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Milkha Singh And Another v. Tara Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns agricultural land in village Bolewal, District Gurdaspur, originally owned equally by Lal Singh and Sher Singh. Upon Lal Singh's death, his share passed to his son Milkha Singh. Sher Singh allegedly executed a will in favor of Kundan Singh on 15th December 1957 and died on 16th October 1958 without heirs. Sher Singh's share was mutated in favor of his sister, Ramo. On 23rd June 1960, Kundan Singh (minor) through Milkha Singh and Milkha Singh himself filed a suit against Ramo for declaration of ownership and possession of the land. During the suit, plaintiffs claimed a compromise was reached with Ramo on 7th February 1961, which Ramo opposed, asserting the compromise was fraudulent and invalid since she had sold her share to defendants Nos. 2 to 10 on 28th October 1960. The plaintiffs then impleaded these vendees as defendants. A preliminary issue was framed concerning the existence and terms of the compromise, alongside substantive issues regarding ownership, suit maintainability, and validity of the sale to defendants Nos. 2 to 10. The trial court found no valid compromise, held Milkha Singh owner of half the land and in possession of most of it, and recognized the defendants' valid title from Ramo’s sale. The appellate court affirmed these findings. The plaintiffs appealed again, contesting the timing of title transfer in relation to the compromise.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant Ramo compromised the suit with the plaintiffs on 7th February 1961, and if so, on what terms and with what effect?
- When did the title in the property pass to the vendees: on the date of execution of the sale deed (28th October 1960) or on the date of registration (1st March 1961)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the sale deed executed by Ramo on 28th October 1960 was registered only on 1st March 1961, and thus the title passed only upon registration.
- Therefore, on 7th February 1961, the date of the alleged compromise, Ramo still held title and had the right to compromise the suit.
- The courts below erred in holding that title passed on the date of execution rather than registration.
Respondent's Arguments
- Ramo opposed the compromise application, asserting that the compromise was vitiated by fraud.
- She contended she had no right to compromise the suit on 7th February 1961 as she had already sold her share on 28th October 1960.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Saran Lall v. Mst. Domini Kuer, AIR 1961 SC 1747 | Clarification that a sale of immovable property is complete only upon registration of sale deed under Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 61 of Registration Act, affecting the right of pre-emption. | The court distinguished this precedent as dealing with the timing of completion of sale for pre-emption rights and not the passing of title, which is governed separately by Section 47 of the Registration Act. |
| Ram Chand v. Smt. Rajinder Kaur, 1972 Punj LJ 584 | Held that a sale is complete only upon registration of the sale deed as per Section 61 of the Registration Act. | The court noted this precedent concerned the completion of sale for pre-emption suits and confirmed that sale completion requires registration but did not address the passing of title. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the timing of the passing of title under the Registration Act, specifically Section 47, which provides that a registered document operates from the date it would have operated if registration were not required, effectively from the date of execution once registered. The sale deed was executed on 28th October 1960 but registered on 1st March 1961. The court distinguished the issue of sale completion for pre-emption rights (which requires registration completion as per Section 61) from the passing of title, which under Section 47 relates back to the date of execution once registration occurs. Since the deed was ultimately registered, title passed to the vendees from 28th October 1960, the date of execution. Therefore, on 7th February 1961, when the alleged compromise was made, Ramo no longer had title and could not validly compromise the suit. The courts below correctly held that title passed on execution date, not registration date, and dismissed the compromise claim. The court also noted that the appellants were not prejudiced by the absence of a separate issue on the will, as it was covered under existing issues and evidence.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the findings of the lower courts that the title to the property passed to the vendees on the date of execution of the sale deed, not on the date of registration. Consequently, the alleged compromise by Ramo was ineffective as she no longer held title at that time. The decision directly affects the parties by confirming ownership and possession rights but does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and case law. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
1. The facts giving rise to this second appeal are these. The property in dispute is some agricultural land, situate in village Bolewal, District Gurdaspur. It belonged to Lal Singh and his brother Sher Singh in equal shares. Lal Singh died and on his death, his share was inherited by his son Milkha Singh. On 15th December, 1957, Sher Singh is alleged to have executed a will in favour of Kundan Singh son of Milkha Singh. On 16th October, 1958, Sher Singh died without leaving any child or a widow. His share in the property was mutated by the revenue authorities in favour of his sister Shrimati Ramo. On 23rd June, 1960, Kundan Singh minor, through his father Milkha Singh, and Milkha Singh on his own behalf as well, brought a suit, out of which the present second appeal has arisen, against Ramo, for a declaration that they were the owners-in-possession of the land in question. The suit was contested by Ramo, defendant No. 1, on a number of pleas, but, in the present appeal, it is not necessary to mention them, because the case is being decided on a preliminary issue.
