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Pramod Kumar v. Illrd Additional District Judge,Meerut & Ors
Summary of Judicial Opinion (Sudhir Narain, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash two orders: the judgment and decree dated 24.4.1995 of the Judge, Small Causes Court decreeing Suit No. 152 of 1992 (for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages) and the order dated 11.1.1996 of respondent No. 1 dismissing the petitioner's revision against that decree.
The core factual matrix as stated in the opinion:
- Respondent No. 3 is the landlord of Shop No. 2 in Capt. Mangal Singh Market, Daurala, District Meerut; the petitioner is the tenant.
- Respondent No. 3 filed Suit No. 152 of 1992 on 30.5.1992 alleging that the shop was let to the petitioner at Rs. 400 per month and that a rent-note was executed on 11.6.1991. The plaint pleaded default in payment of rent.
- The petitioner in his written statement said the shop was constructed in June 1991, alleged he had paid Rs. 8,000 as advance/security, and contended that the agreed rent was Rs. 100 per month (asserting that documents showed Rs. 400 only for income-tax purposes). He denied refusing service of a notice.
- The trial court held that the rent was Rs. 400 per month, found the petitioner had not paid rent for March and April 1992, recorded that a notice had been served by refusal, and decreed the suit for ejectment, pendent and future damages, and recovery of rent (with directions to adjust the Rs. 8,000 security towards rents and damages).
- The petitioner’s revision was dismissed by respondent No. 1 on 11.1.1996, and the petitioner challenged these orders by filing the present writ petition, which the High Court ultimately dismissed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the courts below were correct in finding that the agreed rent was Rs. 400 per month (despite the petitioner’s contention that the true agreed rent was Rs. 100 per month and that documents were manipulated for income‑tax purposes).
- Whether the Rs. 8,000 security/deposit paid by the petitioner should be adjusted towards rent and damages (and whether the trial court correctly directed adjustment).
- Whether the notice said to have been sent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was validly served — specifically, whether the presumption of service under Section 114 of the Evidence Act was rebutted by the petitioner’s denial and whether the postman needed to be produced.
- Whether the tenancy, being said to be for eleven months under the agreement, had expired by efflux of time such that service of a notice under Section 106 was unnecessary and the suit could not have been prematurely filed.
- Whether the tenancy could be terminated by forfeiture on the ground of breach of conditions specified in the rent-note (i.e., whether a clause of re-entry/forfeiture existed or whether termination had to be effected under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The finding that rent was Rs. 400 per month was erroneous; the true agreement and parties' arrangement had the rent at Rs. 100 per month and the Rs. 400 figure was used only for income‑tax purposes.
- The petitioner had paid Rs. 8,000 as advance/security which should be adjusted against any rent or damages claimed.
- The notice purportedly sent on 31.3.1992 under Section 106 (and alleged to have been refused on 3.4.1992) was never received by the petitioner; his denial of receipt/rejection ought to rebut the presumption of service under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and the plaintiff should have produced the postman.
- The tenancy was for a definite period of eleven months under clause 5 of the agreement; therefore the suit could not have been filed prior to expiry of eleven months and service under Section 106 would be unnecessary if the lease expired by efflux of time.
- Unless the petitioner had violated express conditions of the rent-note, eviction by forfeiture could not be sustained; there was no clause of re-entry in the agreement.
Respondent/Plaintiff's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)
- The rent-note executed on 11.6.1991 and the rent receipts consistently supported that the rent was Rs. 400 per month; the petitioner did not deny his signatures on the documents and had himself pleaded knowledge of the agreement showing Rs. 400 p.m.
- The plaintiff admitted receipt of Rs. 8,000 as security, and the trial court had directed adjustment of that security towards rent and damages in its decree.
- The notice terminating tenancy dated 31.3.1992 was sent to the petitioner at his correct address and was endorsed as refused by the postman; the trial court found that the petitioner had refused to accept the notice.
- The tenancy was of a monthly character (monthly rent), and clause 5 did not convert the arrangement into a fixed-term lease preventing suit prior to expiry; the tenancy continued to be monthly in nature.
