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Engineers Syndicate v. State Of Bihar And Others
Supreme Court of India – Case Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant entered into Agreement No. 58F-2 of 1980-81 with Respondent 2 (acting on behalf of Respondent 1) for construction of “C-type” six-block quarters at Sherpur Colony, Gandak Project, Muzaffarpur, for Rs 19,02,428.21. Disputes arose, prompting the appellant to invoke the arbitration clause before the Court of the First Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur. On 2 April 1988 that court appointed Respondent 4 as arbitrator, and the appellant claimed Rs 15,77,073.
On 4 July 1988 the arbitrator issued a non-speaking, consolidated award of Rs 8,53,837 plus interest at 12% p.a. in favour of the appellant. The respondents challenged the award. The Subordinate Judge set it aside on the ground that it was non-speaking and failed to address claims item-wise; the High Court affirmed that decision on 30 September 2004. The appellant then sought and obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a non-speaking arbitral award under the Arbitration Act, 1940 can be set aside solely because it does not state reasons.
- Whether the courts below exceeded their jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 1940 Act by reassessing the arbitrator’s view of the evidence and nullifying the award.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Under Section 30 the power to set aside an award is confined to errors of law apparent on the face of the record; courts cannot probe the arbitrator’s undisclosed reasoning.
- Cited Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors (1989) 2 SCC 721, which forbids courts from annulling a non-speaking award merely because it is unreasoned.
- Relied on Rajendra Construction Co. v. MHADA (2005) 6 SCC 678 to reinforce that non-speaking awards under the old Act cannot be disturbed for absence of reasons.
Respondents' Arguments
- Invoked Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction (2003) 8 SCC 154, arguing that failure to consider contract clauses and material evidence constitutes misdirection in law.
- Supported the High Court’s view that the award was defective for not dealing with claims item-wise and for being non-speaking.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors, (1989) 2 SCC 721 | Courts cannot set aside a non-speaking award merely for lack of reasons; intervention is limited by Section 30. | Followed; formed the primary basis for restoring the award. |
| Rajendra Construction Co. v. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority, (2005) 6 SCC 678 | Non-speaking awards under the 1940 Act are not liable to be annulled for not furnishing reasons. | Used to fortify the appellant’s reliance on the Chokhamal principle. |
| Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction, (2003) 8 SCC 154 | An award ignoring contractual clauses and essential evidence is a misdirection in law. | Distinguished; Court held the present case deals with a silent award, not one ignoring relevant material. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated the narrow confines of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Emphasising the authority of Chokhamal Contractors, the Court held:
- An arbitrator is the parties’ chosen tribunal; courts cannot speculate on his reasoning when the award is non-speaking.
- Absence of reasons, by itself, does not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record unless the contract or statute mandates a reasoned award.
- The Subordinate Judge and the High Court erred in re-evaluating the merits and setting aside the award for being non-speaking and not itemising claims.
- Bharat Coking Coal was inapposite because that decision concerned an award that ignored material contract clauses, unlike the present case.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed – the award dated 4 July 1988 is restored and made rule of the court; orders of the Subordinate Judge and High Court are set aside; no order as to costs.
Immediate consequence: the appellant is entitled to Rs 8,53,837 with 12% interest p.a. until realisation. Broader implication: the judgment reaffirms the limited judicial interference with non-speaking awards under the 1940 Act, without creating new precedent.
Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J.— Leave granted.
2. The case on hand arose under the Arbitration Act, 1940.
3. This appeal is directed against the final judgment dated 30-9-2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in CR No. 2035 of 2001.
4. The short facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as under:
The appellant made Agreement No. 58F-2 of 1980-81 with Respondent 2 acting on behalf of Respondent 1 for the construction of ‘C’ type six blocks quarters at Sherpur Colony, Gandak Project, Muzaffarpur for the total consideration of an amount of Rs 19,02,428.21. Since there was dispute between the parties, the appellant had to resort to the Court of Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur to invoke the arbitration clause of the aforesaid agreement. The First Subordinate Judge vide its order dated 2-4-1988 in Misc. Case No. 5 of 1986 appointed Respondent 4 as an arbitrator to arbitrate and adjudicate the dispute and to pass the award. The appellant laid the total claim of Rs 15,77,073 before the arbitrator.
5. The arbitrator made the award on 4-7-1988 in favour of the appellant for Rs 8,53,837 only as consolidated and lump sum amount for all claims of the appellant and against the respondents along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum till the date of realisation.