2. During the pendency of the suit, on 10th February, 1961, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC, saying that they had compromised the matter with the defendant, Ramo, on 7th February, 1961. By the said compromise, the suit had been adjusted, because Ramo had agreed that the same should be decreed. A prayer was, therefore, made that the compromise be recorded and the suit decided accordingly.
3. This application was opposed by Ramo. It may be stated that she did not deny her thumb-impression on the written compromise but pleaded that the compromise was vitiated by fraud and that she had no right to effect the same, because, on 7-2-1961. She did not possess any rights in the property, inasmuch as on 28th October, 1960, she had sold her share in favour of Sohan Singh and others for Rs. 15,250/-. After the said sale, therefore, she could not say that the suit be decreed.
4. It may be mentioned that after this defence was taken by Ramo, the plaintiffs impleaded her vendees as defendants Nos. 2 to 10 in the suit.
5. A preliminary issue was framed regarding this matter and it was “whether defendant No. 1 compromised the suit with the plaintiffs? If so, on what terms and with what effect?”
6. On merits also, the following issues were framed by the trial Judge:—
“1. Whether the plaintiffs, are owners in possession of the land in suit?
2. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form?
3. Whether defendants Nos. 2 to 10 have purchased the land in suit from defendant No. 1? If so, when and with what effect?”
7. Evidence was led by the parties. It is somewhat surprising that instead of trying the issue regarding the compromise as a preliminary one, the whole case was decided. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the suit had not been compromised by Ram and that she could not do so, because she had sold the property in dispute to defendants Nos. 2 to 10 on 28th October, 1960, and, therefore, the compromise alleged to have been made by her on 7th February, 1961, was not legally effective. On merits, under Issue No. 1, it was held that Milkha Singh was the owner of half share in the land, but he was in possession of the whole land, except Khasra Nos. 193, 646 and 648, which were in possession of the tenants of the mortgagees, while Kundan Singh, minor, plaintiff No. 1, was neither owner of the other half share nor was he in possession of any portion of the land. Under Issue No. 2, the finding was that the suit was maintainable in the present form. The finding under Issue No. 3 was that defendants Nos. 2 to 10 had purchased the land in suit from Ramo, defendant No. 1, and they had a valid title thereto. On these findings, the Trial Court passed a decree for a declaration that Milkha Singh, plaintiff No. 2, was the owner of only half share in the land, but he was in actual or constructive possession of the entire land in dispute, except Khasra Nos. 193, 646 and 648, which were in possession of the tenants of the mortgagees.
8. When this matter went in appeal, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the same. The plaintiffs have come here in second appeal.
9. The only question that was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the finding of the court below regarding the matter of the compromise was incorrect Counsel submitted that the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in law, when he held that Ramo had no interest in the property on 7th February, 1961, when the alleged compromise took place between her and defendant No. 1, because she had already transferred her rights in the land to defendants Nos. 2 to 10 on 28th October, 1960, i.e, before the date of the compromise. According to the learned counsel, the title in the property passed to defendants Nos. 2 to 10 only on 1st March, 1961, when the sale-deed dated 28th October, 1960, was registered. It is only on the registration of the deed that the said sale became complete and title passed to the defendants. According to him, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge had made an error in law, when he held that the title had already passed to the vendees on 28th October, 1960, when Ramo executed the sale-deed in their favour.
10. The facts are not in dispute. It is agreed that the sale-deed, Exhibit D-1, by Ramo in favour of Sohan Singh and others, defendants Nos. 2 to 10, had been executed on 28th October, 1960. This document had been presented for registration on 15th February, 1961, but the same was actually registered on 1st March, 1961. The question for decision is as to when did the title in the property pass to the vendees? Was it on 28th October, 1960, as held by the Courts below or 1st March, 1961, when the said sale-deed was registered as urged by the learned counsel for the appellants?
