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Venkataswami Motor Service P.N Palayam, Coimbatore v. C.K Chinnaswamy And 4 Others

Madras High Court
Jan 22, 1992
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from M.C.O.P. No. 14 of 1980 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore. The claimants were the husband and minor children of the deceased, Kamalam, who allegedly sustained fatal injuries on 16-7-1979 at about 7:45 a.m. while alighting from a town bus on Goods Shed Road near the junction with Big Bazaar Street (west of St. Michael's High School).

The claim under S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (repealed) named the driver, conductor, the owner (third Respondent in the original Tribunal proceedings, appellant in this appeal) and the insurer as parties. The Tribunal found that the driver and conductor acted rashly and negligently, that Kamalam did not have contributory negligence, and awarded compensation of Rs. 36,000 with interest at 6% per annum. The Tribunal limited the insurer's liability to Rs. 5,000 under Proviso (ii) to sub‑S. (1) read with sub‑S. (2)(b)(4) of S. 95 of the 1939 Act; the balance was to be borne by the owner.

The owner (third Respondent) appealed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (A.A.O. No. 678 of 1981), contending that the insurer ought to bear the entire award and contesting the Tribunal's findings on negligence and quantum. The single judge below (Swamikkannu, J.) had upheld the Tribunal's findings, including the limitation of the insurer's liability. The Division Bench (Mishra, J., delivering the judgment reproduced here) considered the appeal and dismissed it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Kamalam was a "passenger" within the meaning of the provisions of S. 95(2)(b) read with Proviso (ii) to sub‑S. (1) of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 at the time of the accident, thereby limiting the insurer's liability to the statutory ceiling (Rs. 5,000 in the facts of this case).
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the insurer could be made liable for the full amount of the award (i.e., whether the victim should be treated as a third party rather than a passenger) and whether the owner could shift the entire liability to the insurer.
  3. Whether provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (notably S. 92A, S. 147 and related chapters) which came into force during the pendency of proceedings, operate to increase or otherwise affect the insurer's liability in this pending litigation (i.e., the question of retrospective or prospective application of the new Act and the effect of the savings/repeal provisions).
  4. Whether an insurer's right to make particular defenses in proceedings under the repealed Act is limited to those defenses enumerated in S. 96(2) of the 1939 Act, and if so, whether that prevents a party (owner) from arguing that the victim was not a third party (i.e., was a passenger) when the insurer's liability was originally limited by the Tribunal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Owner's Arguments

  • The owner/appellant contended that it was the insurance company, not the owner, that should pay the entire compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
  • The appellant also challenged the Tribunal’s findings as to the negligence of the driver and conductor and questioned the quantum of compensation awarded.
  • The appellant further advanced arguments (through reliance on certain case law) about the operation of the newer statutory regime introduced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking to alter or recharacterise liabilities during the pendency of proceedings.

Insurer's Arguments

  • The insurer’s case before the Tribunal was that the bus was moving slowly and that the victim jumped or alighted from the bus while it was still moving and thereby fell; it maintained that its maximum liability under S. 95(2)(b)(4) was Rs. 5,000.
  • The insurer relied on the statutory framework (S. 95 and S. 96(2) of the 1939 Act) and relevant authorities to contend that its liability was limited by statute and that its defenses are circumscribed by the statutory provisions applicable to insurers.
  • In the High Court, counsel for the insurer expressed concern that a decision expanding owner liability (or allowing owners to escape liability because of insurance) might unfairly permit negligent owners/drivers to escape consequences; the insurer therefore supported an interpretation that preserves the statutory limits and the role of insurer defenses.

Driver / Conductor / Respondents' Position (as recorded)