- There was no clause of re-entry in the rent-note, so termination by forfeiture was not the mechanism used; the plaintiff proceeded under Section 106 to terminate tenancy.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as stated in opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phoolan Devi, AIR 1970 Allahabad 446 | Whether plaintiff must produce the postman when defendant denies service of registered-post notice; Full Bench held it was not necessary to produce the postman or other evidence. | The court referred to this Full Bench decision to show that production of the postman is not invariably required where service by refusal is alleged. |
| Taley Ram v. Jagminder Das, 1972 All India Rent Control Journal 640 | Held that a postman's report could not be accepted without examining the postman; presumption of service is slight if postman not examined. | The petitioner relied on this authority; the opinion notes the decision but treats the matter as ultimately one depending on facts and later authorities. |
| Md. Achab AH v. Md. Abdul Matilib Majarbhuiya, 1993 (Vol. 2) Current Civil Cases 230 (Gauhati HC) | Where defendant's statement is found trustworthy, the postal peon's evidence alone may not be sufficient to displace that statement. | The petitioner relied on this case; the court observed it was decided on its own facts but considered it in the broader factual inquiry. |
| Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, AIR 1990 SC 1215 | There is no hard-and-fast rule; whether unchallenged testimony of tenant suffices to rebut presumption of service is a question of fact; reliability of tenant's testimony is material. | The court treated this Supreme Court decision as settling the controversy about whether mere denial by the tenant rebuts the presumption; applied the fact-sensitive standard enunciated therein. |
| Shiva Dutt Singh v. Ram Das, AIR 1980 Allahabad 280; Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battu Mai, AIR 1976 Delhi 115 | Earlier authorities that had held the tenant's bare denial could rebut presumption (noted as positions reconsidered by later Supreme Court authority). | The court noted that the view taken in these earlier decisions was over-ruled/qualified by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar. |
| Radhey Shyam Patwa v. Xth A.D.J. Varanasi and others, 1993 (2) A.R.C. 485 | Held that mere denial by tenant is not in itself sufficient to rebut presumption of service; depends on facts; not necessary to produce the postman. | The court cited this authority to support the position that denial alone does not automatically rebut the presumption and that trial courts' findings on service are questions of fact. |
| Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1550 | Where a lease is for a definite term it expires by efflux of time by reason of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act; service under Section 106 is not necessary for determination by efflux of time. | The petitioner relied on this decision to argue that an eleven-month term would have expired by efflux of time, making service unnecessary; the court applied the principle to conclude the petitioner could not complain since the suit was filed after eleven months had expired. |
| Hari Prasad Tamoli v. Smt. Indira Devi, A.I.R. 1977 Patna 208 | Held that non-payment of rent does not entail forfeiture unless the agreement contains a clause providing for re-entry in default of payment of rent. | The court relied on this principle to hold that in absence of a re-entry clause a tenancy cannot be terminated by forfeiture; plaintiff had to proceed under Section 106. |
| Raja Sri Krishna Chandra ... v. M/s National Chemical and Salt Works Ltd., AIR 1957 Orissa 35 | Similar view that forfeiture clauses apply only where the agreement provides for re-entry; without such a clause forfeiture is not available. | The court cited this authority to reinforce that there was no clause of re-entry in the rent-note and therefore the tenancy could not be terminated by forfeiture. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded by addressing each major contention raised by the petitioner and applying factual findings and legal principles drawn from precedent and statute as recorded in the opinion:
- Rent amount: The court examined the rent-note dated 11.6.1991 and rent receipts (July–September 1991 showing Rs. 400 p.m., some receipts showing Rs. 340 for certain months, and others showing Rs. 400). The petitioner had not denied his signature on the documents in the trial court and had pleaded in his written statement that the photostat copy of the agreement showed Rs. 400 p.m. The courts below relied on the rent-note coupled with the rent receipts to find the rent to be Rs. 400 per month. The High Court found no illegality in that factual finding.
- Security deposit of Rs. 8,000: The rent-note acknowledged a security deposit of Rs. 8,000. The trial court's decree expressly directed that the Rs. 8,000 be adjusted towards rent and pendent/future damages. Given that direction in the operative part of the decree, the petitioner's submission that adjustment was required was found to have been disposed of by the trial court’s order.
- Applicability of U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972: The question of applicability turned on the construction date of the shop. The record included conflicting assertions (plaintiff said 1989–90; petitioner said 1991). The court observed that the suit was filed within ten years of construction as per the plaintiff's pleadings and that it was not the petitioner's case that the Act applied. The High Court accepted that the Act was not applicable.
- Service of notice under Section 106 and presumption under Section 114: The court reviewed relevant authorities. It noted Full Bench and High Court decisions (Ganga Ram, Taley Ram, Md. Achab, Radhey Shyam Patwa) on whether production of the postman is required and on whether a bare denial by the tenant rebuts the presumption of service. The Supreme Court decision in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma was treated as settling that no absolute rule applies; whether denial rebuts the presumption is a question of fact and depends on the reliability of the tenant's testimony. On the facts, the court found that the notice was sent to the correct address, the petitioner admitted the postman was not inimical, and the courts below had considered the totality of evidence and recorded that the petitioner refused to accept the notice. The High Court saw no reason to disturb that factual finding.
