deposited as paper book charges on March 18, 1965, in the particular appeal.
4. The appellant denied the charge and stated that there was a typing error in the accounts and the actual figures should have been Rs 21 (and not Rs 210) and Rs 10 (and not Rs 110). When the appellant's attention had been drawn to these amounts he admitted these to be typing errors and asked for adjustment of the amount of Rs 300 towards his fees in the case of Kothari Book Depot.
5. It is rather curious that a criminal complaint should have been lodged against the appellant nearly three years after the receipt of the accounts by the complainant.
6. The trial court acquitted the accused (appellant herein) by observing as follows:
“To sum up the prosecution has been launched after inordinate unexplained delay, there is no clear and conclusive evidence of the criminal intention and dishonest mental act of the accused, the real aggrieved person has not come with the complainant but has already sought the alternative remedy in civil court which is being already pursued. The question whether or not the adjustment made by the accused towards his fees was proper can more appropriately be decided by civil court. Accused having reasonable claim against the complainant for any equivalent sum of money, his user of the disputed sum for his own purpose will not amount to criminal breach of trust.”
7. The High Court, on the other hand, held that the charge was established against the accused and set aside the acquittal. The High Court held that the explanation of the accused did not appear to be true and, therefore, could not be accepted. It further held that it was clear that on the dates mentioned in the accounts no amounts were deposited as paper-book charges in the High Court. The High Court concluded as follows:
“Consequently it cannot be doubted that the respondent, who as an agent of the complainant's father was entrusted with the amounts, showed false expenses and thereby kept the amounts with himself. In the face of these facts and also on the finding that the explanation given by the respondent cannot be accepted, the respondent cannot escape conviction under Section 409 IPC as that was the only charge framed against him by the trying Magistrate.”
8. The statement of account (Ex. P-1) as well as the correspondence between the appellant and the complainant's father, who was his client, clearly show that there was mutual accounting and adjustment between them. The mere fact that certain amounts were in the hands of the appellant and the accounts submitted were incorrect would not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant committed criminal breach of trust in respect of these items. The complainant, who was a junior attached to him and was looking after his cases could himself easily find out the discrepancies in the accounts and in a normal course he would have drawn the attention of his senior on receipt of the statement of account in February 1965. The accused in his statement under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, stated, inter alia, as follows:
“Typing error has occurred in the statement of account of Ex. P-1. The difference of Rs 300.00 which has occurred, has been adjusted against my fees in Kothari Book Depot case at the instance of Suryakant. I have given a receipt for it which is in possession of Suryakant. Suryakant used to maintain account of Court expenses of Dinubhai's cases in a register. That register is with Suryakant. Suryakant used to remain present in the Court on each date along with me. He knows everything. Nothing is concealed from him. There is ‘Gadbad’ of money between Suryakant and his father. Hence on the instigation of other people this false case has been launched. Suryakant had got typed the statement of account Ex. P-1 from the register.”
9. On one side we have the solitary statement of the complainant. Even his father is not there to corroborate him or even to show that he authorised him to file the complaint. As against his statement, we have the explanation of the appellant. The trial court who had an opportunity to see the complainant giving evidence did not choose to rely on his version of the case and preferred to accept the explanation of the appellant. In this state of the evidence we fail to see how the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, thought it possible to hold the charge as proved. While the complaint was filed on December 8, 1967, a few months earlier on May 16, 1967, a lawyer's notice was addressed to the appellant on behalf of Dinubhai. We may extract the following passage from that letter:
“My client has instructed me to call upon you to remit to him the balance of Rs 1700 lying with you (after deducting your fees of Rs 3300 from the amount of Rs 5000 paid to you) within 24 hours of the receipt of this reply otherwise my client will not only place the matter before the Bar Council of M.P but, if so advised, will also file a suit for its recovery against you at your cost and consequences which please note.”
This would clearly show that neither Dinubhai nor his lawyer ever thought of attributing any dishonest intention or criminal intent to the appellant. In view of this letter it is not possible to accept the sole testimony of the complainant imputing dishonest intention on the part of the appellant. We are clearly of opinion that there was no sufficient ground for the High Court to interfere with the acquittal in this case when the reasons given by the trial court were weighty and cogent and there was no compelling justification to take a contrary view.
10. At the conclusion of the argument by Mr Khan on behalf of the complainant pressing for conviction of the appellant, Mr Panjwani, appearing on behalf of the State, fairly enough, did not think it proper to support the judgment of the High Court.
11. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellant shall be discharged from his bail bond.
Alert