  • The driver, conductor and owner (as per their pleadings) maintained that the victim got down from the running bus, lost her balance and the accident was due to her own fault (i.e., contributory negligence or sole negligence of the victim).
  • The Tribunal and the lower appellate court rejected the contention of contributory negligence and found rash and negligent conduct on the part of the driver and conductor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govinda Prasad v. Sujit, AIR 1978 Calcutta 108 Persons attempting to board a bus (or getting on) are covered by S. 95 where Proviso (ii) to S. 95(1) applies; insurer's liability limited where vehicle carried passengers for hire or reward and proviso conditions are met. Cited as an authority holding that even an attempt to board may fall within the Proviso and that the insurer’s liability may be limited to the statutory ceiling; used to support the proposition that S. 95 can apply even where boarding/attempting facts are in issue.
Uvaraja, R. v. Parvathi Ammal, 99 L.W. 265 Person attempting to get into a moving bus but not succeeding may not be a passenger for purposes of insurer limitation. Cited as an authority showing that a person who did not actually enter the bus could be held not to be a passenger; used in the Court's discussion of the line between attempting to board and being a passenger.
C.M.A. No. 558 of 1979 (Div. Bench, 28-7-1981) On facts where deceased was attempting to get into a bus but failed, the person was held not to be a passenger. Referenced as a factual precedent aligning with decisions that deny passenger status to persons who only attempt to board but do not succeed; used to distinguish factual categories.
Southern Motors, Madurai v. C. Sivajothiammal Distinguishes between persons who actually travel and those attempting to get on; person who did not get into bus but fell may not be a passenger. Cited to show distinction and courts' reluctance to adopt an overly broad definition of 'passenger' that would include all ticket-holders or would include persons who never entered the vehicle.
Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Thirunelvell v. Perumal Kumar (C.M.A. Nos. 7 & 25 of 1972) Person travelling on the footboard without entering the bus may not be a passenger; insurer's liability may be unlimited in such case. Referred to limit the breadth of what "passenger" includes and to illustrate that different fact patterns may produce different outcomes on insurer liability.
Sivakumar Transports v. Mani & Palaniswamy (single judge) Defines 'passenger' as one who travels (sitting or standing) and states that presence on entrance/exit/footboard does not normally make one a passenger; attempted boarding that fails does not confer passenger status. Cited and relied upon to support the principle that attempted entry without actual travel is generally not passenger status; used to distinguish the present facts from attempted‑boarding cases.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Sundaravalli, 1989 T.L.N.J. 31 Considered cases of persons getting down from a bus; concluded that one who was getting down but thrown out by negligent starting could be treated as a passenger in some circumstances; analysis of "passenger" includes statutory and rule‑based considerations. Used as a precedent that supports treating a person who was alighting but not yet safe as still being a passenger; the Court relied on this and similar decisions when surveying authorities on alighting cases.
C.M.A. No. 55 of 1981 (unreported; referred) On facts, held that a person alighting who had set one foot on the ground when bus moved was not a passenger (in one reported single‑judge view). Mentioned among conflicting single‑judge authorities, demonstrating that decisions differ on alighting facts; used to show lack of unanimity in some factual permutations.
1988 ACC 571 (referred) Single‑judge decision where deceased getting down but killed because driver moved vehicle before safe alighting was treated as a passenger. Cited to illustrate that some courts treat persons alighting who are thrown by negligent acts as passengers for the purpose of insurer limitation.
Pandit Ram Swaroop v. Balbir Singh (Delhi High Court) Held that a person who had bought a ticket and actually travelled is a passenger; if he had alighted and reached ground safely the passenger status ends; where the bus did not stop at the destination and the deceased was trying to alight but was run over, the deceased was held not to be a passenger. Cited to demonstrate an approach that considers contract and actual completion of alighting; used in the discussion to show that on these facts a person may cease to be a passenger when safely on the ground, but that fact patterns diverge.
B.I.G. Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh (Supreme Court) Interpretation of sub‑S. (2) of S. 96 (1939 Act): insurer entitled only to defenses enumerated in that sub‑section; courts should not add defenses beyond those specified. Reliance placed on the Supreme Court’s observation as a binding statement of law on the limited scope of defenses available to an insurer; the Court considered this binding proposition but also examined whether that principle covered the entire field in the present factual matrix.
United Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P. Parvathamma (A.P. High Court) Observed that insurer can raise all objections under S. 110‑C where impleaded appropriately; otherwise insurer impleaded under S. 96(2) is limited to defenses enumerated therein; insurer cannot be compelled by claimant to be a party. Cited to explain the procedural and substantive limitations on insurer participation and to illustrate that the insurer’s available defenses depend on statutory mode of impleading; Court used it to evaluate the scope of insurer defenses in this appeal.
T. Srinivasulu Sastry v. C. Govardana Naidu (A.P. Div. Bench) Interpretation relevant to S. 92A (amending provision) and its applicability to pending cases; held S. 92A may apply to pending claims. Cited by parties arguing for retrospective operation of the 1982/1988 amendments; Court reviewed and contrasted such holdings when addressing the effect of the 1988 Act and saving provisions.
Oriental Fire & Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Shantabai S. Chume (Bombay High Court) Held that S. 92‑A introduced by Amending Act was retrospective in operation and could apply to pending proceedings. Cited as authority supporting retrospective application of no‑fault provisions; Court considered this view in the context of S. 217 of the 1988 Act and the limits of altering accrued rights.
Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) (multiple authorities cited therein) Compilation of authorities on "passenger" and when passenger status continues or ceases (examples include: boarding a streetcar, setting foot on a step, whether alighting is complete, reasonable opportunity to reach place of safety, etc.). The Court extensively relied on the compilation to show divergent authorities and principles governing when a person is a passenger (boarding, attempting to board, alighting, after alighting). It used the compilation to identify recurring tests and to conclude that context and conduct of the parties determine passenger status.
Zimmermann v. Medanlkoff (162 H.W 349; 163 Wis. 333) Pedestrian crossing to board a waiting street car with open gates held to be a passenger. Included among examples showing circumstances where boarding/approach may amount to passenger status; used as part of the comparative matrix.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Cutter (103 S.W. 279) One who attempts to board a rapidly moving train does not become a passenger though he may have a ticket. Illustrates the contrary category (attempt to board without success does not confer passenger status); Court used it to identify factual distinctions.
Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (151 E.R. 91) Person in the act of getting upon a street car may be a passenger in some circumstances. Cited to show instances where in‑the‑act boarding was treated as passenger status depending on circumstances.
Dahline v. City of Seattle (165 Wash. 683) One becomes a passenger when setting foot on step after car stopped, with intention to become a passenger. Used to support a factual test involving actual ingress after vehicle has come to rest.
Kentucky Highlands R. Co. v. Creal (179 S.W. 417) Attempt to board a moving train does not make one a passenger despite having a ticket. Reiterated by the Court as part of authorities classifying attempted boarding as non‑passenger.
Bradley v. Williams Where street car stops at usual place and opens door, persons proceeding to board are passengers. Included among cases showing that context (stopped car, opened door) matters to passenger status.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Aschenbrenner (65 F.2d 976) Person does not become passenger on moving train until he reaches place of safety inside the car. Used to demonstrate that safety inside the vehicle (or appropriate completed ingress) is significant for passenger status.
Weaver v. Sprague Injury while boarding elevated railway where door closed and train moved found to be a passenger within an insurance policy. Included as an example where in‑the‑act boarding was treated as passenger status for insurance coverage.
North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Williams Relation of carrier and passenger may be implied from proper attempt to enter as passenger with intention to be transported. Used in the compilation to show that intention and proper manner of entry can create passenger relation.
Lacks v. Wells One who had alighted and is in safety on highway is not a passenger as regards carrier's duty. Cited to show that passenger status can cease once safely on the ground.
Columbus R. Co. v. Asbell Where passenger has safely alighted at destination, he ceases to be a passenger. Used to illustrate the principle that completion of alighting ends passenger relation.
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Kennedy Passenger remains such until he has reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety after alighting. Employed to show nuanced tests about reasonable opportunity after alighting.
Zaiewski v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. (263 N.W. 577) Passenger ceases to be such as soon as he safely steps on public street and has reasonable opportunity to leave place of alighting. Used among authorities to show the criteria for termination of passenger status after alighting.
Wittower v. Delias Ry. & Terminal Co. Child struck after stepping from street car held not a passenger at time of injury. Included to show examples where courts treated alighted person as pedestrian rather than passenger.
Callagher v. St. Lemin Public Service Co. One who had alighted and was in safety ceased to be a passenger and had status of ordinary pedestrian. Cited in same vein as other alighting cases to demonstrate when carrier duty ends.
Whilts v. Alighany Cab Co. Status of passenger may continue until reasonable opportunity to leave the place of alighting has elapsed; a passenger may alight during journey without losing status in some circumstances. Used to show that continuation of passenger status after partial alighting depends on circumstances.
Alpine v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp. Passenger who had alighted and walked within a safety zone intended for transfer was no longer a passenger when injured before transferring. Illustrates that movements after alighting may change status depending on safety and opportunity to leave.
Devoy v. St. Louis Transit Co. and related authorities The law deems carrier‑passenger relation to exist while a person is properly on steps leaving the car. Cited among authorities to show that being on steps/entrance in a proper manner may preserve passenger status in some contexts.
Gillis v. Duluth Casualty Assn. Insured on platform preparatory to getting off was within policy's coverage as a passenger. Included to show cases where the in‑the‑act alighting or being on step was treated as within passenger coverage under insurance policies.
Quinn v. New York Life Ins. Co. If insured had safely alighted on pavement, he was not a passenger; if in the act of alighting or had not safely alighted, he remained a passenger. Used to demonstrate the fine line between completed alighting and in‑the‑act alighting for passenger status.
Other foreign and domestic authorities cited in the compilation (e.g., Payne; Nelton; Logan; Houston & T.C.R.Co v. Bachelor; etc.) Various propositions about when the carrier‑passenger relationship begins and ends; reasonable opportunity to leave; effect of ticket, place of alighting, carrier's arrangements, and voluntary acts of passenger. Collectively relied upon to extract guiding principles: passenger generally means one who travels; whether a person is a passenger depends on conduct and circumstances; person alighting may in some circumstances still be a passenger until safely away from vehicle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first restating the key-foundational facts found on record and not seriously challenged: Kamalam alighted from the front exit with other women; while she had one foot on the ground and another on the footboard, the conductor gave a whistle and the bus began to move slowly; she was holding the post and was dragged some ten feet; the bus ran over her causing fatal injuries. The Tribunal had found rash and negligent driving/conduct by the driver and conductor and no contributory negligence on the part of Kamalam.

The Court analysed the relevant statutory provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Chapter VIII) — specifically S. 95(1) and sub‑S. (2)(b)(ii) and (4) — which limited insurer liability per passenger (in the facts of the case, to Rs. 5,000 per passenger under clause (4) of sub‑S. (2)). The central legal question was whether Kamalam was still a "passenger" within the meaning of the proviso to S. 95(1) and S. 95(2) at the time of the occurrence.

The Court surveyed an extensive body of case law (both domestic and foreign), separating them into categories:

  • Cases where the person was attempting to board but had not entered the vehicle and therefore was held not to be a passenger (e.g., decisions referred to in Uvaraja, Division Bench C.M.A. No. 558/79 and Sivakumar Transports).
  • Cases where a person alighting who had not yet reached a place of safety but was thrown or injured because of the negligent conduct of the carrier was treated as a passenger (e.g., some single‑judge decisions including parts of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Sundaravalli and other cited authorities).
  • Authoritative compilations (Words & Phrases) and multiple foreign authorities showing a range of outcomes dependent on the precise facts — e.g., setting foot on the step after the vehicle has stopped with intention to travel; whether the passenger had a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety after alighting; whether the carrier's conduct prevented safe alighting, etc.

The Court emphasised the overarching principle that the expression "passenger" conveys the idea of "one who travels." It concluded that passenger status depends on factual circumstances and the conduct of both the person and those responsible for carrying him or her. The Court rejected any rigid or blanket rule and instead endorsed a case‑by‑case approach: a person who has not entered the vehicle is not a passenger; a person who has alighted and had a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety ceases to be a passenger; but where a person is alighting and the carrier’s rash or negligent conduct prevents safe alighting (for example by starting the vehicle while the person was in the act of alighting), the person may still be treated as a passenger.