- Eleven-month clause and character of tenancy: The agreement contained clause 5 stating it was valid for eleven months and could be renewed. The court observed that the agreement did not convert the arrangement into a fixed-term lease; the tenancy remained monthly in character. The suit was filed after eleven months, and therefore the petitioner could not contend that the suit was premature or that he was unfairly evicted on that ground.
- Forfeiture and conditions in the rent-note: The rent-note contained conditions (exclusive use for TV sales/repairs, no subletting, proprietorship, annual increase of Rs. 25). The petitioner argued eviction could be only upon breach of such conditions invoking Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act (forfeiture). The court found no clause of re-entry nor a stipulation that the lease is determinable only upon breach; the agreement was not perpetual and was not registered as a perpetual lease. Citing authorities (Hari Prasad Tamoli and the Orissa decision), the court held that in absence of a re-entry clause, non-payment/other breach would not automatically entail forfeiture and that the plaintiff's course was to terminate tenancy under Section 106 (which he did).
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The writ petition was dismissed. The court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions and upheld the findings and orders of the courts below (the decree dated 24.4.1995 and the revision dismissal dated 11.1.1996).
Implications:
- The trial court's factual findings that the agreed rent was Rs. 400 per month and that the petitioner refused to accept service of the notice were not disturbed.
- The trial court's direction to adjust the Rs. 8,000 security towards rent and pendent/future damages stands as part of the operative decree.
- The High Court concluded that the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was not applicable on the record before it.
- The court applied established principles (including the Supreme Court’s Anil Kumar decision) that whether a tenant's denial rebuts the presumption of service under Section 114 is fact-specific; no new legal precedent was announced by this opinion and the decision is confined to the facts and legal authorities cited.
Petition dismissed.
Sudhir Narain, J. - The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 24.4.1995 passed by the Judge Small Causes Court, decreeing the suit for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages against the petitioner, and the order dated 11.1.1996, passed by respondent No. 1 dismissing the revision of the petitioner against aforesaid order.
2. Facts of the case in brief are that respondent No. 3 is landlord of Shop No. 2 situated in Capt. Mangal Singh Market, Sardhana Road, Daurala, District Meerut Petitioner is its tenant.
3. Respondent No. 3 tiled suit No. 152 of 1992 for recovery of rent, ejectment and damages against the petitioner on 30th May, 1992 on the allegation that the shop in question was let out to the petitioner at monthly rent of Rs. 400/- and a rent-note to this effect was executed on 11-6-1991. It was constructed in the year 1989-90, and the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are not applicable. The defendant- petitioner failed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 60 per month from the month of July 1991 to September, 1991 and from October 1991, at the rate of Rs. 400 per month. He sent a notice demanding the arrears of rent and terminating his tenancy on 31- 3-1992. He refused to accept it on 3-4-1992.
4. Petitioner filed written statement. He stated that the shop in question was constructed in June, 1991. It was alleged that he had paid Rs. 8000/- to the plaintiff as advance, and the rent was settled at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. Plaintiff had obtained his signature on two stamps of Rs. 10/- each and retained original of it and handed over Photostat copy of those documents. In the documents, the rate of rent was mentioned at the rate of Rs. 400/- p.m. When he came to know of it, he protested and the plaintiff explained thereupon that this had been done for the purpose of income-tax and the defendant- petitioner would have to pay at the rate of Rs. 100/-per month. He had paid entire rent and was entitled to adjustment of Rs. 8000/- which he had paid in advance. He denied that any notice was refused by him. The Judge Small Cause Court held that the rent was Rs. 400/- per month. Petitioner had not paid rent for the month of March and April 1992. Notice was served on him by refusal The suit was decreed for ejectment, pendent elite and future damages, for recovery of rent for the month of March, 1992 to 3.5.1992 at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month.