6. The High Court on 30-9-2004, affirmed the award passed by the Subordinate Judge and rejected the appeal filed by the respondents against which the respondent preferred an appeal in this Court. This Court vide its order dated 16-8-1996, directed the learned Subordinate Judge to dispose of the objection of the State (the respondent herein) on merits. Pursuant to this order, the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the impugned order on the ground that the award was non-speaking and the award failed to refer the claim itemwise and objection of the respondents. The High Court affirmed the impugned judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. Aggrieved against the said order, the appellant has come before this Court by way of a special leave petition.
7. We have heard Mr U.U Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr Nishakant Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents. Mr Lalit, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge as affirmed by the High Court is not correct and that the award can be set aside on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the record under Section 30 of the Act but it qualified the above legal position that the Court while dealing with the application for setting aside an award has no power to consider whether the view of the arbitrator on the evidence was justified.
8. In support of the said contention, the learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors (1989) 2 SCC 721 (five-Judge Bench). The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to some of the judgments referred to in the said judgment and in particular paras 14, 16, 17, 19 and 38 also. This Court, in the above judgment has categorically held that it was not open to the High Court to speculate where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. The Court declined to recognise the power of the Court to attempt to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator had reached his conclusion where it was not disclosed by the terms of his award. It is also further observed in the said judgment that the Court in dealing with an application to set aside an award has not to consider whether the view of the arbitrator on the evidence is justified and that the arbitrator's adjudication is generally considered binding between the parties, for he is a tribunal selected by the parties and the power of the Court to set aside the award is restricted to cases set out in Section 30. It is also further observed that it is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. This Court in para 19 of the above judgment has also observed as under:
“19. It is now well settled that an award can neither be remitted nor set aside merely on the ground that it does not contain reasons in support of the conclusion or decisions reached in it except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission requires him to give reasons. The arbitrator or umpire is under no obligation to give reasons in support of the decision reached by him unless under the arbitration agreement or in the deed of submission he is required to give such reasons and if the arbitrator or umpire chooses to give reasons in support of his decision it is open to the court to set aside the award if it finds that an error of law has been committed by the arbitrator or umpire on the face of the record on going through such reasons. The arbitrator or umpire shall have to give reasons also where the court has directed in any order such as the one made under Section 20 or Section 21 or Section 34 of the Act that reasons should be given or where the statute which governs an arbitration requires him to do so.”
9. The learned Senior Counsel then relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rajendra Construction Co. v. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority (2005) 6 SCC 678 in which similar question arose for consideration by this Court. In the said case, the High Court concluded that the awards were vitiated under Section 30 of the Act and observed that the view taken by the sole arbitrator which has been made rule of the court by the trial court is unsustainable on the ground that it suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record and the sole arbitrator misdirected the proceedings, inasmuch as, he was required to adjudicate upon the issues framed by the trial court and give reasons therefor in respect of the claims allowed by him. The said observation made by the High Court was not countenanced by this Court as could be seen from para 23 of the said judgment at p. 687. This Court also observed that the present awards are not under the new Act but under the old Act and it is, therefore, obvious that they could not have been set aside by the High Court on the ground that they were not supported by reasons and were non-speaking awards.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents placed his reliance on a judgment in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction (2003) 8 SCC 154. This judgment was rendered on 29-8-2003 by a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of this Court. Before the Bench, the judgment reported in Chokhamal case (1989) 2 SCC 721 was also cited. However, the Court has not followed the said principle laid down in Chokhamal case (1989) 2 SCC 721 on the ground that the case on hand reported in Bharat Coking case (2003) 8 SCC 154 stands on a different footing, namely, that the arbitrator while passing the award in relation to some in terms failed and/or neglected to take into consideration the relevant clauses of the contract, nor did he take into consideration the relevant materials for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding and that such an order would amount to misdirection in law. The said question was not involved in the present case. The judgment reported in Bharat Coking case (2003) 8 SCC 154 is not a case of silent or non-speaking award. Following the principles laid down in Chokhamal case (1989) 2 SCC 721 we allow the appeal filed by the appellant herein and set aside the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and as affirmed by the High Court. In the result, the award passed by the arbitrator dated 4-7-1988 is restored and the appellant will be entitled to the amount awarded by the said award. The award of the arbitrator dated 4-7-1988 is made a rule of the court.
11. No costs.
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