On procedural and statutory points, the Court reviewed:

  • The binding Supreme Court authority (B.I.G. Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh) interpreting S. 96(2) of the 1939 Act as limiting an insurer to defenses enumerated in that sub‑section. The Court accepted the principle but found it did not entirely cover the present factual issue about whether an owner can contend that the victim was not a third party where the Tribunal had already fixed insurer liability under the statute.
  • The submissions about the effect of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (including S. 92A, S. 147 and the no‑fault provisions). The Court examined S. 217 (repeal and savings) of the 1988 Act and S. 6 of the General Clauses Act (effect of repeal), concluding that the new Act did not alter the accrued rights or liabilities in a manner that would change the result in the present case. In short, the Court held that a beneficial procedural or welfare provision may apply to pending proceedings but not where the new law would alter accrued substantive liabilities in a way inconsistent with statutory savings.

Applying the legal principles to the facts found by the Tribunal (unrebutted evidence that Kamalam had one foot on the ground, one on the footboard, was holding the front post and was dragged after the conductor signalled movement), the Court agreed with the Tribunal and the single judge below. It held that the victim was a person "being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle" in the sense contemplated by the Proviso and thus fell within the scope of S. 95(2)(b)(ii) and clause (4). Accordingly the insurer's liability was limited by statute.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED. The Tribunal's award of compensation in the sum of Rs. 36,000 (with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition) is upheld; the insurer's liability is limited to the statutory ceiling applicable under S. 95(2)(b)(ii) and clause (4) (Rs. 5,000 in the circumstances recorded) and the balance is payable by the owner.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The award of Rs. 36,000 stands; credit is to be given for the sum already deposited (Rs. 32,610 as represented) and the claimants are entitled to recover the balance with interest per the Tribunal's award.
  • The insurer remains liable only to the extent fixed by the statutory provisions (as applied to the facts); the owner remains liable for the remainder of the award.

Broader implications:

  • The Court emphasised that the decision does not create a sweeping new rule; rather it applies established principles and authorities to the facts. The ruling reinforces that passenger status is a question of fact depending on conduct and circumstances, and must be applied case‑by‑case.
  • The Court held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (and its provisions) do not, by virtue of the repeal and savings provisions, disturb accrued substantive rights and liabilities so as to alter the outcome in cases such as this where rights had already accrued under the 1939 Act and the Tribunal had applied the statutory limits.
  • The Court accepted the binding statement of law that insurers' defenses are generally limited by S. 96(2) of the 1939 Act, but it clarified that this principle does not prevent factual contests in which an owner may contend the victim was not a third party; the resolution depends on the particular factual and legal matrix of each case.

No new precedent was laid down beyond the careful application and synthesis of existing authorities; the Court emphasised careful factual application of the passenger‑status tests in future cases.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. No costs.

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JUDGMENT Mishra, J.

The third Respondent, owner of a Motor vehicle in M.C.O.P No. 14 of 1980 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore, and appellant in A.A.O No. 678 of 1981, has preferred this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court against the award of compensation to the claimants Respondents 1 to 4 herein amounting to Rs. 36,000/- out of which Rs. 5000/- is payable by the Insurer and the balance by the owner appellant.

2. The claimants who are the husband and minor sons and daughters of the victim Kamalam moved the Tribunal under S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (since repealed) alleging that Kamalam was travelling in a town bus plying in route No. 32C and bearing Registration No. TNE 6517 along Goods Shed Road on 16-7-79 at about 7-45 am. When the bus approached the bus stop near the junction of Big Bazaar St., and Goods Shed Road, West of St. Michael's High School, she got down from the bus at that stop. But before she could stabilise herself on the road, the conductor instructed the driver to move the vehicle and accordingly the driver started the bus rashly and negligently with the result that Kamalam was knocked down and dragged along by the body of the bus. In that process, she sustained multiple injuries and succumbed to them in the C.M.C Hospital. The claimants impleaded the driver, the conductor, the owner of the vehicles and the insurer as party respondents in the proceeding before the Tribunal.

3. The driver pleaded in his return that there was no bus stop in the Goods Shed Road near St. Michael's High School and that Kamalam got down from the running bus and the lost her balance due to which she met with the accident which caused her death. The conductor and the owner of the bus (appellant) adopted the said counter and thus maintained that Kamalam met with the accident entirely on account of her own fault and not on account of any rash or negligent act of the driver or the conductor.

4. The insurer in a separate counter affidavit alleged that the driver was plying the bus at a moderate speed from north to south along Goods Shed Road. The victim was one of the passengers travelling in the bus. When the bus approached the junction of the Goods Shed Road and Big Bazaar St., the driver slowed down the vehicle. At this point of time, despite the warning given by the conductor, the victim jumped out of the bus since the bus was still moving, she fell down and sustained injuries, to which injuries, she succumbed later in the day. The insurer maintained that its maximum liability was Rs. 5,000/- only.

5. The Tribunal, on a consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary found that the accident took place only on account of the rash and negligent act of the driver and conductor of the bus and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the victim. It, however, held that the victim did not cease to be a passenger within the meaning of Proviso (ii) to sub-S. (1) of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act and so the liability of the insurer was restricted to Rs. 5,000/-. The Tribunal concluded that the claimants/respondents were entitled to a compensation of Rs. 36,000/- and awarded compensation accordingly with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition.

6. In the appeal against the Tribunal's awarding compensation, the appellant maintained that it was the insurance Company that had to pay the entire amount of compensation that had been awarded by the Tribunal and that the findings of the Tribunal with regard to the negligence of the driver and the quantum of compensation were not proper and not sustainable.

7. Swamikkannu, J. who eventually heard the appeal, however has held that the victim Kamalam was still a passenger within the meaning of S. 95(2)(b) read with Proviso (ii) to sub-S. (1) thereof and thus the insurer's liability was limited to the limits under the Act, that there was no force in the contention of the appellant in view of the evidence on record that the accident was not as a result of the rash and negligent driving and that the quantum of compensation awarded was correct.

8. Before we prospect into the contentions we propose to have the foundation of facts that (1) Kamalam travelled in the town bus plying in route No. 32C bearing Registration No. TNE 5517 on 16-7-1979 at about 7-45 am along Goods Shed Road, (2) the accident took place when the bus approached the bus stop near the junction of Big Bazaar St., and Goods Shed Road, the west of St. Michael's High School and (3) the bus belonged to the appellant.

9. It is on record in the evidence of the witnesses, which has not been seriously challenged before us, that the bus stopped near the junction of Goods Shed Road and Big Bazaar St., and that three women alighted from the bus along the front exit including the victim Kamalam. When she was placing one foot on the ground and another foot on the foot-board of the bus, the conductor gave the whistle and the bus began to move slowly. Kamalam was holding the post near the front exist when the bus moved and dragged her to a distance of about 10 feet. The passenger in the bus shouted and the bus was stopped. The bus ran over her and caused serious injuries, to which injuries she later succumbed.

10. Chapter VIII of the 1939 Act contained a special provision as to insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks and in S. 95 thereof, fixed the limits of liability in these words.

“(1) In Order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy. ……

(2) Subject to the Proviso to Sub-S. (1) a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely.-

(a) Where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver) not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle);

(b) Where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of contract of employment-

(i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all;

(ii) in respect of passengers—

(1) a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry not more than thirty passengers;

(2) a limit of seventy five thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than fifty but not more than sixty passengers;

(3) a limit of one lakh rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than sixty passengers; and

(4) subject to the limits aforesaid, ten thousand rupees for each individual passenger where the vehicle is a motor cab and five thousand rupees for each individual passenger in any other case;

(c) save as provided in Cl. (d), where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of liability incurred;

(d) irrespective of the class of the vehicle, a limit of rupees two thousand in all in respect of damage to any property of a third party.”

11. It is nobody's case that in case victim Kamalam was a passenger in the bus at the time of the accident, the Insurer's liability will be higher than rupees five thousand as fixed under clause (4) of sub-S. (2) of S. 95 above quoted. The controversy herein is whether Kamalam was still a passenger, when, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, Kamalam had ceased to be a passenger, for she had moved out of the bus. According to him, the insurer in such a situation should be held liable for the whole amount of compensation payable to the claimants.

12. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Govinda Prasad v. Sujit AIR 1978 Calcutta 108 dealt with a case of a minor school student, who after the school hours, tried to board a private bus at the bus stop opposite the school, but before he could board the bus, it started moving on the signal of the conductor. The boy lost balance and fell down on the road and the rear wheel of the bus rolled over his right leg. The principal contention before the Court was that the Tribunal should have held that the insurer was liable for the whole amount of compensation and that S. 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was not applicable as the boy who did not board the bus but only made an attempt to board the same, could not be said to be a passenger within the meaning of the said provision. The Calcutta Court observed;

“Clause (b) of Sub-S. (2) of S. 95 inter alia provides that subject to the Proviso sub-S. (1), where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver, a policy of insurance will cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident upto the limit of two thousand rupees in respect of individual passenger. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the vehicle in question is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver. Even assuming that the respondent was not a passenger as he was only attempting to board the bus, still the limit of the liability of the insurer would be in terms, of S. 95. The Proviso (ii) to S. 95(1) which has been quoted above, clearly lays down that where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward, as in the present case, policy of the insurer would cover the liability for death or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicles at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises. Sub-S. (2) having been made subject to the Proviso to sub-S. (1), it covers the liability for death or bodily injury to persons caused in the circumstances stated above. The word ‘passengers’ in Cl. (b) of sub-S. (2) of S. 95 also includes within it any person meeting with death or bodily injury under the circumstances mentioned in the Proviso (ii) to sub-S. (1) where the vehicle is one in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or under a contract of employment. The limit of liability of the insurer will be as specified in Cl. (b) of Sub-S. (2). In our view, there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the Respondent was not a passenger as he had only attempted to board the bus at the time of the accident happened and accordingly, the insurer should be held liable for the whole amount of compensation as awarded. As the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in fixing the liability of the insurer at Rs. 2000/- only in view of Cl. (b) of Sub-S. (2) S. 95 of the Act”.

13. In the case of Uvaraja, R. v. Parvathi Ammal 99 L.W 265, a learned Single Judge of this Court death with a case of a victim of a motor accident, who was about to get into the moving bus, but slipped down due to rush and ultimately got under the wheel and met with his death. Referring to an earlier Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.M.A No. 558/79 dated 28th July. 1981, which was a case on facts that the deceased was about to get into the moving bus, the Court said:

“I must straightway point out that the facts are on all fours with those found in a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this court in C.M.A No. 558 of 1979 dated 28th July. 1981. In this case, the finding is that the deceased was about to get into the moving bus, but then before he could get into the bus, he slipped down due to rush and ultimately get under the wheel and met with his death. It is now relevant to notice the facts in the unreported case referred to above. The deceased was not a passenger in the bus and there was a scramble between the persons who a were waiting for the bus at the bus stand and it is at that scramble the deceased fell down and was run over by the bus. On the said facts, the Bench held:

“Therefore, we can safely say any that a person attempting to get into the bus but who did not succeed in getting entry into the bus, cannot be taken to be a passenger in the bus”. If that is so, in the instant case, the deceased cannot be said to be a passenger in the bus. Unless the deceased was a passenger, the insurance company cannot call to its S. 95(2)(b)(ii) and (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Then, the Insurance company is alone liable to pay the entire claim.”.

14. A Bench of this Court in Southern Motors, Madurai v. C. Sivajothiammal has said,

“Though the learned counsel for the insurer contends that all persons who are authorised to travel in the bus by the issue of tickets should be taken to be passengers of the bus, we are not in a position to accept such a wide proposition. As a matter of fact in a judgment of this court, Natarajan, J. in the Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Thirunelvell v. Perumal Kumar C.M.A Nos. 7 and 25 of 1972, held that a person travelling on the foot board without actually entering the bus cannot be taken to be a passenger and that if death or injury is caused to such a passenger, there cannot be any limit on the insurer's liability. However, it is unnecessary for us to go to the extent of saying that a person travelling foot board is not a passenger, as in this case we are not concerned with a person travelling on the foot board but a person who did not actually get into the bus, fell down and sustained injuries by a fall from the moving bus in his attempt to get an entry into the bus while it was moving.”

15. In Sivakumar Transports v. Mani & Palaniswamy, a learned single judge of this Court again considered the case of a person, who met with an accident while attempting to board a bus and said as follows:—

“The expression ‘passenger’ normally refers to one who travels either in a bus or a vehicle or a ship and the predominant idea conveyed by the expression ‘passenger’ is one who travels. It is further seen from the elaborate provisions and the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act that what is contemplated is that a person could be regarded as a passenger, when he travels either by being seated inside the bus in the seats provided for occupation by passengers who travel or by standing, where such passengers are allowed to travel by standing. The entrance and the exit provided in a bus are only for the purpose of securing ingress and eggress and they are not meant for travel. Therefore, any person found on the foot board at the time of the accident cannot normally be regarded as a passenger travelling by the vehicle concerned. The attempted entry into the bus through the exit from the foot board could at best be regarded as having been done with a view to begin or commence travel by the bus. A person in the position of the first Respondent making an attempt to get into the bus and failing in it cannot be regarded as travelling by the bus as a passenger. In C.M.A No. 558 of 1979, judgment dated 28-7-1981, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider whether a person attempting to get into a moving bus would be a passenger. The Division Bench held that a person attempting to enter a bus but falling down as a result of the bus being suddenly started before he could enter the bus, cannot be said to be a passenger. To similar effect is the decision in 1986 ACT 506 wherein it has been laid down that when a person attempts to get into a moving bus, but before getting into the bus slips down and met with a fatal accident, the deceased could not be regarded as a passenger in the bus and the Insurance company cannot call to its aid S. 95(2)(b)(ii) and (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act.”

16. The cases above cited, however, are cases of persons, who were yet to enter the bus and thus found not travelling in the bus.

17. In National Insurance Company Limited v. V.K Sundaravalli 1989 T.L.N.J 31 a learned single Judge of this Court, however, dealt with a case of a person, who met with an accident while getting down from a bus at the bus stop. That was a case in which before the victim could rest his foot on the ground, the driver of the bus moved the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner as a result of which he was thrown out and sustained serious injuries to which he succumbed later in the hospital. After referring to the various authorities in cases of accidents taking place causing injuries to person, who were yet to enter into the bus, the learned judge has taken notice of two judgments one in C.M.A No. 55/81 and another in 1988 ACC 571, the former being a judgment in which a learned single judge of this court held that the person who was alighting from the bus and had set one foot on the ground when the bus was moved was not a passenger at the time of the accident, and the latter in which on similar facts, a learned single Judge held that the deceased, who was getting down from the bus and was killed since the driver moved the vehicle before he could safely get down was to be treated as passenger, and thereafter said:

“Though some of the decisions of this court and some decisions of other courts holding a person getting inside a vehicle as a third party, had been placed before the learned judge, the decisions referred to by me in the preceding paragraph, rendered by S.A Kader, J. in Judgment in C.M.A No. 55 of 1981 and cross objections dated 24-12-1986 had not been placed before the learned single judge. Learned Judge, therefore, without any further discussion observed that the facts and circumstances of the case before him, were different from the facts and circumstances of the cases cited before him.”

and added,

“The Oxford Universal Dictionary Third Edition gives the meaning of the word “passenger” as hereunder:—

“Passenger: one who travels in some vessel or vehicle esp of board ship or in a factory of passage boat; later applied also to travellers by any public conveyance entry by ferry or contract.”

The paramount idea conveyed by the term passenger is that a passenger travels. A passenger, therefore, is one who travels.