5. The petitioner filed revision against said order. Respondent No. 1 has dismissed the revision by order dated 11.1.1996. Petitioner has challenged these orders in the instant writ petition. 6, Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding recorded by the Courts below that the rent was at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month is erroneous. A copy of the rent-note has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition which indicates that rate of rent is Rs. 400/- per month. The petitioner in his statement did not deny his signature on these documents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention that there is no signature on the first page and only second page of the document bears petitioner's signature. This question was not raised before the Court below. The first page is the continuation of the second page. Petitioner himself in his written statement pleaded in para 12 thereof that the photostat copy of the agreement dated 11.6.1991 was supplied to the petitioner in which rate of rent was shown at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. He protested to the plaintiff. He, however, state that rate of rent was indicated for the income-tax purposes. The petitioner filed document which itself indicated that the rent receipt was at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. The rent receipt for the month of July, August and September 1991 is at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. The rent receipt for the month of October, November and December, 1991, is shown to be at the rate of Rs. 340/- and again for the month February 1992 at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. It is not the case of the petitioner that the rate of rent was Rs. 340/- per month. The plaintiff in his examination clarified that the petitioner had incurred amount in repairing roof. The case of the petitioner was that rate of rent was Rs. 100/- per month. The Courts below relying upon the rent-note coupled with rent receipts, held that the rent was Rs. 400/- per month. This finding does not suffer from any illegality.
7. Second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had paid Rs. 8000/- as advance and that should have been adjusted. The rent-note date 11.6.1991 itself indicates that the tenant has given security deposit of Rs. 8000/- which shall be returned when the shop is vacated. The plaintiff admitted that he had received Rs. 8000/- as security. The trial Court has in its operative portion of the decree, directed that Rs. 8000/-deposited by the petitioner, shall be adjusted towards rent. In view of the operative part of the decree, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that amount is to be adjusted does not survive. It has already been directed to be adjusted. The Court has recorded finding that the petitioner failed to pay rent for the month of March and April, 1992. The suit has been decreed for recovery of rent for the month of March, 1992 to 8.5.1992 and pendent late future damages at the rate of Rs. 400/-. The amount of Rs. 8000/- shall be adjusted towards rent and pendent late future damages.
8. It is not disputed that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1991. Petitioner, himself, stated in para 3 of the written statement that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1991. The plaintiff asserted that it was constructed in the year 1989-90. The suit was filed on 30-5-1992 before ten years from the date of construction as such the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, was not applicable. It is also not the case of the petitioner that this Act was applicable to the shop in question.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner never received any notice alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff-respondent No. 31-3-1992 purported to be sent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice was alleged to have been refused by the petitioner on 3-4-1992 which contained the endorsement of refusal by the postman. The petitioner appeared in the witness box and denied that he, ever refused to accept such notice. It is contended that presumption of service raised under the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act stood rebutted on the denial of service by the petitioner and the plaintiff ought to have produced the postman and in absence of examination of the postman concerned, the Court below acted illegally in holding that the presumption was not rebutted by the petitioner.
10. In Full Bench decision of this Court in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phoolan Devi, AIR 1970 Allahabad 446, one of the question referred to the Full Bench was "whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by the registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him." The Full Bench after considering the various decision answered it in negative and held the* it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision in Taley Ram v. Jagminder Das, 1972 All India Rent Control Journal 640, wherein it was hold that a report of postman could not be accepted without the examination of the postman concerned, regarding the correctness of his report. There is admittedly a presumption of service but the same can be rebutted by evidence, but if the postman is not examined in Court, the presumption is very slight. In this case, the Tribunal had recorded a finding that the notice was not served upon the defendant after taking into consideration various circumstances. This finding was affirmed by the High Court.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon the decision of Gauhati High Court in Md. Achab AH v. Md. Abdul Matilib Majarbhuiya 1993 (Vol. 2) Current Civil Cases 230, wherein it was held that if the statement of defendant/addressee is found trustworthy, then merely because the postal peon came and deposed, is itself not sufficient to hold that statement of defendant is not trustworthy. This case was decided on its own facts.
13. The controversy was settled by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court inAnil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, AIR 1990 SC 1215, wherein the view taken in Shiva Dutt Singh v. Ram Das, AIR 1980 Allahabad 280 and the decision of Delhi High Court in AIR 1976 Delhi 115 Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battu Mai, that the bare statement of the tenant was sufficient to rebut presumption was over-ruled. It was held that there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. The Court observed "In our opinion there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. Unchallenged testimony of tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case, whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge in tail burden."
14. In Radhey Shyam Patwa v. Xth A.D.J. Varanasi and others, 1993(2) A.R.C. 485, the Court after considering the various decisions held that mere fact that the tenant has denied that he ever refused to receive the notice is itself not sufficient to hold that the presumption stands rebutted. It depends upon the facts of each case. If the Courts below record the finding that notice was served by refusal it is question of fact. It was also not necessary to produce the postman for examination to establish that the tenant had refused to accept the notice.