11. Learned counsel for the appellants referred to two decisions in this connection, viz., Ram Saran Lall v. Mst. Domini Kuer, AIR 1961 SC 1747 and Ram Chand v. Smt. Rajinder Kaur, 1972 Punj LJ 584.
12. Before I come to the authorities mentioned above, I may state that in Punjab when immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards is sold, the sale-deed has to be registered. There is no quarrel about the proposition that such a sale-deed will be complete only when it is registered. It is undisputed that the registration will be complete only when the sale-deed is copied out in the records of the Registration Office as provided in Section 61 of the Registration Act. But the title in the property on registration will, however, pass to the vendees from the date when the said deed was executed. This is by virtue of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, which lay down:
“A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”
13. A bare reading of this provision will show that the registered document will operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate, if no registration thereof was required by law and not from the time of its registration Admittedly, this document, as I have already said, was executed on 28th October, 1960. If under the law, it was not required to be registered, it would have operated from the time it was executed. But it had to be registered under the law and, therefore, under the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, it would operate on the date when it was executed, but that would happen only if it was subsequently registered. If it was not registered, no title in the property would pass to the vendees under it. However, the moment it was registered the title in the property would pass to the transferees from the date of its execution.
14. Now coming to the authorities relied on by the learned counsel, in Ram Saran Lall's case AIR 1961 SC 1747 the Supreme Court observed:
“One of the requisites before the right of pre-emption can be exercised is the preliminary demand by the pre-emptor and such demand must be made after the completion of the sale. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act supersede the principles of the Mohammedan Law as to sale and it is to the statute that one should look to find out whether, and if so when, a sale is complete in order to give rise to a right of preemption. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act sale of tangible immovable property of the value of rupees 100/- and upwards, can be made only by a registered instrument. The registration undo the Registration Act is not complete till the document to be registered has been copied out in the records of the Registration Office as provided in Section 61 of the Act. Section 47 of the Registration Act has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date.”
15. The above decision, it will be seen, only deals with the point as to when a sale become complete in order to give rise to a right of pre-emption.
16. A Division Bench of this Court in Ram Chand's case 1972 Pun LJ 584 held:
“A sale is completed only when registration of the sale deed is completed as contemplated by Section 61 of the Registration Act. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date.”
17. The above-quoted ruling relied on Ram Saran Lall's case AIR 1961 SC 1747 and dealt with in Section 21 of the Punjab Preemption Act, which says:
“Any person entitled to a right of preemption may, when the sale or foreclosure has been completed, bring a suit to enforce that right”
18. According to this provision, nobody can file a suit for pre-emption till the sale is complete. When is the sale complete under Section 21 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act? As I have already said, the sale will be complete when the sale-deed is registered and if that is not done, the sale will remain incomplete. Section 21, however, does not mention as to when the right or title in the property passes. That matter has been dealt with in Section 47 of the Registration Act The two authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants deal with the only point as to when the pre-emptor can bring a suit for pre-emption and they lay down that he can bring a suit only when the sale is complete and while deciding this matter these rulings have held that the sale will be complete only when the sale-deed is registered. The other point, with which we are concerned in this case, did not arise for consideration there.
19. In view of this, it is clear that Ramo had no title in the property on 7th February, 1961, when the compromise took place, because she had already sold the property to the vendees on 28th October, 1960, and the title passed to them on that very date, when the document was later registered on 1st March, 1961. In this situation, the finding of both the Courts below on this point is quite correct.
20. No other point was agitated before us by the learned counsel for the appellants, except this that his clients were prejudiced, because no specific issue was framed regarding the alleged will dated 15-12-1957.
21. This point was never raised either before the trial Court or the lower Appellate Court. The parties understood their respective positions and led evidence regarding the will under Issue No. 1 and it was on that account that no specific issue was framed regarding it. Besides, nobody even claimed a exparate issue regarding the said will and that matter has been dealt with while discussing Issue No. 1. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants have not been prejudiced by the non-framing of a separate issue regarding the trill. The result is that this appeal fails end is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, we will leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
Bhopinder Singh Dhillon, J.:— I agree.
22. Appeal dismissed.
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