“The Act, as well as the Rules framed by the State Government thereunder give an indication regarding the mode of by which one would travel in vehicles. Suffice it to refer to the relevant provisions dealing with the mode of travel in public conveyance carrying pass travel, is travelling in the seating accommodation provided in the vehicle. S. 70(2)(b) of the Act enables the State Government to make Roles relating to the seating arrangement in public service vehicles and protection of passenger against the weather. Rule 360 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 and the subsequent Rules prescribe the manner in which seating accommodation is to be provided for the passengers who travel in the vehicle. For each passenger a reasonably comfortable seating space of not less than thirty eight centimeters square measured on straight lines along and at 4 right angles to the front of each seat with a distance of 135 cm. from the backs of the seats on the other side is to be provided. Detailed Rules have been framed regarding alignment of seats in different types of stage carriages, body built of stage carriages and other matters. Travel, therefore, is only by remaining seated in the accommodation provided. Rule 363(2) provides an exception to this mode of travel, wherein the Transport Authority could permit travel by standing, except when the stage carriage is running as express service or running on that roads. Total passengers capacity of each vehicle, is fixed with reference to the seating accommodation available within the body of the bus. Similarly the member of passengers who could be permitted to travel by standing is also fixed with reference to the space available in the bus. For passengers who are permitted to travel by standing grabrails are being provided to ensure safe travel.

Rule 368 provides that in every public service vehicle, other than a motor car, there shall be on the left side of the vehicle an entrance in the rear or rear overhang and an exit in the front, each having a width of not less than 53 cms. and of sufficient height. Rules 370 regulates, the measurement of entrance or exit passage in the bus. The top of the tread of the lowest step shall not be more than 45 cm. or less than 25 cm. above the ground and the steps shall not be less than 23 cm. wide and should be with non-slip treads.

A combined reading of these provisions clearly show that one could travel in a passenger vehicle only in two ways viz., either by remaining seated in the seating accommodation provided or by standing in vehicles where travel by standing is specially permitted. The steps that are provided in the vehicle for the purpose of entry or exit are for entry and exit. They are not meant for travel. When, therefore one is actually using the exit or entry passage, at that point of time, and cannot be, said to be travelling. Such a person, therefore, cannot be considered a passenger. He is using that entry passage for the purpose of commencing or continuing his travel and he is using the exit passage for the purpose of getting down from the vehicle, either after completing the travel or for any other reason. It, therefore, follows that one who is either getting into the vehicles or is getting down from the vehicle cannot be said to travel at that point of time. Such a person is not a passenger. The Act, as well as the rules, do not permit of any other interpretation.

18. A learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court dealt with a case in Pandit Ram Swaroop v. Balbir Singh in which a person suffered an accident while getting down from the bus and said:

“For complying with the provisions of S. 95(2)(b)(ii)(4). It must be shown that the deceased was a passenger at the time when the accident took place. A person is called a passenger when he buys a ticket for the bus from the boarding point to the point of destination and actually travels in the bus. He is a passenger by virtue of a contract between him and the owner of the bus, the consideration being payment of the bus fare and obligation on the part of the owner of the bus being to carry the person from the boarding point to the point of destination. In the present case, the deceased boarded the bus at the General Stores bus stop and his destination point, was the bus stop at Ordinance Depot, Shakurbasti”. He had purchased the ticket for the said journey. If the bus had stopped at the Ordinance Depot bus stop, the deceased would have to get down and the contract would have come to an end. As soon as he had alighted from the bus and touched the ground, he would not have remained a passenger”. What has happened in the present case is that bus No. DLP-6059 did not stop at the Ordinance Depot bus stop and thus prevented the deceased from getting down at the point of destination. The bus went much ahead and when the deceased was trying to get down, the bus started and its rear wheel ran over the deceased the killed him. In these circumstance, I am of the opinion that at the bus stop at the Ordinance Depot, the status of the deceased as a passenger case to an end. Theory of the respondents that the deceased jumped out of the bus and offered injury because of the fall, has been rejected by the Tribunal, as no evidence was furnished by the respondents. I, therefore, held that when the accident was caused and the deceased was run over by the bus, he was not a ‘passenger’ of the bus and, therefore, the insurance company cannot claim limited liability under S. 95(2)(b)(ii) (4). I have no hesitation in holding that the insurance company is liable on the principle of third party liability and hence its liability is unlimited in the present case.”

19. The consensus of judicial opinion thus is in favour of a person being treated as a passenger when he actually entered into the bus and not when he was attempting to get into the bus but not succeeded in getting into the bus. Two Judges of this Court, one in the impugned judgment and another in the case reported in 1988 ACC 571 have taken the view that the victim, who was getting down from the bus and met with the accident before he could safely got down was to be treated as a passenger and one in C.M.A No. 55 of 1981 and another in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. V.K Sundaravalli have taken the view that a person who was alighting from the bus moved was not a passenger at the time of the accident. They are in the company of a learned single judge of this court in the case reported in in Pandit Ram Saroop v. Balbir Singh.

20. Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) 31-A has many cases to refer wherein it is said that a pedestrian crossing a street to board a waiting street car with open gates is a passenger; person in the act of getting upon a street car is a passenger; one becomes passenger of street car when setting foot on step after car stopped with intention of becoming passenger and one who attempts to board a rapidly moving train does not become a passenger, though he may have a ticket for it. Some of the citations in the book are:

“pedestrian crossing a street to board a waiting street car with open gates is a passenger. Zimmermann v. Medanlkoff 162 H.W 349, 350 163 wis. 333.

One who attempts to board a rapidly moving train does not become a passenger, though he may have a ticket for it. Illinoiscent R.Co V. Cttr, 103 S.W 279 280, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 679.

A person in the act of getting upon a street car is a passenger Benjamin v. Metropolitan st. Ry. Co. 151 E.R 91, 94, 245 Mo. 598.

One becomes passenger of street car when setting foot on step after car stopped, with intention of becoming passenger Dahline v. City of Seattle 5 p. 121010, 1012; 165 Wash. 683.

A person boarding a car for the purpose of meeting a friend intending to become a passenger if the friend was on the car, otherwise not, is not a passenger Hatcher v. Quioncy Horse Railway & Carrying Co. 181 III. App. 30.

Person becomes a passenger of street car as soon as he sets his foot on step or running board in the act of getting into the car after it has stopped, with the intention of becoming a passenger. Heva v. City of Seattle 272 P. 41, 43, 150 Wash 61.

One who attempts to board a moving train is not a “passenger”, though he may have purchased a ticket entitling him to passage thereon. Kentucky Highlands R. Co. v. Creal, 179 S.W 417, 418, 166 Ky. 469, I.R.A 1916B, 830, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1205.

Where street car stops at usual place of receiving passengers and opens door, persons proceeding to board car are passengers within law fixing status of parties. Bradley v. Williams 101 So. 808, 809, 20 Ala. App. 308.

Person does not become passenger on train by getting on moving train until he actually reaches place of safety inside car. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Aschenbrenner, CCA, Cal. 65 F.2d 976, 980.

One injured while boarding elevated railway train when door thereof was suddenly closed on his foot and train started was a passenger at time of accident, though train conductor rang bell for motor man to proceed. Weaver v. Sprague 71, N.B.2d 106, 330 III App. 331.

The relation of carrier and passenger may be implied from an attempt to enter in a proper manner a street car as a passenger, with the intention of being transported therein. North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Williams 29 N.B 672 675, 140, 111, 275.”

The book also contains citations of cases in which a person stepping out of the car was either held to be a passenger or not a passenger. Each citations in the book are:

“Persons leaving car on ground

One who had alighted from street car and is in safety in highway is not passenger, as regards care required by carrier. Lacks v. Wells 44 C.W.2d 154, 156, 329 Mo. 327.

Where a passenger has safely alighted from a car at his destination, he cease to be a passenger. Columbus R. Co. v. Asbell, 66 S.E 902, 903, 133 QA. 573.

A passenger alighting from a street car is still a passenger of until he has had a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety. Louiville Ry. Co. v. Kennedy 172 S.W 970, 971, 162 Ky. 560 Ann. Cas. 1916E, 996,

A passenger remains such until he has alighted from carriers vehicle and while alighting carrier owes him duty of a very high degree of care. Lackey v. Missouri & K.I.Ry Co., 264, S.W 807, 808, 305 No. 260.

After woman had alighted from street car and was standing on pavement near car, she was no longer passenger and company did not then owe her duty of carrier to passenger. El. Pase Electric Co. v. Ludlow, Tdx. 291 S.W 619 621.

The relation of passenger and carrier ceases at the end of the journey when the passenger has had a reasonable time and opportunity to leave the premises of the carrier. Illinois cent R. Co. v. V. Memillion 129 III. App. 27, 237.