15. In the present case, admittedly the provisions of the Act No. XIII of 1972 were not applicable. The suit has not been filed on the ground that the petitioner committed default in payment of of arrears of rent or any conditions existed for his eviction under the provisions of the Act. In case the tenancy is determined in accordance with law he was liable for eviction. It was proved that the notice was sent to the petitioner on his correct address. The petitioner admitted that the postman was not inimical to him.
16. The Courts below considered the entire facts and recorded finding that the petitioner refused to accept notice and there is no reason to take different view in the matter.
17. The petitioner has urged two other points which were neither taken in the written statement nor urged before the Courts below.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that tenancy was for a period of 11 months and the suit could not have been filed prior to expiry of 11 months. He placed reliance upon clause 5 of the Agreement which reads as under: - - "The present agreement is valid for eleven months only, the agreement will be renewed after eleven months, if the tenant wishes to retain the shop provided the owner is willing to let him again."
19. The agreement is dated 11 th June, 1991. The notice terminating the tenancy was given on 31-3-1992. It is alleged to have been served by refusal on 3-5-1992 and the tenancy accordingly stood terminated on 3-5-1992. Plaintiff filed suit on 3-5-1992.
20. The plaintiff in para 2 of the plaint had stated that the tenancy was monthly tenancy which commenced from 1st of each month and terminated on the last date of the same month accordingly. The petitioner filed written statement and did not specifically deny this fact. The rent was admittedly payable monthly. The fact that the agreement was to come to end eleventh month did not provide that the tenancy was for fixed term. The tenancy was a monthly tenancy but after expiry of eleven months, the petitioner was not entitled to continue unless the tenancy was renewed. The character of the tenancy continued to be monthly tenancy.
21. Secondly, the petitioner could claim to remain in occupation for eleven months only. The suit for ejectment has been filed on 30th May, 1992 i.e. after 11 months. The petitioner cannot have grievance that 11 months have not expired. The suit has been decreed for ejectment on 24th May, 1995.
22. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision in Smt Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee , A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1550, wherein it was held that where a lease is for a definite term it expires by efflux of time by reason of Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, service of a notice under Section 106 is not necessary for determination of lease. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then after expiry of 11 months, he was not required to be served with any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and suit could have been decreed for ejectment even without service of notice upon him. The petitioner cannot have any grievance from his eviction as 11 months have already expired.
23. Last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the rent-note provided certain conditions to be complied which are as under: (1) The shop has been rented exclusively for the purpose of Sales and Repairs of Television Sets. (2) The shop will not be sublet to anyone. (3) The business shall be in the proprietorship of the tenant, no partnership all be permitted. (4) There will be an increase of Rs. 25/- in the rent every year on a monthly basise the rent shall increase by Rs. 25/- a month every year. The increase will continue every year till the tenant vacates the shop on the renewal of the lease.
24. It is urged that unless the petitioner violates any of these conditions, he is not liable to be evicted. He has placed reliance upon Section lll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that any lease of immovable property is determined by forfeiture i.e. to say (i) in case lease breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof, the lesser may re-enter. The termination of tenancy by forfeiture as provided under Section lll(g) applies only when lease is of a perpetual nature and secondly the terms of the lease contrition provide that the tenancy can be determined only on the breach of such condition.
25. In the present case, a bare perusal of rent-note does not provide for either of them. There is no stipulation in the agreement that lease is determinable only when the conditions are violated and secondly it is not a permanent lease. The agreement itself indicates that it is only for 11 months and secondly for a perpetual lease document should have been registered. It is only a rent-note and not a registered document.
26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in Hari Prasad Tamoli v. Smt. Indira Devi, A.I.R. 1977 Patna 208, wherein it was held that unless there is a clause of re-entry in default of payment of rent, non-payment of rent will not entail forfeiture. The agreement must provide that clause for re-entry. Similar view expressed Raja Sri Krishna Chandra Manasingh Harichandan Mar-daraj Dhramarbar Roy and another v. M/s National Chemical and Salt Works Limited (India), Calcutta, AIR 1957 Orissa 35. According to this case, a clause of forfeiture applies only when there is provision of re-entry in the agreement. If there is no condition of re-entry a forfeiture clause is not applicable. Admittedly there is no clause of re-entry provided in the agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No. 3, the tenancy could not have been terminated by forfeiture. The only course for the plaintiff was to terminate the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff has not terminated the tenancy by forfeiture.
27. In view of the discussion made above, there is no merit in the writ petition and it is, accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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