Street car passenger ceased to be such as soon as she had safely stepped on to public street and had reasonable opportunity to step into place of safety. Zaiewski v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. 263 N.W 577, 219 Wis. 541.

Child struck by motor cycle after stepping from street car to street held not passenger, at time of injury, as respects street car company's liability as carrier for her injuries. Wittower v. Delias Ry. & Terminal Co. Tex. Civ. App. 73 S.W 2d 867, 869.

Person leaving street car ceases to be passenger as soon as he steps from car into public street at regular alighting place and has had reasonable opportunity to leave place at which he alights. Wittower v. Delals Ry, & Terminal Co., Tex. Civ. App. 73 S.N 2d 867, 869.

One who had alighted from street car upon street in safety ceased to be passenger and, as regards injuries sustained in tripping over object dangling from rear of street car, had status of ordinary pedestrian. Callagher v. St. Lemin Public Service Co. 59 S.W.2d 619, 332 Mo. 944.

Generally, status of passenger continues until he has stepped safely from carrier conveyance and has had reasonable opportunity to leave place at which he alights, and he may alight from conveyance during journey without losing his status as passenger. Whilts v. Alighany Cab Co. 29 Ry. E.2d 272 273.

A passenger who had alighted from street car and walked about 50 feet along the safety zone where she intended to transfer to another street car, but was injured before doing so, was no longer a passenger. Alpine v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp. 154 P. 2d 911, 9121, 67 Cal. App 2d 486.

Where a woman who had been a passenger left the train, and in passing through the depot fell over a cuspidor on the floor and was injured, she had ceased to be a passenger, and the burden was on her to show affirmatively negligence on the part of defendant Green v. Baltimore & O.R.Co 63 A.603, 214 Pa. 240.

A person injured while attempting to alight from a moving streetcar was a “passenger”, thereon, within the meaning of an accidents insurance policy providing for the payment of double insurance if insured was injured while riding as a passenger in any passenger conveyance. King v. Travellers Ins. Co. 28 S.E 661, 662, 101 Ga. 64, 65 Am. St. Rep. 288.

An adult passenger in possession of normal faculties, after alighting safely from street car where there is no traffic or anything else to interfere with his movements, ceases to be a passenger and becomes a pedestrian, and street car company owes him no duty greater than it owes to other pedestrian. Ferguson v. Kansan City Public Service Co. 156 p. 2d 869, 875, 159, Kan. 520.

One who alights from street car upon street and is in safely from any contact or collision with street car ceases to be a passenger, and as regards injuries sustained in tripping over some object or being struck by another vehicle, has status of ordinary pedestrian, Wullbrandt v. City of Seattle, 84 p. 2 123, 125, 196 Wash 645.

Where railroad provided work train to carry yard workman to depot from place of work, workman cease to be a passenger when he disembarked at depot, as regards degree of care railroad owed workman killed while riding on tender of engine to his home after he left depot. Buckner v. Southern Ry. Co. 96 S.W 2d 600, 601, 20 Tenn. App. 212.

Generally, a person ceases to be a “passenger” as soon as he safely steps from the car into a public street and has had a reasonable opportunity to leave the place at which he alights, provided he is set down at a place which is reasonably safe and proper for that purpose, Will v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 17 N.W 658, 659, 169 Wis. 38.

If the insured had safely alighted on the pavement from a street car when struck by taxicab, he was not a passenger on a street car, within policy, but if he was in the act of alighting, or had not safely alighted, from the car when struck, he was a passenger, within the policy. Quinn v. New York Life Ins. Co. 195 N.W 427, 429, 234 Mich. 641.

A passenger on alighting from a street car at the end of his journey loses his statute as a passenger when he has stepped from the car to a place of safety on the street, or on the highway, the question depending, not on number of steps he has taken but on the circumstances and conditions under which he alights, Loggins v. Southern Public Utilities Co. 106 S.E 822, 823, 181 N.C 221.

The relation of a street car passenger does not end when he leaves the car, but continues until he has reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's roadway, after the car reaches the place to which he is entitled to be carried. Nelton v. Birmingham Railway Light and Power Co. 45 S.C 153, 159, Aln. 95, 16 L.R.A.N.U 467.

Where a person becomes a passenger he continues to be one until he is safely deposited at his point of destination, and until he has left or had reasonable time within which to leave the premises of the carrier, unless the relation of carrier and passenger sooner terminated by the voluntary act of the passenger. Mc Bridge v. Georgia Railway and Electric co. 54, S.E 674, 676, 125 Qa. 515.

Where defendants's street car conductor committed an unproved assault on plaintiff, an old man, as he was endeavouring to alight, and pushed or threw him from the car, but plaintiff attempted to set his umbrella, which remained on the platform and the conductor kicked him, plaintiff had not entirely ceased to be a passenger at the time he was kicked, and the company was liable therefore. Flyn v. St. Louis Transit Co. 87 S.W 560 562, 113 Mo. App. 185.

Where passenger had not left street car at time it was started forward but then had one foot on steps of car and had hold of an iron attached to car with one hand for purpose of assisting her in alighting, she was still a passenger, Keller v. Chicago Rys. Co. 183 III. App. 399.

The law deems the relation of carrier and passenger to exist, and treats one as a passenger who is properly on the steps leaving the car. Devoy v. St. Louis Transit Co.91 S.W 140, 143, 192, Mo. 197, citing Clerk Street Rys. (2d Ed) 3; Schepers v. Union Depot R.Co 29 S.W 712, 126 Mo. 665, Perth v. Kansas City Electric Railway Co. 44 S.W 778, 142 No. 535; Booth street Ry. Law, 526.

A policy of accident insurance provided for double indemnity when the injury was sustained while riding as a passenger on any railway passenger car. It is held that the insured when on the platform of a car preparatory to getting off, in the way provided by the carrier, or in the act of doing so, was within the meaning of the policy riding as a passenger on a railway passenger car. Gillis v. Duluth Casualty Assn 158 N.W 252, 253, 133 Minn. 238.

A passenger on a railroad train alighted in the night at the town where he resided. The station, the town, and his home were all on the West side of the track, and the doors of the cars, which were vestibuled, were opened on that side. After his train had departed, he was killed by another train on a track to the eastward. Held, that he had ceased to be a passenger prior to his death, and the company at that time owed no duty to him as such. Payne v. Illnoient & Co. 155 P. 73, 76, 83 C.C.A 589.

Where a passenger after alighting from a train passed outside the station grounds and along a path on the railroad's right of way to a point 345 feet from the station, on her way home, where she lost her way in the darkness and fell into a turntable pit, she was not a passenger at the time; the duty that the railroad company owed her as a passenger having terminated when she left the depot grounds Louisville & N.R.Co v. Hobbas 159 S.W 682, 683, 155, Ky. 130, 47 L.R.A.N.S 1149.

The rule is that the relation of passenger and carrier, when established, does not terminate until the passenger has reached his destination, alighted from the train, and had a reasonable time in which to leave the place where passengers are discharged. A traveller on a railroad train ceases to be a passenger when, after alighting from his train upon the railroad platform, he has passed from that platform and off the railroad property to a public highway on which he intends to cross the tracks. Garrett v. Atlantic City and S.R.Co 74 A 273, 274, 79 N.J.L 127.

When a person on a coach of a railway company pays his fare to a point of destination on its line, he becomes a passenger, and remains such till the journey for which he has paid has ended, and until a reasonable time, to be determined from all the attendant circumstances, within which he should have left the carrier's premises, has elapsed, and this is true without regard to the object of the passenger's journey or his reason for stopping at the station which is the end of the journey. Houston & T.C.R.C0 v. Bachelor, 83 S.W 902, 904.37 Tex. Civ. App. 116.

Where a carrier has made proper arrangements for the exit by passengers from its station grounds, a passenger must use the ways provided, and where he knowingly fails to do so, and without invitation makes his exit in some other way, he ceases to be a passenger and becomes at most a mere licencee and it makes no difference that he goes where others, with the knowledge of the carrier, have gone before him, unless there is some invitation on the part of the carrier, and knowledge of such use does not of itself amount to such invitation. Legga v. New York, M.R and H.R.Co 23 L.R A.N.S 633.

Whether a person who has alighted from a standing train at a station, and who is crossing the railway tracks, by a planked way provided by the company for that purpose, after the train from which he has alighted has moved out, is still a passenger, entitled to so cross without looking or listening is a question of fact for the jury, where, under the proof, reasonable men may differ as to whether he was proceeding from the station platform to a place of safety within a reasonable time after he had alighted from the train. The relation of passenger and carrier, when established, does not terminate until the passenger has reached his destination, alighted from the train, and has had reasonable time in which to leave the place where passengers are discharged. Atlantic City Railway Co. v. Kiefex, 66A 930, 931, 932, 75 N.J.L 54.

While one is passing from one train to another, as required by the conditions of his ticket, he remains a passenger, and is entitled to all rights as such. Baltimore and O.R.Co v. State 60 Md. 449, 462.

A passenger on a street car, who steps from the car into a public street, ceases to be a passenger the moment he leaves the car. Creamer v. West and Southern Railway Co. 31 N.E 391, 156 Mass. 320, 16 D.R.A 490, 32 Am. St. Rep. 456.

A person ceases to be a passenger when he has alighted from a train, gone on the sidewalk of the highway, and thence started to cross the track, on his way from the station. Allerton v. Boston and M.R.R 15 N.E 621, 623, 146 Mass. 241.

That an aged and infirm passenger did not get off a railway coach with the other passengers, but waited five minutes for assistance before attempting to alight alone, did not deprive him of his status as a passenger. Turner v. Habah Railway Co. No. 211, S.W 101, 103.

An approach to a railway depot on premises belonging to the company constitutes a part of such premises, and the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has passed beyond such approach Gulf. C. and S.P Ry. Co. v. Blank 30 S.W 278, 279, Tex. Civ. App. 599.

Where a person had a ticket giving him a right to ride as a passenger, and had no opportunity to surrender it or pay his fore, but left the train after it had stopped at a station where passengers were accustomed and had a right to leave the train, and was injured while so doing by a train on another track, he still continued a passenger upto the time of the injury. McKimble v. Boston & M.R.E 2. N.E 97, 98, 139, Mass. 542.

Plaintiff, a married woman, while travelling alone with her baby, was transferred to a station of defendant's railway, over which she had a valid ticket, purchased from a connecting line, and which included her transfer from the road to the other. The station was kept open at all times, both day and night, for the use of passengers; and plaintiff remained there to await her train, which would not arrive for 10 hours, with the assent of defendant's agent. While alone in the waiting room at night, she was assaulted by defendant's night agent. Held, that she was a passenger, and that defendant was liable for act of its employee. St. Louis S.W.Ry Co. of Texas v. Griffith, 35 S.W 741, 743, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 631.

Where a passenger places himself under the-charge of the carrier as he begins his journey, he is a passenger being transported, and is within the protection of S. 3, Art. 1, c. 72 Comp. St. 1911, until he is afforded an opportunity to leave to premises of the carrier at his destination; but if it appears that the passengers, having reached the end of his journey has departed from the car, and has had a reasonable time and opportunity to avoid injury from the operation of the train, or further necessity of relation with the servants of the carrier, he ceases to be a passenger, and thereafter is not within the protection afforded by the statute. Painter v. Chicago B and C. Railway. Co. 140 S.W 787, 789, 93 Neb. 419.

While it is undoubtedly true that one who has brought ticket or otherwise become entitled to transportation on a train of cars of a railroad corporation, is ordinarily a passenger from the time when the reasonably and properly starts from the ticket office or waiting room of the station to take his seat in the car of the train until he has reached the station to which he is entitled to be carried and has had an opportunity by safe and convenient means to leave the train or roadway of the corporation at that station, he loses his character as a passenger by getting off the train at his destination before the train stops. Commonwealth v. Boston and N.R.R 129 Mass. 500, 501, 37 Am. Rep. 382.

21. What is striking, however in all such situations is the fact that to establish that a certain person was a passenger, it should be seen however how he acted and how those responsible to carry him as a passenger behaved. It is not in doubt and it cannot be doubted that a person becomes a passenger by contract, express or implied. The expression passenger ultimately refers to one, who travels either in a bus or a vehicle or a ship or a train. This expression means one who travels and nothing else. When the relationship of a carrier and a passenger begins with reference to the vehicle concerned must be found varying from fact to fact and case to case. A person rushing to a vehicle and attempting to board when in fact it had started moving, given in the circumstances of the case, we found, not to be a passenger. One who has not entered the vehicle is obviously not a passenger. One who has alighted from the vehicle is also not a passenger. But a passenger alighting from a vehicle may still be a passenger until he had reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety, meaning thereby that he was away from the vehicle.

22. While we have no hesitation in holding that insurance of a motor vehicle against third party risks is a sort of indemnity to the insured, we cannot visualise that in the garb of enjoying such indemnity a negligent carrier can escape the liability of damages. How can he be allowed to say, Look here, my vehicle is insured therefore I can throw out a passenger and then say that, since he was found on the street, he was not a passenger.

23. Learned counsel for the insurer expressed this concern and we share his anxiety for the simple reason that while it may appear beneficial to the claimants to hold that the insurer will have the liability not limited to Rs. 5,000/- or Rs. 10,000/- as the case may be, it will indeed be a freedom to the owners, drivers and others to escape any consequences of these rash and negligent acts. It is with this concern, one has to understand the problems in each case and solve in the light of the principles that would determine whether the victim was a passenger or not a person who was yet to become a passenger in the sense that he had not been booked or that he wanted to enter forcibly into a vehicle, which was moving or was seen to move may may not be a passenger. Similarly, a person who was entering into the bus or any other vehicle, but was prevented by any rashness or negligence of the owner, driver, conductor or any other agent or servant of the owner may be taken to be a passenger. The same test may apply to a person leaving the car or vehicle. A passenger alighting from the vehicle may cease to be a passenger if he had left the vehicle for good. If he stepped out of the vehicle into the street, he was a pedestrian and not a passenger in the vehicle. However, this safety catch in a given circumstances can be used as an incisive scissor and when and how the chord of relationship of the carrier and the passenger would be cut could still depend not on speculation but on facts.

24. There has been another serious argument and we must take notice of that before we advert to the last contention that the learned counsel for the appellant has raised, viz., whether the insurer's liability will be under the new Act or will be under the repealed Act. This argument is based upon sub-S. (2) of S. 96 of the 1930 Act, which reads as follows:

No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub S. (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings, in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is go given shall he entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds namely.”

25. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in B.I.G Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh in which it has been observed.

“Now the language of Sub-S. (2) seems to us to be perfectly plaint and to admit of no doubt or confusion. It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely, after which comes an enumeration of the grounds. It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others. If it were riot so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. …

We therefore think that Sub-S. (2) clearly provides that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it. Sub-S. (2) in fact desis with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy. Thus Cl. (d) of that sub-section permits an insurer to defend on action on the ground that the policy has been duly cancelled provided the conditions set out in that Clause have been satisfied. Clause (c) gives him the right to defend the action on the ground that the policy is void as having been obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact or a material false representation of fact. Therefore it cannot be said that in enacting sub-S. (2) the Legislature was contemplating only those defences which were based on the conditions of the policy.

It also seems to us that even if sub-S. (2) and sub-S;. (3) were confined only to defences based on the conditions of the policy that would not have led to the conclusion that the Legislature thought that other defences not based on such conditions, would be open to an insurer. If that was what the Legislature intended, then there was nothing to prevent it from expressing its intention. What the Legislature has done is to enumerate in sub-S. (2) the defences available to an insurer and to provide by sub-S. (6) that he cannot avoid his liability excepting by means of such defences. In order that sub-S. (2) may be interpreted in the way the learned Solicitor-General concedes this and say that the only word that has to be added is the word also after the word grounds. But ever this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do less the section as it sounds is meaningless or of doubtful meaning neither of which we think it is. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words used in the sub-Section.”

26. Reliance has also been placed upon somewhat similar observations as in the above judgment of the Supreme Court by a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in United Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P. Parvathamma. In that judgment it is observed;

“It is only under S. 110-C of the Act, that the insurer is permitted to raise all objections to the claim of the motor vehicle accident victim. But under S. 110-C of the Act, the insurer cannot and would not become a contesting party to the claim normally. The insurer would become entitled to implead himself as a party-respondent and oppose the claim only where the Accident Claims Tribunal was satisfied that there was collusion between the claimant and the person against whom the claim was made or the person against whom the claim had been made had failed to contest the claim. In the absence of collusion between the claimant and the insured and negligence or indifference on the part of the insured in contesting the claim, the insurer cannot implead himself as a party. It follows from the above that the claimant is under no obligation to make on his own the insurer a party-respondent to his claim and it is wholly for the insurer to implead himself as a party-respondent either under S. 110-C of the Act or under S. 96(2) of the Act. If the insurer impleads himself under S. 110-C of the Act, it would be open to the insurer to raise all objections to the granting of the claim which would have been raised by the insured. But, as in this case, as there was no finding by the Accident Claims Tribunal that the insured was colluding with the claimant or that there was any negligence or indifference on the part of the insured and the insurer was impleaded from the commencement of the proceedings the Insurance Company cannot avail itself of the provisions of S. 110-C of the Act. The only other action of which it can take benefit of is S. 96(2) of the Act. As we have already noted that under S. 96(2) of the Act, it is not open to the insurance company to oppose the claim on all and every ground, it can only raise such of those objections which are enumerated in S. 96(2)(a)(b) and (c) of the Act. The question then arises whether the present argument of the insurer falls under S. 96 of the Act. In this case, the argument of the Insurance Company is that the Accident Claims Tribunal ought not to have saddled the Insurance Company with any liability exceeding Rs. 3,000/- fixed by S. 95(2)(4) of the Act, But the question is whether this argument is open for the Insurance company to be raised. …..”

27. The observation in the judgment of the Supreme Court, which evidently is a statement of law, is binding on all concerned. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, also appears to be sound, salutary and convincing. However, they do not appear to cover the whole field particularly the type of the case with which we are dealing. It is one thing to say as to what defence is available to the insurer and quite another as to whether any person including the owner of the vehicle can saddle the insurer with something beyond its liability. The statute has fixed a limit. The insurer is obliged to act as provided thereunder. If something more than the law is said and done, the insurer can always say that anything beyond the law shall not bind it. Here is a case in which the Tribunal has recognised the statutory limitation and fixed the liability of the insurer strictly in accordance with law. The owner of the vehicle has appealed and suggested that it is not his but that of the insurer's liability because the victim was a third party and not a passenger. How then the insurer can now say that the victim was not a third party and that he was a passenger. It is a case quite distinguishable on facts and in such cases, in our opinion, the argument that the insurer can raise no defence other than the defence made available to it under S. 96(2) of the 1939 Act cannot be accepted.

28. The third and the last argument to which we have already made a reference is developed on the basis of a Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Srinivasulu Sastry v. C. Govardana Naidu and a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shantabai S. Chume. In the latter case, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court has taken the view that S. 92-A introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amending Act 47 of 1982 which came into force with effect from 1.10.1982 was retrospective in operation. The same view has been expressed in the judgment of the former case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in these words:

“Applying the ratio of the aforementioned Supreme Court case, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that S. 92-A of the Motors Vehicles Act applies even to pending proceedings. This provision is a social welfare legislation and dispenses with the proof of negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle and imposes no fault liability. We accordingly hold that all actions for compensation pending on the day when the provision came into force are governed by this provision irrespective of the fact whether the accident took place prior or subsequent thereto. Since the law dispenses with the proof of negligence, it can be done in any pending proceeding irrespective of the date of accident. The words the owner or the owners of the vehicles shall jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation occurring in S. 92A (1) and the words claimants shall not be required to plead and establish that the death of permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner “are prospective and shall apply to pending and future claims.”

29. On the strength of these observations, it is suggested before us that the Insurer's liability should be fixed in accordance with the provisions in Chapters X and XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which Act has repealed 1939 Act and has come into force during the pendency of the appeal. Chapter X of 1988 Act deals with liability without fault in certain cases. It fixes the responsibility on the principle of no fault liability upon the owner of the vehicle in the case of death (S. 140) and in the case of permanent disability (S. 141 and 142). Chapter XI however deals with the provisions similar to the provisions in Chapter VIII of the 1939 Act. S. 147 deals with the requirements of Policies and limits of liability and says in S. 147(1) as follows:

In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which —

(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer and

(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in sub-S. (2) the policy to the extent specified in

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger or of a public service vehicles caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicles in a public place:

(iii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place;

Provided that a policy shall not be required.

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the Course of his employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of or bodily injury to, any such employee

(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or

(ii) to cover any contractual liability.

Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the Act or omission which led to the accident occurred is a public place.”

Sub-S. (2) thereof, however, fixes the limit of the liability of he insurer in certain cases. Unlike, however S. 95(2) of the 1939 Act wherein there is mention of a limit as to insurer's liability for each individual passenger, etc. there is no provision in the new Act imposing any such limitation. It, however, must be borne in mind that sub-S. (2) of S. 147 of the new Act is controlled by sub-S. (1) thereof. It will be thus for the insured to see that there is a policy insuring against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle or against any liability which may be incurred in other cases. A public service vehicle cannot be confused with any State owned operation. It has a definite connotations under the Act and that can be gathered from the definition, S. 2(35) has defined public service vehicle to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a maxi-cab a motor cub, contract carriage and stage carriage.

30. In view of the above, it is not possible to find any change introduced by the new law that would destroy what actually accrued as a right to the claimants and or the insurer or in the same view to find any such right accruding to the owner of the vehicle which can enter into claim arising under 1939 Act.

31. This apart, the cases of claims arising under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 have to be viewed in the light of S. 217 of he 1988 Act, which provides as follows:

“Repeal and savings: (1) The Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (4) of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-S. (1) of the repeated enactments.

(a) any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued, or any appointments or declaration made or exemption granted, or any confiscsion made, or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done, or any other action taken under the repealed enactments, and in force immediately before such enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been issued made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act.

(b) Any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have effect after such commencements under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed.

(c) any document referring to any of the repealed enactments or the provisions thereof, shall be construed on referring to this Act or to the corresponding provision of this Act;

(d) the assignment of distinguishing marks by the registering authority and the manner of display on Motor Vehicles in accordance with the provisions of the repealed enactments shall, enter the commencement of this Act, continue to remain in force until a Notification under sub-S. (6) of S. 41 of this Act is issued.

(e) any scheme made under S. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of S. 100 of this Act.

(f) the permits issued under sub-S. (1-A) of S. 62-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), or under the corresponding provisions, if any, in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to remain in force until the approved scheme under Chapter VI of this Act is published.

(3) Any penalty payable under any of the repealed enactments may be recovered in the manner provided by or under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such penalty under the repealed enactments.

4. The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897). with regard to the effect of repeals.”

The mention in sub-S. (4) of S. 217 of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act ‘1897 shall automatically make such claims subject to the principles that are generally recognised under the said provision. S. 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows:

Effect of repeal: When this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactments hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered under or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability required, accrued under any enactment so repealed or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

32. A welfare or beneficial legislation, which will only introduce certain procedural provisions without affecting any right, privilege, obligation, or liability penalty, forfeiture or punishment as indicated in this provision undoubtedly will be welcome and applied in a pending proceeding not however when a right, privilege, obligation or liability is likely to be altered.

33. For the reasons as above, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge does not suffer from any of the infirmities pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. We, however, classify and emphasise that the rule as to whether a certain person is a passenger or not has to be carefully applied in every case.

34. It is represented on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant that a sum of Rs. 32,610/- has already been deposited towards compensation and the balance amount with interest alone remain to be payable to the claimants. After giving credit to the said sum, the claimants are entitled to recover the balance amount of compensation with interest as per the award of the Tribunal.

35. In the result, appeal is dismissed. No costs.

KA/VCS